nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2017‒10‒15
nine papers chosen by
Patrick Kampkötter
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

  1. Endogenously Emerging Gender Diversity in an Experimental Team Work Setting By Gürerk, Özgür; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rockenbach, Bettina
  2. Match Quality, Contractual Sorting and Wage Cyclicality By Joao Alfredo Galindo da Fonseca; Giovanni Gallipoli; Yaniv Yedid-Levi
  3. The Rocky Road to Gender Equality – Justification as a Key Determinant of the Effect of Quotas By Lea Petters; Marina Schroeder
  4. Healthy Business? Managerial Education and Management in Healthcare By Nicholas Bloom; Renata Lemos; Raffaella Sadun; John Van Reenen
  5. Development and Retention of Human Capital in Large Bureaucracies By Darrell J. Glaser; Ahmed S. Rahman
  6. The Impact of Employing Mismatched Workers on Firm Productivity, Wages and Profits By Halvarsson, Daniel; Tingvall, Patrik
  7. The Incentive Properties of Collective Reputation By Fleckinger, Pierre; Mimra, Wanda; Zago, Angelo
  8. Richard H. Thaler: Integrating Economics with Psychology By Committee, Nobel Prize
  9. Corporate governance and firm performance in China By Margit Molnar; Baolin Wang; Wenhao Chen

  1. By: Gürerk, Özgür; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rockenbach, Bettina
    Abstract: We study gender diversity and performance in endogenously formed teams. Participants choose to either perform a cooperation task with members of the own gender only or in a mixed-gender team. We find that independent of the team choice, initially men cooperate significantly more than women. In subsequent periods, men prefer the successful men-only teams, resulting in significantly higher profits for men compared to women. Only over time, this endogenously emerged “gender profit gap” closes.
    JEL: C92 J71 M54
    Date: 2017
  2. By: Joao Alfredo Galindo da Fonseca (University of British Columbia, Vancouver School of Economics); Giovanni Gallipoli (University of British Columbia); Yaniv Yedid-Levi (University of British Columbia, Vancouver School of Economics)
    Abstract: This paper studies the role of match quality for contractual arrangements, wage dynamics and workers’ retention. We develop a model in which profit maximizing firms offer a performance-based pay arrangement to retain workers with relatively high match-specific productivity. The key implications of our model hold in data from the NLSY79, where information about job histories and performance pay is available. We relate our findings to the literature on occupation heterogeneity and provide evidence that jobs in "cognitive" occupations have better match quality, exhibit higher prevalence of performance pay, display significant sensitivity of wages to business cycle conditions and last longer.
    Keywords: match quality, contracts, heterogeneity, occupation, wages, cyclicality
    JEL: M52 M55 J33 J41 E24
    Date: 2017–10
  3. By: Lea Petters (University of Cologne); Marina Schroeder (University of Cologne)
    Abstract: We study the immediate effect of a quota on performance, sabotage, and representation of the different groups affected. In an experimental study, we vary whether a quota is implemented and whether it is justified with ex-ante discrimination or not. We find that unjustified quotas result in a decrease in the performance of affirmed types, an increase in sabotage activity targeted at affirmed types, and a reduction in help received by affirmed types. We do not find such negative effects when the implemented quota is justified. Our findings suggest that information about the justification of a quota crucially determines the success of this intervention.
    Keywords: affirmative action, quota, sabotage, real effort, peer evaluation, fairness, discrimination
    JEL: C92 J33 J71 M51
    Date: 2017–10–10
  4. By: Nicholas Bloom; Renata Lemos; Raffaella Sadun; John Van Reenen
    Abstract: We investigate the link between hospital performance and managerial education by collecting a large database of management practices and skills in hospitals across nine countries. We find that hospitals that are closer to universities offering both medical education and business education have higher management quality, more MBA trained managers and lower mortality rates. This is true compared to the distance to universities that offer only business or medical education (or neither). We argue that supplying joint MBA-healthcare courses may be a channel through which universities increase medical business skills and raise clinical performance.
    JEL: I18 L32 M20 M5
    Date: 2017–09
  5. By: Darrell J. Glaser (United States Naval Academy); Ahmed S. Rahman (United States Naval Academy)
    Abstract: This paper examines the effects of engineer-oriented and technical experience on job mobility during an era of rapid technological advance. We first develop an on-the-job search model to help us understand factors leading to job switching under rigid payment systems. Then, using longitudinal data on late 19th-Century British and American naval officer- and engineer-careers, we show how different forms of technical experience and pro- motion rates infl uence job switching. Using our estimates we find rates of return to technical experience rising dramatically by the turn of the 20th Century. To our knowledge these are the earliest estimates of returns to any type of technical skill. These findings help us understand how modernizing organizations can become more vulnerable to loss of skilled personnel, and how organizations might optimally respond to such loss.
    Date: 2017–10
  6. By: Halvarsson, Daniel (The Ratio Institute); Tingvall, Patrik (The Ratio Institute)
    Abstract: Educational mismatch in the form of over- and under-educated workers has long been studied in relation to labor market outcomes for individual workers. While its consequences for individual workers and society are dire, we have only anecdotal evidence of its consequences for firms' competitiveness. To bridge this gap, this paper studies the impact of mismatch on firm productivity, wages and profit. The results suggest an asymmetric effect from employing over- and under-educated workers. We find that while employing over-educated workers add to wage cost, there are no matching productivity gains, By contrast, the performance of under-educated workers more than compensates for their wage costs, leading to increased profits at the firm level. The net effect, therefore, in the form of gross operating surplus is significantly negative (positive) when firms employ over- (under-)educated workers. The results suggest that the positive effects primarily stem from under-educated young workers, whereas the losses can be traced to over-educated older workers.
    Keywords: Educational; mismatch; ·; Productivity; ·; Labor; cost; ·; Profits; ·; Proxy; variable
    JEL: J24 L25 L60
    Date: 2017–09–21
  7. By: Fleckinger, Pierre; Mimra, Wanda; Zago, Angelo
    Abstract: We build a model of collective reputation under moral hazard to analyze incentives under collective reputation. Producers can produce high quality, but it is only imperfectly detected. Products not detected as of high quality are pooled by to the collective reputation structure. Collective reputation can yield higher quality and welfare than individual reputation. While groups unravel in absence of transfers even when efficient, simple collective reputation contracts implement the First Best.
    JEL: D82 D71 L15
    Date: 2017
  8. By: Committee, Nobel Prize (Nobel Prize Committee)
    Abstract: Economists aim to develop models of human behavior and interactions in markets and other economic settings. But we humans behave in complex ways. Although we try to make rational decisions, we have limited cognitive abilities and limited willpower. While our decisions are often guided by self-interest, we also care about fairness and equity. Moreover cognitive abilities, self-control, and motivation can vary significantly across different individuals.
    Keywords: Behavioral economics;
    JEL: D03 D90 G02
    Date: 2017–10–09
  9. By: Margit Molnar; Baolin Wang; Wenhao Chen
    Abstract: A key priority in China’s “new normal” period -- where returns on investment are slackening -- is corporate governance, which could lead to enhanced productivity by a better management of resources at the firm level. Corporate governance principles for listed firms follow global best practices, though their history is relatively short and the Chinese stock market has a number of features, which make the investigation of the impact of various corporate governance practices on firm performance of particular interest. Productivity is considered as a major measure of firm performance, but for comparison accounting indicators are also used to check the impact of selected corporate governance practices using firm-level data of listed firms between 1999-2015. The results are broadly in line with the existing literature: once controlling for endogeneity, there is no evidence that a greater share of independent directors boosts firm performance in general. At the time when the requirement that at least one third of directors must be independent was introduced in 2002, however, profitability improved. A greater salary gap between executives and staff hurts productivity, but boosts ROA and ROE, which are often among the objectives of executives and thus encourage them to seek short-term returns, even at the expense of productivity. While volume-based growth may lead to higher performance by the accounting ratios, it does not necessarily guarantee higher productivity. If such an expansion is debt financed, it can even harm productivity. Excessive ownership concentration appears harmful, but a certain degree of concentration may improve performance. Institutional investors, even though may own only a tiny fraction of shares, are found to boost firm performance. This Working Paper relates to the 2017 OECD Economic Survey of China ( y-china.htm).
    Keywords: board structure, executive compensation, independent directors, institutional investors, ownership concentration, productivity
    JEL: G34 G38 P31
    Date: 2017–10–11

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