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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Anselm Küsters; Benjamin Schneider |
| Abstract: | Will robots or artificial intelligence take our jobs? At the center of the debate about the future of work is “technological unemployment”, a term that has a seemingly simple definition but has in fact been used and defined differently by economists. In this paper, we explore how economists have discussed the potential for new techniques to replace workers since Aristotle, and how they have defined and conceived of technological unemployment over the past century. We begin with a detailed analysis of classic texts on this topic, from ancient times to the 20th century. To capture changes in the research frontier, we quantitatively and qualitatively analyze all 153 articles that mention the term “technological unemployment” in twelve major economics journals, including the top five, since their inception. We then use the 19 editions of Paul Samuelson’s seminal textbook and a cross-section of 43 economics textbooks from the 2000s and 2010s to observe the state of discourse and changes in economics pedagogy. Our analysis shows that economists have used a range of definitions in their discussions of technological unemployment, and most definitions are brief and imprecise. Economics textbooks notably omit technological unemployment in their discussions of the relationship between technological change and employment, despite the continuing interest in the topic in the academic literature. Nonetheless, we find a surprising consensus in our corpus that technological change may cause unemployment. Over time, the debate around technological unemployment has become narrower and more technical, but also more heated during historical periods of technological anxiety. We suggest that the adoption of a clear definition with specific temporal and scale modifiers could clarify theoretical debates and improve the precision of future empirical research on the topic, which will allow economists to speak directly to public and policy concerns |
| Date: | 2025–03–13 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:esohwp:_218 |
| By: | Andrea Salustri (Università Sapienza di Roma - Dipartimento di Studi Giuridici ed Economici); Francesco Felis (Università Sapienza di Roma - Dipartimento di Studi Giuridici ed Economici) |
| Abstract: | Il lavoro parte dal presupposto che l’economia è una scienza sociale. Pertanto deve essere realistico, riferirsi alla realtà sia nei suoi presupposti e ambientazioni sia nei suoi effetti: non può essere “la meccanica celeste di un mondo inesistente†. Per questo motivo il lavoro analizza una teoria, la Scuola Austriaca di Economia, che ha avuto un impatto in politica. Lo analizza partendo da uno dei suoi principali esponenti viventi. Ne contesta alcuni approcci a partire dal realismo e certi approcci giuridici scorretti. A volte il diritto, ex facto oritur ius, è più realistico dell’economia. The work starts from the assumption that economics is a social science. Therefore it must be realistic, refer to reality both in its assumptions and settings and in its effects: it cannot be "the celestial mechanics of a non-existent world". For this reason the work analyzes a theory, the Austrian School of Economics, which has had an impact in politics. He analyzes it starting from one of its main living exponents. He contests some of its approaches starting from realism and certain incorrect legal approaches. Sometimes law, ex facto oritur ius, is more realistic than economics. |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gfe:pfrp00:00069 |
| By: | Michel Bellet (Université Jean Monnet Saint-Étienne, CNRS, Université Lyon 2, emlyon, GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne UMR 5824, F-42023, Saint-Etienne, France) |
| Abstract: | Saint-Simonianism is often associated with the promotion of a productivist industrialism rooted in science and technology—a model that has fueled, to this day, a tension between its emancipatory and reformist aspirations on one hand, and environmental considerations on the other. This article reexamines that assessment in detail by exploring Saint-Simon’s naturalist philosophy and its transformation by his disciples. It highlights and explains lesser-known aspects that add complexity to the initial interpretation without fundamentally challenging it. |
| Keywords: | Saint-Simonianism, industrialism, ecological economics, naturalist philosophy, religion |
| JEL: | B14 Q5 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2504 |
| By: | Almås, Ingvild (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Cappelen, Alexander W. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Sørensen, Erik Ø. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Tungodden, Bertil (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides global evidence on the nature of inequality acceptance, based on a large-scale experimental study with more than 65, 000 individuals across 60 countries. We show that, across the world, the source of inequality matters substantially more for inequality acceptance than the cost of redistribution. However, fairness views vary significantly across countries, largely reflecting disagreement over whether inequality caused by luck is fair. The meritocratic fairness view is most prevalent in the Western world, but substantial support for the libertarian and egalitarian fairness views exists in many countries. Focusing on beliefs, we further show that, globally, people believe luck plays a greater role than merit in shaping inequality, while disagreement about the cost of redistribution is more pronounced. Finally, we establish that both fairness views and beliefs about the source of inequality are key to understanding policy attitudes and cross-country variation in government redistribution, whereas efficiency considerations play a less important role. |
| Keywords: | Inequality acceptance; fairness views; economic inequality |
| JEL: | J18 J71 |
| Date: | 2025–03–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2025_006 |