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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Garance Genicot |
| Abstract: | This paper shows that when donors and recipients care about each other --two-sided altruism -- the presence of asymmetry of information about the donor's income leads very naturally to a signaling game. A donor who cares about the recipient's welfare has incentives to appear richer than he is when the recipient cares about him. Similarly, asymmetry of information regarding the donor's income generates a signaling game in the presence of two-sided altruism. These signaling games put upward pressure on transfers and this pressure increases with the altruism of the recipient. |
| JEL: | D64 F24 O15 O16 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21309&r=hpe |
| By: | Musegaas, Marieke (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Borm, Peter (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Quant, Marieke (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | In this paper minimum coloring games are considered. We characterize the type<br/>of conflict graphs inducing simple or three-valued simple minimum coloring games. We provide an upper bound on the number of maximum cliques of conflict graphs inducing such games. Moreover, a characterization of the core is provided in terms of the underlying conflict graph. In particular, in case of a perfect conflict graph the core of an induced three-valued simple minimum coloring game equals the vital core. |
| Keywords: | Minimum coloring game; three-valued simple games |
| JEL: | C71 C44 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:425c90bb-c6c6-4561-ad44-111883cd7bc4&r=hpe |
| By: | Koji Yokote (Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University); Yukihiko Funaki (Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University); Yoshio Kamijo (Kochi University of Technology, Department of Management) |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new basis of the set of all TU games. Shapley (1953) introduced the unanimity game in which cooperation of all players in a given coalition yields payoff. We introduce the commander game in which only one player in a given coalition yields payoff. The set of the commander games forms a basis and has two properties. First, when we express a game by a linear combination of the basis, the coefficients related to singletons coincide with the Shapley value. Second, the basis induces the null space of the Shapley value. |
| Keywords: | TU game; Shapley value; Basis; Null space |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wap:wpaper:1418&r=hpe |
| By: | de Boyer des Roches, Jérôme |
| Abstract: | The aim of this paper is to present and compare Ricardo’s monetary and foreign exchange analysis in the writings of 1809-1811 on one side, and in the chapter seven of his 1817 book on the other side. By means of a numerical example, the second section recalls the main features of the 1809-1811 analysis. According to Ricardo, the value of money in two trading countries must be equal for the foreign exchange equilibrium to be reached. Several notions such as the price specie flow mechanism, the quantity theory and the criticism of Thornton’s gold point mechanism are emphasized in this section. The third section presents the theory of the comparative advantage developed in chapter seven of the Principles; more than half of this text is consecrated to monetary components. Emphasis is placed on the distinct effects and mechanisms that intervene in the dynamics of money prices and wages that led to international specialization. The numerical example is used to bring to light the quantity of labour effect, the gold points mechanism, the quantity of money effect and the substitution of imports for production effect that lead to the money prices - i.e. £45, £50, £50, £45 , – linked to the "magic numbers" – i.e. 80, 90, 120, 100 . The fourth section studies first the disconnection established by Ricardo in chapter seven of the Principles between the values of currencies and exchange rates, and concludes. Our research provides the following conclusions. Firstly, Ricardo’s statement of the comparative advantage theory involves the monetary theory; specifically it presupposes the validity of the quantity theory. The specie inflow (outflow) in one country drops (increases) the value of money in this country. Secondly, according to the comparative advantage theory, “England would give the produce of the labour of 100 (English) men, for the produce of the labour of 80 (Portuguese)” (Ricardo, 1817, p; 135). It entails that the money price of the produce of 80 Portuguese men is equal to the money price of the produce of 100 English. It means that the money price of the produce of a given quantity of labour is 25% higher in Portugal than in England; i.e. that the value of a given quantity of money is 20% lower in Portugal than in England. Third, the specie flow between countries is not described with Hume’s price specie flow mechanism, but with Thornton’s gold points mechanism. Fourth, fixed exchange rate under gold standard does not involve gold has the same value in various countries. The symmetrical changes, in two countries, in the quantities of money, that lead to symmetrical changes in the values of money, do not modify the market prices of gold in any of these countries. To conclude, the seventh chapter of the Principles does not support Ricardo’s monetary view at the time of the Bullion Committee. |
| Keywords: | Monnaie; Commerce international; |
| JEL: | B13 E30 F10 F30 |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/15273&r=hpe |
| By: | Peter C. B. Phillips (Cowles Foundation, Yale University) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a tribute to Edmond Malinvaud's contributions to econometrics. We overview the primary original contributions in Edmond Malinvaud's masterful work The Statistical Methods of Econometrics. This advanced text developed a complete treatment of linear estimation theory using geometric methods and, for the first time, provided rigorous nonlinear regression asymptotics, using this theory as the basis of a rigorous development of the limit theory for simultaneous equations theory. Malinvaud's treatise remained the most complete textbook study of econometric methods for several decades. |
| Keywords: | Edmond Malinvaud, Statistical Methods of Econometrics, Linear Estimation, Nonlinear regression |
| JEL: | A19 C10 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2002&r=hpe |
| By: | Beckmann, Klaus (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg); Gattke, Susan (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg); Reimer, Lennart (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg) |
| Abstract: | We review, and extend, one of the classic dynamic models of conflict in economics by Richardson (1919) and Boulding (1962). It turns out that the stability properties of the model change if one takes a more realistic “incrementalist” view, and that chance / friction can easily be incorporated into the standard model by defining a probability of (de-)escalation. This analysis is not just a study in the history of economic thought, but also relevant for the development of simulation models for the analysis of conflict dynamics. |
| Keywords: | conflict dynamics; psychology of aggression; escalation; stability; patterns of conflict |
| JEL: | B25 D74 |
| Date: | 2015–06–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:vhsuwp:2015_159&r=hpe |
| By: | Ariane TICHIT (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International(CERDI)) |
| Abstract: | This article analyzes the social representations of money from survey data. More specifically, it tests how holders of a complementary currency project have a distinct perception of money compared to other citizens. The main results confirm the existence of significant differences between the two groups. The structure of their representations shows that money is less tied to official institutions, the symbol of the sovereign State, to work and wages than for the representative population group. This confirms a number of theoretical works that see these social innovations as protest projects of the standard system, questioning the sovereignty State currency and close to the concepts of unconditional income. Local currencies, by differences in social representations they contain, could well be generators of societal change. |
| Keywords: | social representations of money, survey data, Abric method, complementary currencies |
| JEL: | E42 D71 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdi:wpaper:1714&r=hpe |
| By: | Erhan Bayraktar; Song Yao |
| Abstract: | We study a robust Dynkin game over a set of mutually singular probabilities. We first prove that for the conservative player of the game, her lower and upper value processes coincide (i.e. She has a value process $V $ in the game). Such a result helps people connect the robust Dynkin game with second-order doubly reflected backward stochastic differential equations. Also, we show that the value process $V$ is a submartingale under an appropriately defined nonlinear expectations up to the first time $\tau_*$ when $V$ meets the lower payoff process $L$. If the probability set is weakly compact, one can even find an optimal triplet. The mutual singularity of probabilities in causes major technical difficulties. To deal with them, we use some new methods including two approximations with respect to the set of stopping times. |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1506.09184&r=hpe |
| By: | Bernd Irlenbusch (University of Cologne); Janna Ter Meer (University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study a frequently observed public good setting where accurate contribution feedback is not available and group members can send non-verifiable cheap talk messages about their contributions. As feedback, subjects receive only announced contributions or the announced or actual contribution with 50% probability. In this setting, we explore both information transmission and reception as well as the effectiveness of costly peer punishment. Overall, we find that cooperation breaks down in all announcement treatments except when actual contribution feedback is provided some of the time and punishment is available. We identify various constraints to full cooperation relative to the standard public good game. First, subjects make errors in adjusting their beliefs for the announcements of others and, on average, adjust their beliefs downward for a given announcement. Second, we find that significantly more punishment is assigned to high contributors compared to the standard public good game. Furthermore, punishment for low contributors appears to have a smaller disciplining effect. When actual contribution information is provided some of the time we find that these constraints are less severe compared to the setting where only announcements are available. |
| Keywords: | public goods, punishment, lying, credibility, communication |
| JEL: | C92 D03 H41 D02 |
| Date: | 2015–05–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cgr:cgsser:06-02&r=hpe |
| By: | Barbara M. Fraumeni; Michael S. Christian; Jon D. Samuels |
| Abstract: | In the 25 years since Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989) published their first article on human capital, the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) and the SNA have changed significantly. The contribution of this paper is two-fold: Creation of a contemporary set of accounts which integrate human capital measures into the latest comprehensive revision of the U.S. national income accounts and an analysis of trends in human capital and national income account aggregates over the post-war period. The paper is a national income accounting paper with production and factor outlay, income, receipt and expenditure, capital accumulation , and wealth accounts. All of these accounts are tied to the NIPA accounts, and supplemented with human capital estimates. A key feature of the human capital accounts is presentation of human capital estimates in current and constant prices. The time period covered is 1949-84 and 1998-2009. We update the human capital national income accounts and examine trends in the aggregate time series. The results in the original Jorgenson and Fraumeni paper are for 1982 and the aggregate time series are from 1949-1984. Subsequent research by Christian (2012) developed modified Jorgenson-Fraumeni (J-F) human capital estimates from 1998 through 2009. Unfortunately there is a gap in coverage. Nonetheless, a comparison of the aggregates and their trends between the earlier and later period will be informative. The accounting tables in this new paper are for 2009, the latest base year for the NIPA accounts. |
| JEL: | D24 E01 E24 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21284&r=hpe |
| By: | Soon, Ryoo (Department of Finance and Economics, Adelphi University); |
| Abstract: | The paper examines the determinants of income and wealth inequality in a Kaldorian model where the profit share adjusts to clear the goods market and the long-run output-capital ratio is constant. The approach is radically different from both the mainstream approach that stresses properties of production function and the Kaleckian approach that emphasizes the long-run adjustment of utilization. The Kaldorian model is used to identify several developments that may have caused increasing inequality in income and wealth since the early 1980s, including the shift of the power relation in corporate firms in favor of top managerial pay, the decline in the retention rate, increasing share buybacks, rising indebtedness of lower-income households, and the stock market boom in the 1990s. In contrast to Piketty's explanation, the decline in the natural rate of growth reduces inequality of income and wealth in this Kaldorian framework. |
| Keywords: | income and wealth distribution, managerial pay, financialization, stock- flow consistency |
| JEL: | E12 E21 E25 E44 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ums:papers:2015-09&r=hpe |