|
on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Bruce Caldwell |
| Abstract: | The paper offers a revisionist account of certain episodes in the development of F. A. Hayek's thought. It offers a new reading of his 1937 paper, "Economics and Knowledge," that draws on unpublished lecture notes in which he articulated more fully the distinctions he made in the paper between a "pure logic of choice," or the economic calculus, and an "empirical element," which he would later call the competitive market order. Next, the paper shows that Hayek continued to try to develop his ideas about the role of the economic calculus through the 1950s and early 1960s, an effort that has been missed because it never led to any published work. Finally, the paper examines Hayek's attempt to articulate a theory of the market process, one that would be at the same level of generality as the economic calculus, in lectures he gave at the University of Virginia. He never developed a full-fledged formal theory, but his failed efforts still bore fruit in leading him to his contributions on spontaneous orders and the (verbal) theory of complex phenomena. This work anticipated contributions by others who were more technically trained. |
| Keywords: | F. A. Hayek; the economic calculus; market process; the pure logic of choice; the structure of economic theory; spontaneous orders |
| JEL: | B25 B31 B53 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:63266&r=all |
| By: | Ramirez, Miguel D. (Trinity College) |
| Abstract: | This paper argues that, in Chapters XXIX and XXX of Volume III of Capital, Marx develops an incisive conceptual framework in which excessive credit creation, indebtedness, and speculation play a critical and growing role in the reproduction of social capital on an extended basis; however, given the decentralized and anarchic nature of capitalist production, it does so in a highly erratic and contradictory manner which only postpones the inevitable day of reckoning. The paper also draws important parallels between Marx's analysis of debt-fuelled crises and the events leading up to the subprime debacle of 2007-08. Finally, the paper contends that had Marx lived to re-write Vols. II and III, he would have explicitly connected the expanding role of credit [which he associated with the development of capitalism] to a significant reduction in the turnover period of capital, thereby boosting the rate of surplus-value, and countering in a highly erratic and contradictory manner, the fall in the rate of profit. The growing role of credit has been ignored in the Marxian literature as an important counteracting factor to the law of the declining rate of profit. It is not mentioned at all by Marx in his famous Chp. XIV, Vol. III of Capital where he discusses other important counteracting forces, nor by Engels [in this particular context] who edited both Vols. II and III. |
| JEL: | B10 B14 B24 |
| Date: | 2014–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:yaleco:134&r=all |
| By: | Joseph E. Stiglitz |
| Abstract: | This paper, an extension of the Presidential Address to the International Economic Association, evaluates alternative strands of macro-economics in terms of the three basic questions posed by deep downturns: What is the source of large perturbations? How can we explain the magnitude of volatility? How do we explain persistence? The paper argues that while real business cycles and New Keynesian theories with nominal rigidities may help explain certain historical episodes, alternative strands of New Keynesian economics focusing on financial market imperfections, credit, and real rigidities provides a more convincing interpretation of deep downturns, such as the Great Depression and the Great Recession, giving a more plausible explanation of the origins of downturns, their depth and duration. Since excessive credit expansions have preceded many deep downturns, particularly important is an understanding of finance, the credit creation process and banking, which in a modern economy are markedly different from the way envisioned in more traditional models. |
| JEL: | D59 D90 E20 E21 E30 E32 E44 E49 E50 E52 E60 F41 G01 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21444&r=all |
| By: | Christophe Salvat (TRIANGLE - Triangle : action, discours, pensée politique et économique - CNRS - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon) |
| Abstract: | In this article I address the question of the moral legitimacy of paternalism. Paternalism is considered illegitimate a) when it acts under false pretenses to satisfy the interest of the paternalist agent, b) when it violates the individual autonomy of the people interfered with and c) when it does not respect the equality between people by singling out those who are deemed unable to decide for themselves. Over the last decade a new type of paternalism has emerged thanks to the groundbreaking works of some behavioral economists. This new type of paternalism, that I call here Behavioral Paternalism (BP), has become popular through Sunstein and Thaler's Nudges theory and challenges the view that paternalism is unacceptable today. The aim of this paper is to assess its moral legitimacy (not exclusively focusing on the autonomy proviso). The results of my investigation can be summarized as follows. Though BP is usually acknowledged for its 'libertarian' character, it does not satisfy the conditions of what is considered, since Feinberg, as 'soft paternalism'. Nevertheless, BP has a strong point that has been underestimated by its partisans: it withstands the equality argument. Unlike traditional forms of paternalism, BP is not demeaning and does not ostracize any category of people. Lastly, BP can be proved genuinely altruistic. This, however, demands that one abandons Sunstein and Thaler's main assumptions. |
| Date: | 2014–12–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00947142&r=all |
| By: | Mitri Kitti (Department of Economics, University of Turku) |
| Abstract: | Equilibrium payoffs corresponding to subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies are characterized for infinitely repeated games with discounted payoffs. The equilibrium payoff set of a game is a fixed-point of set-valued operators introduced in the paper. The new operator formalism is utilized in showing the folk theorem for repeated games with unequal but constant discount rates. When the players become more patient, the equilibrium payoff set converges to the fixed-point of an asymptotic operator. This limit set corresponds to the subgame perfect equilibria of a continuous-time repeated game. It is shown that the limit set is convex, which implies that pure strategies are sufficient in obtaining all payoffs in the limit. However, this set differs from the set of all feasible and individually rational payoffs, when the discount rates are not equal. The limit sets for constant discount rates can be used in analyzing the outer limit of equilibrium payoffs when the discount factors increase but discount rates are not fixed. |
| Keywords: | repeated game, equilibrium payoff set, folk theorem, unequal discount rates, continuous-time game |
| JEL: | C72 C73 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp98&r=all |
| By: | Tianhao Zhi (Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney) |
| Abstract: | The Modern Money Theory, originated from the seminal work of Knapp (1905) that established the “chartalism school of monetary theory” and later on, synthesized by so-called “neo-chartalists” such as Wray (2012), is a descriptive economic theory that examines the procedures and consequences of using government-issued tokens as the unit of money. Despite its high relevance in today's policy arena that demands a thorough understanding over the modern fiat monetary system, MMT is generally not well-received by mainstream academics due to some of its radical claims. In an experimental and preliminary manner, this paper proposes a set of disequilibrium models that aims to take a further investigation over the balance sheet effects of those transactions discussed by MMT from a dynamic perspective. We contend that some of the claims made by MMT are fallacious due to its omission of dynamic and behavioural aspects. The framework proposed in this paper would also be useful for future research from a dynamic MMT perspective. |
| Keywords: | Modern Money Theory (MMT); endogenous money; interbank market; fiscal policy; disequilibrium dynamics |
| JEL: | E12 E52 E62 G21 |
| Date: | 2015–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uts:wpaper:184&r=all |
| By: | Hamid Bouchikhi (Accounting / Management Control Department - Essec Business School); John R. Kimberly (University of Pennsylvania [Philadelphia]) |
| Abstract: | As of July 1, 2010, the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of the Holy Spirit (UHS) has a single Department of Economics. However, in the seven prior years, there were two economics departments, one that was resolutely mainstream and the other that was just as resolutely heterodox. What accounts for this unusual organizational arrangement? We show that this arrangement was part of a protracted conflict about the kind of economics that befits the Catholic identity of UHS that resulted, ultimately, in a full embrace of mainstream economics in July 2010. We draw on and amend Oliver's (1991) typology of organizational responses to institutional processes and investigate why and how UHS went from deliberate avoidance to full acquiescence to mainstream economics. Our analysis suggests that while organizations may be compelled to adapt to dominant norms, as institutional theorists contend, the process of adaptation involves a variety of conflicting moves and counter moves that engage identity and power and that require forceful leadership to resolve. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00993435&r=all |
| By: | Claudio Sardoni (Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali ed Economiche, Sapienza University of Rome (Italy).) |
| Abstract: | Many Keynesian economists focus their attention on money as a store of value as a defence from uncertainty. Many others monetary economists, also quite close to the Keynesian approach in several respects, emphasise the importance of money as standard of value and means of payment. By drawing on Hicks's and Kaldor's contributions, this paper suggests an approach in which money is characterized by its two functions of standard of value and means of payment, which are inherently connected to one another. The role of store of value, in economies with well developed financial markets, can be normally played by other assets as liquid and risk-less as money. Therefore, the demand for liquidity as a defence against uncertainty should be kept distinct from the demand for money strictly defined. |
| Keywords: | Money, Liquidity, Uncertainty, Financial Markets. |
| JEL: | E4 E5 G1 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:saq:wpaper:03/15&r=all |
| By: | Schlicht, Ekkehart |
| Abstract: | This note proposes a growth model that is derived from the standard Solow growth model by replacing the neoclassical production function with Kaldor’s technical progress function while maintaining a marginalist theory of factor prices in the spirit suggested by von Weizsäcker (1966, 1966b). The hybrid model so obtained accounts for balanced growth in a way that appears less arbitrary than the Solow model, especially because it directly accounts for Harrod neutral technical change, without any need for further assumptions. |
| Keywords: | directed technical change; directed technological change; bias in innovation; technical progress function; neoclassical production function; Harrod neutrality; Hicks neutrality; Cambridge theory of distribution; marginal productivity theory; Kaldor; Kennedy; von Weizsäcker; Solow model |
| JEL: | O30 O40 E12 E13 E25 B59 B31 |
| Date: | 2015–06–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:muenec:25169&r=all |
| By: | Sidartha Gordon (ECON - Département d'économie - Sciences Po); Alessandro Riboni (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS - Polytechnique - X) |
| Abstract: | Conflicts are likely less violent if individuals entertain the possibility that the opponent may be right. Why is it so difficult to observe this attitude? In this paper, we consider a game of conflict where two opponents fight in order to impose their preferred policy. Before entering the conflict, one opponent (the agent) trusts the information received by his principal. The principal wants to a↵ect the agent's e↵ort, but he also cares that the agent selects the correct policy and that he has the right incentives to acquire information.We find conditions under which the principal induces hawkish attitudes in the agent. As a result, the agent has no doubts about the optimality of his preferred policy, conflicts are violent and bad decisions are sometimes made. Under some other conditions, the agent adopts dovish attitudes of systematic doubt and conflicts are less violent. |
| Date: | 2014–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01073538&r=all |
| By: | Andrew E. Clark (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA) - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)); Sarah Flèche (Centre for Economic Performance - LSE - London School of Economics); Claudia Senik (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA) - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC), UP4 - Université Paris-Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | In spite of the great U-turn that saw income inequality rise in Western countries in the 1980s, happiness inequality has fallen in countries that have experienced income growth (but not in those that did not). Modern growth has reduced the share of both the “very unhappy” and the “perfectly happy”. Lower happiness inequality is found both between and within countries, and between and within individuals. Our cross-country regression results argue that the extension of various public goods helps to explain this greater happiness homogeneity. This new stylised fact arguably comes as a bonus to the Easterlin paradox, offering a somewhat brighter perspective for developing countries. |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:hal-01080877&r=all |
| By: | Raouf Boucekkine (AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) - Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM) - AMU - Aix-Marseille Université); Fabien Prieur (INRA - INRA MONTPELLIER - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA)); Benteng Zou (CREA - Center for Research in Economic Analysis - Uni.lu - Université du Luxembourg) |
| Abstract: | We propose an analysis of institutional dynamics under uncertainty by the means of a stochastic differential lobbying game with two main ingredients. The first one is uncertainty inherent in the institutional process itself. The second one has to do with the crucial role of resource windfalls in economic and political outcomes, shaping lobbying power and adding a second source of uncertainty. First, we focus on uncertainty surrounding the institutional process only and show that its main consequence is the existence of multiple equilibria with very distinct features: symmetric equilibria which lead the economy to reach almost surely a stable pointwise institutional steady state in the long run even in the absence of the retaliation motive put forward by the deterministic lobbying literature, and asymmetric equilibria which only show up under uncertainty and do no allow for stochastic convergence to a steady state. Second, when accounting for the two sources of uncertainty together with resource revenue-dependent lobbying power, we show that revenue volatility tends to stabilize institutional dynamics compared to the deterministic counterpart. |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01181214&r=all |
| By: | Pelenc, Jérôme |
| Abstract: | Few works have tried to articulate the Capability Approach originally developed by Amartya Sen and the Fundamental Human Needs approach developed by Manfred Max-Neef. The goal of this paper is precisely to combine those two approaches in order (i) to build a truly multidimensional framework for assessing well-being and inequalities and (ii) to capture the complexity of human well-being from freedom of choice to needs satisfaction. To test this new framework we have conducted an empirical experimentation with vulnerable teenagers (15-17 years old) living in the suburbs of Paris (Dammarie-les-Lys, France) who suffer strong social exclusion and education difficulties. We have organized participatory workshops and then a questionnaire survey with the vulnerable groups and with a control group in order to assess subjective well-being inequalities. The results clearly demonstrate that the group of vulnerable teenagers suffers inequalities in all dimensions of well-being that we tested. These dimensions correspond to the nine axiological needs (Subsistence, Protection, Affection, Understanding, Participation, Leisure, Creation, Identity, Freedom) and the four existential needs (Being, Having, Doing, Interacting) that Max-Neef identifies in his matrix. Addressing inequalities in all of these dimensions clearly help to operationalize multidimensional well-being assessment. Regarding the theoretical side, on the one hand, our tentative for articulating the two approaches allows us to introduce the two categories of axiological and existential capabilities, to better link the concepts of capabilities, functionings, satisfiers and needs and finally to debate further the idea of a list of well-being dimensions by offering a matrix of ten capabilities. Moreover, the fundamental human approach is complemented by integrating freedom of choice into the conceptualization and assessment of well-being. This allows investigating the potential causes of needs deprivation by using the different parameters that condition the acquisition of capabilities. |
| Keywords: | Capabilities; fundamental human needs; subjective well-being; inequalities; education; vulnerable teenagers |
| JEL: | I24 I31 I32 |
| Date: | 2014–08–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:66277&r=all |
| By: | Claude Roche (LIP - Laboratoire d'innovation pédagogique - Université Catholique de Lille) |
| Abstract: | Notre objet est de caractériser certaines des mutations induites par ce qu’on appelle « l’économie de la connaissance». Nous partons de l’idée que nos économies évoluent fortement car le travail devient massivement intellectuel et cela touche, pensons-nous la nature même des connaissances produites en entreprise, ainsi que le mode de leur gouvernance. Ces mutations sont mal comprises des économistes, pour des raisons méthodologiques. En effet le travail intellectuel est fondamentalement immesurable – son efficacité renvoie à sa seule pertinence - alors que la mesurabilité est un présupposé des principales théories. Nous appuyant sur Kant, nous montrerons qu’il s’agit d’une aporie majeure, qui atteint jusqu’au projet d’une science économique (toute science pour Kant, procède par délimitation préalable de son objet, et donc présuppose la mesurabilité). Contre l’illusion scientifique, nous poserons que cette économie doit être interrogée de deux points de vue spécifiques, épistémologique et managérial : avec deux résultats La mutation de la nature de la connaissance Pour la littérature spécialisée (Foray), la connaissance est un « en-soi » défini extérieurement au monde économique. C’est une erreur, et nous poserons que, du fait de la complexité des objets, y apparaissent des modes spécifiques de connaître : à la fois collectifs et transdisciplinaires (Schmid). Tel est le cas de la conception innovante, du design thinking et du codesign dans le développement duquel nous sommes impliqués. Nous décrirons ces pratiques en détail insistant notamment sur ce que l’ancrage économique fonctionne comme une contrainte d’objectivation. Nous poserons alors l’hypothèse qu’elles peuvent dépasser les apories de la connaissance éclatée considérées comme caractéristiques de la « post-modernité»(Lyotard) Il s’agira alors de qualifier économiquement ces pratiques ; et le ferons de façon réflexive à partir de l’expérience récente du management Une tension entre efficacité opérationnelle et pilotage financier La caractéristique de cette économie est qu’elle génère une tension entre deux logiques de gouvernance de l’entreprise : l’efficacité opérationnelle et la rationalité gestionnaire. Celle-ci domine toujours, mais elle échoue à saisir l’efficacité de la connaissance car ses notions centrales - ressource, capital - sont par essence privatives, là où une connaissance privatisée devient inopérante. Stricto-sensu, elle n’est qu’une ressource répartie (un pseudo-capital pour Llerana). Nous montrerons par contre que le management s’est adapté à cette réalité ; nous le ferons en réinterprétant les doctrines managériales récentes. Nous décrirons alors cette tension par des exemples vécus, montrant qu’elle peut conduire à un dialogue de pilotage, au sens de Lorino, opposant le principe financier à celui de l’efficacité du travail intellectuel. Jusqu’où peut aller ce dialogue ? Jusqu’à intégrer des intérêts extérieurs à l’entreprise ? La logique le voudrait. Car le propre du connaitre est d’englober les enjeux de son contexte. Cela s’observe d’ailleurs dans certains dispositifs « d’open innovation » souvent sensibles aux questions de développement durable (Von Hippel). Nous ne pourrons cependant en juger de façon fiable. Cette contribution n’ayant de sens que de montrer les conditions d’une telle interrogation |
| Date: | 2014–10–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01143583&r=all |
| By: | Nicole Becker (TU Dortmund, Germany); Kirsten Häger (Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany); Jan Heufer (Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands) |
| Abstract: | In Becker et al. (2013a,b), we proposed a theory to explain giving behaviour in dictator experiments by a combination of selfishness and a notion of justice. The theory was tested using dictator, social planner, and veil of ignorance experiments. Here we analyse gender differences in preferences for giving and notions of justice in experiments using the same data. Similar to Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), we find some differences in giving behaviour. We find even stronger differences in the notion of justice between men and women; women tend to be far more egalitarian. Using our preference decomposition approach from Becker et al. (2013a) and parametric estimates, we show that differences in the giving behaviour between men and women in dictator experiments are explained by differences in their notion of justice and not by different levels of selfishness. We employ both parametric and non-parametric techniques, and both methods confirm the result. |
| Keywords: | Altruism; Dictator Games; Distribution; Experimental Economics; Gender Differences; Justice; Social Preferences |
| JEL: | C91 D12 D61 D63 D64 J16 |
| Date: | 2015–08–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150103&r=all |
| By: | Yoann Verger (REEDS - REEDS - Centre international de Recherches en Economie écologique, Eco-innovation et ingénierie du Développement Soutenable - UVSQ - Université Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines) |
| Abstract: | References to Sraffa and to the neo-Ricardian school is something quite customary in ecological economics. By looking at contributions in this area since the beginning of ecological economics and at contributions on environmental problem from the neo-Ricardian school, we see that a connection between both school still has to be made. This connection should be articulated around the initial aim of Sraffa: to develop a new paradigm, competing against the neoclassical one. Only then it will be possible to develop a real eco-Sraffian approach able to pursue the analysis of the sustainability of the economic system. This review of the literature is divided in three sections. Section 1 describes the part of the literature engaged in the “valuation of nature” debate; section 2 the works of researchers trying to develop a neo-Ricardian approach of ecological conflicts; and section 3 several works trying to use the neo-Ricardian knowledge in the analysis of physical interdependence between processes, in particular for the assessment of CO2 emissions. In each of these last sections, works are presented in a (more or less) chronological way. |
| Date: | 2015–07–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01182894&r=all |
| By: | Zimmermann, Christian (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) |
| Abstract: | There is very little replication of research in economics, particularly compared with other sciences. This paper argues that there is a dire need for studies that replicate research, that their scarcity is due to poor or negative rewards for replicators, and that this could be improved with a journal that exclusively publishes replication studies. I then discuss how such a journal could be organized, in particular in the face of some negative rewards some replication studies may elicit. |
| JEL: | A1 B4 |
| Date: | 2015–08–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2015-016&r=all |
| By: | Alain Bienaymé (LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine) |
| Abstract: | La conception de la justice qui prévaut dans les sociétés évolue notamment en fonction de leur niveau de développement et de leur potentiel de croissance. Jusqu’à une époque récente, quand le monde vivait dans l’insouciance des prédations que l’activité économique inflige aux ressources naturelles de la planète, une première conception de la justice dite « commutative » domina, jusque vers la fin du 19° siècle. Dans un contexte de pénurie quasi – générale que symbolise l’expression « tu gagneras ton pain à la sueur de ton front », la liberté d’échanger semblait procurer plus de satisfactions immédiates que les progrès de la production. La logique du donnant – donnant s’illustre dans la formule : « à chacun selon son apport ». Puis, à mesure que les nations s’enrichirent, les injustices ressenties devant une abondance mal répartie, les disparités de revenus, l’inégalité des fortunes ont contribué à faire naître une conception de la justice distributive que résume cette fois la formule : « à chacun selon ses besoins ». La partie de la population qui contribue directement à la production ayant radicalement diminué depuis le 19° siècle, les pouvoirs publics interviennent comme un puissant complément des familles pour venir en aide aux catégories sociales plus faibles. Les transferts de ressources opérés par la voie budgétaire redistribuent plus ou moins largement les revenus primaires en fonction de critères essentiellement politiques. À la suite d’A. Sen, l’analyse de la justice sociale s’est élargie en amont et en aval des revenus monétaires, pour intégrer les « capabilités » qui déterminent l’éventail des choix offerts aux citoyens dans leur vie économique, culturelle, sociale et politique. Cette approche s’impose d’autant plus que notre monde entre dans une époque nouvelle. Il doit faire face à la raréfaction des ressources épuisables, à l’altération des fonctions que l’air, l’eau et la diversité des espèces accomplissent. Ce qui remet certes en cause nos modes de croissance à marches forcées, notre obsession de la croissance et du productivisme. Et toute la difficulté sera de concilier l’aspiration légitime des consommateurs des économies émergentes à rattraper le niveau de vie des économies avancées avec une culture de la sobriété et avec un progrès technique destructeur de nombreux emplois. On tente de définir deux scénarios pour mieux identifier les défis à surmonter, les orientations à prendre dans un esprit de justice sociale sans lequel l’activité économique mondiale de l’avenir ne saurait améliorer le bien-être individuel et collectif de nos sociétés. L’histoire longue livre des leçons utiles pour comprendre la diversité des situations auxquelles les 200 nations du monde sont confrontées aujourd’hui. |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01108215&r=all |
| By: | Yolande Francois (Centre de Recherche Magellan - Université Jean Moulin - Lyon III - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Lyon) |
| Abstract: | This communication suggests wondering about the power but more exactly about the power as the problem. Because before wondering about the contents of the power, we have to wonder about the fact of the existence of the power, about this need at the man of this behavior. Is it a refuge, a means to face its existence ? In an ideal system of governance, this variable has to exist. But why ? In the style of Nietzche, could-we it wonder ? Why, according to Hegel, the man is he a powerman ? Keys words : Power, organization, power of masters, power of the slaves, Organisational Behaviour. |
| Abstract: | Cet article interroge le phénomène du pouvoir organisationnel et plus précisément le pouvoir comme problème. Car avant de s'interroger sur le contenu du pouvoir dans les organisations et de son impact sur leur comportement, nous devons nous interroger sur le fait de l'existence du pouvoir, sur ce besoin chez l'homme de ce comportement. Est-ce un refuge, un moyen de faire face à son existence même ? Dans un système idéal de gouvernance organisationnelle, cette variable doit exister. Mais pourquoi ? A la manière de Nietzche, pourrions – nous nous le demander ? Pourquoi, selon Hegel, l'homme est-il un puissant ? Mots clés : pouvoir, organisation, pouvoir des dirigeants, pouvoir des dirigés, comportement organisationnel. |
| Date: | 2015–07–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01154922&r=all |
| By: | Oesten, Gerhard |
| Abstract: | Peter Deegen hat 2013 eine originelle, Neues bietende und gängigen Auffassungen der Forstökonomik widersprechende Arbeit zu Theorien der forstlichen Nachhaltigkeit vorgelegt. Die Arbeit ist der theoretischen Forstökonomik zuzuordnen. Es geht dem Autor darum, verschiedene ökonomische Konzepte forstlicher Nachhaltigkeit mittels der Hayek'schen Theorie der Formen menschlicher Ordnung zu systematisieren und so theoretischer Erklärung zugänglich zu machen. Im vorliegenden Arbeitspapier wird kritisch hinterfragt, ob das Neue und Originelle in der Arbeit auch in der Sache haltbar ist. Hinterfragt werden Deegens Definition von Nachhaltigkeit, seine forstgeschichtlichen Deutungen zu den Arbeiten von Cotta, Preßler und Judeich, sein methodisches Vorgehen (eine Kombination von typologischer Methode und biographischer Methode der Geschichtswissenschaften) sowie seine auf die marktwirtschaftliche Ordnung verkürzte Darstellung der Ordnungstheorie von Hayek. Als Alternative zur an Hayek orientierten typologischen Methode wird ein ideengeschichtliches Vorgehen vorgeschlagen und am Beispiel der Auseinandersetzungen von Boden- und Waldreinertragslehre im 19. Jahrhundert illustriert. Abschließend wird hinterfragt, warum Deegens Modell der "Forstwirtschaft der Preise" der Idee der Nachhaltigkeit nicht genügt und begründet, warum Forstwirtschaft in einer Marktwirtschaft einen sozial und ökologisch verpflichtenden Ordnungsrahmen braucht, damit Nutzung und Schutz der Wälder nachhaltig erfolgen. |
| Keywords: | Nachhaltigkeit |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifewps:602015&r=all |
| By: | Alesina, Alberto F; Giuliano, Paola |
| Abstract: | A growing body of empirical work measuring different types of cultural traits has shown that culture matters for a variety of economic outcomes. This paper focuses on one specific aspect of the relevance of culture: its relationship to institutions. We review work with a theoretical, empirical, and historical bent to assess the presence of a two-way causal effect between culture and institutions. |
| Keywords: | culture; institutions |
| JEL: | P16 Z1 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10773&r=all |
| By: | Morgan Kelly; Cormac Ó Gráda |
| Abstract: | Sustained economic growth in England can be traced back to the early seventeenth century. That earlier growth, albeit modest, both generated and was sustained by a demographic regime that entailed relatively high wages, and by an increasing endowment of human capital in the form of a relatively adaptable and skilled labour force. Healthier and savvier English workers were better equipped to profit from the technological possibilities available to them, and to build on them. Technological change and economic growth stemmed from such human capital rather than Boserupian forces. They were the product of England’s resource endowment and its institutions. |
| Keywords: | Economic history; Industrial revolution |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucn:wpaper:201418&r=all |
| By: | Leander Heldring; James A. Robinson; Sebastian Vollmer |
| Abstract: | We examine the long-run economic impact of the Dissolution of the English monasteries in 1535, which is plausibly linked to the commercialization of agriculture and the location of the Industrial Revolution. Using monastic income at the parish level as our explanatory variable, we show that parishes which the Dissolution impacted more had more textile mills and employed a greater share of population outside agriculture, had more gentry and agricultural patent holders, and were more likely to be enclosed. Our results extend Tawney’s famous ‘rise of the gentry’ thesis by linking social change to the Industrial Revolution. |
| JEL: | N43 N63 N93 O14 Q15 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21450&r=all |
| By: | Jérôme Sgard (CERI - Centre d'études et de recherches internationales - CNRS - Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | La discussion des rapports entre marché et politique est le plus souvent posée dans des termes caricaturaux: à la fin, l'un est censé l'emporter sur l'autre. A moins, par exemple, qu'on interprète les problèmes de gouvernance économique globale en termes de " guerre économique " : une métaphore particulièrement stérile, qui opacifie les problèmes au lieu de les éclairer. La présente contribution cherche à reproblématiser la question en insistant notamment sur deux points : d'une part les différences riches et significatives existant entre la première mondialisation (1870-1914) et la phase actuelle (post-1990) ; de l'autre l'idée qu'aujourd'hui, l'engagement des souverains sur la scène internationale est contingente, ou optionnelle, alors qu'au plan local, leur obligation de défendre de la société et la division du travail est imparable. Les souverains agissent plus que jamais localement et sont sanctionnés par leurs citoyens et leur société civile. |
| Date: | 2013–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01044706&r=all |