|
on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Nunez, Marina; Solymosi, Tamás |
| Abstract: | We consider various lexicographic allocation procedures for coalitional games with transferable utility where the payoffs are computed in an externally given order of the players. The common feature of the methods is that if the allocation is in the core, it is an extreme point of the core. We first investigate the general relationship between these allocations and obtain two hierarchies on the class of balanced games. Secondly, we focus on assignment games and sharpen some of these general relationship. Our main result is the coincidence of the sets of lemarals (vectors of lexicographic maxima over the set of dual coalitionally rational payoff vectors), lemacols (vectors of lexicographic maxima over the core) and extreme core points. As byproducts, we show that, similarly to the core and the coalitionally rational payoff set, also the dual coalitionally rational payoff set of an assignment game is determined by the individual and mixed-pair coalitions, and present an efficient and elementary way to compute these basic dual coalitional values. This provides a way to compute the Alexia value (the average of all lemacols) with no need to obtain the whole coalitional function of the dual assignment game. |
| Keywords: | assignment game, Alexia value |
| Date: | 2014–10–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2014/15&r=hpe |
| By: | Arnab Chatterjee |
| Abstract: | Socio-economic inequalities are manifested in different aspects of our social life. We discuss various aspects, beginning with the evolutionary and historical origins, and discussing the major issues from the social and economic point of view. The subject has attracted scholars from across various disciplines, including physicists, who bring in a unique perspective to the field. The major attempts to analyze the results, address the causes, and understand the origins using statistical tools and statistical physics concepts are discussed. |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1409.8030&r=hpe |
| By: | Itzhak Gilboa (HEC, Paris, and Tel-Aviv University); Andrew Postlewaite (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania); Larry Samuelson (Department of Economics,Yale University); David Schmeidler (The InterDisciplinary Center in Herzliya, and TAU) |
| Abstract: | We propose a formal model of scientific modeling, geared to applications of decision theory and game theory. The model highlights the freedom that modelers have in conceptualizing social phenomena using general paradigms in these fields. It may shed some light on the distinctions between (i) refutation of a theory and a paradigm, (ii) notions of rationality, (iii) modes of application of decision models, and (iv) roles of economics as an academic discipline. Moreover, the model suggests that all four distinctions have some common features that are captured by the model. |
| Keywords: | Methodology, Models, Economic Modeling |
| JEL: | B40 B41 |
| Date: | 2014–09–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:14-026&r=hpe |
| By: | David King (Radley Yeldar, UK) |
| Abstract: | What is an ethical culture, and why should companies bother about it? An ethical company is a business that helps people know the right thing to do, understand their code of ethics and uphold the organisation’s principles. As a result, the organisation protects itself against the kind of ethical contraventions and scandals that have affected many sectors, putting businesses in the news for all the wrong reasons and undermining the trust of customers, employees and investors. How can companies put ethics at the heart of their business? |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aes:icsrog:wpaper:25&r=hpe |
| By: | Arunav Barua (Assam Don Bosco University, India) |
| Abstract: | The concept of Social responsibility among businessmen, particularly in India, is not new and can be easily seen in the form of magnificent temples, high mosques, large dharamsalas and great educational institutions. Indian literature is full of incidents when businessmen have gone out of the way to help extract kings and societies out of crises. Many Indian businesses are known for staying one step ahead of the government, as far as the welfare of employees and societies is concerned (Agarwal, 2008). Business until the recent past was purely economic. Profit maximization was the watch word. Business responsibility to society vis-à-vis Corporate Social Responsibility were concepts not clearly defined. Since this study will attempt to highlight the relation between a business firms Social Responsibility and its inherent ethical system of governance, a background of business ethics is also called for. We can safely say that business ethics has no chronicled history but a background of the history that has come down through time is given below: Business Ethics seems to have no history. It is one of the stranger aspects of a discipline that routinely invokes the names of long dead-philosophers that its history seems murky, unresolved. There appears to be a consensus that in some way Business ethics simply did not exist before the 1970s (McMahon 2002). Others seem to think that philosophers such as Aristotle spent time expounding on the ethics of business. Cultural theorists may rightly believe that everything is of semiotic value and some moralists see ethical issues in all parts of daily life. Yet to describe business ethics in terms of universal experience is surely to rob the discipline of focus, not to mention to make it sui generis in terms of a broader history of ideas (Bernard Mees, 2005). |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aes:icsrog:wpaper:13-14&r=hpe |
| By: | Yvon Pesqueux (LIRSA - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche en Sciences de l'Action - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM] : EA4603) |
| Abstract: | après avoir questionné la notion d'entrepreneur et d'entrepreneuriat, il sera question de l'extensivité de la figure avec la référence actuelle à l'entrepreneur institutionnel et à l'entrepreneur social. |
| Keywords: | entrepreneur, entrepreneuriat, entrepreneurship |
| Date: | 2014–09–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01068587&r=hpe |
| By: | Carl Christian von Weizsäcker (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) |
| Abstract: | Die deliberative Demokratie setzt die Marktwirtschaft als ein System des wirtschaftlichen Wettbewerbs voraus. Dies kann anhand des Popperschen Konzepts einer Offenen Gesellschaft mit Piecemeal Engineering nachgewiesen werden. Denn die Kohärenz einer Offenen Gesellschaft setzt bei endogen beeinflussten Präferenzen voraus, dass diese Präferenzen adaptiv sind. Ohne Marktwirtschaft würden adaptive Präferenzen jedoch zu gesellschaftlicher Erstarrung führen. – Andererseits setzt die Legitimierung der Marktwirtschaft auch die deliberative Demokratie voraus. Denn die interpersonellen Einflüsse auf Präferenzen und Werte bedürfen zu ihrer Legitimierung des Wettbwerbs dieser Einflüsse, den es nur im Rahmen einer demokratisch strukturierten Öffentlichkeit gibt. Die Kohärenz eines solchen Systems wird gestützt durch die Tatsache, dass man interpersonelle Präferenzeinflüsse oft in Analogie zu adaptiven Präferenzen sehen kann. Das gilt insbesondere für das universelle Phänomen der Nachahmung. |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2014_13&r=hpe |
| By: | Johan Fourie (Department of Economics, University of Stellenbosch) |
| Abstract: | In the late 1980s Robert Ross and co-author Pieter van Duin reversed the widely accepted view of the Cape economy as a ‘social and economic backwater’ of widespread subsistence farming and overall poverty, scattered with small islands of relatively affluent farmers. Exploring the rich quantitative records kept by Dutch East India Company officials, they argued that the Cape had been more dynamic and progressive than earlier historians had assumed and that the market for Cape agricultural produce had been ‘much larger, more dynamic and quicker growing’ than previously thought, so that ‘a very considerable rate of agricultural growth’ had been possible. While their work was not immediately recognised, research conducted over the last decade using new archival sources and econometric techniques have largely confirmed their empirical observations. Yet, despite these rapid advances in our understanding of the Cape economy, the image that the early Cape Colony was a ‘sleepy colonial backwater whose unpromising landscape was seemingly devoid of any economic potential’ persists. |
| Keywords: | Cape Colony, cliometric, economic history, slavery, wealth |
| JEL: | N36 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sza:wpaper:wpapers221&r=hpe |
| By: | Khosro S. Jahdi (Bradford College, UK) |
| Abstract: | The average human being is exposed to an increasing number of communications in a variety of manners on a daily basis. Amongst the recipients of such communications are at times highly impressionable and/or disadvantaged individuals. Although the communicators would vehemently deny that they target such groups intentionally, ultimately their message is conveyed. At has been suggested that in one European language, the word propaganda actually means ‘advertising’. This paper aims to examine the ethicality of communications tools and find out whether such thing as an ethical communication vehicle exists. The expansion of on-line communications of recent years has added to the concern over the related ethical issues. |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aes:icsrog:wpaper:24&r=hpe |
| By: | Erhan Bayraktar; Zhou Zhou |
| Abstract: | On a filtered probability space $(\Omega,\mathcal{F},P,\mathbb{F}=(\mathcal{F}_t)_{0\leq t\leq T})$, we consider stopper-stopper games $\bar C:=\inf_{\Rho}\sup_{\tau\in\T}\E[U(\Rho(\tau),\tau)]$ and $\underline C:=\sup_{\Tau}\inf_{\rho\in\T}\E[U(\Rho(\tau),\tau)]$ in continuous time, where $U(s,t)$ is $\mathcal{F}_{s\vee t}$-measurable (this is the new feature of our stopping game), $\T$ is the set of stopping times, and $\Rho,\Tau:\T\mapsto\T$ satisfy certain non-anticipativity conditions. We show that $\bar C=\underline C$, by converting these problems into a corresponding Dynkin game. |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1409.6773&r=hpe |
| By: | Takao Asano (Okayama University); Takuma Kunieda (City University of Hong Kong); Akihisa Shibata (Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University) |
| Abstract: | Using a simple framework of Cooper and John (1988) and Cooper (1999), this paper derives the conditions under which overconfidence and underconfidence of agents lead to Pareto improvement. We show that an agent’s overconfidence in a game exhibiting strategic complementarity and positive spillovers and an agent’s underconfidence in a game exhibiting strategic complementarity and negative spillovers can lead to Pareto improvement. |
| Keywords: | overconfidence, underconfidence, strategic complementarity, strategic substitutability, positive spillover, negative spillover |
| JEL: | D62 C72 |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kyo:wpaper:903&r=hpe |