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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Pierre Bardier |
| Abstract: | We provide a formal framework accounting for a widespread idea in the theory of economic design: analytically established incompatibilities between given axioms should be qualified by the likelihood of their violation. We define the degree to which rules satisfy an axiom, as well as several axioms, on the basis of a probability measure over the inputs of the rules. Armed with this notion of degree, we propose and characterize i) a criterion to evaluate and compare rules given a set of axioms, allowing the importance of each combination of axioms to differ, and ii) a criterion to measure the compatibility between given axioms, building on a analogy with cooperative game theory. |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2502.13850 |
| By: | Nogues-Marco, Pilar |
| Abstract: | Payment systems evolved from decentralized networks to centralized systems coordinated by a national bank. Contrary to the view that centralization was a natural economic process driven by the gradual concentration of interbank deposits in reputable banks, this research highlights state-driven institutional change. In Spain, the Bank of Spain secured a monopoly on national banknote issuance in 1874 during a civil war, despite opposition from regional issuing banks. While Northern Spain’s industrial growth challenged Madrid’s dominance as the payment system’s center, political motivations ultimately cemented Madrid as Spain’s geographical monetary center to support the nation-state’s building. |
| Keywords: | Payment systems, National issuing banking, Monetary geography, Political sovereignty, Systèmes de paiement, Banque nationale d’émission, Géographie monétaire, Souveraineté politique |
| JEL: | N23 G21 E58 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gnv:wpaper:unige:183332 |