nep-hrm New Economics Papers
on Human Capital and Human Resource Management
Issue of 2011‒02‒12
eleven papers chosen by
Tommaso Reggiani
Universita' di Bologna

  1. Core Employee's Profile as a mean of human resource development in knowledge-intensive firms By Minina, Vera N.; Krupskaya, Anastasia U.
  2. Human resource development through core employee identification By Minina, Vera N.; Krupskaya, Anastasia U.
  3. Human capital and productivity By Angel de la Fuente
  4. Channels Through Which Human Capital Inequality Influences Economic Growth By Amparo Castelló-Climent
  5. Fertility, human capital accumulation, and the pension system By CREMER, Helmuth; GAHVARI, Firouz; PESTIEAU, Pierre
  6. Workforce Skills and Innovation: An Overview of Major Themes in the Literature By Phillip Toner
  7. Is part-time employment beneficial for firm productivity? By Nelen Annemarie; Grip Andries de; Fouarge Didier
  8. Works Councils, Wages, and Job Satisfaction By Grund, Christian; Schmitt, Andreas
  9. Driven by Social Comparisons: How Feedback about Coworkers’ Effort Influences Individual Productivity By Francesca Gino; Bradley R. Staats
  10. Incentives for Accuracy in Analyst Research By Patricia Crifo; Hind Sami
  11. Workplace Democracy in the Lab By Mellizo, Philip; Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Matthews, Peter Hans

  1. By: Minina, Vera N.; Krupskaya, Anastasia U.
    Abstract: Paper for 11th International Conference on Human Resource Development Research and Practice across Europe. Pecs, Hungary, June 2-4, 2010.
    Keywords: knowledge-intensive firm, human capital, human capital, Human Resource Development, Human Capital Management, Core Employee Profile, abilities,
    Date: 2010
  2. By: Minina, Vera N.; Krupskaya, Anastasia U.
    Abstract: Paper for 25th Anniversary Workshop on Strategic Human Resource Management. St Curat, Barcelona, Spain. April 19-20, 2010.
    Keywords: knowledge-intensive firm, human capital, Human Resource Development, Human Capital Management, Core Empoyees, Human Capital Profile, abilities,
    Date: 2010
  3. By: Angel de la Fuente
    Abstract: This paper surveys the empirical literature on human capital and productivity and summarizes the results of my own work on the subject. On balance, the available evidence suggests that investment in education has a positive, significant and sizable effect on productivity growth. According to my estimates, moreover, the social returns to investment in human capital are higher than those on physical capital in most EU countries and in many regions of Spain.
    Keywords: human capital, productivity, growth, measurement error
    JEL: O40 I20 O30 C19
    Date: 2011–01–31
  4. By: Amparo Castelló-Climent (Institute of International Economics, University of Valencia)
    Abstract: This paper empirically investigates the theoretical predictions of some of the channels through which human capital inequality may discourage investment and growth. In a cross-section of countries over the period 1960-2000, findings reveal that, all other things being equal, a greater degree of human capital inequality increases fertility rates and reduces life expectancy, which in turn hampers the accumulation rates of human capital. This effect is reinforced in the countries where individuals find it difficult to access credit. Extensive sensitivity analyses show the results are robust across specifications and are not driven by atypical observations, endogenous regressors or unobservable heterogeneity.
    Keywords: Human capital inequality, structural form, investment rates, economic growth
    JEL: O1 O4
    Date: 2011–01
  5. By: CREMER, Helmuth (Toulouse School of Economics ( University or Toulouse and Institut Universitaire de France), F-3000 Toulouse, France); GAHVARI, Firouz (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Department of Economics, IL, USA); PESTIEAU, Pierre (CREPP, University of Liege, B-4000 Liège, Belgium; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve)
    Abstract: This paper provides a unified treatment of externalities associated with fertility and human capital accumulation within pas-as-you-go pension systems. It considers an overlapping generations model in which every generation consists of high earners and low earners with the proportion of types being determined endogenously. The number of children is deterministically chosen but the children’s future ability is in part stochastic, in part determined by the family background, and in part through education. In addition to the customary externality source associated with a change in average fertility rate, this setup highlights another externality source. This is due to the effect of a parent’s choice of number and educational attainment of his children on the proportion of high- ability individuals in the steady state. Our other results include: (i) Investments in education of high- and low-ability parents must be subsidized; (ii) direct child subsidies to one or both parent types can be negative; i.e., they can be taxes; (iii) net subsidies to children (direct child subsidies plus education subsidies) to at least one type of parents must be positive; (iv) parents who have a higher number of children should invest less in their education.
    Keywords: pay-as-you-go social security, endogenous fertility, education, endogenous ratio of high to low ability types, three externality sources, education subsidies, child subsidies
    JEL: H2 H5
    Date: 2010–09–01
  6. By: Phillip Toner
    Abstract: This paper provides an account of the main approaches, debates and evidence in the literature on the role of workforce skills in the innovation process in developed economies. It draws on multiple sources including the innovation studies discipline, neoclassical Human Capital theory, institutionalist labour market studies and the work organisation discipline. Extensive use is also made of official survey data to describe and quantify the diversity of skills and occupations involved in specific types of innovation activities.
    Date: 2011–01–07
  7. By: Nelen Annemarie; Grip Andries de; Fouarge Didier (METEOR)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes whether part-time employment is beneficial for firm productivity in the service sector. Using a unique dataset on the Dutch pharmacy sector that includes the work hours of all employees and a “hard” physical measure of firm productivity, we estimate a production function including heterogeneous employment shares based on work hours. We find that a larger part-time employment share leads to greater firm productivity. Additional data on the timing of labor demand show that part-time employment enables firms to allocate labor more efficiently. First, firms with part-time workers can bridge the gap between opening hours and a full-time work week. Second, we find that during opening hours part-time workers are scheduled differently than full-timers. For example, we find that part-time workers enable their full-time colleagues to take lunch breaks so that the firm can remain open during these times.
    Keywords: labour economics ;
    Date: 2011
  8. By: Grund, Christian (University of Würzburg); Schmitt, Andreas (University of Würzburg)
    Abstract: We investigate the effects of works councils on employees’ wages and job satisfaction in general and for subgroups with respect to sex and occupational status. Making use of a German representative sample of employees, we find that employees, who move to a firm with a works council, report increases in job satisfaction, but do not receive particular wage increases. Especially the job satisfaction of female employees is affected by a change in works council status. However, we do not find support for the hypothesis that the introduction of a works council itself increases wages or job satisfaction for the employees staying at the firm.
    Keywords: job satisfaction, wages, works councils
    JEL: M5 J30 J53
    Date: 2011–01
  9. By: Francesca Gino (Harvard Business School, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit); Bradley R. Staats (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
    Abstract: Drawing on theoretical insights from research on social comparison processes, this article explores how managers can use performance feedback to sustain employees' motivation and performance in organizations. Using a field experiment at a Japanese bank, we investigate the effects of valence (positive versus negative), type (direct versus indirect), and timing of feedback (one-shot versus persistent) on employee productivity. Our results show that direct negative feedback (e.g., an employee learns her performance falls in the bottom of her group) leads to improvements in employees' performance, while direct positive feedback does not significantly impact performance. Furthermore, indirect negative feedback (i.e., the employee learns she is not in the bottom of her group) worsens productivity while indirect positive feedback (i.e., the employee learns she is not in the top of her group) does not affect it. Finally, both persistently positive and persistently negative feedback lead to improvements in employees' performance. Together, our findings offer insight into the role of performance feedback in motivating productivity in repetitive tasks.
    Keywords: Feedback, Framing, Learning, Motivation, Persistence, Productivity, Social comparison
    Date: 2011–02
  10. By: Patricia Crifo (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X, University Paris X - (-), CIRANO - Montréal); Hind Sami (COACTIS - Université Lumière - Lyon II : EA4161 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne)
    Abstract: This paper proposes a model to analyze the dynamic relations between incentive contracts and analysts' effort in providing accurate research when both ethical and reputational concerns matter. First, we show that reputation picks up ability and thus serves as a sorting device: when analysts have a relatively low reputation for providing research quality (below a threshold level) banks find it more profitable to offer a mix of monetary and non monetary (ethic based) incentives and rely on the analyst's work ethic in ordre to provide research quality. Alternatively, when analysts have a high reputation, full financial (performance based) incentives contracts offer a substantial reward for their contribution to the firm's profits. Second, we find that the design of compensation contracts, in the presence of reputational concerns and work ethic, may lead to incentive problems: full financial incentives contracts may exacerbate conflicts of interest by giving analysts extrinsic rewards on reporting, thereby inducing them to prefer high short term benefits to the detriment of long term research and coverage effort. On the contrary, a mix of monetary and non monetary rewards based on the analyst's work ethic may allow them to resist pressures from conflicts of interest and induces a high research effort thus enhancing long-run reputation.
    Keywords: Motivation, Reputation, Reporting, Investment analysts.
    Date: 2011–02–02
  11. By: Mellizo, Philip (College of Wooster); Carpenter, Jeffrey P. (Middlebury College); Matthews, Peter Hans (Middlebury College)
    Abstract: While intuition suggests that empowering workers to have some say in the control of the firm is likely to have beneficial incentive effects, empirical evidence of such an effect is hard to come by because of numerous confounding factors in the naturally occurring data. We report evidence from a real-effort experiment confirming that worker performance is sensitive to the process used to select the compensation contract. Groups of workers that voted to determine their compensation scheme provided significantly more effort than groups that had no say in how they would be compensated. This effect is robust to controls for the compensation scheme implemented and worker characteristics (i.e., ability and gender).
    Keywords: real-effort experiment, workplace democracy, decision control rights
    JEL: C92 J33 J54
    Date: 2011–01

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