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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Joseph Lanfranchi (LEMMA - Laboratoire d'économie mathématique et de microéconomie appliquée - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche - Sorbonne Universités, CEE - Centre d'études de l'emploi - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche - Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Santé); Sanja Pekovic (University Paris-Dauphine DRM-DMSP (CNRS UMR 7088) - DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - CNRS - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine - DMSP - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine - CEE - Centre d'études de l'emploi - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche - Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Santé) |
| Abstract: | The implementation of environmental standards can be facilitated by motivating workers with pro-social preferences. Therefore, we study if employees working for firms achieving registration for environmental-related standards are more likely to display positive attitudes toward their job, to be actively involved in their jobs and to donate effort. Using a French matched employer-employee database, we find that these "green employees" report a significantly higher perception of usefulness and equitable recognition at work. Besides, they are more likely to work uncompensated overtime hours. Finally, if the adoption of environmental standards is shown to have no direct influence on job involvement, we expose how it indirectly impacts job involvement through the mediation of employees' reported perception of usefulness and equitable recognition at work. |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01081059&r=hrm |
| By: | Seeun Jung (ESSEC Business School - Essec Business School, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA) - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC), EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics); Radu Vranceanu (Economics Department - Essec Business School) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports results from a real-eort experiment in which men and women are paired to form a two-member team and asked to execute a real-effort task. Each participant receives an equal share of the team's output. Workers who perform better than their partner can punish him/her by imposing a fine. We manipulate the teams' gender composition (man-man, man-woman, and woman-woman) to analyze whether an individual's performance and sanctioning behavior depends on his/her gender and the gender interaction within the team. The data show that, on average, men perform slightly better than women. A man's performance will deteriorate when paired with a woman, while a woman's performance will improve when paired with a woman. When underperforming, women are sanctioned more often and more heavily than men; if sanctioned, men tend to improve their performance, while women's performance does not change. |
| Date: | 2015–06–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:hal-01171161&r=hrm |
| By: | Zafer; Emin (Department of Management, Ipek University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we experimentally investigate how goal setting and feedback policies affect work performance. In particular, we study the effects of (i) absolute performance feedback, (ii) self-specified goals and (iii) exogenous goals and relative performance feedback. Our results show that the average performance of the subjects who are provided self-performance feedback is 11% lower than the ones who get no feedback. Moreover, setting a non-binding personal goal does not affect performance. Finally, assigning an exogenous goal and providing relative performance feedback decreases performance by 8%. We discuss the insights our findings offer for the optimal design of goal setting and feedback mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | Feedback, Goal, Relative Performance, Piece-rate, Motivation |
| JEL: | M50 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipk:wpaper:1506&r=hrm |
| By: | T Azomahou (UNU-MERIT - UNU-MERIT - United Nations University - Maastricht University); Bity Diene (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I); Mbaye Diene (University Cheikh-Anta-Diop and CRES - University Cheikh-Anta-Diop and CRES - University Cheikh-Anta-Diop and CRES) |
| Abstract: | Several policies or interventions have been implemented in developing countries with the ultimate goal of improving educational outcomes and human capital. While lots of empirical studies have pointed to mixed results of these interventions, the role of uncertainty arising from the state of the nature about educational environment, household characteristics, along- side the efficiency of these interventions still lack economic mechanism. This paper aims at developing a theoretical framework that links policy interventions to educational outcomes. We characterize optimal policies and determine the conditions for enhancing social welfare. We also study the optimal growth of the economy under uncertainty and population heterogeneity when human capital is produced and used in the education sector. We show that the growth rate of the unskilled population has a direct impact on the growth of human and physical capitals. |
| Date: | 2015–07–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01144989&r=hrm |
| By: | Elise Huillery (ECON - Département d'économie - Sciences Po); Juliette Seban (ECON - Département d'économie - Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | Financial incentives for service providers are becoming a common strategy to improve service delivery. However, this strategy will only work if demand for the service responds as expected. Using a eld experiment in the Democratic Republic of Congo, we show that introducing a performance-based financing mechanism in the health sector has counterproductive effects because demand is non-standard: despite reduced prices and eased access, demand for health decreased, child health deteriorated, workers' revenue dropped. Ironically, expected perverse effects of incentives on worker behavior were not realized: incentives led to more effort from health workers on rewarded activities without deterring effort on non-rewarded activities, nor inducing significant score manipulation or free-riding. We also find a decline in worker motivation following the removal of the incentives, below what it would have been in the absence of exposure to the incentives. Management tools used in for-pro t sectors are thus inappropriate in non-pro t sectors such as health where user and worker rationalities are specific. |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01164460&r=hrm |
| By: | Calub, Renz Adrian |
| Abstract: | Physicians are expected to provide the best health care to their patients; however, it cannot be discounted that their practice is driven primarily by incentives. In this paper, we construct a physician utility maximization model that links physician quality to compensation schemes. Results show that relative to fixed payment, fee-for-service and mixed payment yield higher quality. Multinomial treatment effects regression of vignette scores on payment schemes also support this hypothesis, indicating that physicians are still below the best level of quality and that incentives to improve are still present. |
| Keywords: | Physician, quality of healthcare, incentives, compensation schemes |
| JEL: | I11 J44 |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:66038&r=hrm |
| By: | Adel Ben Youssef (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis); Ludivine Martin (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1); Nessrine Omrani (ADIS - Analyse des Dynamiques Industrielles et Sociales - UP11 - Université Paris-Sud - Paris 11 - Département d'Economie) |
| Abstract: | This article investigates the relationship between Information Technologies (IT), new organizational practices and workers' contextual performance in the European context. Our empirical results are based on data about more than 11000 employees from 16 European countries in 2005 and more than 16000 in 2010. First, we find asymmetric effects of IT use. Internet use is, indeed, positively related to all aspects of contextual performance in 2010, while computer use has been positively associated with contextual performance in 2005 but not in 2010. Second, we find that most of the considered new organizational practices have a positive relationship with employees' contextual performance. |
| Abstract: | Cet article analyse les relations entre les Technologies de l'Information (TI), les nouvelles pratiques organisationnelles et la performance contextuelle des employés dans le contexte européen. Nos résultats empiriques sont basés sur des bases de données concernant plus de 11 000 employés de 16 pays européens en 2005 et plus de 16 000 en 2010. Premièrement, nos résultats soulignent des effets asymétriques de l'usage des TI. L'usage d'Internet est, en effet, positivement lié à tous les aspects de la performance contextuelle en 2010, tandis que l'usage de l'informatique est associé positivement seulement à la performance contextuelle interpersonnelle en 2005. Deuxièmement, nous constatons que la plupart des nouvelles pratiques organisationnelles considérées ont une relation positive avec la performance contextuelle des employés. |
| Date: | 2014–07–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01068238&r=hrm |
| By: | Radu Vranceanu (ESSEC - Economics Department - Essec Business School); Fouad El Ouardighi (Operation management Department - Essec Business School); Delphine Dubart (ESSEC Business School - Essec Business School) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports the results from a real-effort team production experiment, where best performers can impose either tacit or explicit sanctions on their less-performing partners. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs from one condition to another. When explicit sanctions are not allowed, good performers reduce their effort in response to the advantageous difference in scores; when they can impose sanctions, their change in effort is no longer related to the difference in scores. To some extent, a mechanism of explicit sanctions allows good performers to focus on their own performance. Not sanctioning an opponent who under-performs, what we refer to as forgiveness, prompts the latter to improve his performance, but applying the sanction has a stronger effect. |
| Abstract: | L'article propose une étude expérimentale appliquée au problème du travail d'équipe. La tache consiste à compter le nombre d'occurrences du chiffre 7 dans des blocs de chiffre. Les équipes sont composées de deux joueurs. A chaque tour, le joueur qui fait le meilleur score peut appliquer une sanction à l'autre. Nous étudions les stratégies et les comportements des deux joueurs, dans une interaction qui dure quatre tours. |
| Date: | 2013–08–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00857364&r=hrm |
| By: | Burdín, Gabriel (Leeds University Business School); Halliday, Simon (Smith College); Landini, Fabio (LUISS Guido Carli University) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the role of autonomy and reciprocity in explaining control averse responses in principal-agents interactions. While most of the social psychology literature emphasizes the role of autonomy, recent economic research has provided an alternative explanation based on reciprocity. We propose a simple model and an experiment to test the relative strength of these two motives. We compare two treatments: one in which control is exerted directly by the principal (second-party control); and the other in which it is exerted by a third party enjoying no residual claimancy rights (third-party control). If control aversion is driven mainly by autonomy, then it should persist in the third-party treatment. Our results, however, suggest that this is not the case. Moreover, when a third party instead of the principal exerts control, control results in a greater expected profit for the principal. The implications of these results for organizational design are discussed. |
| Keywords: | third party, second party, control aversion, autonomy, principal-agent game, social preferences, trust, reciprocity |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D23 M54 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9251&r=hrm |