nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2013‒05‒24
five papers chosen by
Tommaso Reggiani
University of Cologne

  1. Using Performance Incentives to Improve Medical Care Productivity and Health Outcomes By Paul Gertler; Christel Vermeersch
  2. Management of Science, Serendipity, and Research Performance: Evidence from Scientists' Survey By Murayama, Kota; Nirei, Makoto; Shimizu, Hiroshi
  3. Publish or Teach ? : Analysis of the Professor's Optimal Career Plan By Fouad El Ouardighi; Konstantin Kogan; Radu Vranceanu
  4. Should a Country Invest more in Human or Physical Capital? A Two-Sector Endogenous Growth Approach By Marion Davin; Karine Gente; Carine Nourry
  5. Public Sector Workers and Job Security By Alicia H. Munnell; Rebecca Cannon Fraenkel

  1. By: Paul Gertler; Christel Vermeersch
    Abstract: We nested a large-scale field experiment into the national rollout of the introduction of performance pay for medical care providers in Rwanda to study the effect of incentives for health care providers. In order to identify the effect of incentives separately from higher compensation, we held constant compensation across treatment and comparison groups – a portion of the treatment group’s compensation was based on performance whereas the compensation of the comparison group was fixed. The incentives led to a 20% increase in productivity, and significant improvements in child health. We also find evidence of a strong complementarity between performance incentives and baseline provider skill.
    JEL: I11 J33 O12
    Date: 2013–05
  2. By: Murayama, Kota; Nirei, Makoto; Shimizu, Hiroshi
    Abstract: This study investigates the impact of management style on research performance in science. If a managerial role is played by a leading scientist in the research team, that is considered management-research integration. If not, we consider that management and research are separated. We found that separating the managerial and research role has a positive effect on the number of papers published for that research project. In contrast, management-research integration is positively associated with the quality of the paper through allowing researchers to pursue serendipitous findings. These results show the trade-off between research efficiency and quality in science via who plays the managerial role and the leading research role.
    Keywords: science, serendipity, productivity, research management
    Date: 2013–05
  3. By: Fouad El Ouardighi (Operation management Department - ESSEC Business School); Konstantin Kogan (Faculty of Social Sciences - Bar-Ilan University); Radu Vranceanu (Economics Department - ESSEC Business School)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes how faculty members dynamically allocate their efforts between improving their research and teaching skills, taking into account the organizational structures and incentives implemented by academic institutions. The model builds on the assumption that organizational structures have an impact on the nature of spillover effects between teaching and research competencies. We analyze the dynamic equilibrium under unilateral and bilateral spillovers, using the no-spillover case as a benchmark. The bilateral spillover case is the most appealing as it achieves the highest overall performance; however, the nature of the equilibrium and the career paths can be quite different depending on the parameters of the problem such as the obsolescence of competencies or the strength of the spillover effect. This finding provides interesting insights on what could be the most productive configuration of a higher education institution.
    Keywords: Teaching; Research; Competency spillovers; Effort allocation; Faculty management
    Date: 2013–05
  4. By: Marion Davin (AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - Aix-Marseille Univ. - Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS] - Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM)); Karine Gente (AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - Aix-Marseille Univ. - Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS] - Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM)); Carine Nourry (AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - Aix-Marseille Univ. - Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS] - Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM), IUF - Institut Universitaire de France - Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: Should a country invest more in human or physical capital? The present paper addresses this issue, considering the impact of different factor intensities between sectors on both optimal human and physical capital accumulation. Using a two-sector overlapping generations setting with endogenous growth driven by human capital accumulation, we prove that relative factor intensity between sectors drastically shapes the welfare analysis: two laissez-faire economies with the same global capital share may generate physical capital excess or scarcity, with respect to the optimum. The model for the Japanese economy, that experienced a factor intensity reversal after the oil shock, is then calibrated. It is shown that Japan invested relatively too much in human capital before 1975, but has not invested enough since 1990.
    Keywords: endogenous growth; social optimum; two-sector model; factor intensity differential
    Date: 2013–05
  5. By: Alicia H. Munnell; Rebecca Cannon Fraenkel
    Abstract: One issue that comes up in discussions of compensation of state/local workers is their job security relative to that of workers in the private sector. Several questions arise in this regard. How much more secure are public sector jobs? Has their relative security declined in the Great Recession? Do different types of public sector workers fare differently? And how should greater job security be incorporated in the calculus of relative compensation? This brief addresses these issues. The discussion proceeds as follows. The first section presents data on the employment of state/local workers and private sector workers over the last three business cycles. It indicates that, despite declines in employment that have not yet fully abated, state/local workers fared somewhat better relative to private sector workers during this recession than in the past. The second section presents regression results on the relative job layoff experience of state/local workers between 1990-2007 and 2008-12, which quantifies the difference in job security between state/local workers and private sector workers in the two periods. The third section looks at teachers, non-teacher state workers, and non-teacher local workers separately to see how their employment levels have varied over time. At first, it looks like teachers fared better than non-teachers, but the regression analysis, which focuses on layoffs and controls for education, shows that teachers have no more job security than other public employees. The fourth section briefly discusses alternative ways of thinking about job security in the context of relative compensation considerations. The final section concludes that – due to the nature of the public sector – state/local workers have historically had greater job security than private sector workers, and that relationship continued through the Great Recession. Some argue that job security should be quantified and added to comparisons of public and private compensation. Our view is that while job security is attractive, other non-monetary factors make public sector jobs less attractive. Even if these negative factors are ignored, however, estimates of the value of job security suggest that it is not large enough to overturn the conclusion that state/local and private sector workers receive about the same compensation.
    Date: 2013–05

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