nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2012‒11‒24
four papers chosen by
Tommaso Reggiani
University of Cologne

  1. High-Performance Management Practices and Employee Outcomes in Denmark By Cristini, Annalisa; Eriksson, Tor; Pozzoli, Dario
  2. Specific measures for older employees and late career employment By Boockmann, Bernhard; Fries, Jan; Göbel, Christian
  3. On aggregating human capital across heterogeneous cohorts By Jakub Growiec; Christian Groth
  4. Corporate Criminal Liability and Optimal Behavior by Firms.Internal Monitoring Devices versus Managerial Incentives. By Paolo Polidori; Désirée Teobaldelli

  1. By: Cristini, Annalisa (University of Bergamo); Eriksson, Tor (Aarhus School of Business); Pozzoli, Dario (Aarhus University)
    Abstract: High-performance work practices are frequently considered to have positive effects on corporate performance, but what do they do for employees? After assessing the correlation between organizational innovation and firm performance, this article investigates whether high-involvement work practices affect workers in terms of wages, wage inequality and workforce composition. The analysis is based on a survey directed at Danish firms matched with linked employer-employee data and also examines whether the relationship between high-involvement work practices and employee outcomes is affected by the industrial relations context.
    Keywords: workplace practices, wage inequality, workforce composition, hierarchy
    JEL: C33 J41 J53 L20
    Date: 2012–11
  2. By: Boockmann, Bernhard; Fries, Jan; Göbel, Christian
    Abstract: We analyse the effects of specific measures for older employees (SMOE) on employment duration of workers aged 40 and above. Using longitudinal employer-employee data for German establishments, we account for worker and establishment heterogeneity and correct for stock-sampling. We find a positive effect of mixed-aged team work on employment duration and a negative effect of a part-time scheme addressed at older workers. Employment duration does not appear to be related to other SMOE, such as training and specific equipment of workplaces. --
    Keywords: older workers,human resources policies,SMOE,employment duration,linked employer-employee data,age,tenure
    JEL: J14 J21 J26
    Date: 2012
  3. By: Jakub Growiec (Warsaw School of Economics, Institute of Econometrics, and National Bank of Poland, Economic Institute); Christian Groth (University of Copenhagen, Department of Economics)
    Abstract: Based on a general framework for computing the aggregate human capital stock under heterogeneity across population cohorts, the paper derives aggregate human capital stocks in the whole population and in the labor force, and relates these variables to average years of schooling and average work experience. Under the scenarios considered here, the "macro-Mincer" (log-linear) relationship between aggregate human capital and average years of schooling is obtained only in cases which are inconsistent with heterogeneity in years of schooling and based on empirically implausible demographic survival laws. Our numerical results indicate that the macro-Mincer equation can be a reasonable approximation of the true relationship only if returns to schooling and work experience are roughly constant across countries.
    Keywords: human capital, aggregation, heterogeneity, population cohort, Mincer equation
    JEL: J24 O47
    Date: 2012–09–18
  4. By: Paolo Polidori (Department of Law, University of Urbino “Carlo Bo”); Désirée Teobaldelli (Department of Law, University of Urbino “Carlo Bo”)
    Abstract: Corporate criminal liability legislation has been the subject of a widespread debate around the world in response to the financial scandals of the early 2000s. The existing legal regimes en- tail compliance requirements, such as internal monitoring mechanisms, with the aim of inducing firms to detect the wrongful conduct of their agents. We develop an analytical framework to address when and to what extent firms may find convenient to adopt these regulatory devices. We conclude that more productive firms and those operating in sectors where managers have more opportunities to undertake criminal activities are more likely to prevent such activities (through monitoring or the payment of e¢ ciency wages). When the potential returns of ille- gal activities are high or when the firms are large, implementing internal monitoring devices may be optimal, while smaller firms should generally prefer the payment of efficiency wages to prevent crimes by managers.
    Keywords: Corporate Governance, Law Enforcement, Compliance, Deterrence, Regulation.
    JEL: K22 K42 G34 G38 L50
    Date: 2012

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