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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Schilirò, Daniele |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a comprehensive, albeit non-exhaustive, critical reflection on the evolution of political economy, tracing its intellectual lineage from foundational theories to modern growth dynamics. By examining shifting paradigms of wealth production, resource distribution, and power, the study navigates the transition from Mercantilist protectionism and Classical liberalism to the systemic critiques of Marxian economics. It further analyzes the discipline’s formalization during the Neoclassical Revolution and subsequent 20th-century shifts—specifically the Keynesian macroeconomic surge, the neoclassical synthesis, Hayek’s liberal stance, the Monetarist counter-revolution, and the rational expectations frameworks that redefined state-market relations. Beyond these foundational paradigms, the study evaluates critical modern expansions that transformed economics into a mathematically rigorous and structurally nuanced science. Specifically, it reviews the mathematical-axiomatic breakthrough of the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model and the strategic frameworks of Game Theory pioneered by von Neumann, Morgenstern, and Nash. Furthermore, the analysis incorporates Coase’s foundational work on transaction costs and organizational boundaries, alongside the revolutionary impacts of asymmetric information models and modern financial portfolio theory. Moving into contemporary discourse, the analysis bridges Solow’s foundational growth models with the endogenous growth theory championed by Romer, emphasizing the pivotal roles of technological change and knowledge. By integrating the Schumpeterian tradition of "creative destruction" with these frameworks, the paper highlights the institutional drivers of modern economic expansion. The study also underscores the innovative contributions of behavioral economics, which integrate psychological insights to explain the factors determining individual economic choices. Utilizing a conceptual-analytic approach, this study synthesizes abstract theory with practical policy to offer a cohesive overview of political economy for scholars and policymakers alike. |
| Keywords: | Political economy; value theory; money; income distribution; game theory; general equilibrium; macroeconomics; monetary theory; innovation; technological change; economic growth; institutions; behavioral economics |
| JEL: | B0 D0 E0 O1 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:129334 |
| By: | Speranta Dumitru (Ceped - UMR 196 - Centre Population et Développement - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - INSERM - Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale - UPCité - Université Paris Cité - Université Sorbonne Paris Nord, UFR droit, économie et gestion [Sociétés et Humanités] - Université Paris Cité - UPCité - Université Paris Cité) |
| Abstract: | The push-pull theory is regarded as a modern framework in migration studies. This article challenges this view by tracing debates on attracting and retaining foreigners back to the seventeenth century. It compares four major economic theories and their policy prescriptions concerning immigration. Mercantilism held that to be wealthy, a sovereign state should possess gold and a large population. The article explores three other theories: cameralism, physiocracy, and classical economics. While cameralists held similar views to mercantilists, physiocrats and classical economists fundamentally disagreed. But did their theoretical disputes translate into divergent immigration prescriptions? This article shows that despite disagreements on wealth, money, and population, the four theories converged on an "overlapping consensus" regarding migration. After reviewing the major authors of each school, I reconstruct their arguments around three dilemmas. First, should migrants receive equal rights with natives or be privileged over them? Second, what is the nature of pull factors: are they political (rights, tolerance, freedom, participation), economic (fiscal relief, subventions), or social (cultural ethos, language, respect), geographical (climate, distance, mobility infrastructures)? Thirdly, what are the limits of attracting immigrants: are there numerical limits or socio-professional requirements, like skills selection? Although answers were similar across theories, these debates remain understudied in contemporary migration theory. |
| Keywords: | Physiocracy, Classical economics, Demography, Population, Cameralism, Mercantilism, History of economic ideas, Immigration, Pull Factors, Migration, Emigration, Push-pull, Freedom of Movement, Skilled Migration |
| Date: | 2026–05–18 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05625868 |
| By: | David Green |
| Abstract: | There is a third way of doing empirical work in economics that combines the benefits of the two commonly described approaches (quasi-experimental (QE) and structural). It uses an economic model to provide interpretability and help in deciding on controls and the nature and solutions to endogeneity problems, but utilizes an approximation to get to an empirical specification that allows for QE-type assessments of identifying data variation. This approach is used in some of the most influential papers in applied economics. This paper makes the case for recognizing this as a specific approach to begin a discussion on improving implementation. |
| Keywords: | applied econometrics |
| JEL: | C18 |
| Date: | 2026–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:26152 |
| By: | David Green |
| Abstract: | Empirical economists study outcomes, policies, and mechanisms of interest without ever referencing any particular account of what constitutes a just society. I argue that completely ignoring distributive justice is untenable and has implications for work in empirical economics. I make the argument in three steps. 1) Empirical economists typically proceed as if the Welfare Theorems hold as a rough approximation and, so, efficiency implications of policies are separable from the notion of justice being pursued. I argue that results from empirical labour economics over the last 20 years imply that efficiency and justice are not separable and that acting as if they are is not tenable. We implicitly endorse accounts of justice in choosing what we study, how we study it, and in even our efficiency targeted policy recommendations. 2) To achieve transparency, we need to be explicit about justice concerns. I argue we can do so without sacrificing neutrality if we focus on an element of justice that is common across different specific accounts of justice, and that providing the bases of respect to all is such an element. 3) I examine the implications of a respect principle perspective for existing and potential directions for research on human capital. |
| Keywords: | justice; policy analysis |
| JEL: | A13 J24 J30 |
| Date: | 2026–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:26153 |
| By: | Rosas Martinez, Victor Hugo |
| Abstract: | The present paper results from exploring what known as naturally selected, traits of Nash's work, going through unintended effects on its users to further understand the underlying structure of its salience among all economic theory and designs (e.g. as depending on the size of a group). Sect 1 introduces status quo procedures. Then it is up to the second section to unmask the indeterminacy brought in by the first. Finally, provided indeterminacy, does it become appreciable how defined settings are required if one were to conceive the whole, in reverse, deck of hidden cards which would unintentionally spread the prominence in question, that as a prosthesis, the third section carves-paves a ground to list down traits underlying the aires of somehow transcendental apophenia. The forth concludes formalizing properly implicated cytoarchitectures. |
| Keywords: | Nash; Indeterminacy; Heterodox Economics; Neuroeconomics |
| JEL: | B50 C73 D87 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:129190 |
| By: | Ning Li |
| Abstract: | Does scientific publishing reward the quality of ideas or the advantage of connections? The question is universal to prestige-driven science, yet it has resisted decades of study because a paper's quality could not be gauged ahead of its publication fate without using that fate as the yardstick. We break this constraint by measuring a paper's idea quality directly from its text, before publication, using a discipline-trained LLM evaluator that scores the idea without seeing author names or outcomes. Using economics as a case study, we combine this text-legible idea-quality score with an execution-quality rubric, a connection index, an author-ability index, and an off-the-shelf language-model text score to estimate a five-input production function for journal placement across 6, 208 economics working papers. The inputs are not rivals but a sequence along the ladder of prestige. Execution sets a meritocratic floor and is the largest input overall. Text-legible idea quality grades the rungs in between. Connections set a favoritism ceiling that bites mainly near the apex, the most selective journals. Connections work through two additive channels: connected authors write papers that score higher, and at equal scores their papers are still more likely to place better. Yet this advantage is bounded. Connections raise the odds of every rung without making the apex the typical outcome for ordinary ideas, and even the highest-scoring papers face real friction reaching the visible journal ladder. The result nests, rather than chooses between, the meritocracy and network accounts of how science is published. |
| Date: | 2026–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2606.03763 |
| By: | Tai-Wei Hu (Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK); Mamoru Kaneko (Waseda University, Tokyo, and University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Japan) |
| Abstract: | We explore the conceptual bases of the Nash (noncooperative) theory. To emphasize the conceptual issues, we compare it to the rationalizability theory. Both theories target individual ex ante prediction/decision making in a game. We pinpoint their difference in the treatment of an inside player’s prediction-making, with respect to the quantifiers “for all” and “for some”, about the other’s prediction/decision. We argue that the Nash theory follows the fundamental postulate that each player respects the other as an independent decision-maker, and that this independence is captured in the corresponding prediction/decision criterion. The rationalizability theory is based on a different conceptual base; the quantifier “for some” is highly speculative. We will discuss other conceptual bases of the Nash theory from various points of view, which suggest further developments along the line of the Nash theory. |
| Keywords: | Nash equilibrium, Nash solution, Subsolution, Rationalizable Strategy, Prediction/decision Making, Theory of Mind |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wap:wpaper:2603 |
| By: | Régis Martineau (ICN Business School, CEREFIGE - Centre Européen de Recherche en Economie Financière et Gestion des Entreprises - UL - Université de Lorraine) |
| Abstract: | Comment bien manager ? Cette question est régulièrement remise à l'ordre du jour suivant un cycle, où la préoccupation sociale est éclipsée puis remise au centre de l'attention. Retour sur plus d'un siècle de management. Cet article est publié dans le cadre d'un partenariat avec la Revue française de gestion, qui a fêté ses 50 ans en 2025. On sait depuis Schumpeter que le capitalisme, sous le coup des différentes révolutions technologiques, ne cesse de s'adapter et d'évoluer. Mais on s'intéresse moins à la manière dont les organisations ont fait évoluer leurs méthodes de management pour accompagner ces mutations. Il est donc intéressant, à l'heure où le management algorithmique déferle sur les organisations, de se retourner sur cette évolution, et de remarquer que ces méthodes ne suivent pas un mouvement linéaire (du plus simple au plus sophistiqué), comme on aurait pu le penser, mais oscillent plutôt entre fermeture et ouverture. |
| Keywords: | Mnagement, Intelligence artificielle - IA, Entreprise, Ressources Humaines RH |
| Date: | 2026–05–18 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05625679 |