nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2016‒10‒02
nine papers chosen by
Patrick Kampkötter
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

  1. CEO Personality and Firm Policies By Gow, Ian D.; Kaplan, Steven N.; Larcker, David F.; Zakolyukina, Anastasia A.
  2. LPP - Linked Personnel Panel 1415 : quality of work and economic success: longitudinal study in German establishments (data collection on the second wave) By Broszeit, Sandra; Grunau, Philipp; Wolter, Stefanie
  3. CEO Pay, Performance, and Value Sharing By Donatiello, Nicholas; Larcker, David F.; Tayan, Brian
  4. Training & Development Barometer for Effective Transformation of Organizational Commitment and Overall Performance in Banking Sectors of KPK, Pakistan: Qualitative study of Workforce of Bank of Khyber By Zehra, Nasreen
  5. Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts By DeMarzo, Peter M.; Sannikov, Yuliy
  6. Temporary contracts' transitions: the role of training and institutions By Sara Serra
  7. Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations By Agnieszka Rusinowska; Vassili Vergopoulos
  8. Delegation with a Reciprocal Agent By Ester Manna; Alessandro De Chiara
  9. Intangible Investment and Firm Performance By Nathan Chappell; Suzi Kerr

  1. By: Gow, Ian D. (Harvard University); Kaplan, Steven N. (University of Chicago); Larcker, David F. (Stanford University); Zakolyukina, Anastasia A. (University of Chicago)
    Abstract: Based on two samples of high quality personality data for chief executive officers (CEOs), we use linguistic features extracted from conferences calls and statistical learning techniques to develop a measure of CEO personality in terms of the Big Five traits: agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, and openness to experience. These personality measures have strong out-of-sample predictive performance and are stable over time. Our measures of the Big Five personality traits are associated with financing choices, investment choices and firm operating performance.
    Date: 2016–07
  2. By: Broszeit, Sandra (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany]); Grunau, Philipp (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany]); Wolter, Stefanie (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany])
    Abstract: "This data report describes the second wave of the Linked Personnel Panel (LPP 1415). The LPP is a linked-employer-employee data set on human resources (HR) work, corporate culture and management instruments in German establishments that evolved within the framework of the project 'Quality of work and economic success'. The first survey wave was conducted in 2012/2013 and contains information on 1,219 establishments and 7,508 employees. In the second wave 771 establishments and 7,282 employees were interviewed. On the establishment level, the LPP is representative for German establishments with 50 and more employees in the processing industry and in the service sector. The linkage with the IAB Establishment Panel yields a data product that enables longitudinal analyses regarding HR strategies and quality of work in Germany." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en)) Additional Information German version frequencies and labels Related source
    Keywords: Arbeitsplatzqualität, Unternehmenserfolg - Determinanten, Erhebungsmethode, Stichprobenverfahren, Datenaufbereitung, Betriebsbefragung, Mitarbeiterbefragung, Fragebogen, IAB-Datensatz Linked Personnel Panel, Datensatzbeschreibung
    Date: 2016–09–21
  3. By: Donatiello, Nicholas (Stanford University); Larcker, David F. (Stanford University); Tayan, Brian (Stanford University)
    Abstract: CEO compensation is a highly controversial subject. While most company directors believe that CEO pay is not a problem, the majority of the American public believes that it is. The difficulties that boards face in justifying CEO pay levels in some ways stem from the challenge of quantifying how much value a CEO creates and how much of this value should be shared as compensation. We examine this topic in detail and ask: 1) Why are CEO compensation arrangements not explicitly tied to value creation? 2) How much does a CEO personally contribute to corporate performance? 3) How is corporate performance best measured: by change in stock price or change in corporate profits? 4) What portion of shareholder value creation should a CEO receive in pay? 5) Why don't companies explicitly calculate and disclose the relation between value creation and pay? The Stanford Closer Look series is a collection of short case studies through which we explore topics, issues, and controversies in corporate governance and executive leadership. In each study, we take a targeted look at a specific issue that is relevant to the current debate on governance and explain why it is so important. Larcker and Tayan are co-authors of the books Corporate Governance Matters and A Real Look at Real World Corporate Governance.
    Date: 2016–03
  4. By: Zehra, Nasreen
    Abstract: This research paper investigates the impact of T&D program on the level of employees' organizational commitment and overall performances in the Banking sector of KPK by considering Bank of Khyber as a case study. Study aims to critically examine all three attributes of organizational commitment (affective, normative, and continuance commitment respectively) and its impact on the job satisfaction in banking sector of KPK, Pakistan. The notions of Guest, (2003) and Wall & Wood (2005) are taken as a foundation to explore the linkage between organisational commitment and T&D program, however both these studies had not investigated all three attributes in equal manner. The focus of these previous studies were more on affective and continuance commitment and did not investigate the causes and consequences that make these attributes to create an impact on the overall performances. Thus this study is significant because it attempts to explain in exploratory manner the reasons behind impact created by training. Inductive approach in a cross-sectional design following interpretive research philosophy research is carried out. The bank of Khyber, KPK is case study selected with 15 regional and branch managers as participants for interviews and 277 employees participated in the survey questionnaire, selected through stratified, convenience, and random sampling technique. Results of present study indicates that to retain skilled workforce, organization has to work on their continuance commitment by offering them promotion and salary increment because these are two factors that enable firms to retain skilled workers. Training increases employees' affective and normative commitment more in general as compare to continuance commitment. This paper contributes to the field of management and administrative sciences by investigating the relationship between T&D program and employees' performance and organisational commitment by exploring workforce and management's perspective through financial institution. It adds to the managerial literature related to T&D in relation with organisational commitment and overall performance in developing country's context.
    Keywords: Training & Development Program; Organizational Commitment; Affective Commitment; Normative Commitment; Continuance Commitment; Banking Sector of Pakistan; Job Satisfaction; Employee Performance
    JEL: C12 C19 C35 L21 L29 L86 M12 M15 M19 M53
    Date: 2016–04–25
  5. By: DeMarzo, Peter M. (Stanford University); Sannikov, Yuliy (Princeton University)
    Abstract: We study a principal-agent setting in which both sides learn about future profitability from output, and the project can be abandoned/terminated if profitability is too low. With learning, shirking by the agent both reduces output and lowers the principal's estimate of future profitability. The agent can exploit this belief discrepancy and earn information rents, reducing his incentives to exert effort. The optimal contract controls information rents to improve incentives by distorting the termination decision. Our results capture the transition from a young, financially constrained firm to a mature firm that pays dividends. For young firms, poor performance permanently raises the termination threshold, as doing so lowers information rents. Mature firms pay smoothed dividends and have a fixed termination threshold. Dividend smoothing occurs because earnings surprises are used to adjust financial slack in line with profitability. When profitability only reflects the agent's private ability, a simple equity contract is optimal.
    Date: 2016–05
  6. By: Sara Serra
    Abstract: Despite recent reforms, labour market segmentation is still a marked feature of several European countries. This work empirically analyses transitions out of temporary contracts, by means of a discrete duration model, with a particular focus on human capital features, labour market protection and their interaction. Transitions to open-ended contracts with the same or with a new employer are considered separately, as well as transitions to joblessness, based on data for ten European countries taken from the European Community Household Panel. Conclusions suggest that firm training policies are more relevant for intra-firm transitions, while worker characteristics are more determinant for inter-firm transitions. Labour market regulation plays a signicant role in what concerns transitions to open-ended contracts, but not to joblessness, particularly in strongly segmented labour markets. In countries characterized by this type of labour market institutions, human capital features assume an increased relevance, and firm provided training may reduce the influence of the strictness of labour market regulations on the conversion of temporary contracts into open-ended.
    JEL: E24 J24 J41
    Date: 2016
  7. By: Agnieszka Rusinowska (PSE - Paris School of Economics, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Vassili Vergopoulos (PSE - Paris School of Economics, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: We combine in the same theoretical framework two related phenomena that can be present in organizations – ingratiation of subordinates and favoritism of superiors towards some of their employees. There are three actors in the model: a worker, a manager supervising the worker, and a firm that employs the worker and the manager. Ingratiation is defined as a strategic behavior of the worker to make himself more attractive to the manager. In our model ingratiation is expressed by opinion conformity which is exerted by the worker when reporting his opinion to the manager. Favoritism of the manager is based on using a bias when reporting to the firm her observation of the worker's performance. First, we determine to optimal level of the effort and the reported opinion of the worker, and the level of bias of the manager. Then, we investigate the effects of favoritism and ingratiation on the expected wages and utilities of the worker and the manager, and on the expected profit of the firm.
    Abstract: Nous incorporons au sein d'une même approche théorique, deux phénomènes complémentaires à l'œuvre dans les organisations – l'ingratiation de la part des employés subordonnés et le favoritisme de la part des supérieurs hiérarchiques envers ces employés. Il y a trois acteurs dans le modèle : un employé, un manager qui supervise l'employé et une firme qui emploie ces deux derniers. L'ingratiation est définie comme un comportement stratégique de l'employé qui vise à obtenir les bonnes grâces de son manager. Dans notre modèle, l'ingratiation s'exprime en termes de conformité d'opinion, lorsque l'employé déclare son opinion auprès du manager. Le favoritisme consiste à appliquer un biais dans le rapport que le manager adresse à la firme et qui est censé décrire son observation de la performance de l'employé. Nous déterminons d'abord le niveau optimal d'effort et l'opinion déclarée par l'employé, ainsi que le niveau du biais appliqué par le manager. Nous étudions ensuite les effets du favoritisme et de l'ingratiation sur les salaires et utilités espérés de l'employé et du manager, et sur le profit espéré de la firme.
    Keywords: opinion conformity,favoritism,organization,wage,organisation,favoritisme,ingratiation,conformité d'opinion,performance,salaire,profit
    Date: 2016–01
  8. By: Ester Manna (Universitat de Barcelona); Alessandro De Chiara (Central European University)
    Abstract: We consider a model in which a principal may delegate the choice of a project to a better informed agent. The preferences of the agent and the principal about which project should be undertaken can be discordant. Moreover, the agent benefits from being granted more discretion in the project choice and may be motivated by reciprocity. We find that the impact of the agent's reciprocity on the discretion he receives crucially depends on the conflict of interest with the principal. If preferences are very discordant, the principal is more likely to retain authority about the choice of the project when the agent is more reciprocal. Hence, reciprocity exacerbates a severe conflict of interest. In contrast, if preferences are more congruent, discretion is broader when the agent is more reciprocal. Hence, reciprocity mitigates a mild conflict of interest. In addition, we find that the possibility of being able to offer monetary payments to the agent can make the principal worse off when the agent reciprocates. We also empirically test the predictions of our model using the German Socio-Economic Panel finding some support for our theoretical results.
    Keywords: Authority, Delegation, Reciprocity.
    JEL: D03 D82 D83 D86
    Date: 2016
  9. By: Nathan Chappell (Motu Economic and Public Policy Research); Suzi Kerr (Motu Economic and Public Policy Research)
    Abstract: We combine survey and administrative data for about 13,000 firms from 2005 to 2013 to study the inter-relationships among firm characteristics, intangible investment and firm performance. We find that firm size is associated with higher intangible investment, while firm age, very low competition (‘captive market’) and very high competition (‘many competitors, none dominant’) are associated with lower intangible investment. Relating intangible investment to subsequent firm performance, we find that higher investment is associated with higher labour and capital input and higher revenue, relative to what would otherwise have been predicted. We also find that higher investment is associated with higher firm-reported employee and customer satisfaction, but is not associated with higher productivity or profitability. While we cannot estimate a causal model, the evidence suggests that intangible investment is associated with firm strategies related to growth and possibly to ‘soft’ performance objectives, but not to productivity or profitability.
    Keywords: Intangible investment; productivity; firm performance; industrial policy
    JEL: D22 D24 L21
    Date: 2016–09

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