nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2014‒10‒03
eleven papers chosen by
Tommaso Reggiani
Universität zu Köln

  1. Explaining the Evolution of Educational Attainment in the U.S. By Rui CASTRO; Daniele COEN-PIRANI
  2. Estate Taxation and Human Capital with Information Externalities By Aaron Hedlund
  3. The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence By Xin Jin
  4. Management contradictions on the reforming of higher education system/ Управленческие противоречия реформирования системы высшего образования By Natalia Mayorova
  5. Who Are Poor and Do They Remain Poor? By Geoffrey M. Ducanes; Edita Abella Tan
  6. Optimal sorting in group contests with complementarities By Philip Brookins; John Lightle; Dmitry Ryvkin
  7. Values, Efficacy And Trust As Determinants Of Innovative Organizational Behaviour In Russia By Peter Schmidt; Nadezhda N. Lebedeva
  8. Salary Inequality, Team Success and the Superstar Effect By Philippe Cyrenne
  9. Hold-Up and the Use of Performance-Sensitive Debt By Adam, Tim R.; Streitz, Daniel
  10. Workplace Democracy and Job Flows By Guillermo Alves; Gabriel Burdin; Andres Dean
  11. Top Management Turnover and Corporate Governance in China: effects on innovation performance By Martha Prevezer; Lutao Ning; Yuandi Wang

  1. By: Rui CASTRO; Daniele COEN-PIRANI
    Abstract: We study the evolution of educational attainment of the 1932–1972 cohorts using a calibrated model of investment in human capital with heterogeneous learning ability. The inter-cohort variation in schooling is driven by changes in skill prices, tuition, and education quality over time, and average learning ability across cohorts. A version of the model with static expectations is successful in accounting for the main patterns in the data. Rising skill prices for college explain the rapid increase in college graduation till the 1948 cohort. The measured decline in average learning ability contributes to explain the stagnation in college graduation between the 1948 and 1972 cohorts.
    Keywords: educational attainment, human capital, skill prices, inequality, cohorts
    JEL: I24 J24 J31 O11
    Date: 2014
  2. By: Aaron Hedlund (Department of Economics, University of Missouri-Columbia)
    Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of estate taxation when firms cannot directly observe worker skill levels. Imperfect labor market signaling gives rise to an information externality that causes workers to free-ride off of others' human capital acquisition. Inherited wealth exacerbates the information externality because risk-averse workers with larger inheritances exert less effort to acquire skills. By reducing these inheritances, an estate tax induces greater skill acquisition effort, resulting in a higher number of skilled workers, and in many cases, increased wages and output. In a parametrized model, I establish that the optimal estate tax rate is significantly above zero.
    Keywords: information externalities, signaling, free-rider problem, labor markets, bequests, inheritance taxes
    JEL: D62 D82 E21 E24 E60 H21
    Date: 2014–08–08
  3. By: Xin Jin (Department of Economics, University of South Florida)
    Abstract: This article studies the negative signals associated with non-promotion. I first show theoretically that, when workers’ productivity rises little with additional years on the same job level, the negative signal associated with non-promotion leads to wage decreases. On the other hand, when additional job-level tenure leads to a sizable increase in productivity, workers’ wages increase. I test my model’s predictions using the personnel records from a large US firm from 1970-1988. I find a clear hump-shaped wage-job-tenure profile for workers who stay in the same job level, which supports my model’s prediction.
    Keywords: Asymmetric Information, Human Capital Accumulation, Signaling, Promotion, Wages
    JEL: J24 J31 M51
    Date: 2014–09
  4. By: Natalia Mayorova (Modern tradng "North-South" Department - Moscow State University of Food Production)
    Abstract: The article is devoted to management contradictions on modern reforms of higher education system. On the one hand, the higher education became a key factor of the human capital development. On the other hand, control system of development of the higher education becomes more and more oriented to redistributive relations.
    Date: 2013
  5. By: Geoffrey M. Ducanes (School of Economics, University of the Philippines Diliman); Edita Abella Tan (School of Economics, University of the Philippines Diliman)
    Abstract: This paper examines the link between poverty and income, on the one hand, and human capital and location, on the other. In the process, the paper proposes a shift in the household indicator of human capital from the usual education of the household head to the education of the most educated member. The paper finds poverty to be most severe and persistent for households with low human capital, and that the effect of human capital varies substantially across locations. Additionally, the paper finds that low human capital households tend to underinvest in the human capital of school-age members, thus likely perpetuating poverty.
    Keywords: human capital, poverty, chronic poverty, regional development, enrolment rates
    JEL: I32 J24 I21 R11
    Date: 2014–06
  6. By: Philip Brookins (Department of Economics, Florida State University); John Lightle (Department of Economics, Florida State University); Dmitry Ryvkin (Department of Economics, Florida State University)
    Abstract: Contests between groups of workers are often used to create incentives in organizations. Managers can sort workers into groups in various ways in order to maximize total output. We explore how the optimal sorting of workers by ability in such environments depends on the degree of effort complementarity within groups. For moderately steep costs of effort, we find that the optimal sorting is balanced (i.e., minimizing the variance in ability between groups) when complementarity is weak, and unbalanced (i.e., maximizing the variance in ability) when complementarity is strong. However, when the cost of effort is sufficiently steep, the optimal sorting can be unbalanced for all levels of complementarity or even alternate between unbalanced and balanced as the level of complementarity increases.
    Keywords: group contest, complementarity, sorting, heterogeneity
    JEL: D72 C72 C02
    Date: 2014–09
  7. By: Peter Schmidt (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Nadezhda N. Lebedeva (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
    Abstract: This study examines the relationship between values, efficacy, trust and innovative organizational behaviour in Russia. We analyse the direct and indirect effect of gender, age and education on innovative behaviour via values, trust and efficacy. For the measurement of values we employed a new revised value instrument with 19 values. We found that Openness to Change values had a significant positive effect and Conservation values a significant negative effect on innovative behaviour in organizations; efficacy and trust had a significant positive effect. Moreover, the effect of values is moderated by the level of efficacy. Gender, age and education directly influence innovative behaviour and determine such behaviour via values, efficacy and trust.
    Keywords: human values, innovation, innovative behaviour, trust, gender, education, region, age
    JEL: Z
    Date: 2014
  8. By: Philippe Cyrenne
    Abstract: In this paper, I examine the relationship between a professional sports team's salary distribution and its performance. I first develop a simple model of a team's salary distribution and then using data from the period covered by the recent Collective Bargaining Agreement between players and owners in the National Hockey League, I examine the relationship between a team's salary distribution and its winning percentage. Using a variety of estimators and a variety of measures to describe the distribution of player salaries on a team, I find that teams with higher relative payrolls and lower salary inequality have higher winning percentages. I also find evidence of a superstar effect, in that teams with a higher maximum player salary have higher winning percentages. The results are sensitive; however, to the particular measure of salary inequality used and the endogeneity of the salary distribution.
    Date: 2014–09
  9. By: Adam, Tim R.; Streitz, Daniel
    Abstract: We examine whether performance-sensitive debt (PSD) is used to reduce hold-up problems in long-term lending relationships. We find that the use of PSD is more common in the presence of a long-term lending relationship and if the borrower has fewer financing alternatives available. In syndicated deals, however, the presence of a relationship lead arranger reduces the use of PSD, which is consistent with hold-up being of lesser concern in such cases. Further, supporting our hypothesis that hold-up concerns motivate the use of PSD, we find a substitution effect between the use of PSD and the tightness of financial covenants.
    Keywords: Performance-sensitive debt; relationship lending; hold-up; holdout; syndicated debt; covenants
    JEL: G21 G31 G32
    Date: 2014
  10. By: Guillermo Alves (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía); Gabriel Burdin (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía); Andres Dean (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía)
    Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between workplace democracy and job flows (net job creations, gross job creations and destructions) by comparing the behavior of worker-managed firms (WMFs) and conventional firms. The empirical analysis relies on high frequency administrative firm-level panel data from Uruguay over the period April 1996-July 2009. The main findings of the paper are that (1) WMFs exhibit much more stable job dynamics than CFs; (2) both types of firms have decreasing in age and increasing in size gross job creation profiles; (3) there are heterogeneous employment regimes within WMFs: high job creation and destruction rates of hired workers and low job creation and destruction of members. This paper contributes to the literature on the role of institutions in shaping job flows. Our results have important implications for the understanding of the allocative efficiency effects of worker participation.
    Keywords: Job flows, Worker-managed firms
    JEL: D21 J54 J63
    Date: 2014–10
  11. By: Martha Prevezer; Lutao Ning; Yuandi Wang
    Abstract: Research Question: How does Chinese corporate governance in publicly-listed firms affect the relationship between innovation productivity and top management turnover? Is state shareholding in China a positive force for innovation productivity? Research Insights: A balance is maintained between the negative effect of (relatively high) top management turnover on investment horizons and innovation productivity, mitigated by positive effects of high state ownership, up to a certain level of ownership concentration. Beyond this level, potential for abuse by the dominant shareholder curtails positive effects on innovation. This contrasts with foreign dominant shareholders where no alignment between dominant shareholder and top management occurs and shorter investment horizons are preferred with lower innovation productivity. Theoretical Implications: In China, with state-held and controlled publicly listed firms, there is an alliance between the dominant shareholder and top management with relatively low employee protection and weak protection for lesser shareholders . This may have positive outcomes for long term innovation but may also lead to principal-principal abuses. Any such alliance needs to be tempered by stronger internal governance structures to protect minority shareholders. But stronger protection may in turn reduce investment horizons and lower innovation. Policy Implications: As well as strengthening external corporate governance mechanisms, insider corporate governance mechanisms need to be strengthened to discipline managers. However stronger countervailing powers to secondary shareholders, stronger Supervisory Board rights and greater independence of Directors may tend to decrease time horizons of investment for the firm and impede innovation.
    Keywords: Corporate governance, Top management turnover, innovation performance, China
    JEL: P3 L2 P5
    Date: 2014–09

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