nep-hpe New Economics Papers
on History and Philosophy of Economics
Issue of 2013‒11‒16
seventeen papers chosen by
Erik Thomson
University of Manitoba

  1. Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case By Forges, Françoise; Vida, Péter
  2. Schumpeter's conceptions of process and order By Mário Graça Moura
  3. Monetary plurality in economic theory By Ould Ahmed, Pepita; Marques-Pereira, Jaime; Le Maux, Laurent; Desmedt, Ludovic; Blanc, Jerome; Théret, Bruno
  4. Mea Culpa, Economica: Perkembangan Konsep dan Pengajaran Ilmu Ekonomi Pasca Krisis Ekonomi Global 2008 By Sanjaya, Muhammad Ryan
  5. Multicoalitional solutions. By Stéphane Gonzalez; Michel Grabisch
  6. "Not Only Defended But Also Applied" : The Perceived Absurdity of Bayesian Inference. By Robert, Christian P.; Gelman, Andrew
  7. The Institutional Approach to Economic History: Connecting the Two Strands By Richard N. Langlois
  8. The Use of Economics in WTO Appellate Body Decisions By Thomas J. Prusa
  9. Make Humans Randomize By Lisa Bruttel; Tim Friehe
  10. Coalition Formation in General Apex Games By Dominik Karos
  11. Evolutionary beliefs and financial markets By Napp, Clotilde; Viossat, Yannick; Jouini, Elyès
  12. Population and Economic Growth: Ancient and Moderns By Elise S. Brezis; Warren Young
  13. Gender- and Frame-specific Audience Effects in Dictator Games By Jonathan E. Alevy; Francis L. Jeffries; Yonggang Lu
  14. Estudo bibliométrico do contributo de Buckley e Casson (1976) na investigação em negócios internacionais By Manuel Portugal Ferreira; Fernando Ribeiro Serra; Martinho Almeida
  15. "Modern Money Theory 101: A Reply to Critics" By Eric Tymoigne; L. Randall Wray
  16. From headscarves to donation: Three essays on the economics of gender, health and happiness. By Ugur, Z.B.
  17. Expectation Formation in an Evolving Game of Uncertainty: Theory and New Experimental Evidence By Gigi Foster; Paul Frijters; Markus Schaffner; Benno Torgler

  1. By: Forges, Françoise; Vida, Péter
    Abstract: We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly fin nitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely fi nite), direct, cheap talk.
    Keywords: Bayesian game; pre-play communication; cheap talk; communication equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; Two Player;
    JEL: C72 D70 C73
    Date: 2013–01
  2. By: Mário Graça Moura (Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto e CEF.UP)
    Abstract: Abstract: This paper scrutinises Schumpeter’s conceptions of process and reproduced order. In order to facilitate a detailed understanding of his position, his work is examined from different angles, in three successive ‘approximations’. The coherence, or mismatch, of Schumpeter’s conceptions is subsequently discussed. The paper argues that Schumpeter’s essay on social classes provides an ontologically grounded theory of process which is also a theory of reproduced order; and that this theory does not fit well with Schumpeter’s alternative conception of order as equilibrium. His methodological commitment to an orthodox notion of order as equilibrium is shown to be the source of pervasive tensions in his writings, here classified as ‘retroductive problems’ and ‘spurious problems’.
    Keywords: Schumpeter, methodology, ontology, critical realism
    JEL: B3 B4
    Date: 2013–11
  3. By: Ould Ahmed, Pepita; Marques-Pereira, Jaime; Le Maux, Laurent; Desmedt, Ludovic; Blanc, Jerome; Théret, Bruno
    Abstract: The objective of this article is to identify the monetary plurality in economic theory. We will try to throw light on the way in which theories are attracted towards both unicity and plurality, and more specifically by unification and diversification of money. It should also be noted, in this respect, that the economics of money has undergone considerable development since the 1970s. A survey of the diverse theories, whether mainstream or not, static or dynamic, holistic or individualistic, will reveal the surprising amount of attention devoted to the problem of monetary unicity and/or plurality. We base our presentation on two lines of thought: -The first of these lines concerns a situation of general equilibrium, as opposed to theories giving place to the forms of disequilibrium and regime-crises. The general equilibrium theories usually see money as a financial asset and assume that it is neutral at least over the long term; theories of the second type, on the contrary, see money as a necessary condition for the development of trade, acknowledging that it influences the system of relative prices and consequently the dynamics of production. Thus money is presumed to be totally neutral (“super-neutral”) in the New Classical Economics in the manner of Lucas (1972, 1995) and in the New Monetary Economics initiated by Black (1970) and Fama (1980). On the contrary, it is not neutral according to neo-Mengerian approaches and to those that are neo-Marxist, Chartalist and post-Keynesian. -The second line of thinking revolves round the relationship between economic theories and the question of the unicity or plurality of money as a norm to be established. This relationship is often linked to the role assigned by the various approaches to finance. For example, the macroeconomics of the New Classical Economics school, in dealing with monetary “friction” within general equilibrium theory, maintains an approach that is largely “unitary”, seeking to integrate it into its framework. In this respect it opposes the financial views of the New Monetary Economics, that are based on a pluralist notion of money, aiming moreover to ensure that it could be dispensed it with the world of reality. Similarly, neo-Mengerian economists, who are pluralist and see financing as the heart of the proper organisation of money, are opposed to the unitarian approaches of Marxist, Chartalist and post-Keynesian economists. Our survey of contemporary theories will give rise to a typology of the forms of monetary unicity and plurality, framing a new reading of monetary theories.
    Keywords: École néo-classique d'économie politique; Économie politique; Économie monétaire; Monnaie;
    JEL: G0
    Date: 2013–05
  4. By: Sanjaya, Muhammad Ryan
    Abstract: The latest 2008 crisis has become a "proof" that the mainstream economics cannot avoid, or even predict, the economic meltdown. The teaching of conventional economics that tend to be homogenous and dominated by the new neoclassical synthesis is thought to be failed in predicting human behavior. This is because the mainstream teaching and research in economics has become too mechanistic and simplify the complexity of the real life. However, in the last three decades there has been various contribution from other disciplines, especially from psychology, on economic science that formed a new branch of economics called behavioral economics. Finally, the use of laboratory experiments can be utilized to teach some basic concepts in economics and to observe whether human's behavior is as predicted by economic theories.
    Keywords: economic teaching, crisis, behavioral economics
    JEL: A12 A22 A23 B40
    Date: 2013–11–12
  5. By: Stéphane Gonzalez (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics); Michel Grabisch (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics)
    Abstract: The paper proposes a new concept of solution for TU games, called multicoalitional solution, which makes sense in the context of production games, that is, where v(S) is the production or income per unit of time. By contrast to classical solutions where elements of the solution are payoff vectors, multicoalitional solutions give in addition an allocation time to each coalition, which permits to realize the payoff vector. We give two instances of such solutions, called the d-multicoalitional core and the c-multicoalitional core, and both arise as the strong Nash equilibrium of two games, where in the first utility per active unit of time is maximized, while in the second it is the utility per total unit of time. We show that the d-core (or aspiration core) of Benett, and the c-core of Guesnerie and Oddou are strongly related to the d-multicoalitional and c-multicoalitional cores, respectively, and that the latter ones can be seen as an implementation of the former ones in a noncooperative framework.
    Keywords: Cooperative game, core, aspiration core, strong Nash equilibrium.
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2013–08
  6. By: Robert, Christian P.; Gelman, Andrew
    Abstract: The missionary zeal of many Bayesians of old has been matched, in the other direction, by an attitude among some theoreticians that Bayesian methods were absurd—not merely misguided but obviously wrong in principle. We consider several examples, beginning with Feller's classic text on probability theory and continuing with more recent cases such as the perceived Bayesian nature of the so-called doomsday argument. We analyze in this note the intellectual background behind various misconceptions about Bayesian statistics, without aiming at a complete historical coverage of the reasons for this dismissal.
    Keywords: Laplace law of succession; Frequentist; Foundations; Doomsdsay argument;
    JEL: C11
    Date: 2013
  7. By: Richard N. Langlois (University of Connecticut)
    Abstract: This essay examines the historiography of two episodes in history – the scattering of plots in the open fields in the Middle Ages and the transition to the factory system in the Industrial Revolution – to shed light on the uses of institutional economics in economic history. In both of these episodes, economic “just-so” stories advanced our understanding of history. What animated intellectual innovation in both cases was a bold conjecture about the raison d’être of a puzzling institutional structure. But what ultimately enriched our understanding was the process of conjecture and revision those conjectures set off. In both episodes, the revised conjectures that best withstood criticism and revision were those that saw the phenomena not as static snapshots of economic agents confronting an economic problem but rather those that embedded the phenomena within a larger economic problem and within a process of economic change. In the end it is an account of institutional change – what I call the good old New Institutional Economics – that connects the use of institutional economics to explain puzzling historical phenomenon with the role of institutional economics in addressing the big questions of economic growth.
    Keywords: institutions, institutional change, transaction costs, open-field system, factory system
    JEL: B52 D02 D23 N01 N53 N63
    Date: 2013–09
  8. By: Thomas J. Prusa
    Abstract: While WTO disputes involve legal rights and obligations, economics often can help the Appellate Body (AB) make sense of the dispute and the implications of ambiguous language in the Agreements. This paper reviews three examples of where the economics could have provided a clearer basis for the AB’s decision. I begin by looking at the question of whether countervailing duties can continue to be imposed subsequent to privatization of state-owned enterprises. I next review the question of how antidumping margins are calculated and whether the zeroing methodology is consistent with the fair comparison requirement. Finally, I examine the question of whether the simultaneous application of antidumping and countervailing duties on imports from non-market economies constitutes double remedy. In each of these examples I argue that standard economic theory provides the basis for clear and logic interpretation of the relevant WTO provisions.
    Date: 2013–03–18
  9. By: Lisa Bruttel (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany); Tim Friehe (Center for Advanced Studies in Law and Economics, University of Bonn, Germany)
    Abstract: This paper presents results from an experiment studying a two-person 4x4 pure coordination game. We seek to identify a labeling of actions that induces subjects to select all options with the same probability. Such a display of actions must be free from salient properties that might be used by participants to coordinate. Testing 23 different sets of labels, we identify two sets that produce a distribution of subjects’ choices which approximate the uniform distribution quite well. Our design can be used in studies intending to compare the behavior of subjects who play against a random mechanism with that of participants who play against human counterparts.
    Keywords: coordination game, experiment, mixed strategy, level k
    JEL: C71 C92 D83
    Date: 2013–07–19
  10. By: Dominik Karos
    Abstract: We generalize the class of apex game by combining a winning coalition of symmetric minor players with�a collection of apex sets which can form winning coalitions only together with a fixed quota of minor players.� By applying power indices to these games and their subgames we generate players' preferences over coalitions which we use to define a coalition formation game.� We focus on strongly monotonic power indices and investigate under which conditions on the initial general apex game there are core stable coalitions in the resulting coalition formation game.� Besides several general results, we develop condition for the Shapley-Shubik index, the Banzhaf index, and the normalized Banzhaf index in particular.� It turns out that many statements can be easily verified for arbitrary collections of apex sets.� Nevertheless, we give some relations between the collection of apex sets and the set of core stable coalitions.
    Keywords: Apex Games, Core Stability, Hedonic Games, Strong monotony
    JEL: C71 G34
    Date: 2013–10–28
  11. By: Napp, Clotilde; Viossat, Yannick; Jouini, Elyès
    Abstract: Why do investors keep different opinions even though they learn from their own failures and successes? Why do investors keep different opinions even though they observe each other and learn from their relative failures and successes? We analyze beliefs dynamics when beliefs result from a very general learning process that favors beliefs leading to higher absolute or relative utility levels. We show that such a process converges to the Nash equilibrium in a game of strategic belief choices. The asymptotic beliefs are subjective and heterogeneous across the agents. Optimism (respectively overconfidence) as well as pessimism (respectively doubt) emerge from the learning process. Furthermore, we obtain a positive correlation between pessimism (respectively doubt) and risk tolerance. Under reasonable assumptions, beliefs exhibit a pessimistic bias and, as a consequence, the risk premium is higher than in a standard setting.
    Keywords: heterogeneous beliefs; Beliefs formation; evolutionary game theory; risk premium; pessimism;
    JEL: D81 D53 D03 G12
    Date: 2013
  12. By: Elise S. Brezis (Bar-Ilan University); Warren Young (Bar-Ilan University)
    Abstract: This paper focuses on the evolution of the relationship between population and economic growth from Hume to New Growth Theory. In the paper, we show that there were two main views on the subject. There were those who assumed that the relationship between fertility rates and income was positive. On the other hand, there were those who raised the possibility that this linkage did not occur, and they emphasized that an increase in income did not necessarily lead to having more children. The paper will show that their position on the issue was related to a socio-economic fact: the sibship size effect. We show that those who took the view that an increase in income leads to the desire to have more children, did not take into consideration a sibship size effect, while those maintaining that there existed a negative relationship, introduced into their utility function a sibship size effect.
    Keywords: Population, Economic Growth, Sibship size effect, children, fertility rates.
    JEL: B10 D10 J13
    Date: 2013–11
  13. By: Jonathan E. Alevy (Department of Economics, College of Business and Public Policy, University of Alaska Anchorage); Francis L. Jeffries (College of Business and Public Policy, University of Alaska Anchorage); Yonggang Lu (College of Business and Public Policy, University of Alaska Anchorage)
    Abstract: We study dictator allocations using a 2x2 experimental design that varies the level of anonymity and the choice set, allowing observation of audience effects in both give and take frames. Changes in the distribution of responses across treatment cells allow us to distinguish among alternative motives as elaborated in recent theory. We observe significant audience effects that vary by both frame and gender. The pattern of responses suggests that heterogeneous concerns for reputation and self-signaling across gender give rise to the contextual effects associated with the give and take frames that have previously been observed in the literature .
    Keywords: Dictator game; anonymity; gender; framing.
    JEL: C91 C92 D01 D03
    Date: 2013–10
  14. By: Manuel Portugal Ferreira (Instituto Politécnico de Leiria); Fernando Ribeiro Serra (Uninove – Universidade Nove de Julho); Martinho Almeida (Universidade de São Paulo)
    Abstract: In this paper we examine the work by Peter Buckley and Mark Casson (1976), “The future of the multinational enterprise”, contribution to international business research. In this work, the Buckley and Casson conceptualized one of the foundational theories for International Business (IB) research in the past three decades: internalization theory. Our bibliometric study examines the entire track record of publications in the leading journal for IB research – Journal of International Business Studies (JIBS) – between 1976 and 2010, that cite Buckley and Casson’s 81976) work. The analyses of citations, co-citations and themes permit us analyze the impact of the Internalization theory, and of Buckley and Casson (1976) in specific, in IB research. Conceptually founded on the internalization theory for the study of multinational corporations and the internationalization of firms, the ramifications extend to several domains of the discipline and make this one of the most salient works of the past three decades.
    Keywords: internalization theory, multinational corporation, international business research, bibliometric study
    JEL: M0 M1
    Date: 2013–09–29
  15. By: Eric Tymoigne; L. Randall Wray
    Abstract: One of the main contributions of Modern Money Theory (MMT) has been to explain why monetarily sovereign governments have a very flexible policy space that is unencumbered by hard financial constraints. Through a detailed analysis of the institutions and practices surrounding the fiscal and monetary operations of the treasury and central bank of many nations, MMT has provided institutional and theoretical insights about the inner workings of economies with monetarily sovereign and nonsovereign governments. MMT has also provided policy insights with respect to financial stability, price stability, and full employment. As one may expect, several authors have been quite critical of MMT. Critiques of MMT can be grouped into five categories: views about the origins of money and the role of taxes in the acceptance of government currency, views about fiscal policy, views about monetary policy, the relevance of MMT conclusions for developing economies, and the validity of the policy recommendations of MMT. This paper addresses the critiques raised using the circuit approach and national accounting identities, and by progressively adding additional economic sectors.
    Keywords: Modern Money Theory; Price Stability; Full Employment; Financial Stability; Money
    JEL: B5 E10 E11 E12 E31 E42 E58 E6 F41
    Date: 2013–11
  16. By: Ugur, Z.B. (Tilburg University)
    Abstract: Abstract: Zeynep’s research interests are mainly in the field of health and labor economics. In this thesis, she explores a broad range of topics within the domain of the economics of gender, health and happiness. The first chapter provides the motivations for the studies and summarizes the main findings. The second chapter documents differences in educational attainment, labor market outcomes and childbearing among women by their use of headscarves and investigates the impact of the headscarf ban in Turkey on women’s educational attainment, labor force participation and childbearing decisions. In Chapter 3, she explores the relationship between presumed consent legislation and various organ donation indicators such as willingness to donate one’s organs, organ donation card holding, actual organ donation rates and kidney transplantation rates. The last chapter looks at the relationship between pro-social behavior and subjective wellbeing and tries to quantify the happiness effect of donating in the Netherlands.
    Date: 2013
  17. By: Gigi Foster; Paul Frijters; Markus Schaffner; Benno Torgler
    Abstract: We examine the nature of stated subjective probabilities in a complex, evolving context in which true event probabilities are not within subjects' explicit information set. Specically, we collect information on subjective expectations in a car race wherein participants must bet on a particular car but cannot influence the odds of winning once the race begins. In our setup, the actual probability of the good outcome (a win) can be determined based on computer simulations from any point in the process. We compare this actual probability to the subjective probability participants provide at three dierent points in each of 6 races. We find that the S-shaped curve relating subjective to actual probabilities found in prior research when participants have direct access to actual probabilities also emerges in our much more complex situation, and that there is only a limited degree of learning through repeated play. We show that the model in the S-shaped function family that provides the best fit to our data is Prelec's (1998) conditional invariant model.
    Keywords: behavioural economics, expected utility theory, experiments, expectations, probabilities
    JEL: D40 L10
    Date: 2013–11–01

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