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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Robert Hassink, Huiwen Gong, Fabian Faller; Huiwen Gong,; Fabian Faller |
| Abstract: | Since the launch of new economic geography by Paul Krugman there have been intensive debates between geographical economists and economic geographers both about the ways they differ from each other as well as about potential complementarities. Overman’s (2004) provocative article, titled “can we learning anything from economic geography proper?” has been not very helpful in developing the latter. By responding to his core critiques we provide a much more positive answer to his question, do justice to economic geography and show more complementarities between geographical economics and economic geography. |
| Date: | 2016–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egu:wpaper:1622&r=hpe |
| By: | Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the robustness of Dutta and Sen's (2012) Theorem 1 to re-ductions in the strategy space of individuals in relation to preference announcements. Specifically, it considers the Saijo-type's (1988) simplification of Maskin's canonical mechanism, according to which each individual's strategy choice includes her own preference and those of her k ‘neighbor’ individuals. This paper refers to this type of mechanisms as q-mechanisms where q = k + 1. A partially-honest individual is an individual who strictly prefers to tell the truth whenever lying has no effect on her material well-being. When there is at least one partially-honest participant, it offers a necessary condition for Nash implementation by q-mechanisms, called partial-honesty monotonicity, and shows that in an independent domain of preferences that condition is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity. It also shows that the limitations imposed by Maskin monotonicity can be circumvented by a q-mechanism provided that there are at least n - q + 1 partially-honest participants. |
| Keywords: | Nash implementation, partial-honesty, non-connected honesty standards, independent domain, q-mechanisms |
| JEL: | C72 D71 D82 |
| Date: | 2016–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:hituec:651&r=hpe |
| By: | Anna Khmelnitskaya (St.Petersburg State University, Russia); Gerard van der Laan (VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands); Dolf Talman (Tilburg University, the Netherlands) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games the shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition amongst the players by taking into account the worths that can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does not take into account the role of the players when communication between players is restricted. Existing values for communication graph games as the Myerson value and the average tree solution only consider the worths of connected coalitions and respect only in this way the communication restrictions. They do not take into account the position of a player in the graph in the sense that, when the graph is connected, in the unanimity game on the grand coalition all players are treated equally and so players with a more central position in the graph get the same payoff as players that are not central. The two new values take into account the position of a player in the graph. The first one respects centrality, but not the communication abilities of any player. The second value reflects both centrality and the communication ability of each player. That implies that in unanimity games players that do not generate worth but are needed to connect worth generating players are treated as those latter players, and simultaneously players that are more central in the graph get bigger shares in the worth than players that are less central. For both values an axiomatic characterization is given on the class of connected cycle-free graph games. |
| Keywords: | cooperative game; Shapley value; communication graph; restricted cooperation; centrality |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2016–09–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20160070&r=hpe |
| By: | Gabriele Camera (Chapman University and University of Basel); Cary Deck (University of Arkansas and Chapman University); David Porter (Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | Does inequality affect a group’s cohesion and ability to prosper? Participants in laboratory economies played an indefinite sequence of helping games in random, anonymous pairs. A coin flip determined donor and recipient roles in each pair. This random shock ensured equality of opportunity but not of results, because earnings depended on realized shocks. We manipulated the ability to condition choices on this uncontrollable inequality source. In all treatments, uncertain ending supports multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria, including full cooperation. Theoretically, inequalities do not alter the incentives’ structure. Empirically, inequality disclosures altered conduct, weakened norms of mutual support and reduced efficiency. |
| Keywords: | experiments, indefinitely repeated games, social norms, social dilemmas |
| JEL: | C70 C90 D03 E02 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:16-18&r=hpe |
| By: | Richard N. Langlois (University of Connecticut) |
| Abstract: | This paper is a draft chapter from an ongoing book project I am calling The Corporation and the Twentieth Century. In The Visible Hand, Alfred Chandler explained the rise of the large vertically integrated corporation in the United States mostly in terms of forces of technology and economic geography. Institutions, including government policy, played a quite minor role. In my own attempt to explain the decline of the vertically integrated form in the late twentieth century, I stayed true to Chandler’s largely institution-free approach. This book will be an exercise in bringing institutions back in. It will argue that institutions, notably various forms of non-market controls imposed by the federal government, are a critical piece of the explanation of the rise and decline of the multi-unit enterprise in the U. S. Indeed, non-market controls, including those imposed in response to the dramatic events of the century, account in significant measure for the dominance of the Chandlerian corporation in the middle of the twentieth century. One important form of non-market control – though by no means the only form – has been antitrust policy. This chapter traces the history of antitrust and argues that, far from being a coherent attempt to address an actual economic problem of monopoly, the Sherman Antitrust Act emerged from the distributional political economy of the nineteenth century. More importantly, the chapter argues that the form in which antitrust emerged would prove significant for the corporation, as the Sherman Act and its successors outlawed virtually all types of inter-firm coordinating mechanisms, thus effectively evacuating the space between anonymous market transactions and full integration. |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2016-07&r=hpe |
| By: | Debin Ma; Weipeng Yuan |
| Abstract: | The Tong Taisheng (统泰升) merchant account books in Ningjin county of northern China in 1800-1850 constitute the most complete and integrated surviving archive of a family business for pre-modern China. They contain unusually detailed and high-quality statistics on exchange rates, commodity prices and other information. Utilized once in the 1950s, the archive has been left largely untouched until our recent, almost accidental rediscovery. This article introduces this unique set of archives and traces the personal history of the original owner and donor. Our story of an archive encapsulates the history of modern China and how the preservation and interpretation of evidence and records of Chinese economic statistics were profoundly impacted by the development of political ideology and in modern and contemporary China. We briefly discuss the historiographical and epistemological implication of our finding in the current Great Divergence debate. |
| Keywords: | Tong Taisheng; Ningjin; Rong Mengyuan; merchant account books; economic statistics. |
| JEL: | C1 N0 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:67552&r=hpe |
| By: | Gharyeni, Abdellatif |
| Abstract: | The role of the minimum wage as « standard indicator » of public employment policies made a lot of controversy in the literature. The last few years, the issue renewed interest in the distributions offset angle, widening inequality gap and the emergence of insecurity in the workplace. Interpretations diverge and converge between the neoclassical orthodoxy and other schools of thought. We spend in literature review the effects of minimum wages on employment. Our review indicates that there is a lack of consensus on the overall effects of a minimum wage fixing. The competitive model usually provides negative effects. However, we noticed very little evidence is convincing. The dominant theory showed many flaws in its strength and relevance. Moreover, recent approaches fail to support the conclusion that the minimum wage negatively affects the level and quality of employment. The majority of the models discussed in this document provide strong evidence on the positive effects of the minimum wage. The competitive model seems well offset the reality of the employment system and wage relationship. |
| Keywords: | History of economic, minimum wage, labor management relations, working conditions, human resources, public employment policy |
| JEL: | B31 J2 J24 J31 J68 J81 |
| Date: | 2015–12–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:73499&r=hpe |
| By: | Martin Binder (Bard College Berlin); Guido Buenstorf (University of Kassel) |
| Abstract: | A robust relationship between subjective well-being and mortality has been established in the literature. While this relationship has been confirmed for many measures and data sets, few studies address how it is affected by concrete diseases. In this paper we assess for the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data set from 1991-2008 how life satisfaction interacts with twelve concrete health impairments. Specifically, we analyze whether subjective well-being predicts longer survival in the panel for individuals having the respective impairments. We find that cancer, chest pains and diabetes consistently decrease survival in our sample, even controlling for the severity of health problems. But our results cast doubt on strong claims for the benefits of well-being on mortality: while life satisfaction generally predicts longer survival in the data set, this finding is not robust to controlling for the endogeneity of subjective well-being, and we do not find significant interactions between substantive health impairments and life satisfaction. Higher subjective well-being may keep you healthy, but once you have gotten sick, it does not predict your survival. |
| Keywords: | subjective well-being, health, survival analysis, longevity, BHPS, life satisfaction |
| JEL: | I31 I12 C41 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201633&r=hpe |
| By: | Asheim, Geir B. (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the view that a criterion of intergenerational equity serves to make choices according to ethical intuitions on a domain of relevant technological environments. In line with this view I first calibrate different criteria of intergenerational equity in the AK model of economic growth, with a given Productivity parameter A, and then evaluate their performance by mapping the consequences of the criteria in various technological environments. The evaluation is based on the extent to which they yield social choice mappings satisfying four desirable properties. The Calvo criterion as well as sustainable discounted utilitarianism and rank-discounted utilitarianism yield sustainable growth in the AK model, the Ramsey technology and the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz technology for any specifications of these technological environments. |
| Keywords: | Intergenerational; Equity; |
| JEL: | D63 D71 O41 Q01 |
| Date: | 2016–04–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:osloec:2016_007&r=hpe |
| By: | van Dalen, Harry (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management) |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiutis:3ca19848-06c3-4a70-8a04-0f88604aa08c&r=hpe |
| By: | Khmelnitskaya, A.; van der Laan, G.; Talman, Dolf (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games the shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition amongst the players by taking into account the worths that can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does not take into account the role of the players when communication between players is restricted. Existing values for communication graph games as the Myerson value and the average tree solution only consider the worths of connected coalitions and respect only in this way the communication restrictions. The two values take into account the position of a player in the graph. The rst one respects centrality, but not the communication abilities of any player. The second value reflects both centrality and the commu- nication ability of each player. That implies that in unanimity games players that do not generate worth but are needed to connect worth generating players are treated as those latter players, and simultaneously players that are more central in the graph get bigger shares in the worth than players that are less central. For both values an axiomatic characterization is given on the class of connected cycle-free graph games. |
| Keywords: | cooperative game; Shapley value; communication graph; restricted cooperation; Centrality |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:f449b907-5e19-4702-b48e-a1c812747507&r=hpe |
| By: | Veneziani, Roberto; Yoshihara, Naoki |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the normative and positive foundations of the theory of exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour (UEL). The key intuitions behind all of the main approaches to UEL exploitation are explicitly analysed as a series of formal claims in a general economic environment. It is then argued that these intuitions can be captured by one fundamental axiom - called Labour Exploitation - which defines the basic domain of all UEL exploitation forms and identifies the formal and theoretical framework for the analysis of the appropriate definition of exploitation. |
| Keywords: | Exploitation, Unequal Exchange of Labour, axiomatic analysis |
| Date: | 2016–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:hituec:652&r=hpe |
| By: | Hoel, Michael (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo) |
| Abstract: | This note gives a brief, non-rigorous sketch of basic optimal control theory, which is a useful tool in several simple economic problems,such as those in resource and environmental economics. While the mathematical analysis in the note is self-contained, there is not much explanation and intuition on the economic issues. The note should therefore be read together with articles or books that give more discussion of the economics of the problems considered. |
| Keywords: | optimal control theory; exhaustible Resources; renewable Resources; climate change; water management |
| JEL: | C61 Q20 Q30 Q50 |
| Date: | 2016–08–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:osloec:2016_008&r=hpe |