nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2011‒05‒07
eight papers chosen by
Tommaso Reggiani
Universita' di Bologna

  1. A decomposition of China's productivity through calibration of an endogenous growth model By Luckstead, Jeff; Choi, Seung Mo; Devadoss, Stephen; Mittelhammer, Ron C.
  2. Effects of Training on Employee Suggestions and Promotions in an Internal Labor Market By Christian Pfeifer; Simon Janssen; Philip Yang; Uschi Backes-Gellner
  3. Unemployment, Human Capital Depreciation and Pension Benefits: An Empirical Evaluation of German Data By Niklas Potrafke
  4. A Human Relations Paradox By Hans Gersbach; Hans Haller
  5. The Impact of Pollution on Worker Productivity By Joshua S. Graff Zivin; Matthew J. Neidell
  6. Watch your Workers Win. Changing Job Demands and HRM Responses By Luke Haywood
  7. The Heterogeneous Economic Consequences of Works Council Relations By Christian Pfeifer
  8. Quality competition with motivated providers and sluggish demand By Luigi Siciliani; Odd Rune Straume; Roberto Cellini

  1. By: Luckstead, Jeff; Choi, Seung Mo; Devadoss, Stephen; Mittelhammer, Ron C.
    Keywords: China, IST, human capital, International Development, o30,
    Date: 2011
  2. By: Christian Pfeifer (Institute of Economics, Leuphana University Lueneburg, Germany); Simon Janssen (University Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, Switzerland); Philip Yang (Leibniz University Hannover, Institute of Labor Economics, Germany); Uschi Backes-Gellner (University Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, Switzerland)
    Abstract: We evaluate the effects of employer-provided formal training on employee suggestions for productivity improvements and on promotions among male blue-collar workers. More than twenty years of personnel data of four entry cohorts in a German company allow us to address issues such as unobserved heterogeneity and the length of potential training effects. Our main finding is that workers have larger probabilities to make suggestions and to be promoted after they have received formal training. The effect on suggestions is however only short term. Promotion probabilities are largest directly after training but also seem to be affected in the long term.
    Keywords: Human capital; Insider econometrics; Productivity; Promotions; Training
    JEL: J24 M53
    Date: 2011–04
  3. By: Niklas Potrafke (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany)
    Abstract: This paper investigates empirically how unemployment-induced employment-breaks at different career stages influence pension benefits. The analysis is based on German data. I distinguish four different career phases and investigate to what extent the prevailing social security policy compensated for earning losses. The results suggest that (1) losses in pension benefits were the greatest if unemployment occurred in the middle of a career (between 31 50); (2) social security policies have had a mitigating effect on losses in pension benefits. These findings indicate that institutions have a decided influence on how career patterns translate into pension benefits.
    Keywords: employment histories, career interruptions, pension benefits, social security policy, human capital depreciation, institutions
    JEL: J26 J24 H55 I38
    Date: 2011–04–25
  4. By: Hans Gersbach (ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Hans Haller (Virginia Polytechnic Institute)
    Abstract: We present a variant of a general equilibrium model with group formation to study how changes of non-consumptive benefits from group formation impact on the well-being of group members. We identify a human relations paradox: Positive externalities increase, but none of the group members gains in equilibrium. Moreover, a member who experiences an increase of positive emotional benefits in a group may become worse off in equilibrium.
    Keywords: Group formation, competitive markets, human relation, exit
    JEL: D41 D50 D60
    Date: 2011–04
  5. By: Joshua S. Graff Zivin; Matthew J. Neidell
    Abstract: Environmental protection is typically cast as a tax on the labor market and the economy in general. Since a large body of evidence links pollution with poor health, and health is an important part of human capital, efforts to reduce pollution could plausibly be viewed as an investment in human capital and thus a tool for promoting economic growth. While a handful of studies have documented the impacts of pollution on labor supply, this paper is the first to rigorously assess the less visible but likely more pervasive impacts on worker productivity. In particular, we exploit a novel panel dataset of daily farm worker output as recorded under piece rate contracts merged with data on environmental conditions to relate the plausibly exogenous daily variations in ozone with worker productivity. We find robust evidence that ozone levels well below federal air quality standards have a significant impact on productivity: a 10 ppb decrease in ozone concentrations increases worker productivity by 4.2 percent.
    JEL: I1 J3 Q5
    Date: 2011–04
  6. By: Luke Haywood (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I)
    Abstract: This paper considers how the demand for non-material aspects of jobs evolves over changing wealth levels and how firms may want to react. We first consider the importance of non-material job aspects in general before turning to two specifc human resource practices: flexible working hour arrangements and employer pension provision. In order to estimate the effect of wealth on job preferences without confounding it with the potential effect of job preferences on wealth due to earnings differentials, we focus on non-labour income (e.g. lottery winnings). We test how it affects workers' preferences using an approach based on duration data.
    Keywords: job satisfaction; wealth; HRM; job mobility; turnover
    Date: 2011–01
  7. By: Christian Pfeifer (Institute of Economics, Leuphana University Lueneburg, Germany)
    Abstract: I use a question about works council relations from the 2006 wave of the IAB Establishment panel to analyze the heterogeneous effects of works councils on productivity, wages, and profits. The results indicate that the effects differ significantly between works council relationship types in a systematic pattern. The overall findings are in line with productivity-enhancing and rent-sharing functions of works councils.
    Keywords: Codetermination; Firm performance; Industrial relations; Works councils
    JEL: J53 M54
    Date: 2011–04
  8. By: Luigi Siciliani (Department of Economics and Centre for Health Economics, University of York, Heslington); Odd Rune Straume (Universidade do Minho - NIPE); Roberto Cellini (Department of Economics, University of Catania)
    Abstract: We study incentives for quality provision in markets where providers are motivated (semi-altruistic); prices are regulated and firms are funded by a combination of block grants and unit prices; competition is based on quality, and demand adjusts sluggishly. Health or education are sectors in which the mentioned features are the rule. We show that the presence of motivated providers makes dynamic competition tougher, resulting in higher steady-state levels of quality in the closed-loop solutions than in the benchmark open-loop solution, if the price is sufficiently high. However, this result is reversed if the price is sufficiently low (and below unit costs). Sufficiently low prices also imply that a reduction in demand sluggishness will lead to lower steady-state quality. Prices below unit costs will nevertheless be welfare optimal if the providers are sufficiently motivated.
    Keywords: Quality competition; Differential games;Motivated agents
    JEL: C73 H42 I18 I21 L13
    Date: 2011

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