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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Committee, Nobel Prize (Nobel Prize Committee) |
| Abstract: | Economists aim to develop models of human behavior and interactions in markets and other economic settings. But we humans behave in complex ways. Although we try to make rational decisions, we have limited cognitive abilities and limited willpower. While our decisions are often guided by self-interest, we also care about fairness and equity. Moreover cognitive abilities, self-control, and motivation can vary significantly across different individuals. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral economics; |
| JEL: | D03 D90 G02 |
| Date: | 2017–10–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:nobelp:2017_001&r=hpe |
| By: | Committee, Nobel Prize (Nobel Prize Committee) |
| Abstract: | The American economist Richard H. Thaler is a pioneer in behavioural economics, a research field in which insights from psychological research are applied to economic decision-making. A behavioural perspective incorporates more realistic analysis of how people think and behave when making economic decisions, providing new opportunities for designing measures and institutions that increase societal benefit. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral economics; |
| JEL: | D03 D90 G02 |
| Date: | 2017–10–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:nobelp:2017_002&r=hpe |
| By: | Thomas I. Palley |
| Abstract: | This paper reflects on the history and enduring relevance of Keynes? economics. Keynes unleashed a devastating critique of classical macroeconomics and introduced a new replacement schema that defines macroeconomics. The success of the Keynesian revolution triggered a counter-revolution that restored the classical tradition and now enforces a renewed classical monopoly. That monopoly has provided the intellectual foundations for neoliberalism which has produced economic and political conditions echoing the 1930s. Openness to Keynesian ideas seems to fluctuate with conditions, and current conditions are conducive to revival of the Keynesian revolution. However, a revival will have to overcome the renewed classical monopoly. |
| Keywords: | Keynes, General Theory, Keynesian revolution, Classical economics, classical counter-revolution |
| JEL: | E0 E12 B1 B2 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imk:fmmpap:07-2017&r=hpe |
| By: | Hart, Oliver (Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | Interview with the 2016 Laureate in Economic Sciences Oliver Hart on 6 December 2016, during the Nobel Week in Stockholm, Sweden. Interviewer is freelance journalist Henrik Höjer. |
| Keywords: | Contract Theory; |
| JEL: | D86 |
| Date: | 2016–12–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:nobelp:2016_005&r=hpe |
| By: | Holmström, Bengt (MIT) |
| Abstract: | Interview with the 2016 Laureate in Economic Sciences Bengt Holmström on 6 December 2016, during the Nobel Week in Stockholm, Sweden. Interviewer is freelance journalist Henrik Höjer. |
| Keywords: | Contract Theory; |
| JEL: | D86 |
| Date: | 2016–12–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:nobelp:2016_006&r=hpe |
| By: | Anderson, Richard G. |
| Abstract: | This note introduces the concept of the replication paradigm, a framework that can (and should) be followed in every replication attempt. The paradigm expands, in part, on Bruce McCullough's well-known paraphrase of Berkeley computer scientist Jon Claerbout's insight - "An applied economics article is only the advertising for the data and code that produced the results" - and on the view that the primary social and scientific value of replication is to measure the scientific contribution of the inferences in an empirical study. The paradigm has four steps. First, in the "candidate study," identify and state clearly the hypotheses advanced by the study's authors. Second, provide a clear statement of the authors' econometric methods. Third, discuss the data. Fourth, discuss the authors' statistical inference. The author's purpose in this ordering is to reverse the too-frequent focus in the replication literature on "data." The correct data, of course, are critical to the replication. But "replication" as a scientific endeavor will never achieve respectability unless and until it abandons a narrow focus on data and expands its focus to the underlying scientific inferences. |
| Keywords: | Replication,paradigm |
| JEL: | B41 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201779&r=hpe |
| By: | Hannes Rusch (Philipps-Universität Marburg) |
| Abstract: | A recent series of papers has introduced a fresh perspective on the problem of the evolution of human cooperation by suggesting an amendment to the concept of cooperation itself: instead of thinking of cooperation as playing a particular strategy in a given game, usually C in the prisoner's dilemma, we could also think of cooperation as collaboration, i.e. as coalitional strategy choice, such as jointly switching from (D;D) to (C;C). The present paper complements previous work on collaboration by expanding on its genericity: conditions for the evolutionary viability and stability of collaboration under fairly undemanding assumptions about population and interaction structure are derived. Doing so, this paper shows that collaboration is an adaptive principle of strategy choice in a broad range of niches, i.e., stochastic mixtures of games. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201739&r=hpe |
| By: | Florian Herold (University of Bamberg, Germany); Christoph Kuzmics (University of Graz, Austria) |
| Abstract: | Individuals are randomly matched to play an ex-ante symmetric hawk-dove game. Individuals assume one of a finite set of observable labels and condition their action choice on their opponent's label. We study the evolutionary stability of chosen labels and their social interaction structure. Evolutionary stable social structures are different for games in which a dove player prefers the opponent to play hawk (anti-coordination games), and those in which everyone prefers their opponent to play dove (confl ict games). Non-trivial hierarchical social structures can only emerge in anti-coordination games. Egalitarian social structures can emerge in both, but are more fragile in con flict games. |
| Keywords: | Evolution; Hawk-Dove Games; Roles |
| JEL: | C72 C73 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grz:wpaper:2017-09&r=hpe |
| By: | Mamoon, Dawood |
| Abstract: | Freedoms, rights, and equality are common dreams among different human societies irrespective of their economic, social, political and cultural circumstances. This paper presents a brief discussion on the reasons for the divergence of circumstances different civilisations find themselves into by linking this dichotomy with arguments available in contemporary development economics. |
| Keywords: | Development Economics, Discourse Studies |
| JEL: | A1 A12 A14 |
| Date: | 2017–10–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:81899&r=hpe |
| By: | Nathalie Monnet (IHEID, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva); Ugo Panizza (IHEID, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva and CEPR); |
| Abstract: | This note starts with a short review of the economic literature on philanthropy. Next, it provides some estimates of philanthropic giving in advanced and middle-income economies and discusses how innovative financial instruments can leverage charitable giving. The note concludes with a discussion of the controversial aspects of philanthropic activities. |
| Keywords: | Philanthropy, Taxation, Redistribution, Social welfare |
| JEL: | D64 H21 H44 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gii:giihei:heidwp19-2017&r=hpe |
| By: | Jensen, Martin Kaae (Department of Economics, University of Leicester); Rigos, Alexandros (Department of Economics, Lund University) |
| Abstract: | This study considers evolutionary models with non-uniformly random matching when interaction occurs in groups of n>=2 individuals. In such models, groups with different compositions of individuals generally co-exist and the reproductive success (fitness) of a specific strategy – and consequently long-run behavior in the population – varies with the frequencies of different group types. These frequencies crucially depend on the particular matching process at hand. Two new equilibrium concepts are introduced: Nash equilibrium under a matching rule (NEMR) and evolutionarily stable strategy under a matching rule (ESSMR). When matching is uniformly random, these reduce to Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable strategy, respectively. Several results that are known to hold for population games under uniform random matching carry through to our setting. In our most novel contribution, we derive results on the efficiency of the Nash equilibria of population games and show that for any (fixed) payoff structure, there always exists some matching rule leading to average fitness maximization in NEMR. Finally, we provide a series of applications to commonly studied normal-form games. |
| Keywords: | evolutionary game theory; evolutionarily stable strategy; ESS; non-uniformly random matching |
| JEL: | C72 C73 |
| Date: | 2017–09–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2017_011&r=hpe |
| By: | Takashi Kamihigashi (Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB), Kobe University, Japan); Kerim Keskin (Department of Economic, Kadir Has University, Turkey); Cagri Saglam (Department of Economics, Bilkent University, Turkey) |
| Abstract: | Strong Nash equilibrium (see Aumann, 1959) and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (see Bernheim et al., 1987) rely on the idea that players are allowed to form coalitions and make joint deviations. They both consider a case in which any coalition can be formed. Yet there are many real-life examples where the players cannot form certain types of coalitions/subcoalitions. There may also be instances, when all coalitions are formed, where conflicts of interest arise and prevent a player from choosing an action that simultaneously meets the requirements of the two coalitions to which he or she belongs. Here we address these criticisms by studying an organizational framework where some coalitions/subcoalitions are not formed and where the coalitional structure is formulated in such a way that no conflicts of interest remain. We define an organization as a collection of partitions of a set of players ordered in such a way that any partition is coarser than the partitions that precede it. For a given organization, we introduce the notion of organizational Nash equilibrium. We analyze the existence of equilibrium in a subclass of games with strategic complementarities and illustrate how the proposed notion refines the set of Nash equilibria in some examples of normal form games. |
| Keywords: | Nash Equilibrium, Refinements, Coalitional Structure, Organizational Structure, Games with Strategic Complementarities |
| JEL: | C72 |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2017-25&r=hpe |
| By: | McCullough, Bruce D. |
| Abstract: | In 2011, the Annual Report of the Editor of the American Economic Review reported that the journal's data-code archive was functioning well, and made no changes in the archive rules. This was based on an audit of the archive that the editor has commissioned. The audit was performed by a graduate student who apparently had no experience with archives, and the audit concluded that all was largely well with the archive. In point of fact, all was not well with the archive: the archive did not support the publication of reproducible research. The rules for the archive should have been changed and were not; thus the American Economic Review continued to publish articles that were not reproducible. The cause of reproducible research was set back many years. |
| Keywords: | Replication,reproducible research |
| JEL: | B40 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201778&r=hpe |
| By: | Willem Boshoff (Stellenbosch University); Johannes Paha (Justus-Liebig-University Giessen) |
| Abstract: | Firms sometimes violate competition laws by agreeing on increases of list prices. The economic effects of such list price collusion are far from clear because the cartel firms might deviate secretly from the elevated prices by granting their customers discounts. This article presents case evidence suggesting that agreements on list prices are not infrequently observed in cartel cases. It also reviews theoretical, empirical, and experimental literature in economics showing under what conditions such list price collusion causes the discounted transaction prices to rise. This is relevant for competition authorities in developing a theory of harm when prosecuting cartels, and also for the customers of the cartel firms when suing the conspirators for the repayment of damages. |
| JEL: | D43 K21 L41 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201740&r=hpe |
| By: | Shuige Liu |
| Abstract: | Gale, Kuhn and Tucker (1950) introduced two ways to reduce a zero-sum game by packaging some strategies with respect to a probability distribution on them. In terms of value, they gave conditions for a desirable reduction. We show that a probability distribution for a desirable reduction relies on optimal strategies in the original game. Also, we correct an improper example given by them to show that the reverse of a theorem does not hold. |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1710.02326&r=hpe |
| By: | Thomas I. Palley |
| Abstract: | This paper argues Rodrik?s (2011) globalization trilemma is analytically mistaken. Rather than a trilemma, globalization poses a dilemma between more globalization and reduced national policy space. Not only may globalization shrink policy space, it may also twist it. The character of the twist depends on the type of globalization. There is no inherent contradiction between globalization and the democratic nation state. However, globalization has significant implications for the content of democratic politics which it tends to restrict. Furthermore, globalization can generate policy lock-in (Palley, 2017) which permanently reduces policy space. That has enormous implications for democracy and future democratic policymaking. |
| Keywords: | Globalization, trilemma, dilemma, policy space, policy lock-in,democracy |
| JEL: | F0 F02 F50 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imk:fmmpap:08-2017&r=hpe |
| By: | Simon Deakin |
| Abstract: | In his account of the corporation as a 'community', Tony Lawson advances a materialist theory of social reality to argue for the existence of emergent social structures based on collective practices and behaviours, distinguishing his position from John Searle's theory of social reality as consisting of declarative speech acts. Lawson's and Searle's accounts are examined for what they imply about the relationship between social structures and legal concepts. It is argued that legal concepts are themselves a feature of social reality and that a consequence of the law's recognition of the 'reality' of the corporation is to open up the activities of business firm to a distinct form of normative ordering. |
| Keywords: | social ontology, the corporation, legal evolution |
| JEL: | B52 K22 |
| Date: | 2017–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp491&r=hpe |
| By: | Jan Fidrmuc (Department of Economics and Finance and CEDI, Brunel University, UK; Institute for Strategy and Analysis, Government Office of the Slovak Republic; CESifo Munich; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis; Global Labor Organization); Boontarika Paphawasit (College of Arts, Media and Technology, Chiang Mai University, Thailand); Çiğdem Börke Tunalı (Department of Economics, Istanbul University, Turkey; Le Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Économie, Université de Strasbourg, France) |
| Abstract: | We consider the effect of physical attractiveness, assessed using publicly available pictures of top scientists, on their probability of winning the Nobel Prize. There is now an extensive body of literature that finds that physically attractive people receive non-negligible benefits in the labor market, marriage market and social life. In contrast, we find that attractiveness is negatively correlated with the probability of being awarded the Nobel, with the magnitude of this effect being non-negligible. We discuss the potential mechanisms that could explain this result. |
| Keywords: | Contests, prizes, productivity, discrimination |
| JEL: | I20 J24 J70 O30 |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rim:rimwps:17-27&r=hpe |