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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Ellen P. Green (Department of Economics,University of Delaware) |
| Abstract: | Policy makers and the healthcare industry have proposed changes to physician payment structures as a way to improve the quality of health care and reduce costs. Several of these proposals require healthcare providers to employ a valuebased purchasing program (also known as pay-for-performance [P4P]). However, the way in which existing payment structures impact physician behavior is unclear and, therefore, predicting how well P4P will perform is difficult. To understand the impact physician payment structures have on physician behavior, I approximate the physician-patient relationship in a real-effort laboratory experiment. I study several prominent physician payment structures including feefor- service, capitation, salary, and P4P. I find that physicians are intrinsically motivated to provide high quality care and relying exclusively on extrinsic incentives to motivate physicians is detrimental to the quality of care and costly for the healthcare industry. |
| Keywords: | Physician Payment System, Laboratory Experiment, Incentives, Fee-for-Service, Capitation, Salary, Report Cards, Pay-for-Performance, Crowd Out |
| JEL: | C9 I1 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dlw:wpaper:13-05.&r=hrm |
| By: | Paul H. Kupiec (American Enterprise Institute) |
| Abstract: | In a financial intermediary, risk managers can expend effort to reduce loan probability of default and loss given default, but effort is unobservable. Incentive compensation (IC) can induce manager effort. When deposit insurance is subsidized, the demand for risk management declines. Regulatory policy should then reinforce incentives to offer risk mangers appropriate IC contracts. |
| Keywords: | AEI Economic Policy Working Paper Series |
| JEL: | A G |
| Date: | 2013–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aei:rpaper:39230&r=hrm |
| By: | Kempf, Alexander; Pütz, Alexander; Sonnenburg, Florian |
| Abstract: | We study the decisions and performance of managers who are also chair of the board (duality managers). We hypothesize that duality managers take more risky decisions and deliver worse performance than non-duality managers due to reduced level of control and replacement risk. Using the mutual fund industry as our laboratory we provide strong support for these hypotheses: Duality managers take risk that they could easily avoid, deviate from their benchmarks, make extreme decisions, and, consequently, deliver extreme performance outcomes. Furthermore, their average underperformance is 2.5 percent. All effects are the stronger, the more power the manager has in the board. -- |
| Keywords: | Manager duality,governance,managerial decisions,agency conflicts,mutual funds |
| JEL: | G23 G34 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cfrwps:1206r&r=hrm |