nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2016‒07‒09
six papers chosen by
Patrick Kampkötter
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

  1. Spill over effects of executive incentives on corporate cash holdings: Evidene from Australia By Muhammad Atif; Benjamin Liu; Allen Huang
  2. Training, quality of management and firm level bargaining By Damiani, Mirella; Ricci, Andrea
  3. The magic of the personal touch: Field experimental evidence on money appreciation as gifts By Bradler, Christiane; Neckermann, Susanne
  4. Gender Differences in Risk-Taking: Evidence from Professional Basketball By Böheim, René; Freudenthaler, Christoph; Lackner, Mario
  5. Moneyball in Medicare By Edward C. Norton; Jun Li; Anup Das; Lena M. Chen
  6. Communication versus (Restricted) Delegation: An Experimental Comparison By Silvia Dominguez Martinez; Randolph Sloof

  1. By: Muhammad Atif; Benjamin Liu; Allen Huang
    Keywords: Cash holding, Australia, compensation, corporate governance
    JEL: G30 G32 G34 G38
    Date: 2016–06
  2. By: Damiani, Mirella; Ricci, Andrea
    Abstract: Abstract The double aim of this paper is to investigate the link between firm training behaviour and the adoption of performance-related pay (PRP) and to verify how the quality of management contributes to explaining the strength of this link. Using Ordinary Least Squares Estimates and Fixed Effect Estimates for a sample of Italian firms, we find that training is a significant determinant of firm level bargaining on PRP. Furthermore, we find that managerial quality plays a significant positive role and suggest that this is because managerial quality favours the evolution of social norms based on wage bonuses that enhance trust, sustain collaborative relationships and motivate co-workers to train each other. Jel Classifications: M53; M52; J50; I20
    Keywords: Keywords: Training; Compensation; Management; Education
    JEL: J3 J33 M52 M53
    Date: 2016–06–21
  3. By: Bradler, Christiane; Neckermann, Susanne
    Abstract: This paper makes use of two field experiments to explore individual effort responses to gifts. We extend the literature by looking at nonfinancial gifts and gifts that combine financial and nonfinancial elements with or without adding a 'personal touch.' We find that non-pecuniary gifts that signal worker appreciation induce reciprocity. Most importantly, we find that there are interaction effects between money and appreciation. While money and appreciation are individually effective, they only work well together when they are combined with a personal touch. This points to the importance of interpersonal elements in gift giving and has important implications for how to effectively elicit worker effort.
    Keywords: gift exchange,reciprocity,employee performance,pro-social behavior,gratitude,personal touch,field experiment
    JEL: C93 M52
    Date: 2016
  4. By: Böheim, René (University of Linz); Freudenthaler, Christoph (University of Linz); Lackner, Mario (University of Linz)
    Abstract: We analyze gender differences in risk-taking in high-pressure situations. Using novel data from professional athletes (NBA and WNBA), we find that male teams increase their risk-taking towards the end of matches when a successful risky strategy could secure winning the match. Female teams, in contrast, reduce their risk-taking in these situations. The less time left in a match, the larger is the gap. When the costs of an unsuccessful risky strategy are very large (losing the tournament), we find no increase in risk-taking for male teams.
    Keywords: risk-taking, gender differences, tournament incentives
    JEL: D81 J16 L83
    Date: 2016–06
  5. By: Edward C. Norton; Jun Li; Anup Das; Lena M. Chen
    Abstract: US policymakers place a high priority on tying Medicare payments to the value of care delivered. A critical part of this effort is the Hospital Value-based Purchasing Program (HVBP), which rewards or penalizes hospitals based on their quality and episode-based costs of care. Within HVBP, each patient affects hospital performance on a variety of quality and spending measures, and performance translates directly to changes in program points and ultimately dollars. In short, hospital revenue from a patient consists not only of the DRG payment, but also consists of that patient’s marginal future reimbursement. We estimate the magnitude of the marginal future reimbursement for individual patients across each type of quality and performance measure. We describe how those incentives differ across hospitals, including integrated and safety-net hospitals. We find some evidence that hospitals improved their performance over time in the areas where they have the highest marginal incentives to improve care.
    JEL: I11 I13 I18
    Date: 2016–06
  6. By: Silvia Dominguez Martinez (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands); Randolph Sloof (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands)
    Abstract: This paper reports the results from a laboratory experiment investigating a manager's decision whether or not to delegate authority to a better informed worker whose interests are often, but not always, congruent. Keeping authority implies a loss of information, as the worker communicates his information strategically. Delegating authority leads to a loss of control. A key aspect of our design is that the manager can restrict the worker's choice set when delegating authority. We find that, in case of delegation, managers (as predicted) put tighter restrictions when interests are less aligned. Workers send more informative messages under communication than predicted by the pure strategy equilibria. This finding neither appears to be driven by lying aversion of workers nor by credulity of managers. Qualitatively, our results are in line with a mixed strategy equilibrium under communication, which strictly outperforms optimal restricted delegation and is relatively close to the optimal stochastic mechanism in our setting.
    Keywords: Delegation; Communication; Laboratory Experiment; Organizational Economics
    JEL: C90 D80 M20
    Date: 2016–07–05

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