nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2011‒03‒05
six papers chosen by
Tommaso Reggiani
Universita' di Bologna

  1. Migration and Education By Christian Dustmann; Albrecht Glitz
  2. Long Term Consequences of Natural Resource Booms for Human Capital Accumulation By Emery, Herb; Ferrer, Ana; Green, David
  3. Wage Premia for Newly Hired Employees: Theory and Evidence By Kampkötter, Patrick; Sliwka, Dirk
  4. Works councils, collective bargaining and apprenticeship training By Ben Kriechel; Samuel Muehlemann; Harald Pfeifer; Miriam Schuette
  6. An empirical analysis of the determinants of the Rural Development policy spending for Human Capital By Materia, Valentina C.; Camaioni, Beatrice

  1. By: Christian Dustmann (CReAM, University College London); Albrecht Glitz (CReAM, Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
    Abstract: Sjaastad (1962) viewed migration in the same way as education: as an investment in the human agent. Migration and education are decisions that are indeed intertwined in many dimensions. Education and skill acquisition play an important role at many stages of an individual’s migration. Differential returns to skills in origin- and destination country are a main driver of migration. The economic success of the immigrant in the destination country is to a large extent determined by her educational background, how transferable these skills are to the host country labour market, and how much she invests into further skills after arrival. The desire to acquire skills in the host country that have a high return in the country of origin may also be an important reason for a migration. From an intertemporal point of view, the possibility of a later migration may also affect educational decisions in the home country long before a migration is realised. In addition, the decisions of migrants regarding their own educational investment, and their expectations about future migration plans may also affect the educational attainment of their children. But migration and education are not only related for those who migrate or their descendants. Migrations of some individuals may have consequences for educational decisions of those who do not migrate, both in the home and in the host country. By easing credit constraints through remittances, migration of some may help others to go to school. By changing the skill base of the receiving country, migration may change incentives to invest in certain types of human capital. Migrants and their children may create externalities that influence educational outcomes of non-migrants in the destination country. This chapter will discuss some of the key areas that connect migration and education.
    Keywords: Migration, Education, Human Capital, Return Migration, Immigrant Selection, Second-generation Immigrants.
    Date: 2011–02
  2. By: Emery, Herb; Ferrer, Ana; Green, David
    Abstract: Tight labour markets driven by resource booms could increase the opportunity cost of schooling and crowd out human capital formation. For oil producing economies like the Province of Alberta, the OPEC oil shocks of 1973 to 1981 may have had an adverse long term effect on the productivity of the labor force if the oil boom resulted in workers reducing their ultimate investment in human capital rather than merely altering the timing of schooling. We analyze the effect of this decade long oil-boom on the long-term human capital investments and productivity for Alberta birth cohorts that were of normal schooling ages before, during and after the oil boom. Our findings suggest that resource booms may change the timing of schooling but they do not reduce the total accumulation of human capital.
    Keywords: Resource booms, long term human capital accumulation, OPEC oil crisis
    JEL: J24 I21 I22
    Date: 2011–02–22
  3. By: Kampkötter, Patrick (University of Cologne); Sliwka, Dirk (University of Cologne)
    Abstract: We investigate wage differences between newly hired and incumbent employees. We show in a formal model that when employees care for wages as well as match-specific utility, incumbents earn less than new recruits if and only if firm-specific human capital is not too important. The existence and structure of these wage premia is then investigated empirically using detailed personnel data from a large number of banks. We find that, on average, new hires earn more than comparable incumbent colleagues on the same job. But the size of the wage premia varies between jobs and indeed strongly depends on a measure of human capital specificity.
    Keywords: wages, job mobility, wage premia, human capital, new hires
    JEL: J31 J44 J62
    Date: 2011–02
  4. By: Ben Kriechel (Maastricht University and IZA Bonn); Samuel Muehlemann (University of Bern and IZA Bonn); Harald Pfeifer (Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB) Bonn); Miriam Schuette (Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB) Bonn)
    Abstract: We investigate the effects of works councils on apprenticeship training. The German law attributes works councils substantial information and co-determination rights on training-related issues. Thus, works councils may also have an impact on the cost-benefit relation of workplace training. Using detailed firm-level data containing information on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training in Germany, we apply econometric matching methods to identify works council effects. We find that firms with works councils make a significantly higher net investment in apprenticeship training compared to firms without such an institution. However, we also find that the fraction of workers still employed with the same firm five years after training is significantly higher in the presence of works councils, enabling firms to recoup training investments over a longer time horizon. All works council effects, however, are much more pronounced for firms covered by collective bargaining agreements.
    Keywords: Works councils, collective bargaining agreement, apprenticeship training, firm-sponsored training
    JEL: J24 J50 M53
    Date: 2011–02
    Abstract: Employing a risk perception perspective, this paper studies the link between the investment manager’s human capital and his or her attitude towards the appropriability regime in the business proposal, and more specifically whether or not the technology is patent protected. Even though many researchers acknowledge the benefits related to patenting, agency theory suggests that patents may enlarge agency risk and may therefore result in VCs refraining from investing in proposals commercializing patented technology. We find that task-specific human capital, operationalized as the number of years experience as investment manager, positively affects the attitude towards patents. We find that some elements of general human capital, namely consulting experience, financial experience and entrepreneurial experience affect the attitude towards patents.
    Keywords: venture capital, selection behaviour, appropriability, human capital, risk perception
    Date: 2011–01
  6. By: Materia, Valentina C.; Camaioni, Beatrice
    Abstract: The aim of the paper is twofold: to present a preliminary analysis of the distribution of the Rural Development (RD) expenditure for specific measures related to human capital across EU and to investigate which factors may explain the variation of intensity of spending between the regions. In particular, a descriptive analysis of the budget and of the expenditure for EU 27 will be presented. A linear regression model (OLS) is also presented in order to verify which factors weigh more in determining the spending decisions for the European regions. The analysis is carried out taking into account the EAFRD expenditures for the measures related to human capital for the period 2007-2008 at NUTS2 level.
    Keywords: Rural Development, Human Capital, distribution of the Expenditure, Agricultural and Food Policy, Q18,
    Date: 2011–02–10

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