nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2018‒03‒26
nine papers chosen by
Patrick Kampkötter
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

  1. People Management Skills, Employee Attrition, and Manager Rewards: An Empirical Analysis By Mitchell Hoffman; Steven Tadelis
  2. The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence from a Field Experiment By Florian Englmaier; Stefan Grimm; David Schindler; Simeon Andreas Dermot Schudy
  3. How Post-crisis Regulation Has Affected Bank CEO Compensation By Vittoria Cerasi; Sebastian M. Deininger; Leonardo Gambacorta; Tommaso Oliviero
  4. Do Preferences and Biases Predict Life Outcomes? Evidence from Education and Labor Market Entry Decisions By Uschi Backes-Gellner; Holger Herz; Michael Kosfeld; Yvonne Oswald
  5. Firms' Global Engagement and Management Practices By Görg, Holger; Hanley, Aoife
  6. Skills, Signals, and Employability: An Experimental Investigation By Marc Piopiunik; Guido Schwerdt; Lisa Simon; Ludger Wößmann
  7. Exploring the relationship between talent management and service delivery in a selected government institution By Annah Chiloane; Nicolene Barkhuizen
  8. Firm-Specific Training By Felli, Leonardo; Harris, Christopher J
  9. The Superior Peer Improves Me: Evidence from Swimming Data By Shoko Yamane; Ryohei Hayashi

  1. By: Mitchell Hoffman; Steven Tadelis
    Abstract: How much do a manager's interpersonal skills with subordinates, which we call people management skills, affect employee outcomes? Are managers rewarded for having such skills? Using personnel data from a large, high-tech firm, we show that survey-measured people management skills have a strong negative relation to employee turnover. A causal interpretation is reinforced by research designs exploiting new workers joining the firm and managers moving jobs. However, people management skills do not consistently improve non-attrition outcomes. Better people managers are themselves more likely to receive higher subjective performance ratings and to be promoted.
    JEL: D23 J24 J33 L23 M50
    Date: 2018–02
  2. By: Florian Englmaier; Stefan Grimm; David Schindler; Simeon Andreas Dermot Schudy
    Abstract: Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is known about how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a field experiment with more than 3000 participants, we document a positive effect of bonus incentives on the probability of completion of such a task. Bonus incentives increase performance due to the reward rather than the reference point (performance threshold) they provide. The framing of bonuses (as gains or losses) plays a minor role. Incentives improve performance also in an additional sample of presumably less motivated workers. However, incentives reduce these workers’ willingness to “explore” original solutions.
    Keywords: team work, bonus, incentives, loss, gain, non-routine, exploration
    JEL: C92 C93 J33 D03 M52
    Date: 2018
  3. By: Vittoria Cerasi (Bicocca University); Sebastian M. Deininger (Basel Chamber of Commerce); Leonardo Gambacorta (BIS and CEPR); Tommaso Oliviero (CSEF, Università di Napoli Federico II)
    Abstract: This paper assesses whether compensation practices for bank Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) changed after the Financial Stability Board (FSB) issued post-crisis guidelines on sound compensation. Banks in jurisdictions which implemented the FSB’s Principles and Standards of Sound Compensation in national legislation changed their compensation policies more than other banks. Compensation in those jurisdictions is less linked to short-termprofits and more linked to risks, with CEOs at riskier banks receiving less, by way of variable compensation, than those at less-risky peers. This was particularly true of investment banks and of banks which previously had weaker risk management, for example those that previously lacked a Chief Risk Officer.
    Keywords: Banks; Managerial compensation; Prudential regulation; Risk-taking
    JEL: G21 G28 G32
    Date: 2018–03–07
  4. By: Uschi Backes-Gellner; Holger Herz; Michael Kosfeld; Yvonne Oswald
    Abstract: Evidence suggests that acquiring human capital is related to better life outcomes, yet young peoples’ decisions to invest in or stop acquiring human capital are still poorly understood. We investigate the role of time and reference-dependent preferences in such decisions. Using a data set that is unique in its combination of real-world observations on student outcomes and experimental data on economic preferences, we find that a low degree of long-run patience is a key determinant of dropping out of upper-secondary education. Further, for students who finish education we show that one month before termination of their program, present-biased students are less likely to have concrete continuation plans while loss averse students are more likely to have a definite job offer already. Our findings provide fresh evidence on students’ decision-making about human capital acquisition and labor market transition with important implications for education and labor market policy.
    Keywords: economic preferences, education, dropout, human capital, job search
    JEL: D01 D03 D91 I21 J64
    Date: 2018
  5. By: Görg, Holger; Hanley, Aoife
    Abstract: We investigate whether firms' "global engagement", either in the form of exporting or opening up affiliates abroad, is related to the change in their management performance. We use new and unique data from a recent large scale firm survey of management practices in Germany. We calculate management scores for firms as in Bloom et al. (2013), which indicate how structured management is in a given firm. We find that switching into exporting, and to a lesser degree opening up affiliates abroad, is related to improving management performance in the sense of having more structured management practices.
    Keywords: Management practices,global engagement,exporting,outward investment
    JEL: F2 L2 M2
    Date: 2017
  6. By: Marc Piopiunik; Guido Schwerdt; Lisa Simon; Ludger Wößmann
    Abstract: As skills of labor-market entrants are usually not directly observed by employers, individuals acquire skill signals. To study which signals are valued by employers, we simultaneously and independently randomize a broad range of skill signals on pairs of resumes of fictitious applicants among which we ask a large representative sample of German human-resource managers to choose. We find that signals in all three studied domains – cognitive skills, social skills, and maturity – have a significant effect on being invited for a job interview. Consistent with the relevance, expectedness, and credibility of different signals, the specific signal that is effective in each domain differs between apprenticeship applicants and college graduates. While GPAs and social skills are significant for both genders, males are particularly rewarded for maturity and females for IT and language skills. Older HR managers value school grades less and other signals more, whereas HR managers in larger firms value college grades more.
    Keywords: signals, cognitive skills, social skills, resume, hiring, labor market
    JEL: J24 J21
    Date: 2018
  7. By: Annah Chiloane (Southern Business School); Nicolene Barkhuizen (GIFT Research Niche Area North-West University)
    Abstract: The main objective of this research was to determine the relationship between talent management and service quality of police officials. A Talent Management Measure and adapted version of the SERVQUAL were administered among police officials (N=140). The results showed that more than half of the respondents were in agreement that talent retention practices need substantial improvement. The results further showed inadequate compensation, a lack of strategic talent management policies and talent development practices. About two-thirds of the participants were in agreement that performance management systems and talent attraction practices are somewhat adequate. The results showed a significant relationship between strategic talent management, performance management, talent retention, talent attraction, compensation and rewards, talent development and the assurance and reliability dimensions of service quality. Recommendations are made.
    Keywords: Police Officials, Talent Attraction, Talent Management, Talent Retention, Service Delivery
    JEL: J24
    Date: 2017–10
  8. By: Felli, Leonardo; Harris, Christopher J
    Abstract: This paper investigates the market provision of firm-specific training, and identifies the inefficiencies associated with it. Within a general stochastic learning-by-doing model, there is a potential inefficiency in the market provision of firm-specific training. In order to determine whether this inefficiency is in fact present, we analyze two special cases of the model: the accelerated productivity-enhancement model and the accelerated learning model. In both models, the inefficiency is indeed present. However, the nature of the inefficiency depends on the balance between the two key components of training, namely productivity enhancement and employee evaluation. In the accelerated productivity-enhancement model, training results in an increase in productivity enhancement but no change in employee evaluation, and training is overprovided by the market. In the accelerated learning model, training results in a proportionate increase in both productivity enhancement and employee evaluation, and training is underprovided by the market. In both cases, turnover is inefficiently low.
    Keywords: Specific human capital; Training; Learning-by-doing; Turnover; Productivity enhancement; Employee evaluation
    JEL: D61 D86 J20 J24
    Date: 2018–02
  9. By: Shoko Yamane; Ryohei Hayashi
    Abstract: This study examined the peer effects of newcomer on the performance of existing members of teams, based on comparing the performances of swimming team members before and after the arrival of a newcomer. The identification strategy was similar to a natural experimental setting. This study found that the performance of an existing member of a team improves when a newcomer joins the team and that this effect is larger when the newcomer is a superior to the original team members.
    Date: 2018–03

This nep-hrm issue is ©2018 by Patrick Kampkötter. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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