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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Alberto Baffigi (Banca d’Italia) |
| Abstract: | The origins of credit statistics by economic sector (Statistiche sul credito per rami di attività) form a crucial part of the history of official statistics in Italy. In the way they were conceived and in the institutional context in which they were developed, they represent a significant episode for at least two complementary reasons: they enabled a systematic encounter between statistics and economic analysis – something rare in the Italian tradition – and they gave rise to a form of statistical production that was autonomous from political power, and thus stable, reliable, and enduring. Within the context of the fascist dictatorship, the creation of the Research Department at the Bank of Italy contributed to making the institution a stable technostructure over time – one capable of ensuring methodological consistency in its statistical outputs. It allowed to establish a technostructure that did not merely carry out the will of the regime, but rather drew on a degree of theoretical and, to some extent, organizational autonomy. |
| Keywords: | Credit statistics, Bank of Italy, Fascist Italy |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vnm:wpdman:226 |
| By: | Anton Samokish; Valeriy Egorushkin |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a unified framework in which economic dynamics is treated as evolutionary process analogous to those studied in natural sciences, including physics. Using methods from gauge field theory and plasticity, we show that the traditionally elusive influence of the invisible hand in economic markets can be made explicit and mathematically tractable. Derived equations demonstrate that market adaptation proceeds through localized nonlinear waves processes, closely resembling self-induced transparency in electrodynamics. Taken together, the results provide a physically grounded interpretation of the invisible hand as a real, dynamically operating field mechanism governed by choice, competition, and profit. |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2512.15265 |
| By: | Richard V. Burkhauser; Ji Ma |
| Abstract: | How does academic research inform presidential economic policy? This paper investigates the sources of evidence in the Economic Report of the President from 2010 to 2025. We construct a novel dataset of 4, 140 unique references cited across the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations to map the evidence base used by the Council of Economic Advisers. Our analysis shows that peer-reviewed articles, comprising 66.62% of all these references, are heavily concentrated in top-tier economics journals. While the specific articles cited change with policy priorities, the hierarchy of journals remains moderately stable across years and administrations. A co-author network analysis reveals a scholarly landscape of distinct intellectual camps. Crucially, a small number of high-centrality scholars act as brokers, connecting these disparate research communities. Together, our findings illuminate the social structure of evidence-based policymaking, demonstrating how journal hierarchies and scholarly networks shape the flow of economic knowledge to the White House. |
| JEL: | A11 H11 I38 J08 N01 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34597 |
| By: | Takeshi Ojima; Shinsuke Ikeda |
| Abstract: | If dishonest behavior stems from a self-control problem, then offering the option to commit to honesty will reduce dishonesty, provided that it lowers the self-control costs of being honest. To test this theoretical prediction, we conducted an incentivized online experiment in which participants could cheat at a game of rock-paper-scissors. Treatment groups were randomly or invariably offered a hard Honesty-Commitment Option (HCO), which could be used to prevent cheating. Our between- and within-subject analyses reveal that the HCO provision significantly reduced cheating rates by approximately 64%. Evidence suggests that the commitment device works by lowering self-control costs, which is more pronounced in individuals with low cognitive reflection, rather than by an observer effect. Further analyses reveal two key dynamics. First, an individual’s frequency of not using the HCO reliably predicts their propensity to cheat when the option is unavailable. Second, repeatedly deciding not to use the commitment device can become habitual, diminishing the HCO provision’s effect in reducing cheating over time. This research highlights the effectiveness of honesty-commitment devices in policy design while also noting that their disuse can become habitual, pointing to a new dynamic in the study of cheating. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1295 |
| By: | Singhal, Karan (University of Luxembourg, LISER); Sierminska, Eva (Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER)) |
| Abstract: | We study the determinants of field specialization among U.S. economics PhD students, focusing on individual, institutional, and contextual factors shaping early research careers. Using data on over 8, 000 dissertations from 2009–2018, we classify each dissertation into one of ten fields using author-reported JEL codes and topic modeling of abstracts. We link dissertations to student gender, program characteristics, and country of origin inferred from surnames and matched to country-level indicators. We find substantial variation in field choice by region of origin. Gender gaps in specialization are not uniform but vary in size and direction across regions, indicating that gender and origin interact in shaping choices. Results are robust to alternative classification methods and to using genetic distance as a continuous measure of origin. Our findings highlight how early specialization in economics reflects inherited context and institutional exposure, with implications for research agendas, job market outcomes, and diversity across subfields. |
| Keywords: | topic modeling, JEL, economics PhD students, field specialization, diversity in economics |
| JEL: | J15 J16 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18348 |