nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2013‒06‒04
24 papers chosen by
Tommaso Reggiani
University of Cologne

  1. Surprising Gifts - Theory and Laboratory Evidence By Kiryl Khalmetski; Axel Ockenfels; Peter Werner
  2. The Lemons Problem in a Labor Market with Intrinsic Motivation. When Higher Salaries Pay Worse Workers By F. Barigozzi; D. Raggi
  3. Post Schooling Human Capital Investments and the Life Cycle Variance of Earnings By Magnac, Thierry; Pistolesi, Nicolas; Roux, Sébastien
  4. The Effects of Work Values and Work Centrality on Job Satisfaction. A Study With Older Spanish Workers By Orgambídez-Ramos, Alejandro; Mendoza-Sierra, M. Isabel; Giger, Jean-Christophe
  5. Overtime Working and Contract Efficiency By Hart, Robert A; Ma, Yue
  6. The Balance of Brains: Corruption and High Skilled Migration By Andrea ARIU; Pasquamaria SQUICCIARINI
  7. Organizational Culture and Subjective and Work Well-being. The Case of Employees of Portuguese Universities By Santos, Joana; Gonçalves, Gabriela; Gomes, Alexandra
  8. Why Do People Volunteer? An Experimental Analysis of Preferences for Time Donations By Alexander L. Brown; Jonathan Meer; J. Forrest Williams
  9. CEO Pay and Firm Size: an Update after the Crisis By Xavier Gabaix; Augustin Landier; Julien Sauvagnat
  10. Survival or performance? Healthcare viewed through organization, information management, and personnel By Kauhanen, Antti; Kulvik, Martti; Maijanen, Sirpa; Martikainen, Olli; Ranta, Paula; Kulvik, Silja
  11. The democratisation of innovation: Managing technological innovation as if people matter By PH Spies
  12. Impact of Board Structure and Process on Cooperative Performance By Franken, Jason R.V.; Cook, Michael L.
  13. What Are Error Rates for Classifying Teacher and School Performance Using Value-Added Models? By Peter Z. Schochet; Hanley S. Chiang
  14. Corporate Profit, Entrepreneurship Theory and Business Ethics By Vranceanu , Radu
  15. Can You Trust the Good Guys? Trust Within and Between Groups with Different Missions By Fehrler, Sebastian; Kosfeld, Michael
  16. Bonus Schemes and Trading Activity By Pikulina, E.S.; Renneboog, L.D.R.; Horst, J.R. ter; Tobler, P.N.
  17. EXPERTS’ AWARDS AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS: EVIDENCE FROM AN ITALIAN LITERARY PRIZE By Michela Ponzo; Vincenzo Scoppa
  18. Towards autonomous decision-making: A probabilistic model for learning multi-user preferences By Peters, M.; Ketter, W.
  19. Justification and Legitimate Punishment By Xiao, Erte; Tan, Fangfang
  20. Taking Punishment into your Own Hands: An Experiment By Julia Mueller; Peter Duersch
  21. The role of early career factors in academic patenting By Lawson Cornelia; Sterzi Valerio
  22. Firms as Persons By Richard Adelstein
  23. Organizational Well-being Factors. Determinants of Entrepreneurship in Small and Medium Companies of the Defense Sector By Almeida, Helena; Peñalver, Briones
  24. Effectiveness of a Stress Management Training on Motivation and Well-being By Jesus, Saul; Rus, Claudia; Tobal, Juan

  1. By: Kiryl Khalmetski; Axel Ockenfels; Peter Werner
    Abstract: People do not only feel guilt from not living up to others' expectations (Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)), but may also like to exceed them. We propose a model that generalizes the guilt aversion model to capture the possibility of positive surprises when making gifts. A model extension allows decision makers to care about others' attribution of intentions behind surprises. We test the model in two dictator game experiments. Experiment 1 shows a strong causal effect of recipients' expectations on dictators' transfers. Moreover, in line with our model, the correlation between transfers and expectations can be both, positive and negative, obscuring the effect in the aggregate. Experiment 2 shows that dictators care about what recipients know about the intentions behind surprises.
    Keywords: guilt aversion, surprise seeking, dictator game, consensus effect
    JEL: C91 D64
    Date: 2013–05–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kls:series:0061&r=hrm
  2. By: F. Barigozzi; D. Raggi
    Abstract: We study the Lemons Problem when workers have private information on both their skills and their intrinsic motivation for the job offered by firms in the labor market. We first show that, when workers are motivated, inefficiencies due to adverse selection are mitigated. More interestingly, depending on the association between productivity and motivation, higher salaries affect the pool of candidates in three possible ways: they can attract (i) more skilled but less motivated applicants, as expected; (ii) more skilled and more motivated applicants; (iii) less skilled and less motivated applicants. The last two counterintuitive effects can only occur when a positive correlation exists between productivity and motivation. Our results are relevant in the policy debate on whether it is possible to improve the quality of workers in vocational markets by changing their wage rate and allow to reconcile the different empirical evidence provided so far on motivated workers as teachers, nurses, public servants and politicians.
    JEL: J24 D82 D40
    Date: 2013–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp883&r=hrm
  3. By: Magnac, Thierry (University of Toulouse I); Pistolesi, Nicolas (Toulouse School of Economics); Roux, Sébastien (CREST-INSEE)
    Abstract: We propose an original model of human capital investments after leaving school in which individuals differ in their initial human capital obtained at school, their rate of return, their costs of human capital investments and their terminal values of human capital at a fixed date in the future. We derive a tractable reduced form Mincerian model of log earnings profiles along the life cycle which is written as a linear factor model in which levels, growth and curvature of earnings profiles are individual-specific. Using panel data from a single cohort of French male wage earners observed over a long span of 30 years, a random effect model is estimated first by pseudo maximum likelihood methods. This step is followed by a simple second step fixed effect method by which individual-specific structural parameters are estimated. This allows us to test restrictions, compute counterfactual profiles and evaluate how earnings inequality over the life-cycle is affected by changes in structural parameters. Under some conditions, even small changes in life expectancy seem to imply large changes in earnings inequality.
    Keywords: human capital investment, earnings dynamics, post-schooling earnings growth, dynamic panel data
    JEL: C33 D91 I24 J24 J31
    Date: 2013–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7407&r=hrm
  4. By: Orgambídez-Ramos, Alejandro (University of Algarve); Mendoza-Sierra, M. Isabel (University of Huelva); Giger, Jean-Christophe (University of Algarve)
    Abstract: Since workforces are ageing throughout Europe, interest in the role of age in the workplace is increasing. Older workers with high work centrality are more likely to negotiate a relational contract and express higher levels of job satisfaction than older workers with low work centrality (Armstrong-Stassen and Schlosser, 2008). This study examines the role of work centrality and valued work outcomes as antecedents of job satisfaction. A cross sectional study using questionnaires was conducted. The sample consisted of 203 Spanish employees (Mage = 55.78, SD = 3.01). Hierarchical multiple regression analyses have revealed that job satisfaction was significantly predicted by needed income and work centrality. When work is not an important part of older workers’ lives, they will prefer extrinsic outcomes and will not invest in the relationship with their organization (Grant & Wade-Benzoni, 2009). Implications for research and theory are explored in the conclusion.
    Keywords: Job Satisfaction; Work Values; Ageism; Work Centrality
    JEL: I10
    Date: 2013–05–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:cieodp:2013_015&r=hrm
  5. By: Hart, Robert A; Ma, Yue
    Abstract: We present a wage-hours contract designed to minimize costly turnover given investments in specific training combined with firm and worker information asymmetries. It may be optimal for the parties to work ‘long hours' remunerated at premium rates for guaranteed overtime hours. Based on British plant and machine operatives, we test three predictions. First, trained workers with longer tenure are more likely to work overtime. Second, hourly overtime pay exceeds the value of marginal product while the basic hourly wage is less than the value of marginal product. Third, the basic hourly wage is negatively related to the overtime premium.
    Keywords: Paid overtime, wage-hours contract, plant and machine operatives
    Date: 2013–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:stl:stledp:2013-07&r=hrm
  6. By: Andrea ARIU (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) and FNRS); Pasquamaria SQUICCIARINI (KULeuven, LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance and Department of Economics)
    Abstract: In a mobile labor market, a high emigration rate of high skilled workers is not necessarily a problem, if counterbalanced by a high immigration rate. However, some countries experience a net gain of high skilled while others a net loss. Corruption is part of the explanation, acting through two different channels: first, it pushes skilled natives to virtuous countries, where they can find a job based on meritocratic criteria; second, it discourages the entry of foreign talents, which would hardly have access to string-pulling recommendations. This might induce a prolonged loss in human capital and vanish investments in education.
    Keywords: migration, high-skilled, corruption
    Date: 2013–05–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvir:2013010&r=hrm
  7. By: Santos, Joana (University of Algarve); Gonçalves, Gabriela (University of Algarve); Gomes, Alexandra (University of Algarve)
    Abstract: This study investigated the determination of Organizational Culture on the Well-Being at Work and determination on the Subjective Well-being of employees of Public Institutions of Higher Education in Portugal. The final total sample had 635 participants, employees of Portuguese Public Higher Education Institutions. The hierarchical regression shows a significant effect of Organizational Culture on the criterion variable, Subjective Well-Being. By adding Well-Being at Work, it increased the explanatory power of the model. It was still possible to establish a structural equation model, which considers the determination of Support Organizational Culture on Well-being at Work and this on Well-being Professional. These results reveal the importance of organizations implementing a culture of support, particularly in ensuring the Well-being of its employees.
    Keywords: Organizational Culture; Subjective Well-Being; Well-Being at Work
    JEL: L32 M14
    Date: 2013–05–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:cieodp:2013_013&r=hrm
  8. By: Alexander L. Brown; Jonathan Meer; J. Forrest Williams
    Abstract: We conduct a laboratory experiment to test if there are differences in behavior when subjects can donate either time or money to charity. Our subjects perform an effort task to earn money. In one condition they can have their efforts accrue to a charity instead of themselves. In other conditions subjects may only earn money for their private account but then donate it to a charity. We vary the timing and availability of donation opportunities in the monetary donation settings to test the impact of subtle solicitation pressure. We find that subjects with a more opportunities to donate will donate more often and in larger amounts. Further, subjects giving effort to charity give far more than subjects who give monetary donations – between two and five times as much, on average. We posit that this difference is driven by different warm glow from the two donation types.
    JEL: D64 H41
    Date: 2013–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19066&r=hrm
  9. By: Xavier Gabaix; Augustin Landier; Julien Sauvagnat
    Abstract: In the "size of stakes" view quantitatively formalized in Gabaix and Landier (2008), CEO compensation is determined in a competitive talent market, and reflects the size of firms affected by talent. This paper offers an empirical update on this view. The years 2004-2011, which include the recent crisis, were not part of the initial study and offer a laboratory to examine the theory as they include new positive and negative shocks to the size of large firms. Executive compensation at the top (ex ante) did closely track the evolution of average firm value during those years. During the crisis (2007 - 2009), average total firm value decreased by 17%, and CEO pay decreased by 28%. During 2009-2011, we observe a rebound of firm value by 19% and of CEO pay increased by 22%. These fairly proportional changes provide a validity check in favor of the "size of stakes" view.
    JEL: G3 J2
    Date: 2013–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19078&r=hrm
  10. By: Kauhanen, Antti; Kulvik, Martti; Maijanen, Sirpa; Martikainen, Olli; Ranta, Paula; Kulvik, Silja
    Abstract: This report is an overview to the presentations and discussions in the seminar Survival or performance? Healthcare viewed through organization, information management, and personnel held on 3.9.2012. The seminar provided an interdisciplinary forum for the question how the health care system may overcome its present challenges
    Keywords: health care, work organization, processes, information technology
    JEL: I11 I12 M15
    Date: 2013–05–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rif:report:12&r=hrm
  11. By: PH Spies (Institute for Futures Research, University of Stellenbosch)
    Abstract: Innovation is the transformation of a new idea or scientific discovery into technology through introducing, applying, and integrating it in common practice. The outcome is that people can progressively do more with the same effort, produce different outcomes with the same artefacts and produce outcomes in new and novel ways. Historically this process favoured the (largely Western-style) industrial world and today some 85 percent of global wealth is owned by just 10 percent of the global population. Empoverished people seem to find themselves in a low level human development trap. The focus of this working paper is on innovation management in less-developed poor communities. Its central hypothesis is that endemic (human-centred) technological innovation rather than ‘technology transfer’ (artefact-centred innovation) can help to alleviate this situation. Two concepts from the natural sciences serve as metaphors for the intrinsic systemic and embodied nature of sustainable technological innovation: • ‘Ecosystem’ to highlight the determining role of interactivity with the circumstances under which people exist; and • ‘Endemic’ to highlight the importance of intrinsic innovativeness as both an outcome and a cause of human development. The paper postulates that the innovation challenge is perhaps less procedural and more conceptual, namely to discover the recursive link between technological innovation and human development. It approaches technological innovation as a holistic, human-centred, systemic process. It argues that effective application of technological artefacts is only possible with the support of a complex system of socio-economic conditions. An outline for conceptualising, planning and managing innovation for human development is presented in the concluding sections of the paper.
    Keywords: Innovation, human development, ecosystem, endemic, competence, motivation
    JEL: I3 O3
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sza:wpaper:wpapers185&r=hrm
  12. By: Franken, Jason R.V.; Cook, Michael L.
    Abstract: Limited inquiry into cooperative governance and performance suggests that best practices from corporate governance literature may not apply uniformly to cooperatives. The rarely addressed issue of endogeneity limits confidence in recommendations for corporations and cooperatives alike. By accounting for the most commonly recognized sources of endogeneity, expectations of better performance by larger cooperatives with smaller boards are confirmed, while mixed evidence is obtained on effects of seating outside experts on the board and the board’s share of equity. A comprehensive understanding of implications of governance choices requires consideration of trade-offs between financial performance and effectively serving other needs of patron-members.
    Keywords: Boards of directors, Cooperatives, Corporate governance, Endogeneity, Performance, Agribusiness, Q13,
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea13:149420&r=hrm
  13. By: Peter Z. Schochet; Hanley S. Chiang
    Abstract: This article addresses likely error rates for measuring teacher and school performance in the upper elementary grades using value-added models applied to student test score gain data. Using formulas based on ordinary least squares and empirical Bayes estimators, error rates for comparing a teacher’s performance to the average are likely to be about 25 percent with three years of data and 35 percent with one year of data. Corresponding error rates for overall false positive and negative errors are 10 percent and 20 percent, respectively. The results suggest that policymakers must carefully consider likely system error rates when using value-added estimates to make high-stakes decisions regarding educators.
    Keywords: Value-Added Models, Performance Measurement Systems, Student Learning Gains, False Positive and Negative Error Rates
    JEL: I
    Date: 2013–04–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:7762&r=hrm
  14. By: Vranceanu , Radu (ESSECBusiness School)
    Abstract: Economic profit is produced by entrepreneurs, those special individuals able to detect and seize as yet unexploited market opportunities. In general capitalist firms manage to deliver positive profits even in the most competitive environments. They can do so thanks to internal entrepreneurs, a subset of their employees able to drive change and develop innovation in the workplace. This paper argues that the goal of profit maximization is fully consistent with the corporation doing good for society. However, there is little justification for corporations to transfer the whole economic profit to shareholders. Economic agents entitled to receive the economic profit are precisely those who create this profit, namely the internal entrepreneurs.
    Keywords: Corporate Goal; Entrepreneurship Theory of the Firm; Internal Entrepreneurs; Profit; Social Role of Business; Virtue Ethics
    JEL: A11 A13 L26 M14 P20
    Date: 2013–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-13008&r=hrm
  15. By: Fehrler, Sebastian (University of Zurich); Kosfeld, Michael (Goethe University Frankfurt)
    Abstract: NGOs and other non-profit organizations attract workers who strongly identify themselves with their missions. We study whether these "good guys" are more trustworthy and how such pronounced group identities affect trust and trustworthiness within the groups and toward out-groups. We find that subjects who strongly identify themselves with a non-profit mission are more trustworthy in a minimal group setting but also harshly discriminate against out-groups when subjects are grouped by the missions they identify themselves with.
    Keywords: trustworthiness, trust, group identity, social identity theory, discrimination, organization
    JEL: C72 C92 M51
    Date: 2013–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7411&r=hrm
  16. By: Pikulina, E.S.; Renneboog, L.D.R.; Horst, J.R. ter; Tobler, P.N. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: Abstract: Little is known about how different bonus schemes affect traders’ propensity to trade and which bonus schemes improve traders’ performance. We study the effects of linear versus threshold (convex) bonus schemes on traders’ behavior. Traders purchase and sell shares in an experimental stock market on the basis of fundamental and technical information (evolution of the market index, past share price evolution, realized earnings, and analysts’ earnings forecasts). We find that traders trade more intensively (the number of transactions augments) under the threshold than under the linear bonus scheme. When market conditions are such that a higher profitability can be more easily reached, trading frequency only increases little under a threshold scheme, but the size of trades is significantly larger than in the case of market conditions with lower profitability. Furthermore, trading intensity significantly decreases when bonus thresholds are reached but only after building in a safety margin. Under the threshold scheme, the traders’ performance is lower (even when there are no transaction costs) than under the linear bonus scheme as a consequence of poorer market timing. This is especially the case when earning money by trading is relatively difficult (under low profitability conditions). Nevertheless, under low profitability conditions, traders seem to collect more information about the relationships between share price and market returns, earnings, and earnings forecasts, apply more effort to understand those relationships, and finally show better performance.
    Keywords: Bonus;Compensation;Investment Decisions;Trading Behavior.
    JEL: G11 J33
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2013030&r=hrm
  17. By: Michela Ponzo; Vincenzo Scoppa (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Statistiche e Finanziarie, Università della Calabria)
    Abstract: Product quality is often unobservable ex-ante and consumers rely on experts’ judgments, sometimes coming under the form of ratings or awards. Do awards affect consumers’ choices or they are conferred to the most popular products? To disentangle this issue, we use data of the most important Italian Literary Prize, the “Strega Prize”, undertaking two different estimation strategies to evaluate the impact on book sales of being awarded the Prize. First, we adopt a Regression Discontinuity Design using as dependent variable a measure of book sales and as forcing variable (proxying for intrinsic book quality) the jury votes received by each nominated book in the competition. We find a very strong impact of the Strega Prize on sales. Second, using weekly data on appearances in bestseller lists, we estimate a difference-in-differences model, comparing sales performance of treated and control books before the award is conferred with their respective performance afterwards. The results confirm a huge influence of the Prize on book sales and show that most of the impact occurs in the weeks following the announcement.
    Keywords: Cultural Economics, Awards, Literary Prize, Book Sales, Product Quality, Regression Discontinuity Design, Difference-in-Differences model
    JEL: Z10 Z11 L15 L80 M30 D12
    Date: 2013–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clb:wpaper:201306&r=hrm
  18. By: Peters, M.; Ketter, W.
    Abstract: Information systems have revolutionized the provisioning of decision-relevant information, and decision support tools have improved human decisions in many domains. Autonomous decision- making, on the other hand, remains hampered by systems’ inability to faithfully capture human preferences. We present a computational preference model that learns unobtrusively from lim- ited data by pooling observations across like-minded users. Our model quantifies the certainty of its own predictions as input to autonomous decision-making tasks, and it infers probabilistic segments based on user choices in the process. We evaluate our model on real-world preference data collected on a commercial crowdsourcing platform, and we find that it outperforms both individual and population-level estimates in terms of predictive accuracy and the informative- ness of its certainty estimates. Our work takes an important step toward systems that act autonomously on their users’ behalf.
    Keywords: preferences;software agents;assistive technologies;multi-task learning;autonomous decision-making
    Date: 2013–05–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:eureri:1765040144&r=hrm
  19. By: Xiao, Erte; Tan, Fangfang
    Abstract: Punishment can lose its legitimacy if the enforcer can profit from delivering punishment. We use a controlled laboratory experiment to examine how justification can combat profit-seeking punishment and promote the legitimacy of punishment. In a one-shot sender-receiver game, an independent third party can punish the sender upon seeing whether the sender has told the truth. Most third parties punish the senders regardless of how the senders behave when they can profit from punishment. However, majority third parties punish the sender if and only if the sender lies when they have to provide explanations for their punishment decisions. Our data also suggests that senders are more likely to perceive punishment as legitimate and behave honestly when they know the enforcer has to justify their punishment decisions. Our findings suggest that justification requirement plays an important role in building efficient punishment institutions.
    Keywords: third-party punishment, justification, sender-receiver game, experiment
    JEL: C72 C92 D63 D83
    Date: 2013–05–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:47154&r=hrm
  20. By: Julia Mueller (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Peter Duersch (University of Heidelberg)
    Abstract: In a punishment experiment, we separate the demand for punishment in general from the demand to conduct punishment personally. Subjects experience an unfair split of their earnings from a real effort task and have to decide on the punishment of the person who determines the distribution. First, it is established whether the allocator's payoff is reduced and, afterwards, subjects take part in a second price auction for the right to (physically) carry out the act of payoff reduction themselves. Subjects bid positive amounts and are happier if they get to punish personally.
    Keywords: personal punishment, real effort task, experiment, auction
    JEL: C92 D03
    Date: 2013–05–27
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:2013071&r=hrm
  21. By: Lawson Cornelia; Sterzi Valerio (University of Turin)
    Abstract: This paper explores the characteristics of persistent academic inventors and how they are influenced by their personal attributes, PhD institution, and first invention. Using a novel dataset on 555 UK academic inventors, we find that the quality of the first invention is the best predictor for subsequent participation in the patenting process. We further find evidence for a positive training effect whereby researchers that were trained at universities that had already established commercialisation units have a higher propensity to patent persistently. In addition, researchers that gained first patenting experience in industry are able to benefit from stronger knowledge flows and receive more citations than their purely academic peers.
    Date: 2012–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:labeco:201201&r=hrm
  22. By: Richard Adelstein (Department of Economics, Wesleyan University)
    Abstract: This essay asks whether business firms should be treated as moral or legal persons, capable of bearing rights and duties as distinct entities. Building on earlier work describing firms as relational contracts in performance (Adelstein 2010), it considers the nature of legal and moral personality, whether and when rights and duties can be assigned independently without a balancing symmetry, and what qualifies a subject for personhood, and thus for rights and duties. It argues for an asymmetric view of the rights and duties of firms. On the one hand, because the purposeful acts of firms typically cannot be reduced to the purposeful acts of any individual participant, there is a residual responsibility for the acts of the firm after the responsibility of each participant has been properly reckoned that can only be attributed to the firm. But on the other, while it may be convenient for participants and others that firms hold rights to ordinary property, because firms are never more than instruments created by living people for their own purposes, they have no right to life or liberty. In the absence of these rights, there is no basis for granting firms political rights to such things as free speech, free association or privacy. A concluding section considers the granting of constitutional rights to business corporations in the United States in light of these arguments.
    Keywords: theories of the firm, contracts in performance, Kantian personhood, collective rights and duties
    JEL: A12 B40 D23 K20
    Date: 2013–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wes:weswpa:2013-003&r=hrm
  23. By: Almeida, Helena (CIEO - Research Centre on Spatial and Organizational Dynamics); Peñalver, Briones (Polytechnic University of Cartagena)
    Abstract: All over the world, the small and medium enterprises are more and more organized in consortia, cooperation networks, joint-ventures and strategical alliances allowing not only the reduction of uncertainty and turbulence of the markets but also the gathering of advantages which may make them more competitive. It is worth considering that the results of these relationships are affected by determinant factors which may inhibit or facilitate the entrepreneurship. Our aim is to evaluate the relationship between some of those determinants, association, inter-company cooperation, innovation in the methods of work and creativity—about the entrepreneurship in 236 small and medium enterprises of the national defence. One of the questions initially posed is if there is a significant relation between corporation, innovative methods of work, creativity and entrepreneurship. Secondly, if being creative is an attribute of the entrepreneur, can it have a mediator effect between innovative methods of work and entrepreneurship? A factorial exploratory analysis was made in main components (varimax rotation) and multiple linear regression. The results show the direct relationship of the evaluated determinants and entrepreneurship and the partial mediator effect of the creativity between the innovation in the methods of work and entrepreneurship. These enterprises may expect to develop new methods of work as a high differential component concerning the competition and the more efficient use of knowledge and of the skills of the people who make part of the work team in order to increase their competitiveness.
    Keywords: Cooperation; Creativity; Motivation; Entrepreneurship
    JEL: L26
    Date: 2013–05–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:cieodp:2013_014&r=hrm
  24. By: Jesus, Saul (CIEO - Research Centre on Spatial and Organizational Dynamics); Rus, Claudia (Babes-Bolyai University); Tobal, Juan (Complutense University of Madrid)
    Abstract: This study investigated the immediate influence of a stress management training on teachers’ and physicians’ motivational (professional objective, intrinsic motivation, efficacy expectancies) and well-being related outcomes(positive well-being, emotional exhaustion, work distress, irrational beliefs) using meta-analytical techniques. In an action-research perspective, the stress management training program was implemented in several groups of physicians and teachers, in Portugal and in Brazil (n=144). It was found that, at all the samples where this intervention was implemented, an increase occurred on all motivational indicators and on positive well-being, and a decrease on negative well-being outcomes; nevertheless, not all obtained results are statistically significant. The largest impact of the implemented training program was at positive well-being at work, with a large effect size (d+=.81), and at the irrational beliefs, with a medium effect size(d+=.61). These results suggest the short-term benefits of this intervention on teachers' and physicians’ motivation and well-being.
    Keywords: Stress Management Intervention; Teachers; Physicians; Meta-analysis
    JEL: I38
    Date: 2013–05–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:cieodp:2013_012&r=hrm

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