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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Fernando Salazar Silva; Alba Liliana Cuaspud Cáliz |
| Abstract: | El presente artículo contiene una reflexión que no pretende reproducir con fidelidad las ideas de Smith y Hayek, por el contrario intenta hacer una aproximación para poder comprender su contribución al tema de los precios desde la filosofía moral. Se sostiene tanto que Smith como Hayek, deben ser abordados como tutores del principio de la libertad individual, condición realista para acercar los mercados morales y los mercados económicos y desde aquí conocer el sistema de precios. |
| Keywords: | Libertad; precios; individualismo; moral; instituciones. |
| JEL: | B3 B4 N01 |
| Date: | 2015–09–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000418:014142&r=hpe |
| By: | Francesco Sergi (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this contribution to the epistemology and history of recent macroeconomics is to construct a clear understanding of econometric methods and problems in New Classical mecroeconomics. Most historical work have focused so far on theoretical or policy implication aspects of this research program set in motion by Robert Lucas in the early seventies. On the contrary, the empirical and econometric works of New Classical macroeconomics have received little attention. I focus especially on the contributions gathered in Rational Expectations and Econometric Practice, edited in 1981 by Lucas and Thomas Sargent. The main claim of this article is that the publication of this book must be regarded as a turn in macroeconomics, that would bring macroeconometric modeling methodology closer to Lucas's conception of models. The analysis of the New Classical macroeconometrics through the Lucas methodology allow us to propose an original historical account of the methods presented in Rational Expectations and Econometric Practice, but also of the problems that flawed this approach |
| Keywords: | history of macroeconomics; Lucas (Robert); Sargent (Thomas); macroeconometrics; modeling methodology |
| JEL: | B22 B41 |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:15088&r=hpe |
| By: | Kevin Hjortshøj O’Rourke |
| Abstract: | This is a revised version of the Keynes Lecture, presented at the British Academy on October 7, 2015. I am extremely grateful to Mary Morgan who chaired that event, and to Roger Backhouse, Patrick O’Brien, Richard Portes, Morten Ravn, Hélène Rey, and Donald Winch, who attended the lecture and made many useful suggestions and comments. I particularly want to thank Morgan Kelly and Alan Taylor for many conversations on the subject of secular stagnation; and to Bob Allen, Charlie Bean, Paul Beaudry, Agustín Bénétrix, Steve Broadberry, Nick Crafts, Brad DeLong, Rui Esteves, Ron Findlay, Mike Gavin, Richard Grossman, Leander Heldring, Svend Hylleberg, Philip Lane, Jacob Madsen, Perry Mehrling, Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Cormac Ó Gráda, Thomas Piketty, Filipa Sa, Claus Vastrup, Karl Whelan, Jeff Williamson, and Nikolaus Wolf, for many useful comments, help with data, and advice. The usual disclaimer applies. |
| Date: | 2015–12–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nuf:esohwp:_139&r=hpe |
| By: | Kokkala, Juho; Poropudas, Jirka; Virtanen, Kai |
| Abstract: | Games with incomplete preferences are normal-form games where the preferences of the players are defined as partial orders over the outcomes of the game. We define rationality in these games as follows. A rational player forms a set-valued belief of possible strategies selected by the opponent(s) and selects a strategy that is not dominated with respect to this belief. Here, we say a strategy is dominated with respect to the set-valued belief if the player has another strategy that would yield a better outcome according to the player's preference relation, no matter which strategy combination the opponent(s) play among those contained in the belief. We define rationalizable strategies as the logical implication of common knowledge of this rationality. We show that the sets of rationalizable strategies are the maximal mutually nondominated sets, i.e., the maximal sets that contain no dominated strategies with respect to each other. We show that no new rationalizable strategies appear when additional preference information is included. We consider multicriteria games as a special case of games with incomplete preferences and introduce a way of representing incomplete preference information in multicriteria games by sets of feasible weights of the criteria. |
| Keywords: | Normal-form games, incomplete preferences, rationalizable strategies, multicriteria games |
| JEL: | C72 |
| Date: | 2015–12–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:68331&r=hpe |
| By: | Islahi, Abdul Azim |
| Abstract: | Mufti Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), a graduate of Jāmiʿ al-Azhar, was harbinger and precursor of Islamic modernism. He attracted attention of maximum number of researchers on modernism in the Muslim world. His contributions to fiqh, tafsīr, tawḥīd, literature, educational reform and politics are well known. He also thought and wrote on economic problem. He is one of the pioneer ʿulamā in the modern period who paid attention to this aspect of human life. He had deep concern for the poor; he opposed bonded labor and stressed upon the obligations of the rich towards the poor. He pointed out that the concentration of wealth caused the lack of effective demand. He gave wide meaning to the term fi sabīl-Allāh and al-afwā. He permitted insurance on the basis of muḍārabah. However, this aspect of his biography remained neglected. Ironically, the only thing reported about his economic views is ‘his permission of interest earned from the deposits in post offices’ for which no evidence is available in his writings. The present paper discusses all these points. |
| Keywords: | Jamal al-Din Afghani, Economic History of Egypt, Muslim Economic Thinking in the Nineteenth Century, Abduh on Insurance, Post office interest. |
| JEL: | B3 B31 N0 Z1 Z12 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:68363&r=hpe |
| By: | Islahi, Abdu Azim |
| Abstract: | The present paper is an attempt to correct Timur Kuran on various issues related to the genesis of Islamic economics. It demonstrates that "Islamic economics" is not a product of twentieth century. The term may be new but its origins go back to early period of Islam. Its evolution up to the present state of a distinguished discipline can be divided into six distinct phases. The paper argues that the modern Islamic economics was never a sectarian subject. Nor was it developed for Muslims' identity and protection purpose. Scholars of different regions and of diverse affiliations promoted it and its propounders aimed at the well-being of all |
| Keywords: | Islamic Economic Thought, Muslim economic thinking, Phases of the development of Islamic economics, Timur Kuran |
| JEL: | B2 B20 B5 B51 N0 Z12 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:68367&r=hpe |
| By: | Claire Baldin (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Ludovic Ragni (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | This article assesses how the dynamic of Pareto’s social equilibrium is based on the principle of rupture of the Machiavellian moment. The article sets out this principle in terms of equilibrium between virtù and fortuna then assesses the study of the transposition of Pareto’s social equilibrium dynamic. It then assesses whether this analysis makes it possible to create a synthesis of the results that Pareto established in economics and sociology. Following the assessment of the method of the successive approximations used by Pareto, we show that the principle of rupture of the Machiavellian moment involves taking into consideration that the explanations of the social equilibrium dynamics rests on a law of trends and not on a law of what is always true. This problem leads to calling the synthesis of Pareto’s results into question. |
| Abstract: | Résumé : Cet article explique comment la dynamique de l'équilibre social chez Pareto repose sur le principe de rupture du moment machiavélien. Il resitue ce principe en termes d'équilibre entre virtù et fortuna puis en apprécie la transposition à l'étude de la dynamique de l'équilibre social parétien. Après avoir réévalué la méthode des approximations successives et de synthèse à laquelle Pareto recourt, nous montrons que le principe de rupture du moment machiavélien implique que l'explication de la dynamique sociale repose sur des lois tendancielles qui supposent de remettre en cause la synthèse des résultats de Pareto. Mots-clés : Pareto, Machiavel, méthodologie, histoire de la pensée économique. Pareto Elite Theory and Machiavelian Moment as Explanatory Principles of the Social Dynamics: the Limits of the Method of the Successive Approximations Summary: This article assesses how the dynamic of Pareto's social equilibrium is based on the principle of rupture of the Machiavellian moment. The article sets out this principle in terms of equilibrium between virtù and fortuna then assesses the study of the transposition of Pareto's social equilibrium dynamic. It then assesses whether this analysis makes it possible to create a synthesis of the results that Pareto established in economics and sociology. Following the assessment of the method of the successive approximations used by Pareto, we show that the principle of rupture of the Machiavellian moment involves taking into consideration that the explanations of the social equilibrium dynamics rests on a law of trends and not on a law of what is always true. This problem leads to calling the synthesis of Pareto's results into question. |
| Keywords: | Mathodology,History of Economic Thought,Pareto,Machiavelli,Methodology,Méthodologie,Histoire de la pensée économique |
| Date: | 2014–06–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01241318&r=hpe |
| By: | F. Delbono; L. Lambertini |
| Abstract: | We study a class of games featuring payo¤ functions being parabolic cylinders where best reply functions are orthogonal and therefore the pure-strategy non-cooperative solution is attained as a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. We prove that the resulting threshold of the discount factor above which implicit collusion on the Pareto frontier is stable in the in nite supergames is independent of the number of players. This holds irrespective of whether punishment is based on in nite Nash reversion or one-shot stick-and-carrot strategy. We outline two examples stemming from economic theory and one from international relations. |
| JEL: | C73 |
| Date: | 2015–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp1043&r=hpe |
| By: | David Hugh-Jones (University of East Anglia); Carlo Perroni (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | We examine why heterogeneous communities may fail to provide public goods. Current work characterizes sanctioning free-riders as an undersupplied public good. We argue that often free-riders can be punished by the coordinated action of a group. This punishment can be profitable, and need not be undersupplied. But the power to expropriate defectors can also be used to expropriate outgroups. Heterogeneous societies may be inefficient because minorities, rather than free-riders, are expropriated. Even if this is not so, groups' different beliefs about the reasons for expropriation may make the threat of punishment less effective at preventing free-riding. We illustrate our theory with evidence from California mining camps, contemporary India, and US schools. In a public goods experiment using minimal groups and a profitable punishment institution, outgroups were more likely to be punished, and reacted differently to punishment than ingroup members. |
| Keywords: | group coercion, social heterogeneity |
| JEL: | H1 H4 N4 D02 |
| Date: | 2015–04–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:ueaeco:2015_04&r=hpe |