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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Philip Mirowski (University of Notre Dame) |
| Abstract: | Why do so many people who should know better argue that Neoliberalism 'does not exist'? In this paper I examine the disinclination to treat the Neoliberal political project as a serious intellectual project motivating a series of successes in the public sphere. Economists seem especially remiss in this regard. |
| Keywords: | Neoliberalism, Angus Burgin, Leo Strauss, Friedrich Hayek, Mont Pelerin, classical liberalism. |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:thk:wpaper:23&r=hpe |
| By: | Loukas Balafoutas; Helena Fornwagner |
| Abstract: | Guilt aversion has been put forward in recent years as a prominent motivation for certain aspects of human behavior. When agents are guilt averse, their utility depends on what they believe others expect of them and they suffer a cost whenever they fall short of those expectations. In this paper we suggest that there may be limits to this kind of motivation. We present evidence from a dictator game showing that dictators display behavior consistent with guilt aversion for relatively low levels of recipient expectations, roughly up to the point where the recipient expects half of the available surplus. Beyond that point the relationship between expectations and transfers becomes negative. We argue that this non-monotonicity can help explain why the economic literature on guilt aversion offers conflicting findings on the relationship between expectations and behavior. Moreover, we examine this relationship at the individual level and establish a typology of subjects depending on how and whether they condition their behavior on recipient expectations. Our evidence is consistent with a simple theoretical model of guilt aversion. |
| Keywords: | guilt aversion, greed, experiment, strategy method |
| JEL: | C91 D03 |
| Date: | 2016–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2016-09&r=hpe |
| By: | Bigsten, Arne (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | This paper discusses the historical roots of development economics and how it has changed over the last half century. We first identify the most important changes in orientation within development economics and discuss whether there are important areas that have been side-lined. Then we look at current work in development economics and discuss where the field should go in the future. |
| Keywords: | development economics; review; methodology |
| JEL: | B12 O11 O12 O13 O14 O15 O16 O17 O18 O19 |
| Date: | 2016–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0653&r=hpe |
| By: | Antonelli, Cristiano; David, Paul (University of Turin) |
| Date: | 2015–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:labeco:201509&r=hpe |
| By: | Rawadee Jarungrattapong (Thailand Development Research Institute); Suparee Boonmanunt (Faculty of Environment and Resource Studies, Mahidol University) |
| Keywords: | Altruism,Cooperation,Trust,Behavior, Thailand |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eep:report:rr20160332&r=hpe |
| By: | Dominique, C-Rene |
| Abstract: | A modern market economy is an exceedingly complex, infinite-dimensional, stochastic dynamical system. The failure of mainstream economists to characterize its dynamics may well be due to its intractability. This paper argues that the characterization of its dynamics becomes almost trivial when it is analyzed from the perspective of information production. Whether its Jacobian matrix is specifiable or not, a Lyapunov spectrum can be constructed from which the potential Kolmogorov-Sinai or Shannon entropy can be assessed. But, a self-organized equilibrium must first obtain, and for that a suitable policy must be operational. |
| Keywords: | Complexity, Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy, Shannon entropy, Lyapunov spectrum, Lyapunov dimension, Efficient policy, Self-organized equilibrium. |
| JEL: | B4 B41 C6 C61 |
| Date: | 2016–04–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:70725&r=hpe |
| By: | Morgen Witzel (Centre for Leadership, Department of Management, University of Exeter); Malcolm Warner (Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge) |
| Abstract: | In this article, we look at the role of culture, management theory and paradigm-shift vis a vis their implications for general management. We focus in depth on the influence of the European Enlightenment on eighteenth and nineteenth century industrialism and the emergence of a possibly dominant paradigm in management theory in the twentieth century, namely 'Scientific Management' or 'Taylorism', as it became known. We also examine how, in turn, it shaped the next development in the narrative - 'Human Relations' - and its successors 'Organizational Behaviour' and 'Human Resource Management'. |
| Keywords: | culture, enlightenment, general management, management theory, paradigm shift, scientific management, Taylorism |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jbs:wpaper:201501&r=hpe |
| By: | Jost Halfmann (TU Dresden, Institute of Sociology) |
| Abstract: | Populist movements are abound in Europe: since the 1990s such movements and parties as Podemos in Spain, the Lega Nord in Italy, the UKIP in England or the Front National in France sprang up and attracted substantial numbers of voters and followers over time. Populist movemements and parties claim to speak for the people, they oppose elites in politics and economy and large associations and demand direct democracy. The thesis of the paper is that these movements and parties protest against the perceived erosion of the political status of the people as the legitimate constituent of democratic rule. According to populist views, political and social elites violate the obligation of the implicit contract between elites and the people to pursue the common good of the people in exchange for the people's loyalty to political rule. This loyalty appears to be challengd by perceived corruption, fatal governmental decisions and actions risking the wealth and the security of the nation, among which immigration politics rank highly. Immigration violates this contract because, as populists see it, only the people (that is: the legal and legitimate members of a constituency) should profit from the provisions of the state (welfare, safety, public order). The paper will illustrate this thesis by comparing selected populist movements and parties and reflect on the possible consequences of populism for representative democracy. |
| Keywords: | populism, protest, common good, immigration |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iacpro:3506108&r=hpe |