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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Arizmendi, Luis-Felipe |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a comprehensive synthesis of the contributions recognized by the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel during the decade 2010–2019. This period marks a critical evolution in economic thought, transitioning from abstract general equilibrium modeling to rigorous empirical identification, behavioral integration, and the explicit modeling of market frictions. We systematically analyze the mathematical microstructures of the awarded theories—including Search and Matching Theory (2010), Empirical Macroeconomics (2011), Market Design (2012), Asset Pricing (2013), Regulation (2014), Consumption Analysis (2015), Contract Theory (2016), Behavioral Economics (2017), Climate and Endogenous Growth (2018), and Experimental Development Economics (2019). Special attention is paid to the policy applications of these frameworks in contemporary governance. |
| Keywords: | Search Frictions, Causal Inference, Market Design, Behavioral Finance, Climate Change, Contract Theory |
| JEL: | B22 C50 E00 G12 Q54 |
| Date: | 2026–03–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:129056 |
| By: | Atanu, Atanu Sengupta; Sanjoy, Sanjoy De |
| Abstract: | Economics is the religion of the modern era. Like all religions, it has its own scriptures and like all faiths there are numerous ways to interpret it. It is difficult, if not impossible, to prove the correctness or otherwise of any economic doctrine. Despite the claim of several schools of thought, we have failed to achieve any coherent decision in this regard. Both theoretically as well as empirically the situation is in a fluid state. We fail to commit to any particular point of view. However, whatever is done, it is necessary that the plight of the most neglected and downtrodden is kept in mind. |
| Keywords: | Polyphonic view. Development economics, neoclassical economics, social issues and development economics, sustainability |
| JEL: | O10 |
| Date: | 2026–05–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:129261 |
| By: | Goldstein, Daniel A. N. (University of Oslo); Wig, Tore |
| Abstract: | Do moral norms influence citizens' tolerance of anti-system behavior by politicians? Although moral norms are often invoked as guardrails, their measurement and causal influence in politics remain understudied. We theorize the link between moral norms, personal judgments, and attitudinal consequences and test our theory in a pre-registered survey experiment with financial incentives. Respondents faced moral trade-offs concerning personal scandals, political violence, corruption, and anti-democratic actions. Using a second-order approach to elicit beliefs about what others consider morally wrong, we find that norms against democratic violations are descriptively weaker than norms against scandal and corruption; both lag behind norms against violence. Causal evidence shows that norms primarily shift judgments when respondents face large discrepancies from their initial perceived norm and have strong conformity motives. However, this largely does not translate into attitudinal shifts. The findings shed light on the concept of moral norms and detail their consequences and limitations for politics. |
| Date: | 2026–06–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:nwrtz_v1 |
| By: | Galmarini, Umberto; Gamba, Astrid (Insubria University); Martínez-Macías, Ibai (University of The Basque COuntry (UPV/EHU)) |
| Abstract: | Do individuals become more generous after harming others, or less generous after doing the right thing? We study whether moral behavior spills over across sequential decisions through moral accounting: individuals may offset prior moral debts through subsequent prosocial behavior (moral cleansing) or draw on prior moral credits to justify lower generosity (moral licensing). In an online experiment, participants first make a fair or unfair allocation in a Dictator Minigame. They then learn whether the Receiver’s payoff was determined by their own choice or by chance, and make an unanticipated decision about whether to donate part of their earnings to a charity. By varying responsibility for realized social outcomes, the design generates different moral states associated with the same first-stage choice, which can trigger compensatory behavior in the subsequent donation decision. We find a sharp asymmetry. After choosing the fair allocation, being responsible for the Receiver’s favorable outcome significantly reduces subsequent donations, consistent with moral licensing. After choosing the unfair allocation, responsibility has no average effect on giving, but this null effect conceals substantial heterogeneity in individual responses. Overall, the results show that responsibility for outcomes can shape later prosocial behavior, but does so asymmetrically across good and bad deeds. |
| Date: | 2026–05–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:g7tuh_v2 |
| By: | Arizmendi, Luis-Felipe |
| Abstract: | In the contemporary world, disparities in income and wealth remain a persistent social and human concern, appearing to worsen with the imminent disruption of Artificial Intelligence and the potential displacement of labor. This paper develops a mathematical framework in which Jesuit-inspired principles—derived from Loyola (1548), Taparelli (1840), Arrupe (1973), and Francis (2015)—are translated into operational economic rules. We formalize concepts such as the Magis, human dignity, solidarity, and subsidiarity into binding feasibility constraints (Stone-Geary utility), inequality-averse welfare functions, and multi-level optimization architectures. Rather than proposing a religious economic system, the framework extends normative welfare economics within open market economies, dialoguing with modern institutional theory and market design. We present an empirical validation using a balanced panel of 172 countries (1963–2024), demonstrating that unconstrained market equilibria systematically violate the conditions for social sustainability. Specifically, we find that the “Solidarity Wedge” (state correction) is inelastic to market inequality (β ≈ 0.66), and that violations of subsidiarity (regional imbalances) statistically exacerbate national poverty |
| Keywords: | social welfare function; inequality aversion; subsidiarity; institutional economics; integral ecology; Jesuit social thought; market economics |
| JEL: | A23 A31 B0 C00 D63 P16 Z12 |
| Date: | 2026–03–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:129055 |
| By: | Gilles Grolleau (CEREN - Centre de Recherche sur l'ENtreprise [Dijon] - BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC)); Alain Marciano (UNITO - Università degli studi di Torino = University of Turin); Naoufel Mzoughi (ECODEVELOPPEMENT - Ecodéveloppement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | We argue that repugnance is not always a constraint but can, in some cases, be strategically used as a resource by some "entrepreneurs" who can leverage the 'veil of repugnance' itself to advance their own goals. To understand the conditions in which such a strategic use of repugnance is possible, and how these individuals can use it, we first propose a conceptual framework to characterize repugnance-related transactions and emphasize how concerned individuals devise narratives to manage these situations, increase (or even decrease) artificially their acceptability and ultimately justify their behavior. This framework, which combines relational proximity and the strength of social consensus surrounding a transaction, allows for predicting the costs of developing appropriate narratives. Then, we analyze four rationales by which entrepreneurial individuals exploit and use strategically repugnant dimensions. Repugnance can be strategically leveraged as a barrier to entry, a tool for niche differentiation, a mechanism of political and market polarization, and a means of attracting attention, thereby shaping competition, regulation, and visibility across markets and platforms. |
| Keywords: | strategic repugnance, taboo trade-offs, distastefulness, repugnance, narratives |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05631948 |