nep-hpe New Economics Papers
on History and Philosophy of Economics
Issue of 2018‒10‒22
eight papers chosen by
Erik Thomson
University of Manitoba

  1. Beliefs, Plans, and Perceived Intentions in Dynamic Games By Pierpaolo Battigalli; Nicodemo De Vito
  2. William D. Nordhaus and Paul M. Romer: Integrating nature and knowledge into economics By Committee, Nobel Prize
  3. Evolutionary Models of Preference Formation By Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W.
  4. First-best-world economic theory and the second-best-world of public sector outsourcing: the reinvention of the Soviet Kombinat by other means By Abby Innes
  5. Reconciling Orthodox and Heterodox Views on Money and Banking By Andolfatto, David
  6. A quantitative turn in the historiography of economics? By Yann Giraud; José Edwards; Christophe Schinckus
  7. Production Networks: A Primer By Carvalho, V. M; Tahbaz-Salehi, A.
  8. Bourdieu, neo-smithien ? A propos d’Anthropologie économique By Nicolas Brisset

  1. By: Pierpaolo Battigalli; Nicodemo De Vito
    Abstract: We adopt the epistemic framework of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (J. Econ. Theory 88:188-230, 1999) to model the distinction between a players contingent behavior, which is part of the external state, and his plan, which is described by his beliefs about his own behavior. This allows us to distinguish between intentional and unintentional behavior, and to explicitly model how playersrevise their beliefs about the intentions of others upon observing their actions. We illustrate our approach with detailed examples and with a new derivation of backward induction from epistemic conditions. Speci cally, we prove that common full belief in optimal planning and in belief in continuation consistency imply the backward induction strategies and beliefs. We also present within our framework other relevant epistemic assumptions about backward and forward-induction reasoning, and relate them to similar ones studied in the previous literature. KEYWORDS: Epistemic game theory, plans, perceived intentions, back- ward induction, forward induction.
    Date: 2018
  2. By: Committee, Nobel Prize (Nobel Prize Committee)
    Abstract: This year’s Prize in Economic Sciences rewards the design of methods that address some of the most fundamental and pressing issues of our time: long-run sustainable growth in the global economy and the welfare of the world’s population.
    Keywords: long-term growth;
    JEL: O00
    Date: 2018–10–08
  3. By: Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W.
    Abstract: The literature on the evolution of preferences of individuals in strategic interactions is vast and diverse. We organize the discussion around the following question: Supposing that material outcomes drive evolutionary success, under what circumstances does evolution promote Homo oeconomicus, defined as material self-interest, and when does it instead lead to other preferences? The literature suggests that Homo oeconomicus is favored by evolution only when individuals' preferences are their private information and the population is large and well-mixed so that individuals with rare mutant preferences almost never get to interact with each other. If rare mutants instead interact more often (say, due to local dispersion), evolution instead favors a certain generalization of Homo oeconomicus including a Kantian concern. If individuals interact under complete information about preferences, evolution destabilizes Homo oeconomicus in virtually all games.
    JEL: C73 D01 D03
    Date: 2018–09
  4. By: Abby Innes
    Abstract: This paper examines how public sector outsourcing has performed in the UK, one of its leading exponents. It sets out the theoretical economic logic behind it, the unanticipated risks in its conception, and the deepening problems with its intensification. It shows how, when we put the market rhetoric of New Public Management to one side, outsourcing necessitates the central planning of private actors, and how the success of this venture hinges on the viability of the outsourcing contract as a fully effective junction of instruction and control. As contract theory tells us, however, the more complex and dynamic the good, the less a contract can guarantee effective control over its production. Moreover, as the critical economics of Soviet central planning teaches us, the resulting asymmetries in information and leverage are just the start of bargaining games that the state (and taxpayer) cannot win. As the paper shows, a state that outsources its complex tasks puts itself at a chronic informational disadvantage, renders itself dependent on poorly controlled private monopoly service providers for essential services that form part of a matrix of interdependent services, and cannot exit failing contracts under acceptable terms. In the USSR a remarkably isomorphic set of hazards had driven Nikita Khrushchev back to the drawing board by 1965.
    Keywords: Public spending, budget composition, cabinet, ministers, coalition
    Date: 2018–05
  5. By: Andolfatto, David (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis)
    Abstract: A wide range of heterodox theories claim that banks are special because they create money in the act of lending. Put another way, banks can create the funding they need ex nihilo, whereas all other agencies must first acquire the funding they need from other parties. Mainstream economic theory largely agrees with this assessment, but questions its theoretical and empirical relevance, preferring to view banks as one of many potentially important actors in the financial market. In this paper, I develop a formal economic model in an attempt to make these ideas precise. The model lends some support to both views on banking.
    Keywords: Heterodox view; Money; Banking
    JEL: E4 E5
    Date: 2018–10–09
  6. By: Yann Giraud (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); José Edwards (Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez [Santiago]); Christophe Schinckus (Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology)
    Abstract: Quantitative approaches are not yet common among historians and methodologists of economics, although they are in the study of science by librarians, information scientists, sociologists, historians, and even economists. The main purpose of this essay is to reflect methodologically on the historiography of economics: is it witnessing a quantitative turn? Is such a turn desirable? We answer the first question by pointing out a "methodological moment", in general, and a noticeable rise of quantitative studies among historians of economics during the past few years. To the second question, all contributors to this special issue bring relatively optimistic answers by highlighting the benefits of using quantitative methodologies as complements to the more traditional meta-analyses of both historians and methodologists of economics.
    Keywords: Topic modeling,Network analysis,Quantitative statements,Bibliometrics,Historiography of economics
    Date: 2018–09
  7. By: Carvalho, V. M; Tahbaz-Salehi, A.
    Abstract: This article reviews the literature on production networks in macroeconomics. It presents the theoretical foundations for the roles of input-output linkages as a shock propagation channel and a mechanism for transforming microeconomic shocks into macroeconomic fluctuations. The article provides a brief guide to the growing literature that explores these themes empirically and quantitatively.
    Keywords: networks, shock propagation, input-output linkages.
    Date: 2018–10–05
  8. By: Nicolas Brisset (Université Côte d'Azur, France; GREDEG CNRS)
    Keywords: Pierre Bourdieu, don, transition, marxisme politique, capitalisme, Robert Brenner, Edward Thompson
    Date: 2018

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