nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2014‒01‒10
twelve papers chosen by
Tommaso Reggiani
University of Cologne

  1. Executive Compensation: Pay-for-Performance in High-Technology Firms By Paula Faria; Franscisco Vitorino Martins; Elísio Brandão
  2. Wage comparisons in and out of the firm. Evidence from a matched employer-employee French database By Olivier Godechot; Claudia Senik
  3. The level of CEO compensation for the short and long-term - a view on high-tech firms By Paula Faria; Franscisco Vitorino Martins; Elísio Brandão
  4. CEO compensation in high-tech firms and changes in the SFAS No 123 (R) By Paula Faria; Franscisco Vitorino Martins; Elísio Brandão
  5. Connect: Children with School and Workers with Wages in Bagladesh By PAUNIĆ, ALIDA
  6. Sabotage vs Discouragement: Which Dominates Post Promotion Tournament Behavior? By David Johnson; Timothy Salmon
  7. Bankruptcy Risk Induced by Career Concerns of Regulators By Godfrey Charles-Cadogan; John A. Cole
  8. The Love Aspects of Human Capital and the Economic Activity of Countries By Amavilah, Voxi Heinrich
  9. Performance optimization – "sometimes" – result creativity By Iacob, Constanta; Gheorghe, Cristina Mihaela
  10. Formal planning and the reshaping of public sector professional work By Maria Lusiani
  11. Information Sharing and Incentives in Organizations By Jean-Etienne de Bettignies; Jan Zabojnik
  12. Skill premia and intergenerational education mobility: The French case By B. Ben-Halima; Nathalie Chusseau; Joel Hellier

  1. By: Paula Faria (School of Economics and Management, University of Porto); Franscisco Vitorino Martins (School of Economics and Management, University of Porto); Elísio Brandão (School of Economics and Management, University of Porto)
    Abstract: This study examines the relationship between corporate performance and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation in high-technology firms in the S&P 500. The total short- and long-term CEO compensation in high-technology was compared with other industrial sectors from standard classification codes and tested in terms of corporate performance. The ExecuComp database was used to find the variables and to create a sample of firms between 2004 and 2010. Important corporate performance variables are used in this work, such as assets, employees, sales, net income, and earnings per share (EPS), as reported by the firms for each year. A panel data GLS with a fixed effect model for time is estimated that describes total compensation for the period between 2004 and 2010. The result was aligned with the theory of executive compensations to address agency problems and to examine CEO pay-for-performance. The main objective of this paper is to consistently demonstrate that the performance is determined for the total CEO compensation for short- and long-term periods and to examine whether the total remuneration paid to CEOs in high-technology firms in the S&P 500 is related to corporate finance. This work provides a better understanding of the relationship between compensation and performance in high-technology firms. Results suggest that high-tech firms tend to use more sophisticated performance measurements to determine CEO compensation.
    Keywords: corporate finance, CEO compensation, accounting
    JEL: G30 M52 M41
    Date: 2013–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:por:fepwps:517&r=hrm
  2. By: Olivier Godechot (Sciences Po, MaxPo and OSC-CNRS); Claudia Senik (University Paris-Sorbonne and PSE)
    Abstract: This paper looks at the association between wage satisfaction and different notions of reference wage, based on a matched employer-employee dataset. It shows that workers’ satisfaction depends on other-people’s income in different ways. Relative income concerns are important, but we also find robust evidence of signal effects. For instance, workers are happier the higher the median wage in their firm, holding their own wage constant. This is true of all employees, whatever their relative position in the firm. This signal effect is stronger for young people and for women. These findings are based on objective measures of earnings as well as subjective declarations about wage satisfaction, awareness of other people’s wage and reported income comparisons.
    Keywords: Income comparisons, income distribution, job satisfaction, wage satisfaction, signal effect, matched employer-employee survey data.
    JEL: D31 D63 I30 J28 J31
    Date: 2013–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inq:inqwps:ecineq2013-311&r=hrm
  3. By: Paula Faria (School of Economics and Management, University of Porto); Franscisco Vitorino Martins (School of Economics and Management, University of Porto); Elísio Brandão (School of Economics and Management, University of Porto)
    Abstract: This study examines the relationship between corporate performance and the Chief Executive Officer compensation in high-technology firms in the S&P 1500. The total CEO compensation and short and long-term compensations were tested regarding corporate performance. A panel data SUR model is estimated and describes the total compensation and cash compensation as a proportion of total pay for the period between 2000 and 2010 in high-technologies firms. The findings indicate that there is a strong and positive relation between CEO compensation and firm performance. This econometric study provides a better understanding on the relationship between CEO compensation and performance in high-technologies firms.
    Keywords: Corporate finance, Executive compensation, Accounting
    JEL: G30 M52 M41
    Date: 2013–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:por:fepwps:519&r=hrm
  4. By: Paula Faria (School of Economics and Management, University of Porto); Franscisco Vitorino Martins (School of Economics and Management, University of Porto); Elísio Brandão (School of Economics and Management, University of Porto)
    Abstract: This study examines the effects of the introduction of the FASB statement 123 (R) on corporate performance and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation in high-technology firms. The total CEO compensation and short- and long-term compensations were tested regarding corporate performance. Panel data SUR models were estimated that describe total compensation and cash compensation as a proportion of total pay for the period between 2000 and 2010. The findings indicate that there is a positive relation between CEO compensation and firm performance in high-tech firms after the FASB statement 123 (R) is implemented, but with less intensity than before. This econometric study provides a better understanding of the relationship between CEO compensation and performance in high-technologies firms before and after the FASB statement 123 (R).
    Keywords: Executive compensation, Corporate finance, FASB statement 123 (R)
    JEL: M52 G30 M48
    Date: 2013–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:por:fepwps:518&r=hrm
  5. By: PAUNIĆ, ALIDA
    Abstract: Recent attempts of wage rise , problems of security at work place as well as many findings about child labor in Bangladesh were primary cause of writing this paper. But problems have deep roots: from world separation of capital and labor, profit increasing scenarios with labor inputs, human rights to work and get paid to environmental problems connected to increased production in the region. How to induce pay rise to average world level, forbid child labor, induce regional cooperation, are just a few questions that are tried to answer in paper
    Keywords: Wages, Labor,Taxes, Planning,Development
    JEL: J3 O2
    Date: 2014–01–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:52711&r=hrm
  6. By: David Johnson (University of Calgary); Timothy Salmon
    Abstract: We explore the behavior of losers of promotional tournaments after the tournament is concluded. We do so through the use of an experiment in which we vary the design of the promotion tournament to determine how tournament design affects effort. We provide a theoretical model demonstrating two possible effects from the tournaments which are strategic sabotage and the possibility that a worker becomes discouraged by the tournament outcome. We examine behavior after the tournament and Â…find evidence suggesting that bad tournament design can lead to workers being discouraged. This discouragement expect is strong for low ability workers but not for high ability workers. On the other hand we do Â…find evidence that some high ability workers engage in strategic sabotage but the incidence does not vary with the design of the promotion tournament.
    Keywords: Sabotage, Experiment, Tournament Design
    JEL: C90 C91 D03 J32 J33
    Date: 2013–12–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clg:wpaper:2013-31&r=hrm
  7. By: Godfrey Charles-Cadogan; John A. Cole
    Abstract: We introduce a model in which a regulator employs mechanism design to embed her human capital beta signal(s) in a firm's capital structure, in order to enhance the value of her post career change indexed executive stock option contract with the firm. We prove that the agency cost of this revolving door behavior increases the firm's financial leverage, bankruptcy risk, and affects estimation of firm value at risk (VaR).
    Date: 2013–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1312.7346&r=hrm
  8. By: Amavilah, Voxi Heinrich
    Abstract: The influence of non-economic factors and forces on economic activities and their outcomes is undeniable. Love, being so central to many human activities, should similarly have some effects on the economic activity of nations. This paper (a) builds a simple but innovative model, (b) imposes it on a limited data set to estimate the effects of love experience and feeling on the economic activity of a group of 133 countries, and (3) compares such effects to those of other determinants of the economic activity, including Barro-Lee human capital, openness, and physical capital, as well as a broad measure of national well-being, HDI. The results strongly favor physical capital followed, by HDI and Barro-Lee human capital. Although small in magnitude, love effects are more statistically significant than those of openness. There appears to be some multicollinearity and model functional issues which challenge the robustness of the estimates and call for further research. However, the technical efficiency of the estimates is reasonable, so that one may conclude that love is important, but not critical to economic activity. The policy implications call for more investment in physical capital, schooling, and in the overall improvement of human development than in love experience and feeling, even though those are important too.
    Keywords: Love capital, Barro-Lee human capital, Mincer human capital formula, economic activity
    JEL: C21 C51 I0 J12 O15 O47 Z13
    Date: 2013–12–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:52686&r=hrm
  9. By: Iacob, Constanta; Gheorghe, Cristina Mihaela
    Abstract: Seen first as an art, " dell'arte della scrittura venezziana " as he called Luke Paciolo accounting became in turn a technique , a science , a language formalized a social game and, more recently , a techno- science. Long preserved and still used the phrase " art of manipulating figures " which is not far from the truth if we consider the professional accountant freedom to choose between two or more accounting policy choice of the best options is dependent a multitude of factors including its ingenuity . Ingenuity , as well as imagination , novelty , originality and creativity are attributes that led the accounting field coverage of a certain reality , as desired and as there are not . Talking about the performance is natural to ask the following questions : is there a dose of fiction in it ? , That the steps in obtaining and menţienerea performance management may be considered constructive practices and practices with negative meanings ?
    Keywords: Accounting, creativity, performance, gain, competitive advantage
    JEL: M20 M41
    Date: 2014–01–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:52730&r=hrm
  10. By: Maria Lusiani (Dept. of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venice)
    Abstract: This paper deals with the ÔmanagerializationÕ of public sector professional work. Specifically, it will focus on the role of formal planning practices (as expressed in strategic planning, project management and budgeting practices) in changing public sector professional work. Planning and accounting are at the heart of public sector reforms, responding to a logic of having public service professionals transparent on what they do, on how they pursue their goals, and accountable on the use of resources and on results. Thus planning and accounting practices have been transferred from private sector management models to public, professional organizations. Yet public sector professional organizations can be conceived as a pluralistic setting characterized by diffuse power, fragmented objectives and knowledgebased and are deeply embedded in public administration regulatory logics: how can management models deriving from private, hierarchical firms be applied to the specificities and complexities of public, pluralistic settings? What is the specific meaning of formal planning practices in such complex contexts? Based on a qualitative, single case study design, this paper will show how the planning system (in its manifestation of strategic planning, project management and budgeting) applied in a public hospital apparently ÔfailsÕ when its deliberate role of serving as a tool for decisions is considered. Yet it is widely in use and widely accepted by professionals as well. Conclusions on the value of formal planning when other emergent roles are taken into account will be discussed.
    Keywords: Planning, public sector, professionals, managerialism.
    JEL: M10
    Date: 2013–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vnm:wpdman:69&r=hrm
  11. By: Jean-Etienne de Bettignies (Queen); Jan Zabojnik (Queen)
    Abstract: We examine optimal information flows between a manager and a worker who is in charge of evaluating a parameter of interest, e.g. the value of a project. The manager may possesses information about the parameter, and, if informed, may divulge her information to the worker. We show that information sharing may weaken the worker's incentives and that, consequently, the manager may find it optimal to conceal her information from the worker. Moreover, the manager faces a time-inconsistency problem, which leads her to conceal her information more often than she would if she could commit to an information sharing policy. We build on these results to address issues related to authority in organizations.
    Keywords: Information non-disclosure, expert evaluation, agency costs, authority
    JEL: D21 D82 L23
    Date: 2013–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qed:wpaper:1321&r=hrm
  12. By: B. Ben-Halima (EQUIPPE, University of Lille 1, France); Nathalie Chusseau (EQUIPPE, University of Lille 1, France); Joel Hellier (EQUIPPE, University of Lille 1 and LEMNA, IEMN-IAE, France)
    Abstract: In the case of France, we analyse the changes in the wage value of each education level and the impact of parents' education and income upon the education attainment of children, sons and daughters. We find a critical decline in the skill premium of the Baccalaureat (`bac') in relation to the lowest educational level, and an increase in the skill premia of higher education degrees in relation to the bac, which is however not large enough to erase the decrease in all the skill premia relative to the lowest education. We also find a significant rise in the impact of family backgrounds upon education from 1993 to 2003, i.e. a decrease in intergenerational education mobility, which primarily derives from higher impact of parental incomes. Finally, the gender wage gap is particularly large for the lowest and the highest education degrees, and ntergenerational persistence is greater for sons than for daughters.
    Keywords: Family backgrounds, intergenerational education mobility, skill premium.
    JEL: I2 J24 J31
    Date: 2013–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inq:inqwps:ecineq2013-313&r=hrm

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