nep-hpe New Economics Papers
on History and Philosophy of Economics
Issue of 2019‒05‒13
sixteen papers chosen by
Erik Thomson
University of Manitoba

  1. From Methodology to Practice (and Back): Georgescu-Roegen's Philosophy of Economics and the Flow-Fund Model By Quentin Couix
  2. A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning By Franz Dietrich; Antonios Staras; Robert Sugden
  3. Liberal Foundations of Basic Income. Argument Combining Philosophy and Economics By Claude Gamel
  4. Decision Under Normative Uncertainty By Franz Dietrich; Brian Jabarian
  5. Common labour rights and right to work in the commons By Lionel Maurel; Mathieu O'Neil; Steve Colins
  6. Economic Theory ten years after the crisis: Just tweaking around the edges?’ and/or A bit of repair at the seams? By Vassilis Droucopoulos
  7. Real GDP: The Flawed Metric at the Heart of Macroeconomics By Fix, Blair; Nitzan, Jonathan; Bichler, Shimshon
  8. The past and future of the social sciences. A Schumpeterian theory of scientific development? By Stefano Lucarelli; Alfonso Giuliani; Hervé Baron
  9. The science of using science: Towards an understanding of the threats to scaling experiments. By Omar Al-Ubaydli; John List; Dana Suskind
  10. L’émergence d’une socioéconomie écologique. Lecture croisée de trois ouvrages récents By Olivier Petit
  11. Communicating uncertainty about facts, numbers, and science By van der Bles, Anne Marthe; van der Liden, Sander; Freeman, Alessandra L. J.; Mitchell, James; Galvao, Ana Beatriz; Spiegelhalter, David J.
  12. Rethinking Asian Drama By Nayyar Deepak
  13. La biblioteca de Economía de Manuel de Torres en la editorial Aguilar (1945-1960) By Manuel Martín Rodríguez
  14. Radical Markets by Eric Posner and Glen Weyl: a review essay By David K Levine
  15. Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire By Inderst, Roman
  16. The knowledge economy in historical perspective By Hippe, Ralph Thomas Klaus; Fouquet, Roger

  1. By: Quentin Couix (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: Despite his early contribution to the rise of mathematics in economics, Georgescu-Roegen's later methodological criticism of models has received little attention from historians and philosophers of economics. This paper attempts to fill this gap following two lines. First, I examine his explicitly methodological claims and connect them with related topics in economic methodology. Building on the distinction between dialectical and arithmomorphic concepts, I characterise his approach to theory-making as a three steps process of idealisation, isolation and arithmetisation. In this framework, models perform two functions, checking for logical consistency and facilitating understanding, which can be related to the idea of modelling as theorising. I then confront these general principles with Georgescu-Roegen's flow-fund model of production. I use the methodology as a reading grid of this theory, while examining its limits and complementary principles in practice. This shows a great deal of consistency, where idealisation provides conceptual foundations, isolation determines the relevant problems, and models are built according to structural consistency. The two functions of models are then illustrated by the logical derivation of older principles formulated by Babbage and Smith, and the understanding of the different organisational patterns of production. But some slightly different functions also appear when specific configurations of the model enable to check the conceptual consistency of other theories, or the understanding provided by the model contributes to the formation of new concepts. Hence, the consistency and the complementarity between Georgescu-Roegen's methodology and practice of theory-making provide interesting insights and a useful background for further investigations.
    Abstract: Malgré l'importante contribution de Georgescu-Roegen à l'économie mathématique, sa critique méthodologique ultérieure des modèles a reçu peu d'attention de la philosophie économique. Cet article comble ce vide en examinant en premier lieu sa méthodologie explicite et en la reliant à la littérature. Partant de la distinction entre les concepts dialectiques et arithmomorphiques, je caractérise son rapport à l'élaboration théorique comme un processus en trois étapes d'idéalisation, d'isolement et d'arithmétisation. Dans ce cadre, les modèles remplissent deux fonctions, de validation de la cohérence logique et de facilitation de la compréhension. Je confronte ensuite ces principes au modèle flux-fonds de production de Georgescu-Roegen. Sa méthodologie sert de grille de lecture de la théorie, qui révèle en retour limites et principes complémentaires. L'idéalisation fournit les fondements conceptuels, l'isolement délimite les problèmes pertinents, et la cohérence structurelle est rigoureusement respectée, tandis que les deux fonctions des modèles sont illustrées par la dérivation de principes antérieurs et la compréhension des modes d'organisation. Mais d'autres fonctions apparaissent : la validation de la cohérence conceptuelle et la contribution à la formation de nouveaux concepts. Par conséquent, la méthodologie de Georgescu-Roegen et sa pratique de la théorie fournissent un point de vue utile pour mieux comprendre sa pensée.
    Keywords: methodology,philosophy,models,flow-fund,production function,input-output,Georgescu-Roegen,méthodologie,philosophie,modèles,flux-fond,fonction de production,entrée-sortie,substitution
    Date: 2018–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01854031&r=all
  2. By: Franz Dietrich (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Antonios Staras (UEA - University of East Anglia [Norwich]); Robert Sugden (UEA - University of East Anglia [Norwich])
    Abstract: John Broome has developed an account of rationality and reasoning which gives philosophical foundations for choice theory and the psychology of rational agents. We formalize his account into a model that differs from ordinary choice-theoretic models through focusing on psychology and the reasoning process. Within that model, we ask Broome's central question of whether reasoning can make us more rational: whether it allows us to acquire transitive preferences, consistent beliefs, non-akratic intentions, and so on. We identify three structural types of rationality requirements: consistency requirements, completeness requirements, and closedness requirements. Many standard rationality requirements fall under this typology. Based on three theorems, we argue that reasoning is successful in achieving closedness requirements, but not in achieving consistency or completeness requirements. We assess how far our negative results reveal gaps in Broone's theory, or deficiencies in choice theory and behavioural economics.
    Abstract: John Broome a développé une théorie de la rationalité et du raisonnement qui donne des fondements philosophiques au choix rationnel et à la psychologie d'acteurs rationnels. Nous formalisons cette théorie en définissant un cadre qui diffère de modèles classiques du choix rationnel, en mettant au centre la psychologie et le raisonnement. A travers notre modèle, nous reposons la question centrale de Broome si le raisonnement nous permet d'augmenter notre rationalité : si le raisonnement nous fait acquérir des préférences transitives, des croyances cohérentes, des intentions conformes à nos buts (" non akratiques ") etc. Nous identifions trois types de conditions de rationalité : des conditions de cohérence, des conditions de complétude et des conditions de clôture. Un grand nombre de conditions de rationalité classiques tombent sous cette taxonomie. En nous appuyant sur trois théorèmes, nous montrons que le raisonnement est utile pour arriver à satisfaire des conditions de clôture, mais pas des conditions de cohérence ou de complétude. Nous évaluons enfin dans quelle mesure nos résultats négatifs révèlent des problèmes dans la théorie Broomeienne ou posent des problèmes à la théorie du choix rationnel et l'économie comportementale.
    Keywords: rationality,reasoning,beliefs,consistency,completeness,deductive closure,rationalité,raisonnement,intentions,croyances,préférences,cohérence,complétude,clôture déductive
    Date: 2018–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01904091&r=all
  3. By: Claude Gamel (LEST - Laboratoire d'économie et de sociologie du travail - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: Debates among Liberals on social justice have played a major role in current discussion on basic income (or universal benefit). In this paper, the notion is considered on the basis of the "economics of liberal egalitarianism", for which the anchor point is to be found in Rawls' philosophical works. Although this author certainly does not support basic income, he still provides an appropriate general framework to consider it, in particular through the hierarchy of his principles of justice (I). At the third level of this hierarchy, the interpretation of the "principle of difference" appeared controversial concerning the treatment of "Malibu surfers", through which Van Parijs can have defended the unconditional nature of basic income (II). There remains the transition from the philosophy to the economics of basic income, which allows considering it as a precise alternative of negative income tax. At this stage, a rereading of Friedman's intuition on this topic results in seeing basic income as a "universal tax credit" (III). We conclude with some prospective remarks on a possible implementation of this conception of basic income in the case of liberal democracies and of France as well (IV).
    Abstract: Les débats entre libéraux sur la justice sociale ont beaucoup alimenté la réflexion contemporaine sur le revenu de base (ou allocation universelle). Cette notion est présentée ici comme relevant de « l'économie de l'égalitarisme libéral », dont le point d'ancrage se situe dans l'œuvre philosophique de Rawls. Celui-ci n'est certes pas partisan de l'allocation universelle, mais sa pensée offre néanmoins un cadre général adéquat pour l'étudier, en particulier par la hiérarchie des principes de justice qu'il défend (I). Au troisième niveau de cette hiérarchie, l'interprétation à donner au « principe de différence » a suscité la controverse des « surfeurs de Malibu », par laquelle Van Parijs a pu défendre le caractère inconditionnel de l'allocation universelle (II). Reste alors à passer de la philosophie à l'économie du revenu de base, en montrant comment ce dernier peut être considéré comme une variante précise d'impôt négatif sur le revenu. A ce stade, une relecture de l'intuition de Friedman sur la question aboutit à considérer l'allocation universelle comme un « crédit d'impôt universel » (III). En conclusion, pour les démocraties libérales et dans le cas de la France, sont esquissées quelques observations prospectives sur une éventuelle application d'une telle conception du revenu de base (IV).
    Keywords: unconditional nature,universal tax credit.,liberalism,basic income,crédit d’impôt universel.,inconditionnalité,libéralisme,revenu de base
    Date: 2019–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02111455&r=all
  4. By: Franz Dietrich (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Brian Jabarian (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics)
    Abstract: How should we evaluate options when we are uncertain about the correct standard of evaluation, for instance due to conflicting normative intuitions? Such ‘normative' uncertainty differs from ordinary ‘empirical' uncertainty about an unknown state, and raises new challenges for decision theory and ethics. The most widely discussed proposal is to form the expected value of options, relative to correctness probabilities of competing valuations. We show that the expected-value theory is just one of four natural expectation-based theories. These theories differ in the attitudes to normative risk and to empirical risk. The ordinary expected-value theory imposes neutrality to normative risk, whereas its attitude to empirical risk is impartial, i.e., determined by the risk attitudes of the competing valuations deemed possible. The three other theories are, respectively, neutral to both types of risk; impartial to both types of risk; or neutral to empirical but impartial to normative risk. We conditionally defend the theory which is impartial to all risk - the impartial value theory - on the grounds that it respects risk-attitudinal beliefs rather than imposing an ad-hoc-risk attitude. Meanwhile, our analysis shows how one can address empirical and normative uncertainty within a unified formal framework, and rigorously define risk attitudes of theories.
    Abstract: Comment devons-nous évaluer des options de choix lorsque nous ne savons pas quelle méthode d'évaluation est correcte, par exemple à cause d'intuitions normatives concurrentes ? Ce type d'incertitude, nommée « incertitude normative », diffère de l'incertitude standard portant sur les états empiriques du monde, nommée « incertitude empirique ». L'incertitude normative constitue un nouveau challenge pour les sciences économiques et l'éthique contemporaine. La proposition la plus discutée dans le débat est de former la valeur normative espérée des options relativement aux croyances normatives de l'agent. Nous montrons que la théorie de la valeur normative espérée n'est qu'une des quatre formes de théories basées sur l'espérance. Ces théories diffèrent dans leurs attitudes aux risques normatifs et empiriques. La théorie de la valeur normative espérée impose une attitude neutre face au risque normatif, tandis que son attitude face au risque empirique est impartiale, c'est-à-dire seulement déterminée par les attitudes au risque des différentes méthodes d'évaluation jugées possibles par l'agent. Les trois autres théories sont respectivement : neutre face aux deux types de risque ; impartiale face aux deux types de risque ; neutre face au risque empirique mais impartiale face au risque normatif. Nous défendons la théorie qui est impartiale face aux deux types de risque, la théorie impartiale de la valeur, sur la base que cette théorie respecte entièrement les croyances normatives de l'agent concernant la « bonne » attitude face au risque plutôt que d'imposer de manière ad hoc une attitude particulière face au risque. Notre article montre comment nous pouvons traiter à travers un seul cadre formel unifié l'incertitude empirique et l'incertitude normative et définir de manière rigoureuse les attitudes face au risque de théories évaluatives.
    Keywords: empirical uncertainty,normative uncertainty,risk attitude,expected value,impartial value,incertitude empirique,incertitude normative,attitude face au risque,valeur normative espérée,valeur impartiale
    Date: 2018–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01903642&r=all
  5. By: Lionel Maurel (InSHS - CNRS - Institut des Sciences Humaines et Sociales - CNRS - INS1640); Mathieu O'Neil; Steve Colins
    Abstract: The question of the economic models needed to guarantee the sustainability of the Commons is a perennial one, and a multitude of proposals have been put forward to conceive articulations with the market. But with this essay I want to explore another track—that of the recognition of a ‘social right to contribution', by relying in particular on ideas found in a book published by the Économistes Atterrés (Appalled Economists), ‘Changer d'avenir : réinventer le travail et le modèle économique' (‘Changing the Future: Reinventing Work and the Economic Model'). This book contains several references to the Commons, mobilized for example to revitalise our understanding of public services or the Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE). It also includes original proposals that link the reform of the social protection system and the Commons. Here, the Appalled Economists are inspired by ideas stemming from from legal scholar Alain Supiot (Professor at the College of France and specialist in social law issues) in the late 1990s. It seems to me that these theses have not yet received all the attention they deserve, even though they make it possible to envisage the recognition of a form of ‘right to work in the commons'.
    Keywords: social rights,commons,work
    Date: 2019–04–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02089242&r=all
  6. By: Vassilis Droucopoulos (Emeritus Professor of the Department of Economics of the University of Athens.)
    Abstract: It is my intention to address, primarily within the scope of mainstream macroeconomic theory, three of the questions making up the main theme of the conference, namely: “How a very problematic theory continues to survive and dominate both the policy and the academic scene. What are the processes in the economy and the society that sustain its dominance? What is the condition of the economic Orthodoxy (particularly under its current form of the New Macroeconomic Consensus, that is the hybrid of mild neoliberalism with conservative New Keynesianism)?”. A good many orthodox economists hold the view that there is no necessity for a paradigm shift. On the contrary, a mere “evolution towards a more pluralistic discipline” would suffice. Hence the title of my talk.
    Keywords: Economic Pluralism, Macroeconomic Theory
    JEL: A20 B40 B50
    Date: 2018–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:abe:wpaper:0001&r=all
  7. By: Fix, Blair; Nitzan, Jonathan; Bichler, Shimshon
    Abstract: The study of economic growth is central to macroeconomics. More than anything else, macroecon-omists are concerned with finding policies that encourage growth. And by ‘growth’, they mean the growth of real GDP. This measure has become so central to macroeconomics that few economists question its validity. Our intention here is to do just that. We argue that real GDP is a deeply flawed metric. It is presented as an objective measure of economic scale. But when we look under the surface, we find crippling subjectivity. Moreover, few economists seem to realize that real GDP is based on a non-existent quantum – utility. In light of these problems, it seems to us that much of macroeconomics needs to be rethought.
    Keywords: aggregation,national accounting,economic growth,neoclassical economics,quality change,utility
    JEL: C18 M4
    Date: 2019
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:195950&r=all
  8. By: Stefano Lucarelli (UniBG - Università degli studi di Bergamo); Alfonso Giuliani (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Hervé Baron (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: The paper argues that Vergangenheit und Zukunft der Sozialwissenschaften (The Past and Future of the Social Sciences), a contribution not always well understood in the literature, is important to an understanding of Schumpeter's concept of development as applied to the field of the social sciences. To this end, it addresses three key questions. First, can the book be taken as a starting point to reconstruct a Schumpeterian theory of scientific development? Second, is Vergangenheit und Zukunft merely ‘a brief outline of what first became the Epochen [der Dogmen- und Methodengeschichte] and finally the History of Economic Analysis', as Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter wrote in her Editor's Introduction (July 1952) to the latter work (p. XXXII), or should it be read as a complement to Epochen and perhaps the History? Third, is the eminent Japanese scholar Shionoya right to claim that Schumpeter's work pursued the ambitious goal of developing a ‘comprehensive sociology'?
    Keywords: method,scientific development,Schumpeter,social sciences
    Date: 2019–03–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02063397&r=all
  9. By: Omar Al-Ubaydli; John List; Dana Suskind
    Abstract: Policymakers are increasingly turning to insights gained from the experimental method as a means of informing public policies. Whether-and to what extent-insights from a research study scale to the level of the broader public is, in many situations, based on blind faith. This scale-up problem can lead to a vast waste of resources, a missed opportunity to improve people's lives, and a diminution in the public's trust in the scientific method's ability to contribute to policymaking. This study provides a theoretical lens to deepen our understanding of the science of how to use science. Through a simple model, we highlight three elements of the scale-up problem: (1) when does evidence become actionable (appropriate statistical inference); (2) properties of the population; and (3) properties of the situation. We argue that until these three areas are fully understood and recognized by researchers and policymakers, the threats to scalability will render any scaling exercise as particularly vulnerable. In this way, our work represents a challenge to empiricists to estimate the nature and extent of how important the various threats to scalability are in practice, and to implement those in their original research.
    Date: 2019
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:artefa:00670&r=all
  10. By: Olivier Petit (CLERSE - Centre Lillois d’Études et de Recherches Sociologiques et Économiques - UMR 8019 - Université de Lille - ULCO - Université du Littoral Côte d'Opale - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: L'économie écologique est un champ qui a émergé, il y a une trentaine d'années, du rapprochement de travaux d'économistes et d'écologues. Il a connu depuis un formidable essor sur le plan du volume de publications et de sa notoriété. Dans un premier texte qui présente une recension de trois ouvrages parus en 2015 et 2017, Olivier Petit nous montre que ce champ est traversé d'importantes controverses sur la manière de traiter des enjeux de soutenabilité et des rapports entre science et société. Parmi les différents courants de pensée qui le structurent, la socioéconomie écologique apparaît comme la tentative la plus poussée d'instaurer un dialogue entre les sciences de l'environnement, l'économie et les autres sciences sociales. Encore que..., nous laisse entendre Gildas Renou. Dans un second texte, il interpelle, en effet, les auteurs d'un de ces ouvrages promoteurs de cette socioéconomie écologique. Tout en soulignant les grandes qualités pédagogiques de ce livre, il dénonce le « Yalta épistémologique » entre économie et sociologie qui y est tracé à travers une division du travail qui conduirait à ce que l'économie traite de la valeur et les sciences sociales des valeurs. Il appelle à battre en brèche cette partition scientifique afin que la socioéconomie écologique puisse jouer pleinement son rôle en matière de compréhension des rapports que tissent les sociétés avec leur environnement. La Rédaction Résumé-L'objectif de ce texte est de proposer, à partir d'une lecture croisée de trois ouvrages récents relevant de la socioéconomie écologique, une analyse des fondements et des thématiques principales de ce champ d'étude en cours d'émergence. Après avoir brièvement présenté l'architecture générale de chacun de ces trois livres, nous revenons sur la distinction opérée entre les nouveaux économistes des ressources, les nouveaux pragmatistes de l'environnement et les tenants de la socioéconomie écologique, pour en relever les clivages principaux. Nous développons ensuite la perspective empruntée par ce dernier courant, en exposant ses fondements ontologiques, épistémologiques et méthodologiques, puis en déclinant, à partir d'un certain nombre de thèmes structurants, les principaux enjeux et débats actuellement à l'oeuvre dans ce domaine. Mots-clés : économie écologique / économistes socioécologiques / nouveaux économistes des ressources / nouveaux pragmatistes de l'environnement / enjeux théoriques / débats méthodologiques Abstract-An emerging field: social ecological economics. Cross-comparison of three recent books. This paper is based on the critical reading and cross-comparison of three recent books published in the field of social ecological economics. We first start by briefly presenting the general architecture and main goals of the three books. We then highlight the main differences in the approaches developed by new resource economists, new environmental pragmatists and social ecological economists. Finally, we present in greater detail the perspective developed by social ecological economists, from an ontological, epistemological and methodological viewpoint. This perspective involves several topics that structure the debates and currently ongoing controversies in the field of ecological economics.
    Date: 2018–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02099237&r=all
  11. By: van der Bles, Anne Marthe (University of Cambridge); van der Liden, Sander (University of Cambridge); Freeman, Alessandra L. J. (University of Cambridge); Mitchell, James (University of Warwick); Galvao, Ana Beatriz (University of Warwick); Spiegelhalter, David J. (University of Cambridge)
    Abstract: Uncertainty is an inherent part of knowledge, and yet in an era of contested expertise, many shy away from openly communicating their uncertainty about what they know, fearful of their audience’s reaction. But what effect does communication of such epistemic uncertainty have? Empirical research is widely scattered across many disciplines. This interdisciplinary review structures and summarises current practice and research across domains, combining a statistical and psychological perspective. This informs a framework for uncertainty communication in which we identify three objects of uncertainty - facts, numbers, and science - and two levels of uncertainty: direct and indirect. An examination of current practices provides a scale of nine expressions of direct uncertainty. We discuss attempts to codify indirect uncertainty in terms of quality of the underlying evidence. We review the limited literature about the effects of communicating epistemic uncertainty on cognition, affect, trust, and decision-making. While there is some evidence that communicating epistemic uncertainty does not necessarily affect audiences negatively, impact can vary between individuals and communication formats. Case studies in economic statistics and climate change illustrate our framework in action. We conclude with advice to guide both communicators and future researchers in this important but so far rather neglected field.
    Keywords: Epistemic Uncertainty; Uncertainty Communication; economic statistics uncertainty; interdisciplinary; JEL Classification Numbers: E01
    Date: 2019
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:wrkemf:22&r=all
  12. By: Nayyar Deepak
    Abstract: Gunnar Myrdal published Asian Drama in 1968, a work which made important analytical contributions to our understanding of development but was deeply pessimistic about Asia’s future prospects.Since then, contrary to Myrdal’s expectations, Asia’s development has been remarkable, although transformations have been uneven across countries and unequal between people.This paper explains the conception and design of the UNU-WIDER study on Asian Transformations, which seeks to analyse the amazing story of economic development in Asia over the past 50 years. It begins with reflections on Gunnar Myrdal, the author, and rethinking Asian Drama, the book, in retrospect 50 years later. It goes on to outline the rationale and objective of the study.It then discusses some critical issues and lessons that emerge—diversity in development, history and context, economic growth and structural change, wellbeing of people, markets and governments, economic openness, and institutions and policies—to serve as a teaser.It concludes with some brief reflections on Asia’s future prospects over the next 25 years.
    Keywords: Gunnar Myrdal,Transformation,History (Economics)
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2018-150&r=all
  13. By: Manuel Martín Rodríguez (Universidad de Granada, Spain)
    Abstract: In 1945, two years after the creation of the first School of Economics and Political Science in Spain, La Biblioteca de Ciencias Económicas, Políticas y Sociales (Library of Economic, Political and Social Sciences) from the publishing house Aguilar was born. The Economics section was headed by Professor Manuel de Torres Martínez until his death in 1960. In this work, this Publication is studied during the years in which it was under his supervision. Throughout this time, together with the publishing house Fondo de Cultura Económica from Mexico, it became the main bibliographic resource for the first promotions of Spanish economists and for the students of economics of all the Spanish-speaking countries in the world.
    Keywords: Torres, Aguilar, Library, Latin America
    JEL: N01
    Date: 2019–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ahe:dtaehe:1908&r=all
  14. By: David K Levine
    Date: 2019–05–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000001522&r=all
  15. By: Inderst, Roman
    Abstract: We study strategic communication between a customer and an advisor who is privately informed about the best suitable choice for the customer, but whose preferences are misaligned with the customer's preferences. The advisor sends a message to the customer who, in turn, can secure herself from bad advice by acquiring costly information on her own. We find that making the customer's information acquisition less costly, e.g., through consumer protection regulation or digital information aggregation and dissemination, leads to less prosocial behavior of the advisor. This can be explained by a model of shared guilt, which predicts a shift in causal attribution of guilt from the advisor to the customer if the latter could have avoided her ex post disappointment.
    Keywords: Advice; Guilt aversion; responsibility diffusion; shared guilt; Trust
    JEL: C91 D82 D83
    Date: 2019–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13711&r=all
  16. By: Hippe, Ralph Thomas Klaus; Fouquet, Roger
    Abstract: The knowledge economy provides huge opportunities for economic growth and to become the cornerstone of future economic development by turning data into wisdom or human capital. Education, one aspect of the knowledge economy, exhibits a history divided into three stages: the apprenticeship era, the universal schooling era and the (future) life-long learning era. The spread of knowledge has accelerated owing to the different stages of knowledge production, in particular the printing press and now the internet
    JEL: N0
    Date: 2018–03–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:100206&r=all

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