|
on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Gerald Braunberger (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) |
| Abstract: | Since the outbreak of the Great Financial Crisis in 2007, „Macrofinance“ has evolved as an exciting field for economists. The idea of marrying macroeconomics and financial economics has a long tradition, however, which should not remain buried in almost forgotten books. A couple of seemingly new ideas can be traced back to the work of the eminent economist Joseph A. Schumpeter. His dynamic model of the business cycle is built upon a close interaction between entrepreneurs and banks. Fire-sales of assets, liquidity spirals and feedback loops can turn a mild recession into a devastating depression. Schumpeter’s analysis of the role of monetary policy bears a striking resemblance to contemporary discussions. |
| JEL: | B10 B13 B20 B22 E30 E44 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bwu:schdps:sdp16007&r=hpe |
| By: | Yoann Verger (REEDS - Centre international de Recherches en Economie écologique, Eco-innovation et ingénierie du Développement Soutenable - UVSQ - Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines) |
| Abstract: | Martins (2016) recently emphasized the role that classical economics can play in building sustainability economics. In this respect, he uses Sraffa's theory of value and Sen and Nussbaum's capability theory to support his argument. My comment focuses on the part of his article concerning Sraffa's theory, and aims to refine some of Martins claims in order to avoid misunderstandings about the possibilities offered by Sraffa's theory. |
| Keywords: | Ecological economics,Sraffa, theory of value, environment, sustainability |
| Date: | 2016–11–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01397937&r=hpe |
| By: | Emeline Bezin (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Grégory Ponthière (ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We revisit the Tragedy of the Commons in an dynamic overlapping generations economy peopled of shepherds who decide how many sheep they let graze on a common parcel of land, while relying on di fferent forms of rationality (Nash players, Pure or Impure Kantian players). We examine the dynamics of heterogeneity and land congestion when the prevalance of those di fferent forms of rationality evolves over time follow- ing a vertical/oblique socialization process a la Bisin and Verdier (2001). We study the impacts of a quota and of a tax on the congestion of land, and we show that introducing a quota may, in some cases, reduce the proportion of Kantians (Pure and Impure), and worsen the Tragedy of Commons with respect to the laissez-faire. Finally, we examine whether a government should promote either a Pure or an Impure Kantian morality, by comparing the relative fi tness of Pure/Impure Kantians, and their interactions with the congestion of land. |
| Keywords: | Tragedy of the Commons,heterogeneity,Kantian rationality,socialization,overlapping generations,fitness |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-01403244&r=hpe |
| By: | Brahmachari, Deborshi |
| Abstract: | This paper aims at a commentary on the Neoclassical Economics as a Method of Scientific Research Program which argues that many theories in Neo-Classical Economics when tested using Lakatos’ Methodology of Scientific Research Program, were not categorised as 'progressive research program'. This finds that some endogenous growth theories have now been tested by few researcher as progressive in terms of Lakatos’ Scientific Research Program. |
| Keywords: | Scientific Research Program, Neo-Classical Economics, evolution of theory, Research Methodology, Research methods. |
| JEL: | B41 |
| Date: | 2016–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:75341&r=hpe |
| By: | David Martimort (Paris School of Economics-EHESS); Aggey Semenov (Department of Economics, University of Ottawa); Lars Stole (University of Chicago, Booth School of Business) |
| Abstract: | We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to intrinsic common agency screening games as the set of solutions to self-generating optimization programs. This analysis is performed both for continuous and discrete two-type models. These programs, in turn, can be thought of as maximization problems faced by a fictional surrogate principal with a simple set of incentive constraints that embed the non-cooperative behavior of principals in the underlying game. For the case of continuous types, we provide a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes for regular environments by relying on techniques developed elsewhere for aggregate games and mechanism design problems with delegation. Those equilibria may be non-differentiable and/or exhibit discontinuities. Among those allocations, we stress the role the maximal equilibrium exhibits a n-fold distortion due to the principals' non-cooperative behavior. It is the unique equilibrium which is implemented by a tariff satisfying a biconjugacy requirement inherited from duality in convex analysis. This maximal equilibrium may not be the most preferred equilibrium allocation from the principals' point of view. We perform a similar analysis in the case of a discrete two-type model. We select within a large set of equilibria by imposing the same requirement of biconjugacy on equilibrium tariffs. Those outcomes are limits of equilibria exhibiting much bunching in nearby continuous type models which fail to be regular and require the use of ironing procedures. |
| Keywords: | Intrinsic common agency, aggregate games, mechanism design with delegation, duality, ironing procedures |
| JEL: | D82 D86 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ott:wpaper:1618e&r=hpe |
| By: | Zhu, Drew |
| Abstract: | Time might be the scarcest resource for every individual. Time saving could be one of a few specific starting points of Economics. According to the new attribute theory that is based on Lancaster’s attribute theory, the paper constructs a linear programming model with an objective function of time saving that is independent of any utility function. Then the demand function of the time saving good can be derived with a programming method, which is different from the parametric and typically non-parametric methods. Because some data was unavailable, the empirical research of this paper cannot directly derive the demand function from the programming model. Thus another method is used to derive the demand function and the predictive power of this function is at least as good as that of the most common econometric models. Further, as a basic human behavior, time saving could be generalized to other fundamental theories of Economics, especially the long-run growth theory. Therefore, in the ultimate meaning, the conclusion is that Economics is a science of how to save time and time saving might be a milestone that will shift Economics towards a modern science. |
| Keywords: | new attribute theory; time saving function; demand function |
| JEL: | B10 B23 C61 D01 D11 |
| Date: | 2016–11–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:75314&r=hpe |
| By: | Dominik Rothenhaüsler (Seminar for Statistics, ETH Zurich); Nikolaus Schweizer (Department of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg University); Nora Szech (Karlsruher Institut für Technologie) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes how moral costs affect individual support of morally difficult group decisions. We study a threshold public good game with moral costs. Motivated by recent empirical findings, we assume that these costs are heterogeneous and consist of three parts. The first one is a standard cost term. The second, shared guilt, decreases in the number of supporters. The third hinges on the notion of being pivotal. We analyze equilibrium predictions, isolate the causal effects of guilt sharing, and compare results to standard utilitarian and nonconsequentialist approaches. As interventions, we study information release, feedback, and fostering individual moral standards. |
| Keywords: | moral decision making, committee decisions, diffusion of responsibility, Shared guilt, being pivotal, division of labor, institutions and morals |
| JEL: | D02 D03 D23 D63 D82 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hka:wpaper:2016-026&r=hpe |
| By: | Willem Spanjers (Department of Economics, Kingston University London, UK; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, Italy); Elettra Agliardi (Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, Italy) |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this paper is to contribute to rethinking the Social Market Economy with respect to modern economic and technological structures. In doing so, we explore the limits of the traditional Social Market Economy for solving the economic problems of our time. We find that the Social Market Economy's rigid focus on competitive markets as the corner stone for a decentralized economic order has become outdated and that the basic principle of competition should be extended to decentralized institutions and policies. It is proposed that the preferred choice of specific institutions and policies should reflect their legitimacy, i.e. a combination of their effectiveness and their public acceptance. On the basis of our findings, we propose to amend some of the principles of the traditional Social Market Economy and to supplement them with new ones. The principles relate to the economy, to politics, as well as to the uncertainty inherent in the long run future. The proposed principles are illustrated with general examples covering regional economic policy, monetary policy, financial crises, and environmental sustainability. |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rim:rimpre:16-01&r=hpe |
| By: | Yvon Pesqueux (LIRSA - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche en Sciences de l'Action - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM]) |
| Abstract: | Le care est un des courants de pensée qui se rattache au féminisme, féminisme pouvant se définir comme un programme de vie sexuelle et biologique, sociale et politique construit au regard du sexe (dans les deux premiers cas) et au regard du genre (dans les deux seconds). Ce courant de pensée matérialise la logique de relativisation des valeurs patriarcales en considérant le masculin comme un générique et donc comme un « faux » universel et en considérant la vie de couple à partir d’une critique des registres de domination de l’un sur l’autre. Pour la vie en société, les réflexions oscillent entre le contenu à donner à la parité et celui à donner à la complémentarité. Parler de care nécessite de définir ce dont il est question et il faut souligner la multitude des concepts associés, l’ensemble venant constituer une véritable fresque dont les points cardinaux pourraient être les suivants : - S’agit-il d’une notion représentative plutôt d’un processus, plutôt d’un état ou bien encore des deux aspects à la fois ? Avec le care, il est en effet question de tension. - S’agit-il d’une notion plutôt représentative d’une émotion (c’est-à-dire d’un trouble subit, d’une agitation passagère, d’une réaction affective de grande intensité provoquée par un stimulus venant de l’environnement, notion rattachée à l’individu et à sa conscience), d’une impression (c’est-à-dire de quelque chose d’extérieur qui marque au regard des apparences), d’un sentiment (connaissance plus ou moins claire au regard d’une donnée immédiate, d’une opinion ou encore d’un état affectif durable et qui, à la différence de l’impression dépend d’une dimension collective) ou bien encore les trois aspects à la fois ? Soulignons l’appartenance de ces trois notions au champ de l’affectif (et non à celui de la Raison) et le fait que l’on y accède au travers de sensations au travers du prisme cognitivo-sensualiste qui les fonde. De façon très générale, le care peut se définir comme étant tout ce qui tourne autour de la notion d’attention (mobilisation, réception, activités associées). Il s’agit d’une forme non utilitariste de préoccupation, de souci de l’autre. |
| Keywords: | care, attention, philosophie politique |
| Date: | 2016–11–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:cel-01403479&r=hpe |
| By: | Christian Ewerhart; Kremena Valkanova |
| Abstract: | This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-player games. We show that continuous-time fictitious play converges to Nash equilibrium provided that the overall game is zero-sum. Moreover, the rate of convergence is 1/T , regardless of the size of the network. In contrast, arbitrary n-player zero-sum games do not possess the fictitious-play property. As an extension, we consider networks in which each bilateral game is strategically zero-sum, a weighted potential game, or a two-by-two game. In those cases, convergence requires either a condition on bilateral payoffs or that the underlying network structure is acyclic. The results are shown to hold also for the discrete-time variant of fictitious play, which entails a generalization of Robinson's theorem to arbitrary zero-sum networks. Applications include security games, conflict networks, and decentralized wireless channel selection. |
| Keywords: | Fictitious play, networks, zero-sum games, conflicts, potential games, Miyasawa's theorem, Robinson's theorem |
| JEL: | C72 D83 D85 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:239&r=hpe |
| By: | Maren Duvendack; Richard Palmer-Jones; W. Robert Reed (University of Canterbury) |
| Abstract: | This paper discusses recent trends in the use of replications in economics. We identify a number of sources of progress, including the results of recent replication studies that have attempted to identify replication rates within the discipline. These studies generally find that replication rates are relatively low, though they may be higher for laboratory experiments in economics. We also identify two web-based resources for replications, the Replication in Economics wiki and The Replication Network. We then consider obstacles to undertaking replication studies in economics. Two obstacles are the lack of publishing outlets and difficulties in obtaining data and code for published studies. We identify journals that publish replication studies and that "regularly" include data and code as supplementary files for their published research. Finally, we highlight replication initiatives in psychology and political science, behind which economics appears to lag. Whether this is because the problems that beset those disciplines are less severe in economics, or because economics is more resistant to replications, is arguable. |
| Keywords: | Replication, data sharing, publication bias |
| JEL: | A1 B4 |
| Date: | 2016–12–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbt:econwp:16/34&r=hpe |
| By: | Nicolas Piluso (CERTOP - Centre d'Etude et de Recherche Travail Organisation Pouvoir - UT2 - Université Toulouse 2 - UPS - Université Paul Sabatier - Toulouse 3 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Orléan, Aglietta et Cartelier, qui sont les tenants d " une « hétérodoxie monétaire », prétendent qu " il faut rejeter les théories de la valeur sur la base de deux arguments : elles ne parviennent pas à rendre compte de l " existence de la monnaie de façon pleinement satisfaisante (la fable du troc est à rejeter), et sont impuissantes à rendre compte du salariat, caractéristique essentielle du capitalisme. Nous montrons dans cet article que leur théorie économiques de la monnaie, qu " elle le revendique ou non, a recours à un postulat de la monnaie. Par ailleurs, il n " est pas sûr que la théorie de la valeur ne parvienne pas à rendre compte du salariat : tout dépend des hypothèses que l " on quant à la nature du rapport salarial et à la définition de l " échange comme rapport entre équivalents. |
| Keywords: | valeur,monnaie,postulat,crise,salariat |
| Date: | 2016–11–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01405137&r=hpe |
| By: | Benoît LE MAUX (CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France); Sarah NECKER (University of Freiburg, Walter-Eucken Institute, Deutschland); Yvon ROCABOY (CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France) |
| Abstract: | We develop a theory of the evolution of scientific misbehavior. Our empirical analysis of a survey of scientific misbehavior in economics suggests that researchers’ disutility from cheating varies with the expected fraction of colleagues who cheat. This observation is central to our theory. We develop a one-principal multi-agent framework in which a research institution aims to reward scientific productivity at minimum cost. As the social norm is determined endogenously, performance-related pay may not only increase cheating in the short run but can also make cheat-ing increasingly attractive in the long run. The optimal contract thus depends on the dynamics of scientific norms. The premium on scientific productivity should be higher when the transmission of scientific norms across generations is lower (low marginal peer pressure) or the principal cares little about the future (has a high discount rate). Under certain conditions, a greater probability of detection also increases the optimal productivity premium. |
| Keywords: | Economics of Science, Contract Theory, Scientific Misbehavior, Social Norms |
| JEL: | A11 A13 K42 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cccrwp:2016-03-ccr&r=hpe |
| By: | Martin Shubik (Cowles Foundation, Yale University) |
| Abstract: | This is a nontechnical retrospective paper on a game theoretic approach to the theory of money and financial institutions. The stress is on process models and the reconciliation of general equilibrium with Keynes and Schumpeter’s approaches to non-equilibrium dynamics. |
| Keywords: | Bankruptcy, Innovation, Growth, Competition, Price-formation |
| JEL: | C7 E12 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2036r&r=hpe |
| By: | Ellen Garbarino (The University of Sydney [Sydney]); Robert Slonim (The University of Sydney [Sydney]); Marie Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon) |
| Abstract: | We theoretically show that agents with loss-averse preferences are more likely to lie to avoid receiving a financially bad outcome the lower the probability of this bad outcome. The increased dishonesty occurs due to the expected payoff increasing as the bad outcome becomes less likely, and hence the greater the loss that can be avoided by lying. We demonstrate robust support for this role of loss aversion on lying by reanalyzing the results from the extant literature covering 74 studies and 363 treatments, and from two new experiments that vary the outcome probabilities and examine lying for personal gain and for gains to causes one supports or opposes. To measure and compare lying behavior across treatments and studies, we develop an empirical method that estimates the full distribution of dishonesty when agents privately observe the outcome of a random process and can misreport what they observed. Abstract: We theoretically show that agents with loss-averse preferences are more likely to lie to avoid receiving a financially bad outcome the lower the probability of this bad outcome. The increased dishonesty occurs due to the expected payoff increasing as the bad outcome becomes less likely, and hence the greater the loss that can be avoided by lying. We demonstrate robust support for this role of loss aversion on lying by reanalyzing the results from the extant literature covering 74 studies and 363 treatments, and from two new experiments that vary the outcome probabilities and examine lying for personal gain and for gains to causes one supports or opposes. To measure and compare lying behavior across treatments and studies, we develop an empirical method that estimates the full distribution of dishonesty when agents privately observe the outcome of a random process and can misreport what they observed. |
| Keywords: | loss aversion, dishonesty, econometric estimation, experimental economics, lying |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01404333&r=hpe |
| By: | Carlo Beretta |
| Abstract: | Starting with a prisoner’s dilemma, a simple taxonomy of the possible characteristics of a game is introduced. This forms the basis for discussing repeated interactions and the emergence of personalised rules used in durable relationships. When by their nature, interactions are sporadic, much of the same results can be obtained by the use of social rules. Finally, the use of formal contracts, typically incomplete, and a third party to solve conflicts is outlined. The Appendix contains a summary introduction to the problem of incompleteness of norm systems |
| JEL: | A1 C7 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dis:wpaper:dis1501&r=hpe |
| By: | Carlo Beretta |
| Abstract: | Starting with a prisoner’s dilemma, a simple taxonomy of the possible characteristics of a game is introduced. This forms the basis for discussing repeated interactions and the emergence of personalised rules used in durable relationships. When by their nature, interactions are sporadic, much of the same results can be obtained by the use of social rules. Finally, the use of formal contracts, typically incomplete, and a third party to solve conflicts is outlined. The Appendix contains a summary introduction to the problem of incompleteness of norm systems |
| JEL: | A1 C7 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dis:wpaper:dis1502&r=hpe |
| By: | Konow, James |
| Abstract: | Recent years have witnessed a rapid increase in initiatives to expand ethics instruction in higher education. Numerous empirical studies have examined the possible effects on students of discipline-based ethics instruction, such business ethics and medical ethics. Nevertheless, the largest share of college ethics instruction has traditionally fallen to philosophy departments, and there is a paucity of empirical research on the individual effects of that approach. This paper examines possible effects of exposure to readings and lectures in mandatory philosophy classes on student views of morality. Specifically, it focuses on an ethical topic of importance to both economics and philosophy, viz., economic (or distributive) justice. The questionnaire study is designed to avoid features suspected of generating false positives in past research while calibrating the measurement so as to increase the likelihood of detecting even a modest true effect. The results provide little evidence that the philosophical ethics approach studied here systematically affects the fairness views of students. The possible implications for future research and for ethics instruction are briefly discussed. |
| Keywords: | ethics education, fairness, philosophy |
| JEL: | A2 D63 |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:75377&r=hpe |
| By: | Leon Tamayo, Dorian Fernando |
| Abstract: | Este artículo se centra en el enfoque de las capacidades y sus fundamentos en el trabajo de Amartya Sen, analiza cómo se relaciona con otros enfoques éticos, y sus principales aportaciones, también se exponen diferentes teorías de capacidad desarrolladas en el enfoque de capacidades, con especial atención a la de Martha Nussbaum. |
| Keywords: | capacidades, funcionamientos, heterogeneidad |
| JEL: | D6 D63 I31 I32 |
| Date: | 2016–11–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:75399&r=hpe |
| By: | Dawood, Mamoon |
| Abstract: | The paper carries out a context specific debate on why the real sector of the economy is important to look into to establish a framework of effective development. While doing that the paper highlights that the economic policy in the real sector is to be complemented by intervening in the progress of the society by developing social, political and legal institutions. This paper presents a post Washington consensus intellectual debate that eventually made the Prelog for first Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) and now Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). |
| Keywords: | Development Discourse |
| JEL: | P50 |
| Date: | 2016–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:75489&r=hpe |
| By: | Sanjit Dhami; Ali al-Nowaihi |
| Abstract: | The evidence shows that in many important economic domains, many people are either predisposed to engage in ‘socially responsible actions’ and/or required by regulations to do so. Examples include pollution abatement activity, behavior in a commons, and contributions to charity. We propose a general framework of analysis for modelling such actions and the role of public policy in encouraging these actions in an equilibrium setting. Multiple equilibria are endemic in these situations. We show that it is possible to conduct interesting and meaningful analysis in the presence of multiple equilibria. We examine the role of optimal public policy such as subsidies, taxes and direct government grants in engineering moves from less to more desirable equilibria. We highlight a new role for leadership contributions in facilitating moves between multiple equilibria. We also conduct a welfare analysis of the optimal mix between private and public actions. |
| Keywords: | Social responsibility; multiple equilibria; optimal mix of public and pri- vate social responsibility; subsidies and direct grants; environmental economics, problem of the commons, charitable giving. |
| JEL: | D6 H2 H4 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lec:leecon:16/20&r=hpe |
| By: | Ellen Garbarino (University of Sydney Business School, Department of Marketing, Abercrombie building, NSW 2006 Sydney, Australia); Robert Slonim (University of Sydney, Department of Economics, Merewether building, NSW 2006 Sydney, Australia; IZA, Bonn, Germany); Marie Claire Villeval (Univ Lyon, Université Lyon 2, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-69342 Lyon, France) |
| Abstract: | We theoretically show that agents with loss-averse preferences are more likely to lie to avoid receiving a financially bad outcome the lower the probability of this bad outcome. The increased dishonesty occurs due to the expected payoff increasing as the bad outcome becomes less likely, and hence the greater the loss that can be avoided by lying. We demonstrate robust support for this role of loss aversion on lying by reanalyzing the results from the extant literature covering 74 studies and 363 treatments, and from two new experiments that vary the outcome probabilities and examine lying for personal gain and for gains to causes one supports or opposes. To measure and compare lying behavior across treatments and studies, we develop an empirical method that estimates the full distribution of dishonesty when agents privately observe the outcome of a random process and can misreport what they observed. |
| Keywords: | Gender, loss aversion, dishonesty, econometric estimation, experimental economics, lying |
| JEL: | C91 C81 D03 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1631&r=hpe |