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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Alexandre Truc (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur); Dorian Jullien (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UP1 UFR02 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - École d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the controversy on Fehr and Schmidt's model of inequity aversion. It borrows insights from disciplines such as philosophy and the sociology of science that have specialized in studying scientific controversies. Our goal is to contribute to the historical and methodological literature on behavioral economics, which happens to have neglected behavioral economists' research on social preferences. Our analysis of the controversy reveals some new insights about the relation of behavioral economics with other sub-fields in economics, as well as with other disciplines. |
| Keywords: | Controversies, Behavioral Economics, Rhetoric, Social Preferences, Norms, Inequity Aversion |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-04719263 |
| By: | Tom Coupé (University of Canterbury); Thomas Logchies; W. Robert Reed (University of Canterbury) |
| Abstract: | This study examines the commonly held belief that replication studies suffer from a significant citation penalty compared to original research. Analysing a sample of 428 replications in economics, we challenge the traditional method of comparing replication citation rates directly with the originals they replicate. We introduce three incentive-based metrics to assess replication citations: the 'same original counterfactuals, ' 'same author counterfactuals, ' and 'same issue counterfactuals.' These metrics provide a more appropriate comparison by matching replications with comparable non-replication papers in terms of subject area, authorship, and publication venue. Our findings suggest that replications do not invariably receive fewer citations; rather, the citation gap narrows substantially or even reverses when using alternative counterfactual measures. This study not only reframes the discussion about the value of replication in economics but also encourages the academic community to reassess the incentives for conducting and publishing replication studies. |
| Keywords: | Replications, Citations, Incentives, Academic Publishing |
| JEL: | A10 A14 B41 C80 |
| Date: | 2024–10–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbt:econwp:24/15 |
| By: | Truc, Alexandre; Claveau, François; Herfeld, Catherine; Larivière, Vincent |
| Abstract: | This study examines gender diversity among authors in philosophy and methodology of economics, comparing it to the disciplines of economics and philosophy. Using bibliometric methods, we find that philosophy and methodology of economics, as an interdisciplinary field, consistently had a lower share of women authors than its parent disciplines, which are the two social sciences and humanities disciplines that are the furthest from gender parity. Although homogeneity compounding generally characterizes the whole field of philosophy and methodology of economics, one small and temporary subfield, making contributions to heterodox economics, structural realism, and the discussion on pluralism in economics, constituted a pocket of gender diversity. Alongside a more general discussion of possible reasons behind the striking gender imbalance in the field, we also elaborate on possible reasons for the limited size and duration of this pocket of diversity. |
| Date: | 2024–09–18 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:ck6s9 |
| By: | Matthew S. Jaremski; David C. Wheelock |
| Abstract: | The Federal Reserve Act was the outcome of compromises among competing economic and political interests. Numerous studies examine how the act came together but largely take the makeup of Congress and the Administration as given rather than considering the unique circumstances that led to that political distribution. This paper examines how the election of 1912 changed the makeup of Congress and increased the likelihood of central banking legislation and shaped the act. The decision of Theodore Roosevelt and other Progressives to run as third-party candidates split the Republican Party and enabled Democrats to capture the White House and Congress. We show that the election produced a less polarized Congress and that newly-elected members were more likely to vote for the act. Absent their interparty split, Republicans would likely have held the White House and Congress, and any legislation to establish a central bank almost certainly would have been quite different. |
| JEL: | G28 N42 |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32987 |