nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2012‒06‒13
eleven papers chosen by
Tommaso Reggiani
Universita' di Bologna

  1. The Tenuous Relationship between Effort and Performance Pay By Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond
  2. Progression of HR Practices in Danish Firms during Two Decades By Eriksson, Tor
  3. Education, Risk and Efficiency in Human Capital Investment By David Mayston; Juan Yang
  4. Aging and Attitudes Towards Strategic Uncertainty and Competition: An Artefactual Field Experiment in a Swiss Bank By Thierry Madiès; Marie-Claire Villeval; Malgorzata Wasmer
  5. Human Capital Accounting in the United States: Context, Measurement, and Application By Michael S. Christian
  6. Flexibility vs. screening: The performance effects of temporary agency work strategies By Michael Beckmann; Dieter Kuhn
  7. WORRIED SICK? WORKER RESPONSES TO ORGANIZATIONAL TURMOIL By Bratberg, Espen; Monstad, Karin
  8. A NLIP Model on Wage Dispersion and Team Performance By Papahristodoulou, Christos
  9. Task Allocation and Corporate Performance: Is There a First-Mover Advantage? By Kathrin Armbruster; Michael Beckmann; Dieter Kuhn
  10. Current issues of motivation, academic performance and internet use- implications for an education of excellence By Turturean, Monica
  11. Does Culture Affect Corporate Governance? By Pascal Gantenbein; Christophe Volonté

  1. By: Kvaløy, Ola (UiS); Olsen, Trond (NHH)
    Abstract: When a worker is offered performance related pay, the incentive effect is not only determined by the shape of the incentive contract, but also by the probability of contract enforcement. We show that weaker enforcement may reduce the worker's effort, but lead to higher-powered incentive contracts. This creates a seemingly negative relationship between effort and performance pay.
    Keywords: .
    JEL: A10
    Date: 2012–06–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:stavef:2012_011&r=hrm
  2. By: Eriksson, Tor (Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business)
    Abstract: This paper describes the spread of new work and pay practices in Danish private sector firms during the last two decades. The data source is two surveys directed at firms and carried out ten years apart. The descriptive analysis shows that large changes in the way work is organized in firms have occurred during both decades, whereas the progression of pay practices predominantly took place in the nineties. There is considerable firm heterogeneity in the frequency of adoption of the practices. In particular, the prevalence of both incentive pay and work practices is higher in multinational companies and firms engaged in exporting
    Keywords: High performance work practices; Pay practices; Performance pay
    JEL: M52
    Date: 2012–06–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:aareco:2011_011&r=hrm
  3. By: David Mayston; Juan Yang
    Abstract: University of York Beijing Normal University The efficiency of the process of investment in human capital through education is of considerable importance both to the individuals involved and to the wider economy. The paper develops an analytical framework in which issues of the efficiency of such investment can be considered alongside its interface with the operations of the labour market, and in which the risks posed by such educational investments when the labour market is less than fully efficient can be analysed. These issues are of particular relevance in the context of the major expansions in higher education which have taken place in recent years, not least in China, which is now second in its share of all 25 – 64 year olds internationally with tertiary education. The paper therefore complements its theoretical analysis with an empirical investigation of the risk factors which impact on the efficiency of this large-scale educational investment for individual graduates and for the wider economy
    Keywords: Human capital investment, higher education, graduate overeducation, risk factors, educational expansion in China.
    JEL: I21 I25 I28 J24 J31
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yor:yorken:12/15&r=hrm
  4. By: Thierry Madiès (Department of Economics - University of Fribourg - University of Fribourg); Marie-Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - École Normale Supérieure - Lyon); Malgorzata Wasmer (Department of Economics - University of Fribourg - University of Fribourg)
    Abstract: We study the attitudes of junior and senior employees towards strategic uncertainty and competition, by means of a market entry game inspired by Camerer and Lovallo (1999). Seniors exhibit higher entry rates compared to juniors, especially when earnings depend on relative performance. This difference persists after controlling for attitudes towards non-strategic uncertainty and for beliefs on others' competitiveness and ability. Social image matters, as evidenced by the fact that seniors enter more when they predict others enter more and when they are matched with a majority of juniors. This contradicts the stereotype of risk averse and less competitive older employees.
    Keywords: Aging; risk; ambiguity; competitiveness; self-image; confidence; experiment
    Date: 2012–05–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00702579&r=hrm
  5. By: Michael S. Christian (Bureau of Economic Analysis)
    Abstract: This study updates Christian's (2010) human capital account for the United States to the year 2009, refining the underlying data and putting the account into international context by reviewing applications in the rest of the world. It also measures the sensitivity of human capital measures to alternative assumptions about income growth rates, discount rates, the treatment of taxes, smoothing and imputation of labor force and school enrollment data, and the valuation of non-market time. It concludes with an application to the measurement of the output of the education sector.
    Date: 2011–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bea:wpaper:0073&r=hrm
  6. By: Michael Beckmann; Dieter Kuhn (University of Basel)
    Keywords: Temporary agency work, firm performance, flexibility strategy, screening strategy
    JEL: C23 J24 J42 J82 M55
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2012/03&r=hrm
  7. By: Bratberg, Espen (University of Bergen,); Monstad, Karin (HEB-Uni Rokkansenteret)
    Abstract: Sickness absence has risen over the past years in Norway. One explanation put forward is that a tougher labor market represents a health hazard, while a competing hypothesis predicts that loss of job security works as a disciplinary device. In this analysis we aim to trace a causal impact of organizational turmoil or job insecurity on sickness absence, applying a difference-in-difference approach. Utilizing a negative financial shock that hit specific employers and workplaces, we find that sickness absence decreased considerably in the following year. The decrease is substantially larger among male than among female employees, and stronger for days of sickness absence than for its incidence. <p> Acknowledgements: The paper has benefited from comments at the 2011 Norwegian Social Insurance Research Meeting in Lillehammer and the 2012 HEB/HERO workshop in Geilo. We are also grateful for information from Ingvar Linde, Jan G. Myrvang, and chief executives of the eight municipalities impacted by the financial shock. Remaining errors are the authors’ sole responsibility. Financial support from the Norwegian Research Council (Grant 187912) is gratefully acknowledged.
    Keywords: Worker absenteeism; sickness absence; organizational schange; job security; difference-in-differences
    JEL: H53 I18 J22 J28 J45
    Date: 2012–04–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:bergec:2012_008&r=hrm
  8. By: Papahristodoulou, Christos
    Abstract: Using a Non-Linear Integer Programming (NLIP) model, I examine if wage differences between Super talents and Normal players improve the performance of four teams which participate in a tournament, such as in the UEFA Champions League (UCL) group matches. With ad-hoc wage differences, the optimal solutions of the model show that higher wage equality seems to improve the performance of all teams, irrespectively if the elasticity of substitution between Super- and Normal- players is high or low. In addition to that, a U-type performance exists in two teams with the highest and the second high elasticity of substitution. With team data from the 2011-12 UCL group matches and from the Italian Serie A over 2010-12 seasons, the wage dispersion has no effect on team performances.
    Keywords: Players; Teams; Wages; Performance; Tournament
    JEL: L83 C60 J30
    Date: 2012–05–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39149&r=hrm
  9. By: Kathrin Armbruster; Michael Beckmann; Dieter Kuhn (University of Basel)
    Keywords: Task Allocation, First Mover, Late Adopter, Firm Performance, Switzerland
    JEL: C21 C24 D24 M12
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2012/07&r=hrm
  10. By: Turturean, Monica
    Abstract: Today’s world is facing many problems caused by the economic crisis leading thus to an education crisis. Witnessing major changes in the curricula, at different ways of assessment, at teaching and learning in transdiciplinary manner which took by surprise the students who, in turn, feel disarmed and unable to cope with these changes that take place in a very fast rate. And internet has a big influence in students learning and their performance. Many universities try to introduce the internet and new technologies to facilitate student learning, to enhance their motivation for study and to improve their academic performance. Given that, if we want to provide an education of excellence, we have to know the student professional motivation, which determines them to obtain academic performance, to enhance their learning using internet to successfully cope with the challenges of knowledge-based society.
    Keywords: motivation; academic performance; internet technology; critical thinking; active learning
    JEL: I21
    Date: 2012–04–26
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39250&r=hrm
  11. By: Pascal Gantenbein; Christophe Volonté (University of Basel)
    Keywords: Corporate governance, Culture, Law, Board of directors, Ownership structure
    JEL: G30 G32 G34 G38 Z10
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2012/04&r=hrm

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