nep-hpe New Economics Papers
on History and Philosophy of Economics
Issue of 2013‒09‒24
eight papers chosen by
Erik Thomson
University of Manitoba

  1. On the Convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols By BRITZ, Volker; HERINGS, Jean-Jacques; PREDTETCHINSKI, Arkadi
  2. A Zero-Sum Stochastic Game with Compact Action Sets and no Asymptotic Value. By Vigeral, Guillaume
  3. Incomputability, Undecidability & Unsolvability in Economic Theory By K. Vela Velupillai
  4. Keynesian Utilities: Bulls and Bears By Anat Bracha; Donald Brown
  5. Emotions and Political Unrest By Passarelli, Francesco; Tabellini, Guido
  6. Shocking Behavior : Random Wealth in Antebellum Georgia and Human Capital Across Generations By Hoyt Bleakley; Joseph P. Ferrie
  7. (Ir)rational Exuberance: Optimism, Ambiguity, and Risk By Anat Bracha; Donald Brown
  8. Chancen, Grenzen und Barrieren staatlicher Regulierungspolitik - Eine verhaltensökonomische Betrachtung unter Berücksichtigung des individuellen landwirtschaftlichen Unternehmerverhaltens By Grüner, Sven; Fietz, Anica

  1. By: BRITZ, Volker (ETH Zürich, Switzerland); HERINGS, Jean-Jacques (Maastricht University, The Netherlands; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.); PREDTETCHINSKI, Arkadi (Maastricht University, The Netherlands)
    Abstract: We consider a non–cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action–dependent bargaining protocol, that is, the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected. An important example is the frequently studied rejector–becomes–proposer protocol. We focus on subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies which are shown to exist and to be efficient. Equilibrium proposals do not depend on the probability to propose conditional on the rejection by another player, though equilibrium acceptance sets do depend on these probabilities. Next we consider the limit, as the bargaining friction vanishes. In case no player has a positive probability to propose conditional on his rejection, each player receives his utopia payoff conditional on being recognized and equilibrium payoffs are in general Pareto inefficient. Otherwise, equilibrium proposals of all players converge to a weighted Nash Bargaining Solution, where the weights are determined by the probability to propose conditional on a rejection.
    Keywords: strategic bargaining, subgame perfect equilibrium, stationary strategies, Nash bargaining solution
    JEL: C78
    Date: 2013–09–11
  2. By: Vigeral, Guillaume
    Abstract: We give an example of a zero-sum stochastic game with four states, compact action sets for each player, and continuous payoff and transition functions, such that the discounted value does not converge as the discount factor tends to 0, and the value of the n-stage game does not converge as n goes to infinity.
    Keywords: Compact action sets; Uniform value; Asymptotic behavior; Zero sum stochastic games;
    JEL: C73
    Date: 2013
  3. By: K. Vela Velupillai
    Date: 2013
  4. By: Anat Bracha; Donald Brown
    Date: 2013–09–19
  5. By: Passarelli, Francesco; Tabellini, Guido
    Abstract: This paper formulates a theory of how political unrest influences public policy. Political unrest is motivated by emotions. Individuals engage in protests if they are aggrieved and feel that they have been treated unfairly. This reaction is predictable because individuals have a consistent view of what is fair. This framework yields novel insights about the sources of political influence of different groups in society. Even if the government is benevolent and all groups have access to the same technology for political participation, equilibrium policy can be distorted. Individuals form their view of what is fair taking into account the current state of the world. If fewer aggregate resources are available, individuals accept a lower level of welfare. This resignation effect in turn induces a benevolent government to procrastinate unpleasant policy choices.
    Keywords: emotions; fairness; political economics; procrastrination; public debt; riots; unrest
    JEL: H0
    Date: 2013–05
  6. By: Hoyt Bleakley; Joseph P. Ferrie
    Abstract: Does the lack of wealth constrain parents’ investments in the human capital of their descendants? We conduct a fifty-year followup of an episode in which such constraints would have been plausibly relaxed by a random allocation of wealth to families. We track descendants of those eligible to win in Georgia’s Cherokee Land Lottery of 1832, which had nearly universal participation among adult white males. Winners received close to the median level of wealth – a large financial windfall orthogonal to parents’ underlying characteristics that might have also affected their children’s human capital. Although winners had slightly more children than non-winners, they did not send them to school more. Sons of winners have no better adult outcomes (wealth, income, literacy) than the sons of non-winners, and winners’ grandchildren do not have higher literacy or school attendance than non-winners’ grandchildren. This suggests only a limited role for family financial resources in the transmission of human capital across generations and a potentially more important role for other factors that persist through family lines.
    JEL: J01 J13 J24 J62 N11 N31 O12 O15
    Date: 2013–08
  7. By: Anat Bracha; Donald Brown
    Date: 2013–09–19
  8. By: Grüner, Sven; Fietz, Anica
    Abstract: Die regulatorischen Aktivitäten des Staates werden oftmals mit dem Vorliegen von Marktversagen begründet. Diese Perspektive ist allerdings zu eng und vernachlässigt das Auftreten von Staatsversagen. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht staatliche Eingriffe aus einer verhaltensökonomischen Perspektive. Dabei werden bedeutsame Erkenntnisse aus der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung vorgestellt. Zunächst werden systematische Verhaltensabweichungen des Homo sapiens vom Modell des rationalen Erwartungsnutzenmaximierers und dessen politische Relevanz für den Agrar- und Umweltbereich aufgezeigt. Anschließend liegt der Fokus auf den ökonomischen Kosten der Regulierung. Als zentrale Faktoren werden neben der fehlenden Treffsicherheit hinsichtlich der Zielgröße, nicht-intendierte Folgen auf zielgrößenferne Bereiche und direkte Kosten der Politikfolgenabschätzung identifiziert und diskutiert. Sofern die an der Regulierung beteiligten Akteure (Regulierer und Regulierte) nur über unvollständige Informationen verfügen und die Informationsverarbeitung Grenzen unterliegt, ist Regulierung stets mit Kosten verbunden. Festzuhalten bleibt: Um ein gegebenes Regulierungsziel zu erreichen ist ein Abwägungsprozess zwischen der Vor- und Nachteilhaftigkeit von Markt- und Staatslösungen erforderlich.
    Keywords: Regulierung, Staatsversagen, experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung, (un)begrenzte Rationalität, individuelle Verhaltensdeterminanten, deskriptive Entscheidungstheorie, Environmental Economics and Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Risk and Uncertainty,
    Date: 2013

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