nep-hpe New Economics Papers
on History and Philosophy of Economics
Issue of 2016‒10‒09
24 papers chosen by
Erik Thomson
University of Manitoba

  1. Eyes wide shut: John Rawls's silence on racial justice By Ai-Thu Dang
  2. Conceptualizing the formation and role of expectations before 1950: George Katona's thought By Pierrick Dechaux
  3. The European Payments Union and the origins of Triffin’s regional approach towards international monetary integration By Ivo Maes; Ilaria Pasotti
  4. Pouvoir de marché, stratégies et régulation: Les contributions de Jean Tirole, Prix Nobel d'Economie 2014 By David Encaoua
  5. The Evolution of "Kantian Trait": Inferring from the Dictator Game By Lorenzo Cerda Planas
  6. Managing the Knowledge Commons: Interview with Carlo Vercellone - By Carlo Vercellone
  7. Price revelation and existence of financial equilibrium with incomplete markets and private beliefs By Lionel De Boisdeffre
  8. Proving the existence of macropsychological phenomena? The Katona-Tobin controversy over the predictive value of attitudinal data By Pierrick Dechaux
  9. Dynamics of Socio-Economic Systems: Attractors, Rationality and Meaning By Andrzej Nowak; Jørgen Vitting Andersen; Wojciech Borkowski
  10. The Solidarity Motive By Christoph Engel
  11. The Principle of Social Scaling By Paulo dos Santos
  12. Simple Sufficient Conditions for Weak Reciprocal Upper Semi-Continuity in Extended Games By Blake Allison; Adib Bagh; Jason Lepore
  13. An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game By Ata Atay
  14. A Comprehensive Approach to Revealed Preference Theory By Hiroki Nishimura; Efe A. Ok; John K.-H. Quah
  15. Across the crises of modern capitalism By Fusari, Angelo i
  16. Comment les individus évaluent l'engagement pour une cause légitime ? By Clarisse Vermes
  17. Théorie de la régulation : pourquoi ? comment ? Approche structuriste et déconstruction du symbolique en économie By Jean-Pierre Chanteau
  18. Developmental states in the 21st century - analytical structure of a new approach By Judit Ricz
  19. Redistributive Politics, Power Sharing and Fairness By Dario Debowizc; Alejandro Saporiti; Yizhi Wang
  20. Do Beliefs About Peers Matter for Donation Matching? Experiments in the Field and Laboratory By Laura Gee; Michael Schreck
  21. Who are the forerunners, economists or central bankers? By Ginafranco Tusset
  22. Building a path of equality to economic progress and macroeconomic stability - the economic theory of the Swedish model By Erixon, Lennart
  23. Some structural properties of a lattice of embedded coalitions By José María Alonso-Meijide; Mikel Alvarez-Mozos; María Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro; Andrés Jiménez-Losada
  24. Classroom Games: Trading in a Pit Market 2.0 By Markwardt, Gunther; Seidel, André; Thum, Marcel

  1. By: Ai-Thu Dang (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: John Rawls's remarks on race are sparse in his writings. However, three key moments in his conceptual apparatus wherein racial issues appear explicitly can be be highlighted: (1) the status of race as a feature of the veil of ignorance; (2) racial minorities, the least advantaged, and the difference principle; and (3) the role of arguments made by antebellum abolitionist dissidents and Martin Luther King, Jr., in favor of racial equality in his reformulation of his notion of public reason. I show that the introduction of race poses difficulties for Rawls in his theory of justice. I also propose an explanation of why Rawls does not address issues of racial justice more explicitly and in-depth. However, because Rawls himself explained his relative silence on racial justice, I discuss its relevance. I contend that Rawls's conception of justice as fairness as a form of political liberalism is indebted to a strong principle of equal citizenship for all individuals that is blind to race and ethnicity, so his theoretical apparatus addresses the issue of legal racial discrimination or institutional racism. Nevertheless, it fails to address the problem of systemic racial discrimination.
    Abstract: Il n'existe pas de développements systématiques dans les écrits de John Rawls sur la question des inégalités raciales ou fondées sur l'origine ethnique, mais seulement des remarques parcellaires et répétitives sur ce sujet. On peut toutefois repérer trois moments clés dans la construction théorique de Rawls où les questions de justice raciale sont introduites : le statut de la race et le voile d'ignorance ; les minorités raciales, les plus mal lotis de la société et le principe de différence ; le rôle des arguments religieux avancés par les abolitionnistes américains et par Martin Luther King en faveur de l'égalité raciale dans la reformulation par Rawls de sa conception de la raison publique. Je montre que l'introduction des questions de justice raciale déstabilise le cadre théorique de Rawls et soulève des questions dont il est lui-même conscient. Je discute de l'explication donnée par Rawls pour justifier son relatif silence et je montre que ses principes de justice permettent de lutter contre la discrimination directe mais ne permettent pas de répondre au défi de la discrimination systémique.
    Keywords: justice as fairness,racial (in)justice,public reason,ideal and nonideal theory,théorie idéale et théorie non idéale,John Rawls,justice comme équité,(in)justice raciale,raison publique
    Date: 2015–04
  2. By: Pierrick Dechaux (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: This article analyzes Katona's theory of expectations and compares it to that of Keynes and Hicks. It discusses the implicit and explicit debates on the introduction of psychology in economic theory. The aim of this paper is twofold: define Katona's thought and examine the impact of this work on the debate on expectations in macroeconomics. This paper shows that Katona is the only author, to our knowledge, who develops both an empirical and theoretical research program on expectations that borrows from the epistemology of Keynes. While rediscovering Katona's work, this paper contributes to highlight the forgotten methodology that initiated the construction of confidence (or sentiment) indexes. It also discusses the implicit and explicit debates on the introduction of psychology in economic theory.
    Abstract: Cet article étudie la théorie des anticipations de Katona et la compare à celle de Keynes et de Hicks. Il poursuit deux objectifs : définir la pensée de Katona et examiner son impact dans le débat sur les anticipations en macroéconomie. Ce papier met en évidence que Katona est le seul auteur, à notre connaissance, à développer un programme à la fois empirique et théorique sur les anticipations qui empreinte à l'épistémologie de Keynes. En s'intéressant aux travaux peu étudiés de Katona, cet article remet en avant la méthodologie à l'origine de la construction des indicateurs de confiance. Il discute aussi les débats implicites et explicites sur l'introduction de la psychologie en théorie économique.
    Keywords: psychology,expectations theories,expectations measures,Macroeconomics,George Katona,Keynes,Hicks,psychologie,théories des anticipations,mesures des anticipations,Macroéconomie
    Date: 2015–02
  3. By: Ivo Maes (Economics and Research Department, NBB, Robert Triffin Chair, Université catholique de Louvain, and ICHEC Brussels Management School); Ilaria Pasotti (Catholic University of Milan)
    Abstract: Robert Triffin (1911-1993) played an important role in the international monetary debates in the postwar period. He was known as one of the main advocates of a multipolar international monetary system. In this paper we analyse the origins of riffin’s “regional” approach towards international monetary integration. We argue that Triffin’s experience with the European Payments Union (EPU)played hereby a crucial role. Triffin was not only an “architect” of the EPU, but the EPU also led to an important shift in Triffin’s view of the geography of the international monetary system. Before his work on the EPU, Triffin thought of the international economy as composed of two geographical entities: national economies and the world economy. With his work on the EPU he introduced a third geographical entity: the region. The EPU would so be at the basis of Triffin’s advocacy of a regional approach towards international monetary integration. Moreover, while Triffin was initially quite positive on the IMF, he became, through his EPU experience, more critical of the IMF and its worldwide approach.
    Keywords: Triffin, European Payments Union (EPU), international monetary system (IMS)
    JEL: A11 B31 F02 F33 F36 N24
    Date: 2016–09
  4. By: David Encaoua (PSE - Paris School of Economics, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: This article is devoted to a perspective of the works of Jean Tirole on the topics mentioned by the Nobel Committee, namely the analysis of market power, its control mechanisms and the regulation of network activities and natural monopoly. It develops in three parts. The first explains why and how these works have contributed to a profound renewal of the Industrial Organization field by offering strong theoretical foundations. The second presents different contributions that advance our understanding of the Economics of Innovation. The third part refers to the works on the Economics of Regulation. In each part, the focus is on three aspects: i / the state of knowledge at the time of the work, ii / the analytical instruments and iii / the lessons that can be drawn. The article seeks to illustrate a common feature in many of these works, that of combining theoretical research leading to the knowledge's enlargement in various fields of economic analysis, and a choice of questions motivated by a strong concern to find solutions to some contemporary economic problems, based on a serious prior theoretical analysis.
    Abstract: Cet article est consacré à une mise en perspective des travaux réalisés par Jean Tirole sur les thèmes mentionnés par le communiqué du Nobel, à savoir l'analyse du pouvoir de marché, ses modalités de contrôle et la régulation des activités de réseaux et de monopole naturel. Il se développe en trois parties. La première explicite pourquoi et comment ces travaux ont participé à un profond renouveau de l'Economie Industrielle. La seconde présente les contributions participant à l'élaboration d'une véritable économie de l'innovation. La troisième partie se réfère aux travaux sur la régulation. Dans chacune de ces parties, l'accent est mis sur trois aspects : i/ l'état des connaissances au moment de ces travaux, ii/ les instruments d'analyse utilisés, et iii/ les enseignements que l'on peut en tirer. L'article cherche également à illustrer une caractéristique commune à plusieurs de ces travaux, celle de combiner, d'une part, une recherche théorique conduisant à un véritable renouvellement de nos connaissances dans différents champs de l'analyse économique, et d'autre part, un choix de questions motivées par une forte préoccupation à trouver des moyens de résolution de nombreux problèmes économiques contemporains, se fondant sur une sérieuse analyse théorique préalable.
    Keywords: réseaux,standards technologiques,asymétries informationnelles,oligopole,restrictions verticales,forclusion,course au brevet,systèmes non propriétaires,marchés bifaces,pools de brevets,régulation
    Date: 2015–04
  5. By: Lorenzo Cerda Planas (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics)
    Abstract: The aim of this paper is twofold. Starting from the population dynamics literature, which usually finds the resulting distribution of a trait in a population, according to some parents' preferences, I answer the inverted question: Which preference function would yield into a given trait distribution? I solve this using a continuous trait, instead of finite types of agents. Using this result, I connect this transmission theory of social traits with the well-known results of Dictator Game (DG) experiments. I use a specific definition of a Kantian trait applied to DG results, and determine the distribution of this trait that is commonly found in these experiments. With these two ingredients, I show that homo-œconomicus parents have a greater' dislike' or disutility of having offspring with different traits from them compared to their Kantian counterparts. This could be a result of myopic empathy being stronger in homo-œconomicus parents, driving this dislike of difference.
    Keywords: population dynamics,Kantian morale,evolutionary equilibrium
    Date: 2015–03
  6. By: Carlo Vercellone (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: Interview with Dr. Carlo Vercellone, one of the leading theorists of cognitive capitalism and economist at the CNRS Lab of The Sorbonne Economic Centre (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, CES).
    Keywords: commons, knowledge based economy, Common property, cognitive capitalism
    Date: 2015–06–16
  7. By: Lionel De Boisdeffre (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CATT - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour)
    Abstract: We consider a pure exchange financial economy, where rational agents, possibly asymmetrically informed, forecast prices privately with no model of how they are determined. Therefore, agents face both ‘exogenous uncertainty’ on the future state of nature, and ‘endogenous uncertainty’ on the future price. At a sequential equilibrium, all consumers expect the ‘true’ price as a possible outcome and elect optimal strategies at the first period, which clear on all markets ex post. The paper's purpose is twofold. First, it defines no-arbitrage prices, which comprise all equilibrium prices, and displays their revealing properties. Second, it shows under mild conditions, that a sequential equilibrium always exists in this model, whatever agents' prior beliefs or the financial structure. This outcome suggests that standard existence problems, which followed Hart [1975] and Radner [1979], stem from the national expectation and perfect foresight assumptions of the classical model.
    Abstract: Nous proposons un modèle de marchés financiers incomplets avec asymétrie d'information, dans lequel les agents anticipent les prix de manière privée sans anticipations rationnelles. Ils sont donc confrontés à une double incertitude. La première, exogène, sur l'état de la nature qui prévaudra demain. La seconde, endogène, sur le prix d'équilibre dans chaque état anticipé qui dépend des croyances privées des agents. Un équilibre séquentiel est atteint lorsque les agents ont optimisé leurs stratégies et anticipé les vrais prix de demain et que tous les marchés sont à l'équilibre ex post. L'objet de l'article est double. Définir des prix de non arbitrage d'une part et montrer l'information qu'ils peuvent révéler. Montrer d'autre part que l'équilibre existe toujours dans ce modèle, sous des conditions faibles quelles que soient les croyances initiales des agents et la structure des marchés financiers. Ceci, dès que les agents ont atteint une structure d'information sans arbitrage, ce qui est toujours possible. Ce résultat suggère que les problèmes d'existence qui ont suivi Hart [1975] et Radner [1979] proviennent des hypothèses d'anticipations rationnelles et parfaites des modèles classiques.
    Keywords: sequential equilibrium,temporary equilibrium,perfect foresight,rational expectations,financial markets,asymmetric information,équilibre séquentiel,équilibre temporaire,anticipations parfaites,existence,anticipations rationnelles,marchés financiers,information asymétrique,arbitrage
    Date: 2015–04
  8. By: Pierrick Dechaux (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the controversy between George Katona and James Tobin that happened at the end of the nineteen fifties. The central problem of the paper concerns the nature of psychological phenomena. While Tobin defends that economic behavior stems from the individual, Katona tries to develop a macropsychological approach in which the individual plays a secondary role. The controversy thus reveals the arguments that initiated the developments of microeconomic theories and the construction of microeconomic data during the nineteen fifties.
    Keywords: Macroeconomics,history of behavioral economics,attitudinal data,economic prediction
    Date: 2015–02
  9. By: Andrzej Nowak (Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw - Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw,); Jørgen Vitting Andersen (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Wojciech Borkowski (Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw - Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw,)
    Abstract: Gintis and Helbing go beyond traditional boundaries of scientific disciplines and propose integration of major theories from the main disciplines of the social as well as natural sciences. The theory captures well many insights from social psychology. Several assumptions of the model, however, may be questioned. The assumption that social systems are at equilibrium is too narrow, because social systems may also be out of equilibrium. The notion of attractor dynamics shows that systems may converge on different types of attractors depending on the value of control parameters. The notion of rationality of human behavior may be challenged on the basis of new data from psychology, decision science and behavioral economics. Often individuals do not process the information, but rather copy the choices of others. Individuals interact by both direct and indirect means – though market mechanisms. Most importantly, social dynamics, in contrast to physical systems, is governed by meaning. Despite these limitations the theory of Gintis and Helbing represents an important step in the integration of the social sciences.
    Keywords: complex system,adaptive system,general equilibrium
    Date: 2015
  10. By: Christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)
    Abstract: For decades, experimental economics has been very interested in behavior that could be characterized as practicing solidarity (although the term is rarely used). Solidarity is a key concept in Catholic Social Teaching. This paper builds a bridge between these two endeavors that, thus far, had little contact with each other. Catholic Social Teaching is essentially normative. People are informed what they should do if they are good Christians. Experimental Economics is descriptive. Experimenters want to learn how much solidarity experimental participants exhibit when this is costly. But from a Catholic perspective it is interesting how strongly their norms are reflected in actual behavior. The many distinctions uncovered by behavioral economics may also help refine Catholic thinking. And behavioral economics is confronted with new questions, in particular regarding deontological motives.
    Keywords: Solidarity, Dictator Game, Stealing Game, Public Good Game, Social Preferences, Deontological Motives
    JEL: A12 A13 C91 D03 D63 D64 Z12
    Date: 2016–10
  11. By: Paulo dos Santos (Department of Economics, New School for Social Research)
    Abstract: This paper motivates the content and analytical significance of processes of “social scaling” in competitive economic settings, postulating a general Principle that describes the regulations they impose on the functioning of certain economic systems. Economic competition often defines behavioral relationships between individual measures of certain variables and average or social measures of themselves. These relationships ensure a number of behaviorally significant economic variables are socially scaled measures. Individual values of such variables are subject to systemic interdependences, which may take the form of aggregate first-moment constraints on their distributions. The paper shows how processes of social scaling in capital and labor markets can help account for the observed frequency distributions of wage income and Tobin’s q, suggesting such processes may be a pervasive in economic systems. Finally, the paper’s discussion illustrates and motivates the distinctive usefulness of statistical-mechanical methods in Economics, both in defining new conceptualizations of the relationship between individual agencies and aggregate regulations in economic systems, and in the development of logically robust observational methods in economic analysis.
    Keywords: Social Scaling, Economic Distribution, Statistical Mechanics, Observational Economics
    JEL: B41 C18 C69
    Date: 2016–09
  12. By: Blake Allison (Department of Economics, Emory University); Adib Bagh (Department of Economics and Mathematics, University of Kentucky); Jason Lepore (Department of Economics, California Polytechnic State University)
    Abstract: We provide a sufficient condition for a game with discontinuous payoffs to be weakly reciprocally upper semi-continuous in mixed strategies. This condition is imposed on the individual payoffs and not on their sum, and it can be readily verified in a large class of games even when the sum of payoffs in such games is not upper semi-continuous. We apply our result to establish the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in probabilistic voting competitions when candidates have heterogenous beliefs about the distribution of the voters.
    Keywords: Better reply security, extended games, Weak reciprocal upper semi-continuity, Nash equilibria, Probabilistic voting models.
    JEL: C63 C72 D72
    Date: 2016
  13. By: Ata Atay (Universitat de Barcelona)
    Abstract: Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. Their proof makes use of some graph-theoretical tools, while the present proof relies on the notion of buyer-seller exact representative in Núñez and Rafels (2002).
    Keywords: Assignment game, core, stability, von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set.
    JEL: C71 C78
    Date: 2016
  14. By: Hiroki Nishimura (Department of Economics, University of California Riverside); Efe A. Ok; John K.-H. Quah
    Date: 2016–10
  15. By: Fusari, Angelo i
    Abstract: This essay provides a preliminary assessment of the transition from the 1929 crisis (and its solution) to the 2008 crisis. It points out how the modalities of the solution of the first crisis have paved the way for the recent crisis. The paper hangs the description and explanation of the whole process on a combination of the notions of business cycles and phases of development, a combination that allows the representation and explanation of the successive and various patterns of capitalism across the considered historical period. Thereafter we underline, mainly using the notion of functional imperatives, the important institutional transformations required in the passage from one type of capitalism to another, and the destabilizing effects that have resulted from the absence of those transformations in the wake of the emergence of conflictualconsumeristic capitalism and financial capitalism. On this analytical basis, we ground the widening of the recent crisis, showing a growing menace of long-term stagnation, contradictions and conflicts. Finally, the paper delineates some institutional reforms essential to overcoming the structural deficiencies inherited by conflictual-consumeristic capitalism and the dawning and no less damaging drawbacks that are being prepared by financial capitalism
    Keywords: Business cycles; Phases of development; The present failure of demand models; The question of money; Oganization of financial markets; Separation principle
    JEL: A1 E5 E6 E60 O3 P50
    Date: 2015
  16. By: Clarisse Vermes (CORHIS - COmmunication, Ressources Humaines et Intervention Sociale - UM3 - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - UPVD - Université de Perpignan Via Domitia, MRM - Montpellier Research in Management - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UM2 - Université Montpellier 2 - Sciences et Techniques - UPVD - Université de Perpignan Via Domitia - Université Paul Valéry - Montpellier III - Groupe Sup de Co Montpellier (GSCM) - Montpellier Business School)
    Abstract: This communication shows how operationalizing the theory of Economies of Worth (Boltanski and Thevenot, 1991) to study how people judge the legitimacy of an action. This methodological approach would, in our view, be appropriate to the quantitative study of the relationship between judgments of the legitimacy of a situation, and commitments into action.
    Abstract: Cette communication montre comment a été opérationnalisée la théorie des Economies de la grandeur (Boltanski et Thévenot, 1991) pour étudier comment les individus jugent de la légitimité d'une action. Cette approche méthodologique serait, selon nous, adaptée à l'étude quantitative des liens entre jugements de la légitimité d'une situation, et engagements dans l'action.
    Keywords: Survey,data collection,quantitative analysis,Economies of Worth,scenario method,Enquête,collecte de données,étude quantitative,Economie de la grandeur,méthode des scénarios
    Date: 2015–06–02
  17. By: Jean-Pierre Chanteau (CREG - Centre de recherche en économie de Grenoble - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2)
    Abstract: Après avoir montré comment, historiquement, la régulation se définit d'abord comme un objet de recherche, et donc quel est le champ de la théorie de la régulation comme théorie, nous proposons de caractériser de façon positive le contenu d'une approche non-standard de cette théorie, que l'on propose de qualifier d'approche structuriste, intégrant les résultats d'autres sciences sociales plutôt que préservant l'illusion d'une autonomie disciplinaire de la science économique : cette proposition est structurée par une position ontologique (structurisme critique) et une position méthodologique (déconstruction du symbolique).
    Keywords: régulation , sciences sociales , théorie de la régulation , théorie économique
    Date: 2015–06–09
  18. By: Judit Ricz (Institute of World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences)
    Abstract: The financial and economic crisis of 2008-9 and the following difficulties have brought back the analysis of active state involvement in the economy to the research agenda of economists, and a new renaissance of developmental state (DS) approach can be observed. The aim of our paper is to draw up a new approach of DS in the twenty-first century by reviewing most recent literature. In our analysis we argue that to construct a new DS concept one has to break up with the historical and geographical limitation of the classic DS paradigm and the ideological debate around it. Meanwhile one has to build upon most recent results of new institutional, political and development economics’ analysis as well as the more than half century long experiences of classic DS. While presenting the structure and main elements of the new DS approach we aim to highlight those questions and areas of analysis, where consensus seems to emerge in literature.
    Keywords: developmental state, globalization, inclusive development
    JEL: F63 O20 P11
    Date: 2016–09
  19. By: Dario Debowizc; Alejandro Saporiti; Yizhi Wang
    Date: 2016
  20. By: Laura Gee; Michael Schreck
    Abstract: Charitable giving has been about 2% of US GDP since the turn of the century. A popular fundraising tool is donation matching where every dollar is matched by a third party. But field experiments find that matching does not always increase donations. This may occur because individuals believe that peer donors will exhaust the matching funds. We develop a theory of how beliefs about peers' donations affect one's own likelihood of donation. We test our theory using novel "threshold match" treatments in field and laboratory experiments. These treatments form small groups and offer a flat matching bonus if a threshold number of donations is received. One "threshold match" treatment more than doubles the donation rate in the field relative to no match. To better understand the mechanism behind this huge increase, we use a lab study to replicate the field results and further show that beliefs about peers' donations matter. Our theoretical, lab, and field results combined suggest people are more likely to donate when they believe they are more pivotal to securing matching money. Beliefs about others matter, and they should be taken into account when trying to increase donations.
    Date: 2016
  21. By: Ginafranco Tusset (University of Padova)
    Abstract: Is it possible to tell whether central banks’ choices are grounded on monetary theories or whether the theories derive from what central bankers have already experimented? This study delves into this issue by adopting an approach that is novel for at least two reasons. First, it involves a lexical comparison between the textual content used by central banks and in economic articles. Second, this comparison is drawn using quantitative tools. In short, the variables measured here are words and segments of text that were submitted to a statistical analysis to identify trends and behaviors in central bankers and economists that would otherwise not be immediately apparent.
    Keywords: Monetary forerunners, Central bankers’ speeches, Monetary approaches, Quantitative history of economic thought.
    JEL: B23 B59 E58
    Date: 2016–09
  22. By: Erixon, Lennart (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University)
    Abstract: The Swedish Rehn-Meidner model is a unique economic- and wage-policy program for the simultaneous achievement of full employment, price stability, growth and equality. This article presents, specifies and develops the model’s underlying macroeconomic theory. The Rehn-Meidner theory is a synthesis between a flex-price Kaldorian model of profit margins and a Kaleckian model where profit margins are squeezed under full-employment conditions. The theory deviates from both Kaldorian and Kaleckian models by stressing the importance of low profit margins for productivity growth. The Rehn-Meidner theory and policy deserve a prominent place in macroeconomics even in the age of globalization and financialization. However, some weaknesses of the model make it necessary to modify the arguments for and partly the composition of its policy program.
    Keywords: Rehn-Meidner model; labor market policy; wage policy of solidarity; structural change; productivity growth; inflation
    JEL: E11 E12 E23 E24 E25 E31 E32 E62 F43
    Date: 2016–09–30
  23. By: José María Alonso-Meijide (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela); Mikel Alvarez-Mozos (Universitat de Barcelona); María Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro (Universidade de Vigo); Andrés Jiménez-Losada (Universitad de Sevilla)
    Abstract: In this paper we investigate some structural properties of the order on the set of embedded coalitions outlined in de Clippel and Serrano (2008). Besides, we characterize the scalars associated to the basis they proposed of the vector space of partition function form games.
    Keywords: embedded coalitions, lattice, partition function form games.
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2016
  24. By: Markwardt, Gunther; Seidel, André; Thum, Marcel
    Abstract: We have developed a computerized version of Charles Holt’s classical market game that can be used even in classes with a large audience. The Pit market game gives students intuitive access to the interaction of supply and demand in real-world markets. Even though trade can take place at non-uniform prices in the classroom game, the average price and the quantity traded are usually very close to the equilibrium values predicted by supply and demand curves. The classroom game can also be used for a lively discussion about the efficiency of markets or to show the consequences of taxes and regulatory interventions.
    Keywords: Pit Market,Market Game,Classroom Game,Economic Education,Supply and Demand,Pit Market,Angebot und Nachfrage,Marktspiel
    JEL: A22 C88 D01 D40
    Date: 2016

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