nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2013‒05‒19
25 papers chosen by
Tommaso Reggiani
University of Cologne

  1. Altruism and Relational Incentives in the Workplace By Dur, Robert; Tichem, Jan
  2. Social Relations and Relational Incentives By Robert Dur; Jan Tichem
  3. Ability Dispersion and Team Performance: A Field Experiment By Sander Hoogendoorn; Simon C. Parker; Mirjam van Praag
  4. Employee recognition and performance: A field experiment By Dur R.; Neckermann S.; Bradler C.; Non J.A.
  5. The Role of Performance Appraisals in Motivating Employees By Jurjen J.A. Kamphorst; Otto H. Swank
  6. Severity vs. Leniency Bias in Performance Appraisal: Experimental evidence By Lucia Marchegiani; Tommaso Reggiani; Matteo Rizzolli
  7. Nash Bargaining and the Wage Consequences of Educational Mismatches By Joop Hartog; Michael Sattinger
  8. On the Merits of Meritocracy By John Morgan; Dana Sisak; Felix Vardy
  9. The Effects of Prize Spread and Noise in Elimination Tournaments: A Natural Field Experiment By Josse Delfgaauw; Robert Dur; Arjan Non; Willem Verbeke
  10. The Value of Hiring through Referrals By Burks, Stephen V.; Cowgill, Bo; Hoffman, Mitchell; Housman, Michael
  11. Female Labour Supply, Human Capital and Welfare Reform By Blundell, Richard; Costa Dias, Monica; Meghir, Costas; Shaw, Jonathan
  12. Ethnic Diversity and Team Performance: A Field Experiment By Sander Hoogendoorn; Mirjam van Praag
  13. Complex Tax Incentives: An Experimental Investigation By Abeler, Johannes; Jäger, Simon
  14. Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control By Ferdinand von Siemens
  15. Intrinsic Motivations of Public Sector Employees: Evidence for Germany By Robert Dur; Robin Zoutenbier
  16. Works Councils, Quits and Dismissals in Germany By Grund, Christian; Schmitt, Andreas
  17. Job Spells, Employer Spells, and Wage Returns to Tenure By Devereux, Paul J.; Hart, Robert A.; Roberts, J. Elizabeth
  18. Sharing Information through Delegation and Collaboration By Otto H. Swank; Bauke Visser
  19. Language Proficiency of Migrants: The Relation with Job Satisfaction and Matching By Bloemen, Hans
  20. Dilemmas Of Downsizing During the Great Recession: Crisis Strategies of European Employers By Dalen, H.P. van; Henkens, K.
  21. Altruism to Strangers for our Own Sake: Domestic Effects from Immigration By Annie Tubadji; Peter Nijkamp
  22. Gender Differences in Sickness Absence and the Gender Division of Family Responsibilities By Angelov, Nikolay; Johansson, Per; Lindahl, Erica
  23. “Double Penalty in Returns to Education: Informality and Educational Mismatch in the Colombian Labour market” By Paula Herrera; Enrique López-Bazo; Elisabet Motellón
  24. Outsourcing, Occupational Restructuring, and Employee Well-Being: Is There a Silver Lining? By Böckerman, Petri; Maliranta, Mika
  25. The Effect of Performance Evaluation on Employee’s Job Satisfaction in Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (2013) By Alvi, Mohsin; Surani, Mehreen; Hirani, Saneea

  1. By: Dur, Robert (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Tichem, Jan (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
    Abstract: This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The con- tract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find that altruism undermines the credibility of a threat of dis- missal but strengthens the credibility of a bonus. Among others, these two mechanisms imply that higher altruism sometimes leads to higher bonuses, while lower altruism may increase productivity and players utility in equilibrium.
    Keywords: altruism, spite, incentives, relational contracts, efficiency wages, subjective performance evaluation, Nash bargaining
    JEL: D23 J33 M52 M55
    Date: 2013–04
  2. By: Robert Dur (Erasmus University Rotterdam, CESifo, and IZA); Jan Tichem (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
    Abstract: This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find that good social relationships undermine the credibility of a threat of dismissal but strengthen the credibility of a bonus. Among others, these two mechanisms imply that better social relationships sometimes lead to higher bonuses, while worse social relationships may increase productivity and players' utility in equilibrium.
    Keywords: Altruism, spite, social relations, incentives, relational contracts, efficiency wages, subjective performance evaluation, Nash bargaining
    JEL: D23 J33 M52 M55
    Date: 2012–05–16
  3. By: Sander Hoogendoorn (University of Amsterdam); Simon C. Parker (University of Western Ontario, Richard Ivey School of Business); Mirjam van Praag (University of Amsterdam)
    Abstract: This paper studies the impact of diversity in cognitive ability among members of a team on their performance. We conduct a large field experiment in which teams start up and manage real companies under identical circumstances. Exogenous variation in - otherwise random - team composition is imposed by assigning individuals to teams based on their measured cognitive abilities. The setting is one of business management practices in the longer run where tasks are diverse and involve complex decision-making. We propose a model in which greater ability dispersion generates greater knowledge for a team, but also increases the costs of monitoring necessitated by moral hazard. Consistent with the predictions of our model, we find that team performance as measured in terms of sales, profits and profits per share first increases, and then decreases, with ability dispersion. Teams with a moderate degree of ability dispersion also experience fewer dismissals due to few er shirking members in those teams.
    Keywords: Ability dispersion, team performance, field experiment, entrepreneurship, knowledge pooling, moral hazard
    JEL: C93 D83 J24 L25 L26 M13 M54
    Date: 2012–11–29
  4. By: Dur R.; Neckermann S.; Bradler C.; Non J.A. (GSBE)
    Abstract: This paper reports the results from a controlled field experiment designed to investigate the causal effect of public recognition on employee performance. We hired more than 300 employees to work on a three-hour data-entry task. In a random sample of work groups, workers unexpectedly received recognition after two hours of work. We find that recognition increases subsequent performance substantially, and particularly so when recognition is exclusively provided to the best performers. Remarkably, workers who did not receive recognition are mainly responsible for this performance increase. This result is consistent with workers having a preference for conformity.
    Keywords: Field Experiments;
    Date: 2013
  5. By: Jurjen J.A. Kamphorst (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Otto H. Swank (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
    Abstract: In many organizations, reward decisions depend on subjective performance evaluations. However, evaluating an employee's performance is often difficult. In this paper, we develop a model in which the employee is uncertain about his own performance and about the manager's ability to assess him. The manager gives an employee a performance appraisal with a view of affecting the employee's self perception, and the employee's perception of the manager's ability to assess performance. We examine how performance appraisals affect the employee's future performance. The predictions of our model are consistent with various empirical findings. These comprise (i) the observation that managers tend to give positive appraisals, (ii) the finding that on average positive appraisals motivate more than negative appraisals, and (iii) the observation that the effects of appraisals depend on the employee's perception of the manager's ability to assess performance accurately.
    Keywords: Subjective Performance Appraisal, Credibility, Cheap Talk
    JEL: M52 M54 D82 D83
    Date: 2012–04–10
  6. By: Lucia Marchegiani (Rome 3 University); Tommaso Reggiani (University of Cologne); Matteo Rizzolli (Free University of Bozen)
    Abstract: Performance appraisal can be biased in two main ways: lenient supervisors assign pre- dominantly high evaluations (thus rewarding also undeserving agents who have exerted no effort) while severe supervisors assign predominantly low evaluations (thus failing to reward deserving agents who have exerted effort). The principal-agent model with moral hazard predicts that both biases will be equally detrimental to effort provision. We test this prediction with a laboratory experiment and we show that failing to reward deserving agents is significantly more detrimental than rewarding undeserving agents. This finding is compatible with empirical evidence on real world supervisors being preponderantly biased towards lenient appraisals. We discuss our result in the light of alternative economic the- ories of behavior. Our result brings interesting implications for strategic human resource management and personnel economics and contributes to the debate about incentives and organizational performance.
    Keywords: Agency theory, Performance appraisal, Type I and Type II errors, Leniency bias, Severity bias, Economic experiment
    JEL: C91 M50 J50
    Date: 2013–05
  7. By: Joop Hartog (University of Amsterdam); Michael Sattinger (University at Albany)
    Abstract: The paper provides a theoretical foundation for the empirical regularities observed in estimations of wage consequences of overeducation and undereducation. Workers with more education than required for their jobs are observed to suffer wage penalties relative to workers with the same education in jobs that only require their educational level. Similarly, workers with less education than required for their jobs earn wage rewards. These departures from the Mincer human capital earnings function can be explained by Nash bargaining between workers and employers. Under fairly mild assumptions, Nash bargaining predicts a wage penalty for overeducation and a wage reward for undereducation, and further predicts that the wage penalty will exceed the wage reward. This paper reviews the established empirical regularities and then provides Nash bargaining results that explain these regularities.
    Keywords: Overeducation, Undereducation, Nash bargaining, Qualitative mismatches, Mincer earnings function, Wages
    JEL: J31 J24 C78 C51
    Date: 2012–11–27
  8. By: John Morgan (University of California, Berkeley); Dana Sisak (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Felix Vardy (University of California, Berkeley and IMF)
    Abstract: We study career choice when competition for promotion is a contest. A more meritocratic profession always succeeds in attracting the highest ability types, whereas a profession with superior promotion benefits attracts high types only if the hazard rate of the noise in performance evaluation is strictly increasing. Raising promotion opportunities produces no systematic effect on the talent distribution, while a higher base wage attracts talent only if total promotion opportunities are sufficiently plentiful.
    Keywords: career choice, promotion competition, selection, meritocracy
    JEL: J45 J24 M52
    Date: 2012–07–20
  9. By: Josse Delfgaauw (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Robert Dur (Erasmus University Rotterdam, CESifo, IZA); Arjan Non (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Willem Verbeke (Erasmus University Rotterdam, ERIM)
    Abstract: We conduct a field experiment in a large retail chain to test basic predictions of tournament theory regarding prize spread and noise. A random subset of the 208 stores participates in two-stage elimination tournaments. Tournaments differ in the distribution of prize money across winners of the first and second round of the tournament. As predicted by theory, we find that a more convex prize spread increases performance in the second round at the expense of first-round performance, although the magnitude of these effects is small. Moreover, the treatment effect is significantly larger for stores that historically have relatively stable performance as compared to stores with more noisy performance.
    Keywords: Elimination tournaments, Incentives, Prize spread, Performance measurement, Field experiment
    JEL: C93 M51 M52
    Date: 2011–08–11
  10. By: Burks, Stephen V. (University of Minnesota, Morris); Cowgill, Bo (University of California, Berkeley); Hoffman, Mitchell (Yale School of Management); Housman, Michael (Evolv on Demand)
    Abstract: Employee referrals are a very common means by which firms hire new workers. Past work suggests that workers hired via referrals often perform better than non-referred workers, but we have little understanding as to why. In this paper, we demonstrate that this is primarily because referrals allow firms to select workers better-suited for particular jobs. To test our model, we use novel and detailed productivity and survey data from nine large firms in three industries: call-centers, trucking, and high-tech (software). Referred workers are 10-30% less likely to quit and have substantially higher performance on rare "high-impact metrics" (e.g. creating patents and avoiding truck accidents), despite having similar characteristics and similar performance on non-rare metrics. To identify the source of these behavioral differences, we develop four new statistical tests, all of which indicate that firms benefit from referrals predominantly by selecting workers with a better fit for the job, as opposed to referrals selecting workers with higher overall quality; to referrals enabling monitoring or coaching; or to it being more enjoyable to work with friends. We document that workers refer others like themselves, not only in characteristics but in behavior (e.g. unsafe workers refer other unsafe workers), suggesting that firms may gain by incentivizing referrals most from their highest quality workers. Referred workers achieve substantially higher profits per worker and the difference is driven by referrals from high productivity workers.
    Keywords: referrals, productivity, worker selection, innovation, patents, cognitive ability, non-cognitive ability, job testing, call centers, high-tech, software, trucking, truck accidents
    JEL: M51 J24 O32 J63 L84 L86 L92
    Date: 2013–05
  11. By: Blundell, Richard (University College London); Costa Dias, Monica (Institute for Fiscal Studies, London); Meghir, Costas (Yale University); Shaw, Jonathan (Institute for Fiscal Studies, London)
    Abstract: We consider the impact of tax credits and income support programs on female education choice, employment, hours and human capital accumulation over the life-cycle. We analyze both the short run incentive effects and the longer run implications of such programs. By allowing for risk aversion and savings, we quantify the insurance value of alternative programs. We find important incentive effects on education choice and labor supply, with single mothers having the most elastic labor supply. Returns to labor market experience are found to be substantial but only for full-time employment, and especially for women with more than basic formal education. For those with lower education the welfare programs are shown to have substantial insurance value. Based on the model, marginal increases to tax credits are preferred to equally costly increases in income support and to tax cuts, except by those in the highest education group.
    Keywords: labour supply, human capital, welfare reform
    JEL: J22 J24 H31
    Date: 2013–04
  12. By: Sander Hoogendoorn (University of Amsterdam); Mirjam van Praag (University of Amsterdam)
    Abstract: One of the most salient and relevant dimensions of team heterogeneity is ethnicity. We measure the causal impact of ethnic diversity on the performance of business teams using a randomized field experiment. We follow 550 students who set up 45 real companies as part of their curriculum in an international business program in the Netherlands. We exploit the fact that companies are set up in realistic though similar circumstances and that we, as outside researchers, had the unique opportunity to exogenously vary the ethnic composition of otherwise randomly composed teams. The student population consists of 55% students with a non-Dutch ethnicity from 53 different countries of origin. We find that a moderate level of ethnic diversity has no effect on team performance in terms of business outcomes (sales, profits and profits per share). However, if at least the majority of team members is ethnically diverse then more ethnic diversity has a positive impact on the performance of teams. In line with theoretical predictions, our data suggest that this positive effect could be related to the more diverse pool of relevant knowledge facilitating (mutual) learning within ethnically diverse teams.
    Keywords: Ethnic diversity, team performance, field experiment, entrepreneurship, (mutual) learning
    JEL: J15 L25 C93 L26 M13 D83
    Date: 2012–07–13
  13. By: Abeler, Johannes (University of Oxford); Jäger, Simon (Harvard University)
    Abstract: How does the tax system's complexity affect people's reaction to tax changes? To answer this question, we conduct a real-effort experiment in which subjects receive a piece rate and face a set of taxes. In one treatment the tax system is simple; in the other treatment it is highly complex. The payoff-maximizing effort level and the incentives around this optimum are, however, identical across treatments. We then introduce the same sequence of additional tax rules in both treatments. We find that subjects in the complex treatment adjust their effort provision less in response to a new tax than subjects in the simple treatment. Many subjects in the complex treatment even ignore the new rule entirely, repeating their previous choice. Contrary to predictions from models of rational inattention, we find no evidence that subjects are less likely to ignore larger changes in incentives. Our results suggest that the effect of a newly introduced tax will be attenuated in a more complex tax system.
    Keywords: complexity, taxation, attention, salience, laboratory experiment
    JEL: C91 D03 H31 J22
    Date: 2013–04
  14. By: Ferdinand von Siemens (University of Amsterdam)
    Abstract: Empirical research suggests that - rather than improving incentives - exerting control can reduce workers' performance by eroding motivation. The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding-out if individuals differ in their propensity for reciprocity and preferences are private information. Not being controlled might then be considered to be kind, because not everybody reciprocates not being controlled with high effort. This argument stands in contrast to existing theoretical wisdom on motivational crowding-out that is primarily based on signaling models.
    Keywords: extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, crowding-out, intention-based reciprocity
    JEL: A13 C70 D63 D82 L20
    Date: 2011–08–09
  15. By: Robert Dur (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Robin Zoutenbier (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
    Abstract: We examine differences in altruism and laziness between public sector employees and private sector employees. Our theoretical model predicts that the likelihood of public sector employment increases with a worker's altruism, and increases or decreases with a worker's laziness depending on his altruism. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study, we find that public sector employees are significantly more altruistic and lazy than observationally equivalent private sector employees. A series of robustness checks show that these patterns are stronger among higher educated workers; that the sorting of altruistic people to the public sector takes place only within the caring industries; and that the difference in altruism is already present at the start of people's career, while the difference in laziness is only present for employees with sufficiently long work experience.
    Keywords: public service motivation, altruism, laziness, sorting, public sector employment, personality characteristics
    JEL: H1 J45 M5
    Date: 2012–12–07
  16. By: Grund, Christian (RWTH Aachen University); Schmitt, Andreas (RWTH Aachen University)
    Abstract: We examine the relationship between works councils and two different types of employment separation: dismissals by the firm and voluntary quits by employees. Based on representative data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we find a negative relationship between works councils and both kinds of separation. This is particularly true for skilled blue collar as well as qualified white collar workers compared to employees in other job categories. Additionally, we find first hints for a positive relation between works councils and the relevance of severance payments in the case of dismissals.
    Keywords: dismissal, employment separation, quit, severance pay, works council
    JEL: M5 J6
    Date: 2013–04
  17. By: Devereux, Paul J. (University College Dublin); Hart, Robert A. (University of Stirling); Roberts, J. Elizabeth (University of Stirling)
    Abstract: We show that the distinction between job spells and employer spells matters for returns to tenure. Employer spells encompass between-job wage movements linked to promotions or demotions while job spells don't. Using a 1% sample of the British workforce over the period 1975-2010, we find that a significant proportion of the return to employer tenure arises due to job changes within employer spells. Conditional on tenure with employer, the return to job tenure is negative. This suggests that any positive effects of job-specific human capital on wage growth within jobs are outweighed by the effects of job changes within firms.
    Keywords: job spells, employer spells, wage-tenure profiles
    JEL: J31 J24
    Date: 2013–05
  18. By: Otto H. Swank (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam); Bauke Visser (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)
    Abstract: This article analyzes under which conditions a manager can motivate a junior worker by verbal communication, and explains why communication is often tied up with organizational choices as job enlargement and collaboration. Our model has two important features. First, the manager has more information about a junior's ability than the junior himself. Second, the junior's effort and ability are complements. We show that the manager has an incentive to exaggerate the junior's ability. We discuss two ways in which the manager can make credible statements about the junior's ability. First, the senior can delegate a task to the junior for which it is important that the junior has a correct perception of his ability. Information is shared through a costless signal. Second, the senior can spend more time on a junior she perceives as able than on a junior she perceives as less able. Information is then shared through a costly signal.
    Keywords: Communication; incentives; signalling; overconfidence; delegation; collaboration
    JEL: C70 D23 D83
  19. By: Bloemen, Hans (VU University Amsterdam)
    Abstract: We empirically analyze the language proficiency of migrants in the Netherlands. Traditionally, the emphasis in studying language proficiency and economic outcomes has been on the relation between earnings and indicators for language proficiency, motivated by the human capital theory. Here we analyze whether there is a relation between proficiency of the destination language and job level. A lack of language skills may induce the migrant to work in jobs of a lower level leading to lower job satisfaction. We use subjective survey information about job satisfaction and the fit between the migrant's education and skill level and the job. We also use objective information on professional level. For men, we find evidence for a positive relationship between indicators for language proficiency and satisfaction with work type and professional level.
    Keywords: immigrants, skills, job satisfaction
    JEL: J15 J24 J28
    Date: 2013–04
  20. By: Dalen, H.P. van; Henkens, K. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: Summary The present paper analyzes the choices faced by European employers when threatened with the prospect of the mass lay-off of their employees as a result of the Great Recession. By means of a representative survey among employers in Italy, Germany, Denmark, Poland, the Netherlands and Sweden in 2009, we show that employers mainly prefer to tackle such threats by offering short-time work, and by early retirement packages to older workers, in conjunction with buy-outs. The latter preference is particularly visible in countries where employers perceive the level of employment protection to be high. The only notable exception is Denmark, where employers prefer to reduce working hours. In general, a sense of generational fairness influences downsizing preferences, with those employers who favor younger workers particularly likely to use early retirement and buy-outs when downsizing, followed by working time reductions. Wage reductions and administrative dismissal are less favored by European employers. In particular, CEOs and owners are more inclined than lower-level managers to cut wages.
    Keywords: downsizing;early retirement;fairness;older workers;recession
    JEL: D2 J63 J23 J26
    Date: 2013
  21. By: Annie Tubadji (Institut für Arbeidsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), and University of Regensburg); Peter Nijkamp (VU University Amsterdam)
    Abstract: This paper seeks to identify relationships between human capital and cultural capital, in the context of local labour market productivity. The key constituents of human capital, identified in the literature, are jointly examined in a close-to-reality-model. The main advantage of our model of productivity is that, in addition to accounting for the filigree composition of human capital, it also takes into consideration the cultural capital present in a locality. In this manner, we are able to examine the interaction between the quality of the incoming human capital and the cultural encounter context (generating the cultural "milieu" effect) of the modern diverse city. To this end, we operationalize one model with data on the 'melting pot' of EU15, at NUTS2 level. The sources of our data are the Eurostat Regional Database and the World Value Survey, which have served to construct both a cross-section for the year 2001. These datasets allows us: (1) to exa mine the different groups of migrating and local human capital, their interaction and joint impact on local productivity, and (2) to cross-check for the causality direction behind our model. Our findings suggest that benefits from immigrants differ, not only due to their human capital, but also due to their culturally biased different bargaining power on the labour market.
    Keywords: human capital, cultural capital, diversity, productivity, growth, Weber
    JEL: Z10 O31 O43 R11
    Date: 2012–07–27
  22. By: Angelov, Nikolay (IFAU); Johansson, Per (IFAU); Lindahl, Erica (IFAU)
    Abstract: This study investigates possible reasons for the gender difference in sickness absence. We estimate both short- and long-term effects of parenthood in a within-couple analysis based on the timing of parenthood. We find that after entering parenthood, women increase their sickness absence by between 0.5 days per month (during the child's third year) and 0.85 days per month (during year 17) more than their spouse. By investigating possible explanations for the observed effect, we conclude that the effect mainly stems from higher home commitment, which reduces women's labour market attachment and, in turn, increases female sickness absence.
    Keywords: double burden, health investment, household work, labour market work, moral hazard, parenthood, sickness insurance, work absence
    JEL: C23 D13 I19 J22
    Date: 2013–04
  23. By: Paula Herrera (Faculty of Economics, University of Barcelona); Enrique López-Bazo (Faculty of Economics, University of Barcelona); Elisabet Motellón (Faculty of Economics, University of Barcelona)
    Abstract: This paper examines the returns to education taking into consideration the existence of educational mismatches in the formal and informal employment of a developing country. Results show that the returns of surplus, required and deficit years of schooling are different in the two sectors. Moreover, they suggest that these returns vary along the wage distribution, and that the pattern of variation differs for formal and informal workers. In particular, informal workers face not only lower returns to their education, but suffer a second penalty associated with educational mismatches that puts them at a greater disadvantage compare to their formal counterparts.
    Keywords: Educational Mismatch; Formal/Informal Employment; Economic Development; Wage Gap. JEL classification: O17; J21; J24.
    Date: 2013–05
  24. By: Böckerman, Petri (Labour Institute for Economic Research); Maliranta, Mika (ETLA - The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy)
    Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between outsourcing and various aspects of employee well-being by devoting special attention to the role of occupational restructuring as a conveying mechanism. Using linked employer-employee data, we find that offshoring involves job destruction, especially when the destination is a low-wage country. In such circumstances, staying employees' job satisfaction is reduced. However, the relationship between outsourcing and employee well-being is not entirely negative. Our evidence also shows that offshoring to high-wage countries stimulates the vertical mobility of employees in affected firms in a manner that improves perceived well-being, particularly in terms of better prospects for promotion.
    Keywords: globalization, outsourcing, offshoring, downsizing, working conditions, subjective well-being, job satisfaction
    JEL: J28 F23
    Date: 2013–05
  25. By: Alvi, Mohsin; Surani, Mehreen; Hirani, Saneea
    Abstract: This study is designed to study the relationship between the performance evaluation system and its impact on job satisfaction of employees. A questionnaire is designed for this purpose and the study is conducted to the employees of Pakistan International Airline Corporation. For this purpose the employees of Admin, Sales, HR, Flight crew, Engineering and other departments filled up 34 questionnaires. Literature survey described in the report served as the conceptual framework. Analysis of data includes comparison of results through graphs, co-relation techniques. Findings of the data indicate that there is no relationship between the performance evaluation and its impact on job satisfaction on employees. Additionally, in view of the limitations of the study (small sample, low response) limited conclusions can be drawn from the study. And this study disapproves the null hypothesis.
    Keywords: Performance Evaluation, Job Satisfaction, Appraisal Systems, Percentage, Correlation
    JEL: C8 M1 Y1
    Date: 2013–04–25

This nep-hrm issue is ©2013 by Tommaso Reggiani. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.