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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Sylvie Thoron (LIPHA - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire d'Etude du Politique Hannah Arendt Paris-Est - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12) |
| Abstract: | The theory of social preferences expanded the definition of the utility function in order to reproduce the prosocial behavior observed in experiments. Does this then mean that this is the route towards a positive theory of morality in economics? We do not think so. Our claim is that there is an epistemic contradiction between methodological individualism which assumes that the economic agent's rationality is autonomous from society, and the nature of social consciousness. Therefore, we argue that a positive theory of morality should rely on social mechanisms that could not fit in this framework. We give two examples of lines of research that go in this direction. The first one is drawn from 18th century moral philosophy, this is the approach adopted by Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. The other one is drawn from a very recent domain of research, that of social neuroscience. We show how, in both cases, the objective is not only to understand how moral judgements shape behavior but also to get an understanding of how people form these moral judgements. Smith's thought and recent developments in social neuroscience seem to be mutually illuminating on this second aspect. Smith's model is an essential model of a moral agent embedded in society. The sympathy operator and the impartial spectator find an echo in the way in which social neuroscience tries to understand how emotional and cognitive empathy intermesh. Furthermore, social neuroscience attempts to go further in the understanding of the complex empathy mechanism, by considering it as a learning process. |
| Abstract: | La théorie des préférences sociales a élargi la définition de la fonction d'utilité de façon à pouvoir reproduire le comportement prosocial observé dans les expériences. Cela signifie-t-il pour autant que nous sommes sur la bonne voie vers l’élaboration d’une théorie positive de la morale en économie? Nous considérons, au contraire, qu'il existe une contradiction épistémique entre l'individualisme méthodologique, qui suppose que la rationalité de l'agent économique est autonome par rapport à la société, et la nature d’une conscience sociale. Ainsi, nous montrons qu'une théorie positive de la morale doit reposer sur des mécanismes sociaux qui ne pourraient entrer dans ce cadre. Nous donnons deux exemples de lignes de recherche qui vont dans ce sens. Le premier est tiré de la philosophie morale du 18ème siècle, et il s’agit de l'approche adoptée par Adam Smith dans La Théorie des sentiments moraux. L'autre est tiré d'un domaine de recherche très récent, celui des neurosciences sociales. Nous montrons comment, dans les deux cas, l'objectif est de comprendre non seulement comment les jugements moraux modèlent les comportements, mais aussi la façon dont les gens forment ces jugements moraux. La pensée de Smith et les récents développements en neurosciences sociales semblent s’éclairer mutuellement au sujet de ce second aspect. Le modèle de Smith est un modèle essentiel d'un agent moral encastré dans la société. L'opérateur de sympathie et le spectateur impartial trouvent un écho dans la manière dont les neurosciences sociales cherchent à comprendre comment l'empathie émotionnelle et l’empathie cognitive s’articulent. En outre, les neurosciences sociales tentent d'aller plus loin dans la compréhension du mécanisme complexe de l'empathie, en le concevant comme un processus d'apprentissage. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01645043&r=hpe |
| By: | André Lapidus (PHARE - Pôle d'Histoire de l'Analyse et des Représentations Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | et A. Lapidus (éds), Экономическая теория в историческом развитии [La théorie économique dans une perspective historique], Moscou : Infra-M, 2016, pp. 6-30.4. Nous entretenons avec l'histoire de notre discipline des relations peu communes : nous avons cette double particularité d'assurer nous-mêmes, comme économistes, l'histoire de la pensée économique, et de maintenir un lien étroit entre cette investigation historique et la recherche théorique en économie. Bien sûr, en biologie, en physique ou en mathématiques, la recherche historique est féconde. Mais elle intéresse en priorité des historiens des sciences ou des épistémologues, plus rarement des spécialistes de la discipline concernée. Au moins à partir du XX e siècle, la division du travail semble s'être imposée dans les sciences de la nature. Rien de tel en économie. Prolongeant une tradition intellectuelle qu'illustrèrent, au XIX e siècle, Jean-Baptiste Say [1826], Auguste Blanqui [1837] ou Friedrich Engels [1843], de nombreux auteurs depuis le début du XX e siècle (Charles Gide et Charles Rist [1909], Joseph Schumpeter [1954] ou Takashi Negishi [1989]) témoignent de l'implication persistante d'économistes majeurs, qui les conduit à entreprendre non seulement des histoires thématiques ou chronologiquement restreintes, mais aussi des histoires générales de la science économique. Et ce qui, pour un regard extérieur, paraîtra le plus saisissant, est cette ambition de se saisir d'enjeux théoriques qui dépassent la seule investigation historique : une ambition qui se retrouve, de façon récurrente, depuis au moins trois décennies dans les discussions parfois contradictoires conduites par les historiens de la pensée économique eux-mêmes 1. C'est là, aussi, que se tient la principale différence qui oppose l'histoire de la pensée économique et, par exemple, l'histoire de la pensée physique ou mathématique. Dans les sciences de la nature, la contribution positive à l'élaboration de la théorie semble, aujourd'hui, largement déconnectée de la réflexion historique. Ainsi, lorsqu'A. Einstein publie, avec L. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01619020&r=hpe |
| By: | Wendelin Schnedler (University of Paderborn); Nina Lucia Stephan (University of Paderborn) |
| Abstract: | Previous experimental studies show that subjects who receive little in a dictator game, pass on less to a third person when they are dictators themselves (they reciprocate negatively to a third party). However, when they can write a letter to their dictator, subjects are less likely to pass on the unkindness. There are two potential explanations for this phenomenon: First, writing the letter may help to emotionally ‘close the case’ (closure explanation). Second, the opportunity to write a letter is a sign that it is not ‘ok’ to imitate the previous dictator (signal explanation). The present study examines with an experiment which explanation is more suitable.\\ The novelty in our design is a domain shift, making imitation impossible: The first subject does not decide on how to split a pot of money but can instead treat the second subject unkindly by assigning her to an annoying instead of a funny task. We find that letter writing nevertheless increases the average amount passed on in the subsequent dictator game. Thus, the closure explanation is perhaps more suitable. There is, however, one caveat: while writing the letter may make people emotionally ‘close the case’, this is not reflected in how happy people rate themselves. |
| Keywords: | experimental economics, chain of unkindness, imitation, emotional closure, cooling down |
| JEL: | D91 C91 D03 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pdn:dispap:29&r=hpe |
| By: | Faber, Malte; Petersen, Thomas |
| Abstract: | Since the beginning of the finance crisis, the notion of capitalism and the adjective capitalistic are more and more employed in public discourse without making an attempt to define it. In contrast, the concept of market economy is less used. We try in this paper to differentiate both concepts by going back to the approaches by Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Fernand Braudel (1902-1985). Marx does not use the term capitalism but only capitalistic production, while Braudel argues on the basis of a wealth of empirical evidence that one has to differentiate between capitalism and market economy, because he sees a contrast between them. For this reason, he has different view of a capitalistic economy as Marx has. JEL classification: B14, B24, P10, P16, P5 |
| Keywords: | capitalism, capitalistic production, market economy, political economy |
| Date: | 2018–02–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0645&r=hpe |
| By: | Satoh, Atsuhiro; Tanaka, Yasuhito |
| Abstract: | About a symmetric multi-person zero-sum game we will show the following results. 1. Sion's minimax theorem plus the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy are proved by the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium. 2. The existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium is proved by Sion's minimax theorem plus the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy. Thus, they are equivalent. If a zero-sum game is asymmetric, maximin strategies and minimax strategies of players do not correspond to Nash equilibrium strategies. If it is symmetric, the maximin strategies and the minimax strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium. However, with only the minimax theorem there may exist an asymmetric equilibrium in a symmetric multi-person zero-sum game. |
| Keywords: | multi-person zero-sum game, Nash equilibrium,Sion's minimax theorem |
| JEL: | C72 |
| Date: | 2018–02–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:84533&r=hpe |
| By: | Blanchflower, David G. (Dartmouth College, Stirling, NBER, Bloomberg and IZA); Oswald, Andrew J (University of Warwick, CAGE, and IZA) |
| Abstract: | In Happiness for All?, Carol Graham raises disquieting ideas about today’s United States. The challenge she puts forward is an important one. Here we review the intellectual case and offer additional evidence. We conclude broadly on the author’s side. Strikingly, Americans appear to be in greater pain than citizens of other countries, and most subgroups of citizens have downwardly trended happiness levels. There is, however, one bright side to an otherwise dark story. The happiness of black Americans has risen strongly since the 1970s. It is now almost equal to that of white Americans. |
| Keywords: | Happiness ; well-being ; GHQ ; mental-health ; depression ; life-course |
| JEL: | I3 I31 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1153&r=hpe |
| By: | haldane, Andrew (Bank of England); Turrell, Arthur (Bank of England) |
| Abstract: | Macroeconomic modelling has been under intense scrutiny since the Great Financial Crisis, when serious shortcomings were exposed in the methodology used to understand the economy as a whole. Criticism has been levelled at the assumptions employed in the dominant models, particularly that economic agents are homogeneous and optimising and that the economy is equilibrating. This paper seeks to explore an interdisciplinary approach to macroeconomic modelling, with techniques drawn from other (natural and social) sciences. Specifically, it discusses agent-based modelling, which is used across a wide range of disciplines, as an example of such a technique. Agent-based models are complementary to existing approaches and are suited to answering macroeconomic questions where complexity, heterogeneity, networks, and heuristics play an important role. |
| Keywords: | Macroeconomics; modelling; agent-based model |
| JEL: | A12 C60 E17 E60 |
| Date: | 2017–11–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boe:boeewp:0696&r=hpe |
| By: | Quentin Couix (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a historical and epistemological account of one of the key controversy between natural resources economics and ecological economics, lasting from early 1970s to the end of 1990s. It shows that the theoretical disagreement on the scope of the economy's dependence to natural resources, such as energy and minerals, has deep methodological roots. On one hand, Solow's and Stiglitz's works are built on a “model-based methodology”, where the model precedes and supports the conceptual foundations of the theory and in particular the assumption of “unbounded resources productivity”. On the other hand, Georgescu-Roegen's counter-assumption of “thermodynamic limits to production”, later revived by Daly, rest on a methodology of “interdisciplinary consistency” which considers thermodynamics as a relevant scientific referent for economic theory. While antagonistic, these two methodologies face similar issues regarding the conceptual foundations that arise from them, which is a source of confusion and of the difficult dialogue between paradigms |
| Keywords: | natural resources; thermodynamics; growth; sustainability; model; theory; methodology |
| JEL: | B22 B41 Q01 Q32 Q43 Q57 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:18001&r=hpe |
| By: | Stefania Sitzia (University of East Anglia); Jiwei Zheng (Universtiy of East Anglia) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports an experimental investigation of Schelling's theory of focal points that compares group and individual behaviour. We find that when players' interests are perfectly aligned, groups choose more often the label salient option and achieve higher coordination success than individuals. However, in games with conflict of interest, groups do not always perform better than individuals, especially when the degree of conflict is substantial. We also find that groups outperform individuals in games in which identifying the solution to the coordination problem requires some level of cognitive sophistication (i.e. trade-off games). Finally, players that successfully identify the solution to these games achieve also greater coordination rates in games with a low degree of conflict than other players. This result raises questions of whether finding the focal point is more a matter of logic rather than imagination as instead Schelling argued. |
| Keywords: | groups, coordination, label cues, cognition |
| JEL: | C72 C78 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2018–01–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:wcbess:17-02r&r=hpe |
| By: | Madjid Eshaghi Gordji; Gholamreza Askari |
| Abstract: | The rational choice theory is based on this idea that people rationally pursue goals for increasing their personal interests. In most conditions, the behavior of an actor is not independent of the person and others' behavior. Here, we present a new concept of rational choice as hyper-rational choice which in this concept, the actor thinks about profit or loss of other actors in addition to his personal profit or loss and then will choose an action which is desirable to him. We implement the hyper-rational choice to generalize and expand the game theory. Results of this study will help to model the behavior of people considering environmental conditions, the kind of behavior interactive, valuation system of itself and others and system of beliefs and internal values of societies. Hyper-rationality can provide a common research language between psychologists and economists, and it helps us understand how human decision makers behave in interactive decisions. |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1801.10520&r=hpe |
| By: | Alonso, Ricardo; Câmara, Odilon |
| Abstract: | In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of an experiment (public signal). We characterize the set of distributions of posterior beliefs that can be induced by an experiment, and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a sender to benefit from persuasion. We then provide sufficient conditions for the sender to benefit from persuasion for almost every pair of prior beliefs, even when there is no value of persuasion under a common prior. Our main condition is that the receiver's action depends on his beliefs only through his expectation of some random variable. |
| Keywords: | persuasion; strategic experimentation; heterogeneous priors |
| JEL: | D72 D83 M31 |
| Date: | 2016–09–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:67950&r=hpe |
| By: | Wade, Robert H. |
| Abstract: | The USA presents a paradox. The US state has practised production-focused industrial policy from the early years of the republic, with benefits that by any plausible measure far exceed costs. But since the 1980s, the exchange-focused idea that ‘the free market is what works, and having the state help it is usually a contradiction in terms’ has been at the normative centre of gravity in public policy discourse. With ‘industrial policy’ rendered toxic, the state has disguised its production-focused practice, to the point where even non-ideological academic researchers claim that the USA does industrial policy not at all, or badly. This essay reviews the history of US industrial policy, with an emphasis on ‘network-building industrial policy’ over the past two decades. At the end, it draws a lesson for policy communities in other countries and interstate development organisations such as the World Bank and IMF. |
| Keywords: | industrial policy; US developmental state; networks; varieties of capitalism; leading the market; following the market |
| JEL: | H54 L5 N62 O52 |
| Date: | 2017–02–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:69765&r=hpe |
| By: | Fanny Simon (NIMEC - Normandie Innovation Marché Entreprise Consommation - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - ULH - Université Le Havre Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - URN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université) |
| Abstract: | Les travaux de Teresa Amabile sont précurseurs, à la fois dans leurs approches méthodologiques et dans les thématiques abordées. Tout d'abord, Teresa Amabile s'est démarqué des approches traditionnelles qui s'intéressaient essentiellement aux traits de personnalité et profil des personnes créatives. Elle souhaite comprendre comment favoriser la créativité dans les organisations et identifier des facteurs qui la facilitent ou contraignent. Elle étudie ainsi des projets au sein desquels la créativité est nécessaire au sein de laboratoires R&D ou d'entreprises. Ses recherches portent essentiellement sur la motivation et la créativité, l'innovation organisationnelle et plus récemment sur les réactions émotionnelles des individus face à des évènements de leur vie professionnelle. |
| Date: | 2016–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01597607&r=hpe |
| By: | Jean-Luc Gaffard (OFCE Sciences-Po; Université Côte d'Azur; GREDEG CNRS; Institut Universitaire de France) |
| Abstract: | Au cours des années 1970 un changement majeur est apparu dans le domaine de l'analyse macroéconomique : les thèses monétaristes sous la conduite de Milton Friedman ont pris le pas sur les thèses keynésiennes issues de la synthèse néo-classique pour affirmer à la fois le rôle majeur de la politique monétaire dans la genèse et le développement des tensions inflationnistes et, de ce fait même, la nécessité de la neutraliser en imposant l'application d'une règle visant à fixer la quantité de monnaie en circulation. Ces thèses reposent sur l'idée que l'inflation est avant tout la conséquence de l'émission excessive de monnaie par une banque centrale soumise aux desiderata de gouvernements impécunieux et, conjointement, que la quantité de monnaie en circulation est déterminée de manière exogène via le mécanisme du multiplicateur de crédit. Elles participent d'un retour, pas toujours explicite, à une dichotomie entre variables réelles et monétaires qui va marquer profondément la théorie économique devenue dominante à partir de cette période et dont les conséquences vont s'avérer dommageables pour la compréhension des événements et des moyens de politique économique susceptibles d'y faire face. Or, dès le début des années 1960, un économiste français, Jacques Le Bourva, développait, dans deux articles de la Revue Economique, une approche radicalement opposée. Il y fait état du caractère endogène de la création de monnaie, signifiant que ce sont les crédits qui font les dépôts et non l'inverse. Il énonce une théorie de l'inflation qui en fait le fruit de dérives du crédit bancaire aux entreprises rendant les déséquilibres de marché récurrents sinon cumulatifs. Cette approche est d'une étonnante actualité si l'on entend répondre aux interrogations du moment et refonder l'analyse monétaire en s'inscrivant dans la filiation de Wicksell. |
| Keywords: | Crédit, Inflation, Monnaie |
| JEL: | B22 E5 |
| Date: | 2018–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2018-03&r=hpe |
| By: | Irina Chaplygina (MSU - Lomonosov Moscow State University); André Lapidus (PHARE - Pôle d'Histoire de l'Analyse et des Représentations Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01619017&r=hpe |
| By: | Skovsgaard, Christian Volmar; Sharp, Paul; Lampe, Markus; Jensen, Peter Sandholt |
| Abstract: | We explore the role of elites for development and in particular for the spread of cooperative creameries in Denmark in the 1880s, which was a major factor behind that country's rapid economic catch-up. We demonstrate empirically that the location of early proto-modern dairies, so-called hollænderier, introduced onto traditional landed estates as part of the Holstein System of agriculture by landowning elites from the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein in the eighteenth century, can explain the location of cooperative creameries in 1890, more than a century later, after controlling for other relevant determinants. We interpret this as evidence that areas close to estates which adopted the Holstein System witnessed a gradual spread of modern ideas from the estates to the peasantry. Moreover, we identify a causal relationship by utilizing the nature of the spread of the Holstein System around Denmark, and the distance to the first estate to introduce it, Sofiendal. These results are supported by evidence from a wealth of contemporary sources and are robust to a variety of alternative specifications. |
| Keywords: | Denmark; cooperatives; landowning elites; knowledge spillovers; technology; Institutions |
| JEL: | Q13 O13 N53 |
| Date: | 2018–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:whrepe:26211&r=hpe |
| By: | Richard N. Langlois (University of Connecticut) |
| Abstract: | Voices along the whole of the political spectrum are calling for heightened scrutiny of American information-technology companies, especially the Big Five of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft. One of the principal themes of this uprising is that present-day antitrust policy, forged in the rusty era of steel, oil, and cars, is now obsolete. We are in the age of information, which ipso facto calls for new rules. A second animating theme is that the antitrust thinking of the Chicago School, which came to prominence in the last quarter of the last century, must be completely overthrown. Proponents of this new antitrust ground their arguments by returning to the historical roots of American antitrust policy. My contention, however, is that the new antitrust gets this history wrong. It both misconceives the nature of the competitive process and deliberately refuses to confront the political economy of antitrust. In so doing, it adopts some of the worst traits of the Chicago School it criticizes while manifesting few of that school’s many virtues. |
| Keywords: | antitrust, platforms, telecommunications, broadcasting, net neutrality |
| JEL: | L10 L40 L50 L96 N72 N82 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2018-01&r=hpe |
| By: | Amrish Patel (University of East Anglia); Alec Smith (Virginia Tech University) |
| Abstract: | How does guilt affect participation in providing public goods? We characterise and analyse completely mixed symmetric equilibria (CMSE) in participation games where players are guilt averse. We find that relative to material preferences, guilt aversion can: facilitate the existence of CMSE; increase or decrease participation; and imply that group size has a non-monotonic effect on participation. Using our equilibrium characterisation we also re-analyse experimental data on participation games and find a low, but positive, guilt sensitivity parameter. |
| Keywords: | participation, threshold public good, volunteer's dilemma, psychological games, guilt aversion |
| JEL: | C72 H41 |
| Date: | 2018–01–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:ueaeco:2018_01&r=hpe |
| By: | Brock, Michelle |
| Abstract: | Inequality of opportunity is a failure of economies to fairly tie incentives to effort and investment, across the socio-economic spectrum. But the actual limitations on economic activity due to this failure may depend on if people believe the system is unfair, and how well governing institutions safeguard fair-play. In this paper, I study whether inequality of opportunity is correlated with beliefs about fairness, and whether good governance can be a substitute in belief formations for decreases in inequality of opportunity. I find a that people in countries with recent increases in inequality of opportunity are less likely to believe that success is due to fair processes. The relationship is strongest in countries with poor quality governance. In countries with high quality governance, people appear to be more tolerant of inequality of opportunity, as it is only weakly reflected in their beliefs about process fairness. Finally, increases in income inequality also reduce the likelihood people perceive success as fair, but this relationship is not mitigated by good governance. |
| Keywords: | beliefs; governance; Inequality of opportunity; process fairness |
| JEL: | D31 E00 Z13 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12636&r=hpe |
| By: | Alan de Bromhead; Alan Fernihough; Markus Lampe; Kevin Hjortshøj O'Rourke |
| Abstract: | A recent literature explores the nature and causes of the collapse in international trade during 2008 and 2009. The decline was particularly great for automobiles and industrial supplies; it occurred largely along the intensive margin; quantities fell by more than prices; and prices fell less for differentiated products. Do these stylised facts apply to trade collapses more generally? This paper uses detailed, commodity specific information on UK imports between 1929 and 1933, to see to what extent the trade collapses of the Great Depression and Great Recession resembled each other. It also compares the free trading trade collapse of 1929-31 with the protectionist collapse of 1931-3, to see to what extent protection, and gradual recovery from the Great Depression, mattered for UK trade patterns. Deflation was a feature of the 1930s trade collapse, and after 1931 protectionism made the UK's trade collapse geographically unbalanced. Many other features of the two trade collapses are remarkably similar, however. Both took place along the intensive rather than the extensive margin; the same types of goods were particularly badly hit in both instances; and prices of differentiated durable manufactured goods barely fell on either occasion. |
| JEL: | F14 N74 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24252&r=hpe |
| By: | Dominik Bauer; Irenaeus Wolff |
| Abstract: | Many papers have reported behavioral biases in belief formation that come on top of standard game-theoretic reasoning. We show that the processes involved depend on the way participants reason about their beliefs. When they think about what everybody else or another ‘unspeci€fied’ individual is doing, they exhibit a consensus bias (believing that others are similar to themselves). In contrast, when they think about what their situation-speci€fic counterpart is doing, they show ex-post rationalization, under which the reported belief is €‹fitted to the action and not vice versa. Our €findings suggest that there may not be an ‘innocent’ belief-elicitation method that yields unbiased beliefs. However, if we ‘debias’ the reported beliefs using our estimates of the di‚fferent e‚ffects, we €find no more treatment e‚ffect of how we ask for the belief. ‘The ‘debiasing’ exercise shows that not accounting for the biases will typically bias estimates of game-theoretic thinking upwards. |
| Keywords: | Belief Elicitation, Belief Formation, Belief-Action Consistency, Framing E‚ffects, Projection, Consensus E‚ffect, Wishful ‘Thinking, Hindsight Bias, Ex-Post Rationalization |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:twi:respas:0109&r=hpe |