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on Housing and Real Estate |
| By: | Guillaume Chapelle; Alain Trannoy (CY Cergy Paris Université, THEMA) |
| Abstract: | Using French cadastral and transaction data, we study the effects of a VAT cut from 20% to 5.5% on new residential construction in and around about 600 deprived neighborhoods. The reduced rate raised the housing stock by 2% in floorspace terms, equivalent to roughly two years of residential investment over a decade, and generated a gain in total surplus of about €13.6 billion. We estimate the price elasticity of floor-space demand at −0.24, with a 60% pass-through to buyers; landowners and developers each capture roughly half of the remainder. We also confirm that housing supply in France is price-inelastic (elasticity of 0.35). |
| Keywords: | VAT, Housing, price-elasticities |
| JEL: | H22 R31 D61 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:2026-11 |
| By: | Evan Soltas (Princeton University); Jonathan Gruber (M.I.T.) |
| Abstract: | Permitting costs are widely cited, but little analyzed, as a key burden on housing development in leading U.S. cities. We measure them using an implicit market for “ready-to-issue†permits in Los Angeles, where landowners can prepay permitting costs and sell preapproved land to developers at a premium. Using a repeat-listing difference-in-differences estimator, we find developers pay 50 percent more ($48 per square foot) for preapproved land. Comparing similar proposed developments, preapproval raises the probability of completing construction within four years of site acquisition by 10 percentage points (30 percent). Permitting can explain one third of the gap in Los Angeles between home prices and construction costs. |
| Keywords: | Los Angeles, California, building permit, land-use regulation, hedonic, zoning, capitalization |
| JEL: | K25 R38 R52 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:cepsud:352 |
| By: | Hanming Fang; Jing Wu; Vincent Yao |
| Abstract: | We examine the causal effect of uncertainty in property rights on housing prices and speculative behavior. We take advantage of a distinctive setting in Shenzhen, China, where neighboring residential units that are otherwise similar differ in the strength of their property rights protections. Some units have full property rights (FPR) with a 70-year leasehold, whereas others have only limited property rights (LPR) protections. Using detailed listing data, we find that the sales market prices these protections, while the rental market does not. Our estimates imply that the perceived probability that FPR rights could be questioned at the end of the 70-year term is between 7% and 21%, and that the probability the LPR receives no legal protection in any future year exceeds 50%. We further show that LPR units are more susceptible to speculation, as reflected in higher turnover and greater price volatility. Lastly, we show that the public release of new urban planning codes raises listing prices and lowers turnover and price volatility for LPR properties relative to matched FPR units. |
| JEL: | G11 G12 R30 |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35797 |
| By: | Leonardo D’Amico (University of Chicago Booth School of Business); Evan Soltas (Princeton University); Audrey Wang (Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | We estimate the time durations of permitting and development for standardized new housing projects across 60 U.S. cities from 2000 to 2025. We report three new facts. First, the fastest cities complete projects in the time the slowest cities take to merely approve them. Second, across cities, permitting duration is positively associated with housing prices and negatively associated with production. The strength of these relationships rivals that of other measures of land-use regulation and suggests a high cost of delay. Third, permitting duration has risen steadily over time, whereas total project duration has fluctuated cyclically. |
| Keywords: | USA; United States of America, building permit, housing development, time-to-build |
| JEL: | H73 R31 R38 |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:cepsud:357 |
| By: | Batista E Silva Filipe (European Commission - JRC); Joossens Elisabeth (European Commission - JRC); Barranco Ricardo; Curtale Riccardo (European Commission - JRC); Balouktsi Despoina (European Commission - JRC); Bellia Mario (European Commission - JRC); Vasicek Borek; Martins Vitor; Zeugner Stefan; Bazzani Elisa (European Commission - JRC) |
| Abstract: | The Affordable Housing Act (AHA) is a key Commission initiative aiming to enable proportionate measures to address supply and demand mismatches in areas under housing stress. Within this framework, the AHA seeks to establish a common framework for flagging areas potentially under housing stress, clarify the conditions under which targeted and proportionate measures concerning the non-primary use of housing, including short-term rentals, may be justified, and encourage supply-side responses to increase the availability of affordable and social housing. After a thorough assessment of the availability and relevance of data and indicators, the JRC, in coordination with several Commission services, proposed a two-tier approach based on objective and publicly available data to assess areas under housing stress. The first tier combines data on price (Mapadomo) and income (Eurostat) to pre-screen overall housing stress conditions, and can be implemented in a straightforward and consistent manner by competent authorities across all EU Member States. The second tier relies on additional, auxiliary indicators linking to the root causes of the supply-demand mismatches at local level to justify and guide proportional policy development. This visual factsheet summarizes the overall approach, illustrating with recent data at the NUTS3-level how housing stress varies across the EU. |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc147616 |
| By: | Edward W. Chen; Reagan L. Lengefeld; Omar Isaac Asensio |
| Abstract: | This study examines a housing program that created affordable infill developments on formerly vacant, abandoned, or disinvested properties in Savannah, Georgia. Savannah is a major economic hub anchored by the Port of Savannah, where many urban neighborhoods remain impacted by disinvestment and climate risk. Using two decades of record-linked property and tax data, this study quantifies local economic spillovers from this public intervention, revealing previously hidden social and economic benefits of infill housing policies. These benefits include an 11% increase in the market value of properties immediately neighboring an infill development site and an increase of up to 35% in areas with a high density of infill activity, pointing to block-level revitalization in climate-disadvantaged and distressed areas. |
| JEL: | C31 C32 C80 O18 Q56 R31 |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35825 |
| By: | Hyeyoon Jung; Jaehoon (Kyle) Jung |
| Abstract: | In an April post, using millions of homeowners’ insurance contracts matched with property-level exposure and disaster risk, we showed that although households are insured, they are still “on the hook” because deductibles and coverage limits leave homeowners responsible for part of a loss. Because insurers cannot perfectly observe how well homeowners maintain or protect their properties (a problem known as “moral hazard”), contract terms such as deductibles can play an important role in balancing risk sharing and incentives. By requiring homeowners to bear part of a loss, insurers can preserve incentives for policyholders to take actions that reduce damage risk. In this post, we quantify the cost of keeping homeowners on the hook. How costly is moral hazard in homeowner’s insurance? How much risk must households retain to preserve these incentives? And, importantly, who ultimately bears that residual risk? The short answer is that keeping homeowners on the hook costs insurers relatively little, but it leaves households with substantial risk, especially those least able to absorb a large loss. |
| Keywords: | insurance; financial constraints; household finance; moral hazard; contracting |
| JEL: | C6 D8 G1 G2 G3 |
| Date: | 2026–10–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fednls:103873 |