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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Vranceanu, Radu (ESSEC Business School); El Ouardighi, Fouad (ESSEC Business School); Dubart , Delphine (ESSEC Business School) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports the results from a real-effort team production experiment, where best performers can impose either tacit or explicit sanctions on their less-performing partners. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs from one condition to another. When explicit sanctions are not allowed, good performers reduce their effort in response to the advantageous difference in scores; when they can impose sanctions, their change in effort is no longer related to the difference in scores. To some extent, a mechanism of explicit sanctions allows good performers to focus on their own performance. Not sanctioning an opponent who under-performs, what we refer to as forgiveness, prompts the latter to improve his performance, but applying the sanction has a stronger effect. |
| Keywords: | Team work; Performance; Experimental economics; Punishment |
| JEL: | C92 D03 M52 |
| Date: | 2013–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-13010&r=hrm |
| By: | Johansson, Anders C. (Stockholm China Economic Research Institute); Feng, Xunan (Shanghai University) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates CEO incentives in Chinese state-controlled firms. We find that firm performance has a positive effect on CEO compensation. We also find that firm performance is positively associated with CEO promotion and negatively associated with CEO turnover. CEOs for state-controlled firms thus face significant incentives, not only in monetary form, but also in terms of career prospects. These results suggest that the CEO labor market in the Chinese state sector exhibits characteristics similar to those of managerial labor markets in developed countries, at least during our sample period. Moreover, we show that local institutions have a significant impact on the relationship between CEO incentives and firm performance, with performance having a larger effect on CEO compensation, promotion and turnover in regions characterized by stronger institutions. Overall, our results demonstrate that firm performance is associated with CEO incentives also for state-controlled firms in China, suggesting that there is a functioning labor market for top managers in the Chinese state sector. |
| Keywords: | State-controlled firms; Managerial labor market; Performance; CEO compensation; CEO promotion; CEO turnover; China |
| JEL: | G30 G38 J30 M52 P30 |
| Date: | 2013–09–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:hascer:2013-027&r=hrm |
| By: | McCormack, John; Propper, Carol; Smith, Sarah L. |
| Abstract: | Using a tried and tested measure of management practices which has been shown to predict firm performance, we survey nearly 250 departments across 100+ UK universities. We find large differences in management scores across universities and that departments in older, research-intensive universities score higher than departments in newer, more teaching-oriented universities. We also find that management matters in universities. The scores, particularly with respect to provision of incentives for staff recruitment, retention and promotion, are correlated with both teaching and research performance conditional on resources and past performance. Moreover, this relationship holds for all universities, not just research-intensive ones. |
| Keywords: | management practices; performance; universities |
| JEL: | I32 M51 M54 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9560&r=hrm |
| By: | Hijzen, Alexander (OECD); Mondauto, Leopoldo (IMT Lucca); Scarpetta, Stefano (OECD) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the impact of employment protection (EP) on the composition of the workforce and worker turnover using a unique firm-level dataset for Italy. The impact of employment protection is analyzed by means of a regression discontinuity design (RDD) that exploits the variation in EP provisions across firms below and above a size threshold. Using our RDD approach, we show that EP increases worker reallocation, suggesting that EP tends to reduce rather to increase worker security on average. We further show that this can be entirely explained by the fact that firms facing more stringent EP make a greater use of workers on temporary contracts. Our preferred estimates suggest that the discontinuity in EP increases the incidence of temporary work by 2-2.5 percentage points around the threshold. Moreover, further analysis suggests that the effect of employment protection persists among larger firms well beyond the threshold and may account for about 20% of the overall incidence of temporary work. There is also evidence that EP reduces labour productivity and this effect is to an important extent due to the impact of EP on worker reallocation and the incidence of temporary work. |
| Keywords: | employment protection legislation, worker reallocation, temporary contracts, labour market duality |
| JEL: | J42 J63 J65 |
| Date: | 2013–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7594&r=hrm |
| By: | Kumler, Todd J. (Columbia University); Verhoogen, Eric (Columbia University); Frias, Judith A. (Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS)) |
| Abstract: | Non-compliance of firms with tax regulations is a major constraint on state capacity in developing countries. We focus on an arguably under-appreciated dimension of non-compliance: under-reporting of wages by formal firms to evade payroll taxes. We develop a simple partial-equilibrium model of endogenous compliance by heterogeneous firms to guide the empirical investigation. We then compare two independent sources of individual-level wage information from Mexico – firms' wage reports to the Mexican social security agency and workers' responses to a household labor-force survey – to investigate the extent of wage under-reporting and how it responded to an important change in the social security system. We document that under-reporting by formal firms is extensive, and that compliance is better in larger firms. Using a difference-in-differences strategy based on the 1997 Mexican pension reform, which effectively tied pension benefits more closely to reported wages for younger workers than for older workers, we show that the reform led to a relative decline in under-reporting for younger workers. Within metro area/sector/firm size cells, the decline in under-reporting was greater in cells initially employing a younger workforce on average. The empirical patterns are consistent with our theoretical model and suggest that giving employees incentives and information to improve the accuracy of employer reports can be an effective way to improve payroll-tax compliance. |
| Keywords: | tax compliance, state capacity, Mexico, heterogeneous firms, pension reform |
| JEL: | O17 H26 H55 |
| Date: | 2013–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7591&r=hrm |
| By: | Stefano Bosi; Lionel Ragot |
| Abstract: | On the one hand, the adoption of polluting technologies can enhance the factor productivity; on the other hand, pollution lowers the stock of human capital by weakening physical and mental performances, and short-ening the life expectancy at the end. To capture the impact of pollution on economic growth, we compute the optimal policy in an endogenous growth model `a la Lucas (1988) and we study the effects of pollution in the short and the long run. |
| Keywords: | pollution, human capital, endogenous growth |
| JEL: | D90 J24 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2013-25&r=hrm |
| By: | Natalia Danzer; Victor Lavy |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the question whether long-term human capital outcomes are affected by the duration of maternity leave, i.e. by the time mothers spend at home with their newborn before returning to work. Employing RD and difference-in-difference approaches, this paper exploits an unanticipated reform in Austria which extended the maximum duration of paid and job protected parental leave from 12 to 24 months for children born on July 1, 1990 or later. We use test scores from the Austrian PISA test of birth cohorts 1990 and 1987 as measure of human capital. The evidence suggest no significant overall impact of the extended parental leave mandate on standardized test scores at age 15, but that the subgroup of boys of highly educated mothers have benefited from this reform while boys of low educated mothers were harmed by it. |
| JEL: | J13 J22 J24 |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19452&r=hrm |