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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Sunde, Uwe (University of St. Gallen); Vischer, Thomas (University of St. Gallen) |
| Abstract: | This paper suggests that the weak empirical effect of human capital on growth in existing cross-country studies is partly the result of an inappropriate specification that does not account for the different channels through which human capital affects growth. A systematic replication of earlier results from the literature shows that both, initial levels and changes in human capital, have positive growth effects, while in isolation, each channel often appears insignificant. Moreover, the effects are heterogeneous across countries with different levels of development. The results suggest that the effect of human capital is likely to be underestimated in empirical specifications that do not account for both channels. This study therefore complements alternative explanations for the weak growth effects of human capital based on outlier observations and measurement issues. |
| Keywords: | human capital, growth regressions, specification |
| JEL: | O47 O11 O15 E24 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5991&r=hrm |
| By: | Link, Albert N. (University of North Carolina, Greensboro); Ruhm, Christopher J. (University of Virginia) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we show that the patenting behavior of creative entrepreneurs is correlated with the patenting behavior of their fathers, which we refer to as a source of the entrepreneurs' human capital endowments. Our argument for this relationship follows from established theories of developmental creativity, and our empirical analysis is based on survey data collected from MIT's Technology Review winners. |
| Keywords: | patents, entrepreneurship, human capital endowments |
| JEL: | J24 O31 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5988&r=hrm |
| By: | Dihai Wang (School of Economics, Fudan University); Heng-fu Zou (Research Department, World Bank) |
| Abstract: | According to Robert Fogel (1994a, 1994b), nutrition is the driving force for the increase in health human capital, which in turn has significantly promoted economic growth in the long run. In this paper, we take Fogel¡¯s finding to extend the standard Ramsey model by including the effect of consumption on nutrition and health human capital formation. It is demonstrated that there exist multiple equilibria in the modified Ramsey model with a subsistence level of consumption. That is to say, different countries may end up with different levels of long-run consumption, nutrition, health human capital, and physical capital. |
| Keywords: | Health Human Capital, Consumption, Economic Growth, Poverty Trap |
| JEL: | D99 E21 I12 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cuf:wpaper:520&r=hrm |
| By: | Susumu Imai (Queen`s University, Department of Economics); Derek Stacey (Queen`s University, Department of Economics); Casey Warman (Queen`s University, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We examine the ability of male immigrants to transfer their occupational human capital using information from the O*NET and a unique dataset that includes both the last source country occupation and the first four years of occupations in Canada. We first augment a model of occupational choice and skill accumulation to derive predictions about the cross-border transferability of occupational human capital. We then test the empirical implications using the skill requirements of pre- and post-immigration occupations. We find that male immigrants to Canada were employed in source country occupations that required high levels of cognitive skills, but relied less intently on manual skills. Following immigration, they find initial employment in occupations that require the opposite. Regression analysis uncovers large returns to the quantitative skill requirements of Canadian occupations, but no returns to source country skill requirements. Finally, our empirical findings suggests that occupational skill gaps are detrimental to immigrants` earnings. |
| Keywords: | occupational mobility, skills, human capital, immigration |
| JEL: | J24 J31 J61 J71 J80 J62 D83 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qed:wpaper:1275&r=hrm |
| By: | Gerald Eisenkopf (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany); Zohal Hessami (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany); Urs Fischbacher (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany); Heinrich Ursprung (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany) |
| Abstract: | We study the effects of random assignment to coeducational and single-sex classes on the academic performance of female high school students. Our estimation results show that single-sex schooling improves the performance of female students in mathematics. This positive effect increases if the single-sex class is taught by a male teacher. An accompanying survey reveals that single-sex schooling also strengthens female students’ selfconfidence and renders the self-assessment of their mathematics skills more level-headed. Single-sex schooling thus has profound implications for human capital formation and the mind-set of female students. |
| JEL: | I21 J16 |
| Date: | 2011–09–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:knz:dpteco:1135&r=hrm |
| By: | de Grip, Andries (ROA, Maastricht University); Sauermann, Jan (ROA, Maastricht University) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the effects of work-related training on worker productivity. To identify the causal effects from training, we combine a field experiment that randomly assigns workers to treatment and control groups with panel data on individual worker performance before and after training. We find that participation in the training programme leads to a 10 percent increase in performance. Moreover, we provide experimental evidence for externalities from treated workers on their untreated teammates: An increase of 10 percentage points in the share of treated peers leads to a performance increase of 0.51 percent. We provide evidence that the estimated effects are causal and not the result of employee selection into and out of training. Furthermore, we find that the performance increase is not due to lower quality provided by the worker. |
| Keywords: | training, field experiment, peer effects, productivity |
| JEL: | J24 M53 C93 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5976&r=hrm |
| By: | Kuhn, Peter J. (University of California, Santa Barbara); Villeval, Marie Claire (CNRS, GATE) |
| Abstract: | Are women disproportionately attracted to work environments where cooperation rather than competition is rewarded? This paper reports the results of a real-effort experiment in which participants choose between an individual compensation scheme and a team-based payment scheme. We find that women are more likely than men to select team-based compensation in our baseline treatment, but women and men join teams with equal frequency when we add an efficiency advantage to team production. Using a simple structural discrete choice framework to reconcile these facts, we show that three elements can explain the observed patterns in the team-entry gender gap: (1) a gender gap in confidence in others (i.e. women are less pessimistic about their prospective teammates' relative ability), (2) a greater responsiveness among men to instrumental reasons for joining teams, and (3) a greater "pure" preference for working in a team environment among women. |
| Keywords: | gender, cooperation, self-selection, confidence, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 J16 J24 J31 M5 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5999&r=hrm |
| By: | Patricia Justino (Institute of Development Studies (IDS), University of Sussex) |
| Abstract: | This paper reviews and discusses available empirical research on the impact of violent conflict on the level and access to education of civilian and combatant populations affected by violence. Three main themes emerge from this empirical review. The first is that relatively minor shocks to educational access can lead to significant and long-lasting detrimental effects on individual human capital formation in terms of educational attainment, health outcomes and labour market opportunities. Secondly, the destruction of infrastructure, the absence of teachers and reductions in schooling capacity affect secondary schooling disproportionately. Finally, the exposure of households to violence results in significant gender differentials in individual educational outcomes. The paper then turns its attention to the specific mechanisms that link violent conflict with educational outcomes, an area largely unexplored in the literatures on conflict and education. The paper focuses six key mechanisms: soldiering, household labour allocation decisions, fear, changes in returns to education, targeting of schools, teachers and students and displacement. |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hic:wpaper:99&r=hrm |
| By: | Levenson, Alec (University of Southern California); Zoghi, Cindy (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics); Gibbs, Michael (University of Chicago); Benson, George (University of Texas at Arlington) |
| Abstract: | We study effects of a firm's attempt to optimize an existing incentive scheme to increase sales growth for direct store delivery workers. Before optimization workers reported Ratchet Effects that lowered productivity. The altered incentive plan offered higher compensation for increased sales relative to a sales growth target, and lower compensation for failing to meet the target. We gathered data on performance and attitudes at pilot and control sites before and after the change. Relative to control sites, sales growth increased in the pilot sites by two percent, a meaningful contribution to firm profits. We find no change in distortion of effort or manipulation of the performance measure. Workers did not substantially change number of hours worked, though allocation of time across tasks changed slightly. Despite increased productivity, workers continued to report Ratchet Effects after the change. We also find that an unplanned price increase midway through a fiscal year affected the extent of Ratchet Effects that year. |
| Keywords: | incentives, ratchet effect |
| JEL: | M52 J33 M12 L81 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5985&r=hrm |
| By: | Dessi, Roberta (Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI and GREMAQ), and CEPR); Rustichini, Aldo (University of Minnesota) |
| Abstract: | Standard economic models with complete information predict a positive, monotonic relationship between pay and performance. This prediction does not always hold in experimental tests: offering a small payment may result in lower performance than not offering any pay- ment. We test experimentally two main explanations that have been put forward for this result: the "incomplete contract" hypothesis views the payment rule as a signal given to subjects on purpose of the activity. The "informed principal" hypothesis views it as a signal concerning the characteristics of the agent or of the task. The incomplete contract view appears to oer the best overall explanation for our results. We also nd that high-powered monetary incentives do not "crowd out" intrinsic motivation, but may elicit "too much" eort when intrinsic motivation is very high. |
| Date: | 2011–09–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:24942&r=hrm |
| By: | Eva-Maria Steiger (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena); Ro'i Zultan |
| Abstract: | Transparency in teams can induce cooperation. We study contribution decisions by agents when previous decisions can be observed. We find that an information chain, in which each agent directly observes only the decision of her immediate predecessor, is at least as effective as a fully-transparent protocol in inducing cooperation under increasing returns to scale. In a comparable social dilemma, the information chain leads to high cooperation both when compared to a non-transparent protocol for early movers, and when compared to a fully-transparent protocol for late movers. we conclude that information chains facilitate cooperation by balancing positive and negative reciprocity. |
| Keywords: | team production, public goods, incentives, externality, information, transparency, conditional cooperation |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D21 J31 M52 |
| Date: | 2011–09–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-040&r=hrm |
| By: | René Böheim (WIFO); Thomas Leoni (WIFO) |
| Abstract: | Sick workers in many countries receive sick pay during their illness-related absences from the workplace. In several countries, the social security system insures firms against their workers' sickness absences. However, this insurance may create moral hazard problems for firms, leading to the inefficient monitoring of absences or to an underinvestment in their prevention. In the present paper, we investigate firms' moral hazard problems in sickness absences by analysing a legislative change that took place in Austria in 2000. In September 2000, an insurance fund that refunded firms for the costs of their blue-collar workers' sickness absences was abolished (firms did not receive a similar refund for their white-collar workers' sickness absences). Before that time, small firms were fully refunded for the wage costs of blue-collar workers' sickness absences. Large firms, by contrast, were refunded only 70 percent of the wages paid to sick blue-collar workers. Using a difference-in-differences-in-differences approach, we estimate the causal impact of refunding firms for their workers' sickness absences. Our results indicate that the incidences of blue-collar workers' sicknesses dropped by approximately 8 percent and sickness absences were almost 11 percent shorter following the removal of the refund. Several robustness checks confirm these results. |
| Keywords: | Absenteeism Moral Hazard Sickness Insurance |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wfo:wpaper:y:2011:i:400&r=hrm |
| By: | Bassanini, Andrea; Caroli, Eve; Rebérioux, Antoine; Breda, Thomas |
| Abstract: | We study compensation packages in family and non-family firms. Using French matched employer-employee data, we first show that family firms pay on average lower wages. We find that part of this wage gap is due to low wage workers sorting into family firms and high wage workers sorting into non-family firms. However, we also find evidence that company wage policies differ according to ownership status, so that the same worker is paid differently under family and non-family firm ownership. We also find evidence that family firms are characterised by lower job insecurity, as measured by dismissal rates and by the subjective risk of dismissal perceived by workers. In addition, family firms appear to rely less on dismissals – and more on hiring reductions – than non-family firms when they downsize. We show that compensating wage differentials account for a substantial part of the inverse relationship between the family/non-family gaps in wages and job security. |
| Keywords: | family firms; wages; job security; compensating wage differentials; linked employer-employee data |
| JEL: | G34 J31 J33 J63 L26 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpm:docweb:1110&r=hrm |
| By: | Joaquín Gómez Miñambres |
| Abstract: | We study a principal agent model where agents derive a sense of pride when accomplishing production goals. As in classical models, the principal offers a pay-per-performance wage to the agent, determining the agent’s extrinsic incentives. However, in our setting, the principal does also want to set goals that affect the agents’ intrinsic motivation to work. Agents differ in their personal standard which determines what becomes challenging and rewarding to them, and hence the intensity of their intrinsic motivation to achieve goals. We show that, at the optimal contract, the agents’ production, as well as the goals set by the principal, increase with the agents’ personal standards. Thus, although goal setting is payoff irrelevant, since it does not directly affect agents’ wage, it increases agents’ achievement and hence the principal’s profits. Moreover, we show that a mediocre standard agent could end up being the most satisfied one |
| Keywords: | Intrinsic motivation; Goal-setting; Reference dependent preference |
| JEL: | D82 D86 M50 Z13 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:we1123&r=hrm |