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on Human Capital and Human Resource Management |
| By: | Runli Xie |
| Abstract: | This paper focuses on the dynamic link between skill-specific labor markets with search frictions. Human capital investment is formed through households' endogenous decision, and competes with physical capital investment. Idiosyncratic shock shifts the skilled labor share and changes tightness in both skilled and unskilled markets. Given inelastic labor participation, the model can generate downward-sloping Beveridge curves in aggregate, skilled and unskilled labor markets. Upon a neutral shock, total unemployment decrease is two-staged: firstly with a reduction in unskilled unemployment, and then due to a sharp decline of skilled unemployment when skill substitution dominates. A higher elasticity of substitution between two types of labor leads to higher volatility of the model variables and higher u - v correlation. |
| Keywords: | skill-specific unemployment, human capital investment, idiosyncratic shock, skill substitution, search and matching |
| JEL: | E24 E32 J24 J63 |
| Date: | 2011–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2011-011&r=hrm |
| By: | Mano, Yukichi; Yamamura, Eiji |
| Abstract: | Japanese household-level data describing a husband's earnings, his wife's working status, and their schooling levels are used to test the implications of a model proposing a time-consuming process of human capital accumulation within marriages, in which an educated wife is more productive. The empirical results support the model’s predictions: in particular (i) a housewife's schooling has a greater positive effect on her husband's earnings than a working wife’s schooling does; and (ii) the effect of a housewife's schooling increases with the length of marriage, whereas the effect of a working wife’s schooling does not change over the course of marriage. |
| Keywords: | Human Capital; Married Couple;Housewife; Working Wife |
| JEL: | J12 J24 |
| Date: | 2011–02–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:28936&r=hrm |
| By: | Silvia Dominguez-Martinez (University of Amsterdam); Otto H. Swank (Erasmus University Rotterdam) |
| Abstract: | Using simple game-theoretical models, this paper studies the role of pre-determined rules for HRM policies. We consider a model in which HRM decisions affect employees' self-images and thereby their motivation. We show that in the absence of written rules, managers are too reluctant (1) to differentiate between employees on the basis of their abilities, and (2) to terminate employment of employees on probation. Generally, organizations benefit from committing to strict rules for various HRM practices. |
| Keywords: | rules; human resource management policies; self-image; motivation |
| JEL: | M5 D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2011–02–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20110034&r=hrm |
| By: | Klor, Esteban F. (Hebrew University, Jerusalem); Kube, Sebastian (University of Bonn); Winter, Eyal (Hebrew University, Jerusalem); Zultan, Ro'i (Max Planck Institute for Economics) |
| Abstract: | Conventional wisdom suggests that an increase in monetary incentives should induce agents to exert higher effort. In this paper, however, we demonstrate that this may not hold in team settings. In the context of sequential team production with positive externalities between agents, incentive reversal might occur: an increase in monetary incentives (either because rewards increase or effort costs decrease) may lead agents to exert lower effort in the completion of a joint task – even if agents are fully rational, self-centered money maximizers. Herein we discuss this seemingly paradoxical phenomenon and report on two experiments that provide supportive evidence. |
| Keywords: | incentives, incentive reversal, team production, externalities, laboratory experiments, personnel economics |
| JEL: | C92 D23 J31 J33 J41 M12 M52 |
| Date: | 2011–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5501&r=hrm |
| By: | Eva Gutierrez-i-Puigarnau (VU University Amsterdam); Jos N. van Ommeren (VU University Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | There is little known about the effects of staggered-hours programs that affect workers' working schedules to mitigate peak congestion. We examine the effect of workers' morning start times on their wages for Germany. In contrast to previous work based on cross-section data, we demonstrate that wages are not, or maybe, a slight inverse U-shaped function of start time suggesting that staggered-hours programs might be welfare enhancing. |
| Keywords: | Commuting; start time; wages; staggered hours; peak congestion |
| JEL: | R48 |
| Date: | 2010–07–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20100073&r=hrm |
| By: | Bas ter Weel |
| Abstract: | This research examines the impact of manager turnover on firm performance using information from the Dutch soccer league in the period 1986-2004. The main advantage of using sports data is that both manager characteristics and decisions and firm outcomes are directly observable. |
| JEL: | J24 |
| Date: | 2011–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpb:discus:166&r=hrm |
| By: | Daniel van Vuuren; Paul de Hek |
| Abstract: | It is widely believed that wage and productivity profiles of individual workers do not coincide at all ages. We give an overview of the theories which provide a rationale for this, and discuss the empirical literature. |
| JEL: | J24 J31 J33 J51 J62 |
| Date: | 2010–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpb:discus:165&r=hrm |
| By: | Joeri Sol (Erasmus University Rotterdam) |
| Keywords: | peer evaluation; peer appraisal; incentive contracts; co-worker relations; likeability bias |
| JEL: | D86 J33 M50 |
| Date: | 2010–05–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20100055&r=hrm |
| By: | Jana Vyrastekova (Radboud University Nijmegen); Sander Onderstal (University of Amsterdam); Pierre Koning (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis) |
| Abstract: | We examine how self-selection of workers into firms depends on the power of the firms' incentive schemes and how it affects the performance of firms that increase the power of the incentive schemes. In a laboratory experiment, we let subjects choose between (low-powered) team incentives and (high-powered) individual incentives. We observe that subjects exhibiting high trust or reciprocity in the trust game are more likely to choose team incentives. When exposed to individual incentives, workers who chose team incentives perform worse if both the unobservable interdependency between workers and their incentive to cooperate under team incentives are high. |
| Keywords: | Incentive scheme; Self-selection; Laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C91 J33 M52 |
| Date: | 2010–07–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20100074&r=hrm |