nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2018‒09‒17
nine papers chosen by
Patrick Kampkötter
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

  1. Job Tasks and the Gender Wage Gap among College Graduates By Todd Stinebrickner; Ralph Stinebrickner; Paul Sullivan
  2. Align your Job with You: The Effects of a Job Crafting Intervention on Work Engagement By Evy Kuijpers; Dorien de Kooij; Marianne van Woerkom
  3. Dynamic Compensation under Uncertainty Shocks and Limited Commitment By Felix Feng
  4. The Determinants of Faculty Pay in Russian Universities: Incentive Contracts By Ilya Prakhov; Victor Rudakov
  5. Manager Characteristics and Firm Performance By KODAMA Naomi; Huiyu LI
  6. Do Financial Incentives Crowd Out Intrinsic Motivation to Perform on Standardized Tests? By John List; Jeffrey Livingston; Susanne Neckermann
  7. Adjusting to Robots: Worker-Level Evidence By Dauth, Wolfgang; Findeisen, Sebastian; Suedekum, Jens; Woessner, Nicole
  8. How wage announcements affect job search - a field experiment By Belot, Michele; Kircher, Philipp; Muller, Paul
  9. You'll Never Walk Alone : The Effect of Moral Support on Performance By Colella, Fabrizio; Dalton, Patricio; Giusti, G.

  1. By: Todd Stinebrickner (Western University); Ralph Stinebrickner (University of Western Ontario); Paul Sullivan (American University)
    Abstract: Gender differences in current and past job tasks may be crucial for understanding the gender wage gap. We use novel task data to address well-known measurement concerns, including that standard task measures assume away within-occupation gender differences in tasks. We find that unique measures of task-specific experience, in particular high-skilled information experience, are of particular importance for understanding the substantial widening of the wage gap early in the career. Highlighting the importance of these measures, traditional work-related proxies for gender differences in human capital accumulation are not informative because general work experience is similar by gender for our recent graduates.
    Keywords: gender gap, gender wage differentials, human capital
    JEL: J16 J31 J62 J24
    Date: 2018–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hka:wpaper:2018-062&r=hrm
  2. By: Evy Kuijpers (Tilburg University); Dorien de Kooij (Tilburg University); Marianne van Woerkom (Tilburg University)
    Abstract: This study offered an experimental design in order to evaluate the effects of a practical hands-on intervention on job crafting. Additionally, we introduced three types of job crafting; crafting towards strengths, crafting towards interest, and developmental crafting. We hypothesized that participating in a job crafting intervention will lead to elevated levels of job crafting, which in turn will promote work engagement. Moreover, we state that the indirect effect of the intervention will be influenced by the workload of the employee. Results showed that all job crafting behaviors significantly enhanced work engagement. Furthermore, participating in the job crafting intervention increased interests crafting for workers with a high workload, which in turn lead to an increase in work engagement. Our findings suggest that the job crafting intervention can indeed be an effective tool for enhancing work engagement.
    Keywords: job crafting, job crafting intervention, work engagement, workload, field experiment.
    JEL: J20 J24 J29
    Date: 2018–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iacpro:6408655&r=hrm
  3. By: Felix Feng (University of Notre Dame)
    Abstract: This paper studies dynamic compensation and risk management when firms face cash flow volatility shock. Back-loaded compensation with a penalty upon the arrival of the shock is used to incentivize effort and prudence from managers. Thus, implications of the volatility shock depend critically on firms’ ability to commit to future compensa- tion: firms with full commitment power impose high pay-performance sensitivity and large penalties to implement low risk, and defer compensation more when volatility becomes higher. In contrast, firms with limited commitment ability optimally allow excessive risk-taking from managers in exchange for a low pay-performance sensitivity; they expedite compensation when volatility is higher because commitment to future payments becomes less feasible. These predictions shed light on empirical observations particularly the controversial compensation practices during the recent financial crisis.
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed018:159&r=hrm
  4. By: Ilya Prakhov (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Victor Rudakov (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
    Abstract: This paper evaluates the design of current contractual incentive mechanisms in Russian universities depending on the type of higher education institution after recent significant contractual reforms in the national academic sector. We employ the theoretical framework of incentive contracts in order to identify and assess performance measures of university faculty determining the total income received from teaching, research and administrative duties. We estimate returns from academic productivity in Russia to be reflected in the academic salary by an evaluation of empirical models of the determinants of faculty pay depending on their productivity, current academic and administrative position, gender and seniority. We show that for the entire sample, faculty salary is positively associated with publication activity. Teaching is significant only for the entire sample, but not significant for subsamples. Administrative duties (expressed in the position held) are positively related to faculty pay: the largest effect is for rectors and vice-rectors, but for deans and heads of departments or laboratories the effect is also strong. Heads of universities and structural units receive a significant bonus for their administrative position. For research-oriented universities the largest effect in publication activity is for the number of papers in high ranking journals. In universities with no research status we discovered a significant gender gap: the male faculty earn more than their female colleagues. There is a positive linear relationship between salary and seniority for the entire sample and in universities with no special status, which corresponds to human capital theory. Salaries in universities requiring higher entrance exam scores are higher than in less selective higher education institutions. The salary in Moscow universities is higher than in the regional higher education institutions.
    Keywords: academic contracts, faculty pay, merit pay, incentive contract, international rankings, competitiveness of higher education.
    JEL: I21 I23 J31
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:47edu2018&r=hrm
  5. By: KODAMA Naomi; Huiyu LI
    Abstract: This paper studies the relationship between the performance of a firm and the characteristics of its manager for private and public firms in Japan. We use a panel data of firms from 2006-2016 that covers over two-thirds of aggregate employment and is representative of the firm size distribution. We find that firm performance measures—size, growth, and sales per employee—are higher in firms with managers who are male, more educated, and whose self-reported hometown differs from the location of the firm he or she manages (migrant managers). We also find an inverted-U relationship between firm performance level and manager's age, and that growth rate declines with the manager's age. Firm performance first increases with age until middle age, after which it declines with age. However, managers with characteristics that are associated with good performance do not necessarily perform better in recessions: male and migrant managers cut back more on sales and employment during the 2008-2009 recession. These results hold even after controlling for firm characteristics such as industry, age, location, and family ownership. Our results are consistent with human capital and risk preference affecting the productivity of managers. They suggest that demographic shifts—aging, rising female labor participation and education attainment, change in migration patterns—may affect economic growth through the distribution of managerial productivity.
    Date: 2018–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:18060&r=hrm
  6. By: John List; Jeffrey Livingston; Susanne Neckermann
    Abstract: In the face of worryingly low performance on standardized test, offering students financial incentives linked to academic performance has been proposed as a potentially cost-effective way to support improvement. However, a large literature across disciplines finds that extrinsic incentives, once removed, may crowd out intrinsic motivation on subsequent, similar tasks. We conduct a field experiment where students, parents, and tutors are offered incentives designed to encourage student preparation for a high-stakes state test. The incentives reward performance on a separate low-stakes assessment designed to measure the same skills as the high-stakes test. Performance on the high-stakes test, however, is not incentivized. We find substantial treatment effects on the incented tests but no effect on the non-incented test; if anything, the incentives result in worse performance on the non-incented test. We also find evidence supporting the conclusion that the incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation to perform well on the non-incented test, but this effect is only temporary. One year later, students who had been in the incentives treatments perform better than those in the control on the same non-incented test.
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:framed:00643&r=hrm
  7. By: Dauth, Wolfgang (University of Würzburg); Findeisen, Sebastian (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis); Suedekum, Jens (DICE Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf); Woessner, Nicole (DICE Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf)
    Abstract: We estimate the effect of industrial robots on employment, wages, and the composition of jobs in German labor markets between 1994 and 2014. We find that the adoption of industrial robots had no effect on total employment in local labor markets specializing in industries with high robot usage. Robot adoption led to job losses in manufacturing that were offset by gains in the business service sector. We analyze the impact on individual workers and find that robot adoption has not increased the risk of displacement for incumbent manufacturing workers. They stay with their original employer, and many workers adjust by switching occupations at their original workplace. The loss of manufacturing jobs is solely driven by fewer new jobs for young labor market entrants. Moreover, we find that, in regions with higher exposure to automation, labor productivity increases while the labor share in total income declines.
    Keywords: Automation; Labor market institutions; Inequality
    JEL: F16 J24 O33 R11
    Date: 2018–08–21
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedmoi:0013&r=hrm
  8. By: Belot, Michele (European University Institute); Kircher, Philipp (School of Economics, University of Edinburgh); Muller, Paul (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)
    Abstract: We study how job seekers respond to wage announcements by assigning wages randomly to pairs of otherwise similar vacancies in a large number of professions. High wage vacancies attract more interest, in contrast with much of the evidence based on observational data. Some applicants only show interest in the low wage vacancy even when they were exposed to both. Both findings are core predictions of theories of directed/competitive search where workers trade o_ the wage with the perceived competition for the job. A calibrated model with multiple applications and on-the-job search induces magnitudes broadly in line with the empirical findings.
    Keywords: online job search; directed search; wage competition; field experiments
    JEL: C93 J31 J63 J64
    Date: 2018–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0739&r=hrm
  9. By: Colella, Fabrizio (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Dalton, Patricio (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Giusti, G.
    Abstract: This study presents evidence on the role of moral support on performance in a competitive environment. We take advantage of an unusual change in the Argentinean football legislation. In August 2013, as a matter of National security, the Argentinean government forced all the teams of the first division to play their games with only home team supporters. Supporters of the visiting teams were not allowed to be in stadiums during league games. We estimate the effect of this exogenous variation of supporters on team performance, and we find that visiting teams are, on average, about 20% more likely to lose without their supporters. Moreover, we find that the lack of supporters of the visiting team increased the score differential between the home team and the visitor. The effect of the ban is stronger for big teams, who have the highest number of supporters when playing away. In addition, we find no evidence of changes of referees' decisions due to the ban, suggesting that the effect on team performance is due to the loss of moral support rather than a change in referees hostility. As placebo test, we run the analysis using contemporaneous cup matches, where the visiting team supporters were allowed to attend. We find no effect of the ban on the cup games, which provides additional empirical support to our findings. Our results offer unique and novel empirical evidence of the importance on moral support on performance.
    Keywords: support; encouragement; motivation; football; team performance; non-monetary incentives; competitive environments
    JEL: D01 D91 J24
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:1dac53ca-9483-48f5-84b0-0ea70f06f80b&r=hrm

This nep-hrm issue is ©2018 by Patrick Kampkötter. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.