|
on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Karla Hoff; Joseph E. Stiglitz |
| Abstract: | This paper is an attempt to broaden the standard economic discourse by importing insights into human behavior not just from psychology, but also from sociology and anthropology. Whereas the concept of the decision-maker is the rational actor in standard economics and, in early work in behavioral economics, the quasi-rational actor influenced by the context of the moment of decision-making, in some recent work in behavioral economics the decision-maker could be called the enculturated actor. This actor's preferences and cognition are subject to two deep social influences: (a) the social contexts to which he has become exposed and, especially accustomed; and (b) the cultural mental models—including categories, identities, narratives, and worldviews—that he uses to process information. We trace how these factors shape individual behavior through the endogenous determination of both preferences and the lenses through which individuals see the world—their perception, categorization, and interpretation of situations. We offer a tentative taxonomy of the social determinants of behavior and describe results of controlled and natural experiments that only a broader view of the social determinants of behavior can plausibly explain. The perspective suggests new tools to promote well-being and economic development. |
| JEL: | A12 D00 D01 D03 D20 D50 Z13 |
| Date: | 2015–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21823&r=hpe |
| By: | Erkan Gurpinar; Altug Yalcintas |
| Abstract: | In this article, we explain in terms of evolutionary ontology whether (and to what extent) economics has become an evolutionary science since Veblen published his seminal paper in 1898, “Why is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?” We argue that researchers’ habitual and ceremonial behavior as well as ideologies and non-intellectual beliefs cause inertia in the research environment. Inertia caused by the research environment is so significant that economics does not “progress” towards a state advocated by Veblen, where economists revisit their thoughts and change their minds by following the (evolutionary) “drift.” In essence, we stress the evolutionary ontological reasons why economists do not abandon theories when the dominant paradigm in economics is disputed. The “drift” which Veblen thought would turn economics into an evolutionary science has now become an evolutionary process itself, in which economists are unable to displace non-evolutionary preconceptions in economics. |
| Keywords: | Evolutionary ontology, Intellectual path dependence, Intellectual inertia, Epistemic costs, Habits of thought |
| JEL: | B15 B41 B52 |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hpo:wpaper:2_2015&r=hpe |
| By: | Antoinette BAUJARD (University of Lyon, UJM, GATE L-SE (UMR CNRS 5824), France); Muriel GILARDONE (Normandie University, University of Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM (UMR CNRS 6211), France) |
| Abstract: | According to the standard reading, Sen’s contribution to justice consists in the defense of a capability theory, i.e. of a simple switch of focus from utility to capability. This paper aims to undermine this standard reading. We claim that this capability-theory view amounts to the application of formal welfarism to capabilities: social welfare is the aggregation of individual welfares, where welfare is properly defined by capabilities. We show that this view is inconsistent with Sen’s idea of justice, because the latter requires agents to be involved in the definition of what should count for the evaluation of social states, and how it should count. The value attributed to agency in Sen’s idea of justice is such that the process of choosing better policies trumps the substantive definition of what welfare should be. We defend instead a heuristic account of the status of capability in Sen’s thought: capability was introduced to make a point against welfarism; it is an argumentative step that does not imply a definitive commitment to a capability theory. We conclude that a fruitful discussion of his alternative theory of justice requires that we relocate his main contribution: we should see it as pertaining to a theory of public reasoning, not a theory based on a specific material of justice. |
| Keywords: | Capability, capability theory, welfarism, justice, operationalization, paternalism, agency, public reasoning |
| JEL: | A13 B41 D63 D79 I31 |
| Date: | 2015–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cccrwp:2015-02-ccr&r=hpe |
| By: | Maria Cristina Marcuzzo; Giulia Zacchia |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a quantitative investigation into the history of economic thought. Building on previous work (Marcuzzo 2008, 2012), we propose an empirical study in with the aim of describing the dynamics of changes in HET in recent years, detecting three trends: 1) a sort of ‘stepping down from the shoulders of giants’, namely a move towards studies of ‘minor’ figures and/or economists from a more recent past; 2) the blossoming of archival research into unpublished work and correspondence; 3) less theory-laden investigations, connecting intellectual circles, linking characters and events. Using data from Econlit we show the evolution of HET journals and articles for two sub-periods: 1955-2013 and 1993-2013; for the latter, by devising proxies which are amenable to quantitative assessment, we demonstrate that there is some evidence to support these claims. |
| Keywords: | History of economic thought; Bibliometrics; Economics journals; History of economics; Quantitative assessment |
| JEL: | B40 B20 A14 |
| Date: | 2015–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hpo:wpaper:4_2015&r=hpe |
| By: | Carlo Zappia |
| Abstract: | Even though Daniel Ellsberg’s 1961 article “Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms” is well-known and increasingly quoted in current decision theory, introducing the counterexample to Bayesian decision-making that got the normative value of Savage’s theory into trouble, its philosophical background remains totally unknown. This paper examines Ellsberg’s motivations in presenting his critique first to his fellow decision theorists at Harvard and RAND in the late 1950s and it goes into his reasons for giving a philosophical justification and defence of the paradox in his doctoral thesis of 1962. By concentrating mainly on Ellsberg’s all-encompassing analysis of decision-making in his thesis, the paper shows that a number of relevant issues connected to the paradox can be thrown light on. These range from its historical background to the way to test the normative value of decision theory through experiments, and a taxonomy of decision rules based on alternative probabilistic set-ups. Crucially, the paper argues that Ellsberg subscribed to a generalised version of the Bayesian approach, one that informs the developments of the multiple prior approach in current decision theory, but finds its origins in Keynes’s Treatise on Probability |
| Keywords: | Ambiguity, Ellsberg Paradox, decision theory |
| JEL: | B21 D21 |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:wpaper:716&r=hpe |
| By: | Roos, Michael W. M. |
| Abstract: | Macroeconomics must take radical uncertainty into account, if it aims at contributing to the solution of serious real-world problems such as climate change. Allowing for radical uncertainty must happen at two levels: the level of modeling and the level of the scientifi c discipline. I argue that the complexity approach which sees the economy as a complex adaptive system is better suited to deal with radical uncertainty than the mainstream DSGE approach. I review a number of agent-based models that are promising starting points to incorporate radical uncertainty into macroeconomics. Discussing the examples of the fi nancial crisis and climate change, I establish why methodological monism is dangerous and why macroeconomics needs more pluralism and openness towards other scientifi c approaches. Radical uncertainty and the complexity approach have important implications for macroeconomic policy and the advice that economists can give to policy makers. Under radical uncertainty it does not make sense to look for optimal policies. |
| Abstract: | Die Makroökonomik muss radikale Unsicherheit berücksichtigen, wenn sie zur Lösung ernster realer Probleme wie dem Klimawandel beitragen will. Die Berücksichtigung von radikaler Unsicherheit muss auf zwei Ebenen erfolgen: der Modellierungsebene und der Ebene der wissenschaftlichen Disziplin. Ich argumentiere in diesem Papier, dass der Komplexitätsansatz, der die Wirtschaft als komplexes adaptives System versteht, besser dafür geeignet ist, mit radikaler Unsicherheit umzugehen, als der DSGE-Ansatz der Mainstream-Makroökonomik. Es folgt ein Überblick über eine Reihe von agentenbasierten Modellen, die ein vielversprechender Startpunkt sind, um radikale Unsicherheit in die Makroökonomik einzubeziehen. Durch eine Diskussion der Finanzkrise und des Klimawandels zeige ich, warum methodologischer Monismus gefährlich ist und weshalb die Makroökonomik mehr Pluralismus und Offenheit gegenüber anderen wissenschaftlichen Ansätzen benötigt. Radikale Unsicherheit und der Komplexitätsansatz haben wichtige Implikationen für die makroökonomische Politik und die Empfehlungen, die Ökonomen politischen Entscheidungsträgern geben können. Unter radikaler Unsicherheit ist es nicht sinnvoll, nach optimalen Politiken zu suchen. |
| Keywords: | complexity economics,agent-based modeling,complex adaptive systems,non-linear dynamics,climate change,pluralism |
| JEL: | B41 B52 B59 C63 E12 E60 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:rwirep:592&r=hpe |
| By: | Allan H. Meltzer |
| Abstract: | This paper discusses the contributions of Karl Brunner and the enormous influence of his insights and analysis. It considers his work on economic policy--and monetary policy in particular--as well as his ideas for broadening the utility maximizing hypothesis of textbooks by describing how individuals search and grope as they confront incomplete information and uncertainty. It shows how, early on, he highlighted information, institutions and uncertainty as well as the importance of microanalysis in macroeconomics. Karl Brunner explained that nominal monetary impulses changed real variables by changing the relative price of assets to output prices. And he concluded that economic fluctuations occurred because of an unstable public sector—especially the monetary sector—that disturbs a more stable private sector, a policy lesson forgotten or never learned by many central banks. |
| Date: | 2015–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hoo:wpaper:15116&r=hpe |
| By: | AMENDOLA, Adalgiso (CELPE - Centre of Labour Economics and Economic Policy, University of Salerno - Italy); DELL'ANNO, Roberto (CELPE - Centre of Labour Economics and Economic Policy, University of Salerno - Italy); PARISI, Lavinia (CELPE - Centre of Labour Economics and Economic Policy, University of Salerno - Italy) |
| Abstract: | Absolute and relative levels of income as well as income inequality are regarded as determinants of individual happiness. The paper proposes a novel set of multidimensional indexes to control for the effect of the main dimensions of relative deprivation on happiness. We decompose the overall distribution of income into “between” and “within” reference groups with respect to inequality finding that inequality between reference groups does not affect happiness and that within group inequality negatively affects individual happiness. We interpret these results as an extension of social comparison theory and a validation of the hypothesis that people perceive the income of their reference group in terms of their own future prospects. The analysis is based on the European Quality of Life Survey. |
| Keywords: | Happiness; Subjective well-Being; Life satisfaction; Inequality; Deprivation; Multidimensional index; Reference groups; Social comparison theory |
| JEL: | D63 I31 I32 |
| Date: | 2015–12–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sal:celpdp:0136&r=hpe |
| By: | Ernesto Screpanti |
| Abstract: | Marx develops two different theories of the employment relationship: in one it results from a contract for the sale of a commodity, in the other from a contract establishing a social relationship. According to the first, the worker sells a commodity, which is conceived as a flow of abstract labour springing from a stock of labour power. This commodity seems to be a ‘natural’ abstraction with the properties of a productive force. Exploitation occurs when the value of labour power is lower than the value-creating capacity of abstract labour. According to the second theory, the employment relationship is based on a transaction establishing the conditions for the worker’s subordination to the capitalist and the subsumption of his productive capacity under capital. This is an illuminating anticipation of the modern theory which considers the employment contract as an institution generating an authority relationship. It is not liable to criticisms of essentialism, hyposta-tization or naturalism and is able to sustain a consistent and realistic theory of exploitation, which explains it as being based on the power relationship the worker undergoes in the production pro-cess. Now abstract labour is seen not as a productive force, but as a social relationship, and is con-sidered an abstraction that is real in a socio-historical sense rather than in a natural sense |
| JEL: | B14 B24 J41 |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:wpaper:720&r=hpe |
| By: | Levrero, Enrico Sergio |
| Abstract: | This paper examines Friedman’s writings in the years 1941-1943 and compares them with those after the war with a view to assessing differences and similarities. Albeit a first assessment, Friedman’s “Keynesian illness” in his ‘Washington phase’ will appear to have been less ‘serious’ and deep than he himself feared. |
| Keywords: | Friedman; inflationary gap; price inflation; spending tax; quantity theory of money |
| JEL: | B22 B31 E31 E51 |
| Date: | 2015–12–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:68547&r=hpe |
| By: | Mckenzie,David J.; Paffhausen,Anna Luisa |
| Abstract: | This paper uses a combination of survey questions to instructors and data collected from course syllabi and examinations to examine how the subject of development economics is taught at the undergraduate and masters levels in developing countries, and benchmark this against undergraduate classes in the United States. The study finds that there is considerable heterogeneity in what is considered development economics: there is a narrow core of only a small set of topics such as growth theory, poverty and inequality, human capital, and institutions taught in at least half the classes, with substantial variation in other topics covered. In developing countries, development economics is taught largely as a theoretical subject coupled with case studies, with few courses emphasizing data or empirical methods and findings. This approach contrasts with the approach taken in leading U.S. economics departments and with the evolution of development economics research. The analysis finds that country income per capita, the role of the state in the economy, the education level in the country, and the involvement of the instructor in research are associated with how close a course is to the frontier. The results suggest there are important gaps in how development economics is taught. |
| Keywords: | Pro-Poor Growth,Economic Theory&Research,Labor Policies,Tertiary Education,Effective Schools and Teachers |
| Date: | 2015–12–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7521&r=hpe |
| By: | Peter Schmidt (University of Potsdam, August-Bebel-Strasse 89, 14482 Potsdam, Germany) |
| Abstract: | This paper reconsiders the explanation of economic policy from an evolutionary economics perspective. It contrasts the neoclassical equilibrium notions of market and government failure with the dominant evolutionary neo-Schumpeterian and Austrian Hayekian perceptions. Based on this comparison, the paper criticises the fact that neoclassical failure reasoning still prevails in non equilibrium evolutionary economics when economic policy issues are examined. This is more than surprising, since proponents of evolutionary economics usually view their approach as incompatible with its neoclassical counterpart. In addition, it is shown that this “fallacy of failure thinking†even finds its continuation in the alternative concept of “system failure†with which some evolutionary economists try to explain and legitimate policy interventions in local, regional or national innovation systems. The paper argues that in order to prevent the otherwise fruitful and more realistic evolutionary approach from undermining its own criticism of neoclassical economics and to create a consistent as well as objective evolutionary policy framework, it is necessary to eliminate the equilibrium spirit. Finally, the paper delivers an alternative evolutionary explanation of economic policy which is able to overcome the theory-immanent contradiction of the hitherto evolutionary view on this subject. |
| Keywords: | market failure, system failure, economic policy, policy advice, evolutionary economics, non equilibrium economics |
| JEL: | A11 B41 B52 H00 H53 O30 |
| Date: | 2015–12–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:evopap:2015-04&r=hpe |
| By: | Tsoulfidis, Lefteris |
| Abstract: | This paper argues that Keynes’s analysis of the marginal efficiency of capital is consistent with the principle of effective demand and is, in this sense, characteristically different from the related classical or neoclassical conceptualisations. Furthermore, the notion of the marginal efficiency of capital is used not only as an explanation of the short term fluctuations in the level of economic activity but also as an interpretation of more serious long term fluctuations such as that of the great depression. Finally, some of Keynes’s economic policy proposals are critically evaluated. |
| Keywords: | Marginal efficiency of capital, effective demand, great depression, interest rate, overinvestment |
| JEL: | B10 B12 B14 B51 E32 E4 E6 E65 N20 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:68539&r=hpe |
| By: | Daniel Mendonça, Araújo |
| Abstract: | The theme of economic development has always had an important role at the center of macroeconomic research, meanwhile microeconomic environment; uncertainty has its due prominence. However, few authors develop these issues jointly, although the uncertainty holds an important role in decision making of agents, and therefore the array of choices that determine the development of a country. This paper aims to examine how to establish the relationship between uncertainty and economic development, from the perspective proposed by Nobel 1993, Douglass North (05Nov1920 – 23Nov2015). Based on an analysis of the notion of uncertainty proposed by Knight in 1927, this paper advances to the contemporary notion developed by North. Then, through a breakdown of development theory proposed by North, will be discussed how the uncertainty is associated with each factor of development, aiming to demonstrate the critical role played by the control of Uncertainty in development or decline a country. |
| Keywords: | Development; Douglass North; Uncertainty; Economic Transition |
| JEL: | B15 B4 B52 K2 O1 O11 O17 O31 O34 O38 O43 O44 P14 Z13 |
| Date: | 2015–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:68592&r=hpe |
| By: | Stefano Vannucci |
| Abstract: | La teoria dei giochi è l?area di ricerca matematica in cui i contributi di John Nash sono stati meno profondi ed allo stesso tempo hanno forse avuto a tutt?oggi l?impatto maggiore. Nel presente lavoro ci si propone di contribuire alla commemorazione di un grande ricercatore provando a spiegare questo apparente paradosso |
| JEL: | A12 C6 C7 |
| Date: | 2015–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:wpaper:722&r=hpe |
| By: | Moreno-Okuno, Alejandro |
| Abstract: | In this paper I argue that the concept of Sequential Reciprocity of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) doesn't take correctly into consideration the role of threats and promises and I develop a solution concept of reciprocity which I call Fair Threats Equilibrium, that I believe is better at evaluating the fairness of threats and promises. |
| Keywords: | Fairness, Threats, Promises, Game Theory |
| JEL: | D0 D01 D03 |
| Date: | 2015–12–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:68517&r=hpe |
| By: | M. Bigoni; G. Camera; M. Casari |
| Abstract: | This study reveals the existence of a causal link between the availability of money and an expanded scale of interaction. We constructed an experiment where participants chose the group size, either a low-value partnership or a high-value group of strangers, and then faced an intertemporal cooperative task. Theoretically, a monetary system was inessential to achieve cooperation. Empirically, without a working monetary system, participants were reluctant to expand the scale of interaction; and when they did, they ended up destroying surplus compared to partnerships, because cooperation collapsed in large groups. This economic failure was reversed only when participants managed to concurrently develop a stable monetary system. |
| JEL: | C70 C90 D80 |
| Date: | 2015–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp1045&r=hpe |
| By: | Simon Gaechter (Department of Economics, University of Nottingham.); Leonie Gerhards (Department of Economics, University of Hamburg); Daniele Nosenzo (Department of Economics, University of Nottingham.) |
| Abstract: | WA burgeoning literature in economics has started examining the role of social norms in explaining economic behavior. Surprisingly, the vast majority of this literature has studied social norms in asocial decision settings, where individuals are observed to act in isolation from each other. In this paper we use a large-scale dictator game experiment (N = 850) to show that the presence of “peers†in the decision setting faced by an individual can have a profound influence on the individual’s perception of the decision situation and its underlying norms of sharing, as elicited in an incentive compatible way. However, we find limited evidence that this influence of peers in normative considerations translates into a corresponding effect in actual behavior. Partly, this is due to substantial heterogeneity in the extent to which dictators in our sample are willing to comply with norms of fair sharing. |
| Keywords: | social norms, norm compliance, peer effects, fair sharing, dictator game, framing, experiments |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2015-23&r=hpe |
| By: | Jean-Charles BRICONGNE |
| Keywords: | , awards , diff-in-diff methodology , iterative diff-in-diff , John Bates Clark Medal , productivity |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:leo:wpaper:2295&r=hpe |
| By: | Dominik Grafenhofer (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Wolfgang Kuhle (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private information on the game's payoff structure. In addition, agents receive private signals that inform them of each other's private information. We show that once agents possess these different types of information, there exists a coordination game in the evaluation of this information. Even though the precisions of both signal types is exogenous, the precision with which agents forecast each other's actions in equilibrium turns out to be endogenous. As a consequence, there exist multiple equilibria which differ with regard to the way that agents weight their private information to forecast each other's actions. Finally, even though all players' signals are of identical quality, it turns out that efficient equilibria are asymmetric. |
| Keywords: | Coordination Games, Equilibrium Selection, Primary Signals, Secondary Signals |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2015_18&r=hpe |
| By: | Martin Hellwig (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Der Aufsatz diskutiert die Rolle der Wirtschaftswissenschaft in der politischen oder juristischen Diskussion über den Umgang mit ökonomischen Sachverhalten und Zusammenhängen. Die Künstlichkeit der in theoretischen Modellen oder Laborexperimenten untersuchten Welten wirft die Frage nach dem Geltungsanspruch der in diesen Kunstwelten gewonnenen Aussagen für solche Diskussionen auf. In der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Praxis wird diese Frage zu wenig untersucht. Das bietet Spielraum für Ideologien und Vorurteile, die in die Konstruktion der Kunstwelten eingehen und bei der Politikberatung nicht hinterfragt werden. Das ideologische Element wird noch verstärkt durch den Effizienzbias eines Forschungsprogramms, das empirische Beobachtungen als „Lösungen“ zu etwaigen Informations- und Anreizproblemen „erklärt“. Analysen der Robustheit der gewonnenen Erkenntnisse gegenüber Modifikationen der Annahmen sollten zum Standard der Grundlagenforschung gehören, ferner auch Analysen der Konkurrenz alternativer „Erklärungsansätze“. Darüber hinaus benötigen wir eine professionelle Routine für die Anwendung von Erkenntnissen der Grundlagenforschung auf konkrete Sachverhalte und Probleme. Beispiele zeigen, dass der prognostische Gehalt solcher Analysen sehr groß sein kann, wenn man genau darauf achtet, dass die Kunstwelten, theoretische Modelle oder Laborexperimente, auf deren Aussagen man sich stützt, auch jeweils die wesentlichen Details des Falls erfassen. Die Entscheidung, welche Modelle oder Laborexperimente jeweils „passen“, ist der wichtigste Schritt bei der Anwendung wirtschaftswissenschaftllicher Erkenntnisse in der Praxis. |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2015_17&r=hpe |
| By: | Schniter, Eric; Sheremeta, Roman; Shields, Timothy |
| Abstract: | Many economic interactions are characterized by “all-or-nothing” action spaces that may limit the demonstrability of intended trust. We investigate whether restricting investment opportunities to all-or-nothing options affects the investment rate and propensity to reciprocate. We do this by manipulating the investor’s action space in two versions of the trust game. In the all-or-nothing game the investor can invest either $10 (all) or $0 (nothing), while in the continuous game the investor can invest any amount between $10 and $0. In both games, the trustee receives the tripled investment and then can return any amount to the investor. Results indicate that investments are higher in the all-or-nothing game than in the continuous game. However, higher investments in the all-or-nothing game do not lead to higher returns. To the contrary, conditional on $10 investments, on average trustees return less in the all-or-nothing game. Although the all-or-nothing action space results in greater wealth overall, it also appears to “backfire” for investors who do not benefit from the increased wealth. These results support the proposition that humans perceive intentions not only by evaluating what others do but also by evaluating what others choose not to do. |
| Keywords: | trust game, demonstrability, intentions, reciprocity, experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2015–12–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:68561&r=hpe |
| By: | Deaton, Angus (Nobel Prize Committee) |
| Abstract: | Angus Deaton answers the age-old question in this interview from the Nobel Banquet in Stockholm on 10 December 2015. |
| Keywords: | Consumption; Development |
| JEL: | D10 O10 |
| Date: | 2015–12–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:nobelp:2015_004&r=hpe |
| By: | Francisco Rosende |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ioe:doctra:457&r=hpe |
| By: | Lacaze, María Victoria; Franco, N. Graciela; Nuñez Fioramonti, Gustavo Christian |
| Abstract: | Las instituciones universitarias ponen de manifiesto, en los currícula, la concepción del tipo de hombre, de ciudadano, de científico y de profesional que quieren formar. El presente trabajo reflexiona acerca de la estructura curricular de la carrera de Licenciado en Economía que se dicta en la FCEyS-UNMDP. Guió la investigación el siguiente interrogante: ¿qué contenidos enseñamos a nuestros estudiantes a lo largo de su carrera, en relación al Estado como actor social que cumple diversas funciones en una economía de mercado? Pensando al currículo como portavoz de una función social, pero a la vez como la expresión formal y material de un proyecto que, a la luz de nuestras experiencias, propone ciertas secuencias de abordaje de contenidos, dieron forma al trabajo otras inquietudes vinculadas al cumplimiento del principio de gradualidad en la formación, al rol del currículo oculto y a la necesidad de explicitarnos qué contenidos, valores, habilidades, aptitudes, formas de pensar y resolver problemas de la profesión transmitimos a nuestros estudiantes. Dado que la disciplina y la profesión tienen lógicas fuertemente distintas, el trabajo propone explorar el sentido de la formación, dando significado a nuestras prácticas docentes, contrastando nuestro currículo en acción con las competencias que queremos tengan nuestros graduados. |
| Keywords: | Enseñanza de la Economía; Currícula; Planes de Estudio; |
| Date: | 2015–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nmp:nuland:2413&r=hpe |