nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2018‒07‒09
eight papers chosen by
Patrick Kampkötter
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

  1. When does team remuneration work? An experimental study on interactions between workplace contexts By Bartke, Simon; Gelhaar, Felix
  2. Interfirm Relationships and Business Performance_ By Jing Cai; Adam Szeidl
  3. Teacher Performance and Accountability Incentives By Hugh Macartney; Robert McMillan; Uros Petronijevic
  4. Selection versus Talent Effects on Firm Value By Briana Chang; Harrison Hong
  5. The Link Between Benevolence and Well-Being in the Context of Human-Resource Marketing By Catherine Viot; Laïla Benraiss-Noailles
  6. Human capital accumulation through recurrent education By Mariko Tanaka
  7. Does Ignorance of Economic Returns and Costs Explain the Educational Aspiration Gap? Evidence from Representative Survey Experiments By Lergetporer, Philipp; Werner, Katharina; Woessmann, Ludger
  8. The Impact of Supervision and Incentive Process in Explaining Wage Profile and Variance By Nitsa Kasir; Idit Sohlberg

  1. By: Bartke, Simon; Gelhaar, Felix
    Abstract: The extent to which individuals cooperate depends on the context. This study analyzes how interactions of workplace context elements affect cooperation when free-riding is possible. Context consists of a novel team building exercise, varying degrees of complementarity in production, and different remuneration schemes. After participation in the team building exercise and when complementarities are high, subjects exert higher efforts under team remuneration than under individual remuneration, despite the possibility to free-ride. Across all contexts, subjects cooperate significantly more than Nash equilibria predict. Compared to contexts in which not all contextual elements are cooperatively aligned, cooperation in a cooperative context relies significantly less on beliefs and personal values. Instead, a cooperative context changes how a subject's achievement motivation influences cooperation. Our findings present insights on how preferences react to context interactions and how these reactions enable organizations to use team incentives.
    Keywords: team building,workplace context,laboratory experiment,stability of preferences,motivation,cooperation
    JEL: D2 D91 L23 M14 M52
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:2105&r=hrm
  2. By: Jing Cai; Adam Szeidl
    Abstract: We organized business associations for the owner-managers of young Chinese firms to study the effect of business networks on firm performance. We randomized 2,820 firms into small groups whose managers held monthly meetings for one year, and into a “no-meetings” control group. We find that: (1) The meetings increased firm revenue by 8.1 percent, and also significantly increased profit, factors, inputs, the number of partners, borrowing, and a management score; (2) These effects persisted one year after the conclusion of the meetings; and (3) Firms randomized to have better peers exhibited higher growth. We exploit additional interventions to document concrete channels. (4) Managers shared exogenous business-relevant information, particularly when they were not competitors, showing that the meetings facilitated learning from peers. (5) Managers created more business partnerships in the regular than in other one-time meetings, showing that the meetings improved supplier-client matching.
    Date: 2017–11–21
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ceu:econwp:2018_3&r=hrm
  3. By: Hugh Macartney; Robert McMillan; Uros Petronijevic
    Abstract: This paper documents a new empirical regularity: teacher value-added increases within-teacher when accountability incentives are strengthened. That finding motivates a strategy to separate value-added into incentive-varying teacher effort and incentive-invariant teacher ability, combining rich longitudinal data with exogenous incentive-policy variation from North Carolina. Our estimates indicate that teacher effort and ability both raise current and future test scores, with ability having stronger effects. These estimates feed into a framework for comparing the cost-effectiveness of alternative education policies. For illustration, we show incentive-oriented reforms can outperform policies targeting teacher ability, given their potential to influence all teachers rather than a subset.
    Keywords: Incentives, Teacher Performance, Value-Added, Effort, Ability, Education Production, Accountability, Education Policy, Cost-Effectiveness, Persistence
    JEL: I21 J24 M52
    Date: 2018–06–25
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-610&r=hrm
  4. By: Briana Chang; Harrison Hong
    Abstract: Measuring the value of labor-market hires for stock prices, be it underwriters when firms go public (IPOs) or chief executive officers (CEOs), is difficult due to selection. Opaque firms with higher costs of capital benefit more from prestigious underwriters, while productive firms benefit more from talented CEOs. Using assignment models, we show that the importance of talent (or agent heterogeneity) relative to selection (or firm heterogeneity) is measured by wage increases across agents of different compensation ranks divided by changes in output across their firms. The median of this ratio is 0.5% for underwriters and 2% for CEOs.
    JEL: G20 G24 G30 G34
    Date: 2018–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24672&r=hrm
  5. By: Catherine Viot (UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon); Laïla Benraiss-Noailles (IRGO - Institut de Recherche en Gestion des Organisations - Université Montesquieu - Bordeaux 4 - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Bordeaux)
    Abstract: Although interest in the subject of human-resource marketing is growing among researchers and practitioners, there have been remarkably few studies on the effects on employees of how benevolent their organization is. This article looks at the link between the presumption of organizational benevolence and the well-being of employees at work. The results of an empirical study of 595 employees show that the presumption of organizational benevolence is positively linked to employee well-being. The effect is indirect, as it is mediated by the perceived level of organizational support. The existence of a link between employee well-being and intention to quit the company is also confirmed. Keywords Human-resource marketing, presumption of organizational benevolence, well-being at work, perceived organizational support, intention to leave the job. List of abbreviations WB Well-being POB Presumption of organizational benevolence POS Perceived organizational support
    Keywords: intention to leave the job,perceived organizational support,well-being at work,Human-resource marketing,presumption of organizational benevolence
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01803653&r=hrm
  6. By: Mariko Tanaka
    Abstract: Sustaining economic growth under rapid aging is one of the most important policy issues in Japan. Because of the difficulty of increasing labor force in an aging society, it is desirable to promote human capital accumulation for improvement of labor quality in the long run. However, since human capital accumulated in the young may become obsolete for elder workers, we cannot achieve sufficient level of human capital to sustain economic growth only through education for the young. Thus, we need recurrent education for the elderly or retired female workers in an aging society as in Japan. Hence, this paper investigates whether we can achieve socially optimal level of human capital when the decision to participate in recurrent education is left to the private sector.
    Date: 2018–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tcr:wpaper:e123&r=hrm
  7. By: Lergetporer, Philipp (University of Munich); Werner, Katharina (University of Munich); Woessmann, Ludger (University of Munich)
    Abstract: The gap in university enrollment by parental education is large and persistent in many countries. In our representative survey, 74 percent of German university graduates, but only 36 percent of those without a university degree favor a university education for their children. The latter are more likely to underestimate returns and overestimate costs of university. Experimental provision of return and cost information significantly increases educational aspirations. However, it does not close the aspiration gap as university graduates respond even more strongly to the information treatment. Persistent effects in a follow-up survey indicate that participants indeed process and remember the information. Differences in economic preference parameters also cannot account for the educational aspiration gap. Our results cast doubt that ignorance of economic returns and costs explains educational inequality in Germany.
    Keywords: inequality, higher education, university, aspiration, information, returns to education, survey experiment JEL Classification: D83, I24, J24, H75
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:371&r=hrm
  8. By: Nitsa Kasir (Kaliner); Idit Sohlberg
    Abstract: The implementation of a supervision and incentive process for identical workers may lead to wage variance that stems from employer and employee optimization. The harder it is to assess the nature of the labor output, the more important such a process becomes, and the influence of such a process on wage development growth. The dynamic model presented in this paper shows that an employer will choose to pay a worker a starting wage that is less than what he deserves, resulting in a wage profile that fits the classic profile in the human-capital literature. The wage profile and wage variance rise at times of technological advancements, which leads to increased turnover as older workers are replaced by younger workers due to a rise in the relative marginal cost of the former.
    Date: 2018–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1806.01332&r=hrm

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