nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2018‒04‒16
six papers chosen by
Patrick Kampkötter
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

  1. When Salespeople Manage Customer Relationships: Multidimensional Incentives and Private Information By Minkyung Kim; K. Sudhir; Kosuke Uetake; Rodrigo Canales
  2. Management innovation driving sustainable supply management By Koster, Mieneke; Vos, Bart; Schroeder, Roger
  3. Investigating the Relationship between Work-Life-Balance and Motivation of the Employees: Evidences from the Local Government of Jakarta By Oktosatrio, Suhendro
  4. Overburdened judges By Ludivine Roussey; Raphaël Soubeyran
  5. Social capital, human capital and fertility By Coppier, Raffaella; Sabatini, Fabio; Sodini, Mauro
  6. Does Ignorance of Economic Returns and Costs Explain the Educational Aspiration Gap? Evidence from Representative Survey Experiments By Lergetporer, Philipp; Werner, Katharina; Woessmann, Ludger

  1. By: Minkyung Kim (School of Management, Yale University); K. Sudhir (Cowles Foundation & School of Management, Yale University); Kosuke Uetake (School of Management, Yale University); Rodrigo Canales (School of Management, Yale University)
    Abstract: At many firms, incentivized salespeople with private information about customers are responsible for CRM. While incentives motivate sales performance, private information can induce moral hazard by salespeople to gain compensation at the expense of the firm. We investigate the sales performance–moral hazard tradeoff in response to multidimensional performance (acquisition and maintenance) incentives in the presence of private information. Using unique panel data on customer loan acquisition and repayments linked to salespeople from a microfinance bank, we detect evidence of salesperson private information. Acquisition incentives induce salesperson moral hazard leading to adverse customer selection, but maintenance incentives moderate it as salespeople recognize the negative effects of acquiring low-quality customers on future payoffs. Critically, without the moderating effect of maintenance incentives, adverse selection effect of acquisition incentives overwhelms the sales enhancing effects, clarifying the importance of multidimensional incentives for CRM. Reducing private information (through job transfers) hurts customer maintenance, but has greater impact on productivity by moderating adverse selection at acquisition. The paper also contributes to the recent literature on detecting and disentangling customer adverse selection and customer moral hazard (defaults) with a new identification strategy that exploits the time-varying effects of salesperson incentives.
    Keywords: When Salespeople Manage Customer Relationships: Multidimensional Incentives and Private Information
    Date: 2018–02
  2. By: Koster, Mieneke (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management); Vos, Bart (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management); Schroeder, Roger (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)
    Abstract: Although research in the area of sustainable supply management (SSM) has evolved over the past few decades, knowledge about the processes of emergence and innovation of SSM practices within organizations is surprisingly limited. These innovation processes are, however, important because of the considerable impact they may have on resulting sustainable practices and because of SSM's complex societal and intra-firm challenges. In a process study on management innovation, the sequences of SSM innovation processes in two exemplar case companies are studied to address: ‘What are the sequences through which SSM emerges within exemplar organizations?’, and ‘In what way do management innovation processes influence resulting SSM practices?’. We build on literature regarding firstly management innovation and secondly communities and internal networks of practice. An SSM innovation model and propositions are developed, proposing how the process of management innovation affects SSM practices and firm performance in a broader perspective.
    Date: 2017
  3. By: Oktosatrio, Suhendro
    Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between work-life-balance and employees' motivation in the public sector of Jakarta, Indonesia. Through motivational theories and work-life-balance theories, the conceptual framework is developed to explore research variables. This is a descriptive research following qualitative inductive method. The total sample size for this research is 86 respondents working in the local government of Jakarta. Data was gathered through self-administered survey questionnaire. Findings revealed that personal life significantly affect the work. Majority of the respondents prefer flexible work and operating from home. Interestingly, females are more eager to work from home in comparison to males. Furthermore, the findings revealed that females in contrast to males are much more organized in managing professional commitment and personal life agendas. Additionally, all employees seek taking holiday in contrast to extra money or bonus. Lastly, working for longer hours is the most de-motivating job attribute.
    Keywords: Motivation, Job Satisfaction, Public Sector, Qualitative Research, Work-Life-balance
    JEL: H70 H79 J24 M19 O15 Y1
    Date: 2018–01–11
  4. By: Ludivine Roussey; Raphaël Soubeyran
    Abstract: We develop a double-sided moral hazard model in which the production of justice depends on two tasks (jurisdictional and administrative). The jurisdictional task can be provided only by a judge (the agent) while the administrative task can be provided either by the government (the principal) and/or by the judge. However, the judge performs the administrative task at a higher unit cost. First, we show that the rst-best situation is such that the judge exerts no effort to provide the administrative task. Second, we show that two forms of (second-best) optimal contract can emerge when neither the government's effort nor the judge's effort is contractible: either the incentives are shared between the government and the judge and the judge exerts no effort to provide the administrative task, or the judge faces high-powered incentives which induce her to exert effort to provide both tasks. Our model proposes a rationale for judges work overload observed in many countries.
    Date: 2018–02
  5. By: Coppier, Raffaella; Sabatini, Fabio; Sodini, Mauro
    Abstract: Abstract We develop an overlapping generations model to study how the interplay between social and human capital affects fertility. In a framework where families face a trade-off between the quantity and quality of children, we incorporate the assumption that social capital plays a key role in the accumulation of human capital. We show how the erosion of social capital can trigger a chain of reactions leading households to base their childbearing decisions on quantity, instead of quality, resulting in higher fertility.
    Keywords: fertility, quantity-quality trade-off, human capital, education, social capital, trust
    JEL: I25 J13 Z0 Z13
    Date: 2018–03–11
  6. By: Lergetporer, Philipp (ifo Munich); Werner, Katharina (ifo Munich); Woessmann, Ludger (ifo and LMU Munich)
    Abstract: The gap in university enrollment by parental education is large and persistent in many countries. In our representative survey, 74 percent of German university graduates, but only 36 percent of those without a university degree favor a university education for their children. The latter are more likely to underestimate returns and overestimate costs of university. Experimental provision of return and cost information significantly increases educational aspirations. However, it does not close the aspiration gap as university graduates respond even more strongly to the information treatment. Persistent effects in a follow-up survey indicate that participants indeed process and remember the information. Differences in economic preference parameters also cannot account for the educational aspiration gap. Our results cast doubt that ignorance of economic returns and costs explains educational inequality in Germany.
    Keywords: inequality; higher education; university; aspi ration; information; returns to education; survey experiment;
    JEL: D83 I24 J24 H75
    Date: 2018–04–11

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