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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Frank Veneroso |
| Abstract: | The dominant postwar tradition in economics assumes the utility maximization of economic agents drives markets toward stable equilibrium positions. In such a world there should be no endogenous asset bubbles and untenable levels of private indebtedness. But there are. There is a competing alternative view that assumes an endogenous behavioral propensity for markets to embark on disequilibrium paths. Sometimes these departures are dangerously far reaching. Three great interwar economists set out most of the economic theory that explains this natural tendency for markets to propagate financial fragility: Joseph Schumpeter, Irving Fisher, and John Maynard Keynes. In the postwar period, Hyman Minsky carried this tradition forward. Early on he set out a “financial instability hypothesis†based on the thinking of these three predecessors. Later on, he introduced two additional dynamic processes that intensify financial market disequilibria: principal–agent distortions and mounting moral hazard. The emergence of a behavioral finance literature has provided empirical support to the theory of endogenous financial instability. Work by Vernon Smith explains further how disequilibrium paths go to asset bubble extremes. The following paper provides a compressed account of this tradition of endogenous financial market instability. |
| Keywords: | Financial Instability; Joseph Schumpeter; Irving Fisher; John Maynard Keynes; Hyman Minsky; Financial Markets; Macroeconomics |
| JEL: | D53 E44 |
| Date: | 2018–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:wrkpap:wp_903&r=hpe |
| By: | Sylvie Thoron (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales) |
| Abstract: | Au sein des sciences économiques, l'étude du comportement se nourrit d'un dialogue fécond entre théorie et expérience. Mettant en cause le modèle de rationalité de l'Homo oeconomicus, celui-ci jette une nouvelle lumière sur la prise de décision dans les situations d'interaction stratégique. Le courant dominant des sciences économiques est connu des autres sciences sociales pour son modèle de l'agent rationnel et égoïste. Le fameux Homo oeconomicus prend ses décisions en anticipant sans faille celles des autres, en évaluant au mieux les situations risquées, et sans état d'âme, maximise son utilité qui dépend de son seul bien-être. Pourtant, ce modèle de l'agent économique a été largement mis en cause par les économistes eux-mêmes, lorsque ceux-ci ont tenté de le confronter aux comportements des individus réels. Comment s'y sont-ils pris ? Ils auraient pu aller voir dans les entreprises comment les managers prennent leurs décisions, ou dans les maisons, comment les ménages font leurs courses. C'est ce que font, dans une certaine mesure, les gestionnaires. Au lieu de cela, ils ont fait venir les individus dans des laboratoires expérimentaux installés au sein des universités, pour analyser leurs comportements. Un laboratoire expérimental, c'est une pièce informatiq ue meublée de boxes isolés par des paravents. Dans chaque box, un ordinateur, seul interface du « sujet » avec les autres. Chacun prend connaissance d'une situation, décrite sur son écran et expliquée par des instructions, et doit faire des choix. Pour tester le modèle théorique de l'agent économique, il faut que les conditions de l'expérience se rapprochent le plus possible de la théorie. Tout cet agencement est destiné à créer des conditions que l'expérimentaliste peut contrôler. Celui-ci doit pouvoir travailler la situation comme un biologiste dissèque une grenouille ou élève des populations de drosophiles dans des conditions différentes : l'économiste veut, comme le dit la littérature expérimentale, « isoler les effets ». L'expression peut être trompeuse. Il ne s'agit pas des effets observés de certaines causes mais des mécanismes supposés par les économistes pour expliquer certains comportements, donc plutôt des causes elles-mêmes. La littérature expérimentale est plus qu'abondante. Ici, nous nous concentrerons sur les travaux qui s'intéressent aux situations dites d'interactions stratégiques, dans lesquelles l'individu sait que ses décisions ont une influence sur les décisions des autres, et réciproquement. Nous commencerons par expliquer la méthode qui permet aux expérimentalistes de mettre en évidence certains des « effets » escomptés dans une telle situation. Nous verrons que ce travail d'observation et d'interprétation prend le modèle théorique de l'Homo oeconomicus stratégique pour référence. Les expérimentalistes tentent d'interpréter les différences entre les comportements observés et les comportements prévus par la théorie, ce qui les amène à repenser le modèle de la rationalité. Pour comprendre leurs travaux, nous verrons qu'il est utile de distinguer, dans le modèle de la rationalité, la façon dont l'agent économique raisonne, c'est-à-dire la façon dont il collecte et traite l'information d'une part, et ses motivations d'autre part. |
| Date: | 2016–10–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01704873&r=hpe |
| By: | Satoh, Atsuhiro; Tanaka, Yasuhito |
| Abstract: | About a symmetric three-players zero-sum game we will show the following results. 1. A modified version of Sion's minimax theorem with the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy are proved by the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium. 2. The existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium is proved by the modified version of Sion's minimax theorem with the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy. Thus, they are equivalent. If a zero-sum game is asymmetric, maximin strategies and minimax strategies of players do not correspond to Nash equilibrium strategies. If it is symmetric, the maximin strategies and the minimax strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium. However, without the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy there may exist an asymmetric equilibrium in a symmetric three-players zero-sum game. |
| Keywords: | three-players zero-sum game, Nash equilibrium, Sion's minimax theorem |
| JEL: | C72 |
| Date: | 2018–03–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:85452&r=hpe |
| By: | Oulton, Nicholas |
| Abstract: | I propose a new explanation for the UK productivity puzzle. I graft the Lewis (1954) model onto a standard Solow growth model. What I call the neo-Lewis model is identical to the Solow model in good times. But in bad times foreign demand for a country’s exports is constrained below potential supply. This makes labour productivity growth depend negatively on the growth of labour input. I also argue that the neo-Lewis model can explain the fall in TFP growth, in the UK and elsewhere, after 2007. The predictions of the neoLewis model are tested on data for 23 advanced countries and also on a larger sample of 52 countries and find support. |
| Keywords: | Productivity; slowdown; TFP; capital; Lewis; immigration |
| JEL: | E24 F43 J24 O41 O47 |
| Date: | 2018–03–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:87394&r=hpe |
| By: | Bergh, Andreas (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Wichardt, Philipp C. (Kiel Institute for the World Economy) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. As was shown by Oxoby and Spraggon (2008), inducing a feeling of entitlement – one subject earning the endowment – strongly affects allocations in dictator games towards the owner of the money (both dictator and receiver). The present results show that seemingly small differences in instructions induce fundamentally different perceptions regarding entitlement. Behavior is affected accordingly, i.e. instructions inducing subjects to perceive the task as distributive rather than a task of generosity lead to higher allocations to receivers (average 52% vs. 35%). A theoretical explanation integrating monetary as well as social incentives and emphasizing potential effects of uncertainty about the latter is discussed (cf. Bergh and Wichardt, 2018). |
| Keywords: | Dictator games; Framing effects; Property rights; Social preferences |
| JEL: | C70 C91 D63 |
| Date: | 2018–03–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1205&r=hpe |
| By: | Djankov, Simeon; Nikolova, Elena |
| Abstract: | We show that Eastern Orthodox believers are less happy compared to those of Catholic and Protestant faith using data covering more than 100 countries around the world. Consistent with the happiness results, we also find that relative to Catholics, Protestants and non-believers, those of Eastern Orthodox religion have less social capital and prefer old ideas and safe jobs. In addition, Orthodoxy is associated with left-leaning political preferences and stronger support for government involvement in the economy. Compared to non-believers and Orthodox adherents, Catholics and Protestants are less likely to agree that government ownership is a good thing, and Protestants are less likely to agree that getting rich can only happen at the expense of others. These differences in life satisfaction and other attitudes and values persisted despite the fact that communist elites sought to eradicate church-going in Eastern Europe, since communists maintained many aspects of Orthodox theology which were useful for the advancement of the communist doctrine. The findings are consistent with Berdyaev's (1933, 1937) hypothesis of communism as a successor of Orthodoxy. |
| Keywords: | attitudes,communism,Eastern Orthodoxy,religion |
| JEL: | D02 P35 Z12 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:192&r=hpe |
| By: | Pankaj Kumar Baag (Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode); Kavitha P (Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode) |
| Abstract: | The tendency to follow the masses without any rationale is an in born tendency of human beings and researchers are not different in this regard. Many a times when a researcher encounters question like why is he doing the research in a particular manner, he struggles to convince himself and the others with his reasons. Research philosophies that explain how people perceive reality and how they go about acquiring understanding of the reality helps the researchers to have a clarity regarding where he is positioned in the research domain and the reason why he is there. The paradigms which follow common set of assumptions provides the researcher a feeling of Belongingness to a group of people who have similar approach. Hence it is very important for a researcher in any domain to have a basic understanding of the research philosophies and paradigms of his domain. We in this paper examine the different paradigms in accounting research by analyzing the different research philosophies. We also provide an overview of how these paradigms have evolved in the management accounting research and financial accounting research. This paper will help the young researchers in the accounting domain to have an overview of the various philosophies and paradigms that will guide them in finding relevant research questions and in choosing the right research design that is appropriate for addressing the question. |
| Keywords: | research philosophies;financial accounting research; Accounting. |
| Date: | 2017–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iik:wpaper:260&r=hpe |
| By: | Antonio Abatemarco (University of Salerno, Italy); Francesca Stroffolini (University of Naples ``Federico II'', Italy) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we challenge the common interpretation of Rawls' Theory of Justice as Fairness by showing that this Theory, as outlined in the Restatement (Rawls 2001), goes well beyond the definition of a distributive value judgment, in such a way as to embrace efficiency issues as well. A simple model is discussed to support our interpretation of the Difference Principle, by which inequalities are shown to be permitted as far as they stimulate a greater effort in education in the population, and so economic growth. To our knowledge, this is the only possibility for the inequality to be `bought' by both the most-, and above all, the least-advantaged individual as suggested by the Difference Principle. Finally, by recalling the old tradition of universal ex-post efficiency (Hammond 1981), we show that a unique optimal social contract does not exist behind the veil of ignorance; more precisely, the sole set of potentially optimal social contracts can be identified a priori, and partial justice orderings derived accordingly. |
| Date: | 2017–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inq:inqwps:ecineq2017-430&r=hpe |
| By: | Leonardo Becchetti (CEIS & DEF, University of Rome Tor Vergata); Luca Corazzini (Università di Venezia “Ca Foscari”); Vittorio Pelligra (Università di Cagliari, CRENoS) |
| Abstract: | We use an original variant of the standard trust game, in order to study the effect of corruption on trust and trustworthiness. In this game, both the trustor and the trustee know that part of the surplus they can generate may be captured by a third “corrupted” player under different expected costs of audit and prosecution. We find slightly higher trustor’s giving in presence of corruption, matched by a significant effect of excess reciprocity from the trustee. Both the trustor and the trustee expect on average corruption acting as a tax, inelastic to changes in the risk of corruptor audit. Expectations are correct for the inelasticity assumption, and for the actual value of the “corruption tax”. Our experimental findings lead to the rejection of four standard hypotheses based on purely self-regarding preferences. We discuss how the apparently paradoxical excess reciprocity effect is consistent with the cultural role of heroes in history where examples of commendable giving were used to stimulate emulation of the ordinary people. Our results suggest that the excess reciprocity component of the trustee makes trustor’s excess giving a rational and effective strategy |
| Keywords: | corruption, extended trust game, lab experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2018–04–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:429&r=hpe |
| By: | Cédric Poivret (IRG - Institut de Recherche en Gestion - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12) |
| Abstract: | Management sciences, conversely to the other social sciences, have not developed in France research about the French history of their discipline. In this communication, we try to this prove this weakness, and to find elements of explanation. |
| Abstract: | En France, les sciences de gestion, contrairement aux autres sciences sociales, n’ont pas développé de recherche bien établie concernant l’histoire française de leur discipline. Dans ce travail, nous essayons de démontrer cette faiblesse –qui n’a pas empêché la réalisation d’un certain nombre de travaux de qualité-, et de trouver des éléments d’explication. |
| Keywords: | history of management thought in France,organization science,forgetting of history,histoire de la pensée managériale en France,sciences de gestion,oubli de l’histoire |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01702014&r=hpe |
| By: | Nicolás Steven Escobar Forero |
| Abstract: | El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo lograr un acercamiento a las dificultades sociales y políticas por las cuales atravesó el modelo de Industrialización por Sustitución de Importaciones (ISI) en Colombia. A lo largo del texto se realiza un recorrido por diversos problemas afrontados en el país entre 1950 y 1980, periodo durante el cual el problema agrario, el conflicto armado y la falta de una élite económica que propiciara un proceso de industrialización aparecen como razones generadoras de dificultades en el proceso de industrialización colombiano. Finalmente, se concluye que estos motivos generan consecuencias que no permiten consolidar un mercado interno fuerte, factor fundamental para el proceso de industrialización. |
| Keywords: | industrialización, desarrollo económico, modelo económico de Colombia, economía colombiana, historia económica de Colombia |
| JEL: | B25 J21 O14 O18 Q15 |
| Date: | 2018–04–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000176:016181&r=hpe |