nep-hpe New Economics Papers
on History and Philosophy of Economics
Issue of 2013‒07‒05
thirteen papers chosen by
Erik Thomson
University of Manitoba

  1. An Adaptive Learning Model in Coordination Games By Naoki Funai
  2. Valor, Capital e Instituições Sociais em Carl Menger: as contribuições de uma obra inacabada By Eduardo Albuquerque
  3. Extending the Original Position : Revisiting the Pattanaik Critique of Vickrey/Harsanyi Utilitarianism By Hammond, Peter J
  4. Savage Games: A Theory of Strategic Interaction with Purely Subjective Uncertainty By Grant, Simon; Meneghel, Idione; Tourky, Rabee
  5. Ein hermeneutischer Konstruktionsentwurf sozialer Systeme By Krcal, Hans-Christian
  6. An Example of Strategic Market Game with Infinitely Many Commodities By Tonin, Simone
  7. The Shallow or the Deep Ecological Economics Movement? By Clive L. Spash
  8. Uncertainty, Instability, and the Control of Markets By Jo, Tae-Hee
  9. The nature and origin of stability in economic processes By Kuzmin, Evgeny
  11. The Evolutionary Robustness of Forgiveness and Cooperation By Pedro Dal Bó; Enrique R. Pujals
  12. Does willful ignorance deflect punishment? – An experimental study By Björn Bartling; Florian Engl; Roberto A. Weber
  13. Wilhelm Riegers Privatwirtschaftslehre und seine Bedeutung für das Controlling: Eine Würdigung zum 135. Geburtstag By Lingnau, Volker; Koffler, Ulrich

  1. By: Naoki Funai
    Abstract: In this paper, we provide a theoretical prediction of the way in which adaptive players behave in the long run in games with strict Nash equilibria. In the model, each player picks the action which has the highest assessment, which is a weighted average of past payoffs. Each player updates his assessment of the chosen action in an adaptive manner. Almost sure convergence to a Nash equilibrium is shown under one of the following conditions: (i) that, at any non-Nash equilbrium action profile, there exists a player who can find another action which gives always better payoffs than his current payoff, (ii) that all non-Nash equilibrium action profiles give the same payoff. We show almost sure convergence to a Nash equilibrium in the following games: pure coordination games; the battle of the sexes games; the stag hunt game; and the first order static game. In the game of chicken and market entry games, players may end up playing a maximum action profile.
    Keywords: Adaptive Learning, Coordination Games
    JEL: C72 D83
    Date: 2013–06
  2. By: Eduardo Albuquerque (Cedeplar-UFMG)
    Abstract: The theoretical legacy of Carl Menger involves works on value, capital and the origin of social institutions. There is a huge literature on Menger, that has been growing since Schumpeter wrote his short article on the founding father of Austrian Economics in 1921. Reavaliations concerning the place of Menger in the history of economic thought have suggested the de-homogeneization of Menger, Walras and Jevons (Jaffé, 1976) and the desaggregation of Menger, Böhm-Bawerk e Weiser. It might be that now is a moment for a new line of investigation: the desequencing of Menger, Mises and Hayek.
    Keywords: Menger, value, capital, spontaneous order, Austrian Economics
    JEL: B13 B25
    Date: 2013–06
  3. By: Hammond, Peter J (Department of Economics, University of Warwick,)
    Abstract: Harsanyi's original position treats personal identity, upon which each individual's utility depends, as risky. Pattanaik's critique is related to the problem of scaling \state-dependent" von Neumann{Morgenstern utility when determining subjective probabilities. But a unique social welfare functional, incorporating both level and unit interpersonal comparisons, emerges from contemplating an \extended" original position allowing the probability of becoming each person to be chosen. Moreover, the paper suggests the relevance of a \Harsanyi ethical type space", with types as both causes and objects of preference JEL classification: JEL codes:
  4. By: Grant, Simon; Meneghel, Idione; Tourky, Rabee
    Abstract: Abstract. We define and discuss Savage games, which are ordinal games that are set in L. J. Savage’s framework of purely subjective uncertainty. Every Bayesian game is ordinally equivalent to a Savage game. However, Savage games are free of priors, prob- abilities and payoffs. Players’ information and subjective attitudes toward uncertainty are encoded in the state-dependent preferences over state contingent action profiles. In the games we study player preferences satisfy versions of Savage’s sure thing principle and small event continuity postulate. An axiomatic innovation is a strategic analog of Savage’s null events. We prove the existence of equilibrium in Savage games. This result eschews any notion of objective randomization, convexity, and monotonicity. Applying it to games with payoffs we show that our assumptions are satisfied by a wide range of decision-theoretic models. In this regard, Savage games afford a tractable framework to study attitudes towards uncertainty in a strategic setting. We illustrate our results on the existence of equilibrium by means of examples of games in which players have expected and non-expected utility.
    Keywords: Bayesian games, multiple priors, non-expected utility, subjective uncer- tainty, existence of equilibrium, decomposable sets., Risk and Uncertainty, D81, C7,
    Date: 2013–06
  5. By: Krcal, Hans-Christian
    Abstract: The paper handles central topics of social system theory, such as contingency,emergence, communication, reality construction based on cognitive epistemology, and differential logic. The conducted discussion is embedded in the construction of a hermeneutic approach to social system theory. Communication is a decisive part of economic systems, but often it is not object of scientific research on economic topics. Even informal business communication is seldom part of economic terms and models. To understand the meaning of social systems from a firms’ and methodological perspective we must develop a phase scheme driven by communication, because of their decisive structural role for social systems. Hermeneutic means hereby, from an observer’s point of view, a kind of didactical, philosophical opening of business life experiences – it is much more than pure text interpretation. Hence, the observer of social systems has to redefine his own language based preconditions of understanding social systems communication.
    Keywords: social system; communication; hermeneutic approach to social system structure.
    Date: 2013–06–26
  6. By: Tonin, Simone (Department of Economics, University of Warwick,)
    Abstract: This short paper shows in an example of strategic market game that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium converges to the Walras equilibrium, even in the case of an exchange economy with infinitely many commodities.
  7. By: Clive L. Spash
    Date: 2013
  8. By: Jo, Tae-Hee
    Abstract: Grounded in the methodological commitments shared by various traditions in heterodox economics, this paper explores going enterprises’ cooperative actions to control markets through social networks. It is argued that 1) market institutions are created and controlled by business enterprises and the state, that 2) competition and cooperation among business enterprises are two sides of the same coin, that 3) competition is regulated, and hence that 4) market instability is managed, if not eliminated, by those who control the market. Such arguments lead to the managed competition thesis that encompasses corporate governance, market governance, and market regulation in an integrative manner.
    Keywords: Market control, managed competition, uncertainty, instability
    JEL: B5 D40
    Date: 2013–07–01
  9. By: Kuzmin, Evgeny
    Abstract: The article clarifies the substantive aspects of emergence of stability in dynamics of development of economic entities. The condition of stability demonstration in economic processes through the measures of uncertainty and certainty is provided and proved. The tetralistic nature of stability as a property of both state (position) and result of a self-organization mechanism of the economic entity is grounded. The author's position on the non-exclusive role of the rate of transformations in organization and external fluctuations expressed in asynchronous oscillations and responses to them is reasoned. The role of strength and reliability in stability characteristic in the course of adaptation to undesirable deviations from the idealistic path of a life cycle is given.
    Keywords: uncertainty, stability, economic entities, reliability, strength, adaptability, «memory effect».
    JEL: D80 D81
    Date: 2013–06
  10. By: Ho Fai Chan; Benno Torgler
    Abstract: Nobel laureates have achieved the highest recognition in academia,reaching the boundaries of human knowledge and understanding. Owing to past research, we have a good understanding of the career patterns behind their performance. Yet, we have only limited understanding of the factors driving their recognition with respect to major institutionalized scientific honours. We therefore look at the award life cycle achievements of the 1901 to 2000 Nobel laureates in physics, chemistry and physiology or medicine. The results show that Nobelists with a theoretical orientation are achieving more awards than laureates with an empirical orientation. Moreover, it seems their educational background shapes their future recognition. Researchers educated in Great Britain and the US tend to generate more awards than other Nobelists although there are career pattern differences. Among those, laureates educated at Cambridge or Harvard are more successful in Chemistry, those from Columbia and Cambridge excel in Physics, while Columbia educated laureates dominate in Physiology or Medicine.
    Keywords: Nobel Prize, Nobel Laureates, Awards, Recognition, Educational Background, Theory, Empirics, Chemistry, Physics, Physiology or Medicine
    JEL: M52 J33 Z13
    Date: 2013–06–24
  11. By: Pedro Dal Bó; Enrique R. Pujals
    Abstract: We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in innitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator dynamics. We show that there are strategies with a uniformly large basin of attraction independent of the size of the population. Moreover, we show that those strategies forgive defections and, assuming that they are symmetric, they cooperate. We provide partial eciency results for asymmetric strategies.
    Keywords: #
    Date: 2013
  12. By: Björn Bartling; Florian Engl; Roberto A. Weber
    Abstract: This paper studies whether people can avoid punishment by remaining willfully ignorant about possible negative consequences of their actions for others. We employ a laboratory experiment, using modified dictator games in which a dictator can remain willfully ignorant about the payoff consequences of his decision for a receiver. A third party can punish the dictator after observing the dictator’s decision and the resulting payoffs. On the one hand, willfully ignorant dictators are punished less if their actions lead to unfair outcomes than dictators who reveal the consequences before implementing the same outcome. On the other hand, willfully ignorant dictators are punished more than revealing dictators if their actions do not lead to unfair outcomes. We conclude that willful ignorance can circumvent blame when unfair outcomes result, but that the act of remaining willfully ignorant is itself punished, regardless of the outcome.
    Keywords: Willful ignorance, third party punishment, dictator game, fairness
    JEL: C91 D63
    Date: 2013–06
  13. By: Lingnau, Volker; Koffler, Ulrich
    Abstract: Im Mai 2013 wäre der 1971 gestorbene Wilhelm Rieger 135 Jahre alt geworden. In seinem heute nahezu vergessenen Hauptwerk, der Einführung in die Privatwirtschaftslehre von 1928, formuliert er das theoretische Fundament des Shareholder Values. Obwohl er damit als einer der wichtigsten Wegbereiter der deutschsprachigen Betriebswirtschaftslehre gilt, ist in der heutigen betriebswirtschaftlichen Diskussion rund 40 Jahre nach seinem Tod nur wenig über seinen menschlichen und fachlichen Werdegang bekannt. Dieser Beitrag widmet sich zunächst einer ausführlichen Würdigung seiner Person und gibt einen Überblick über sein wichtigstes Schrifttum. Anhand der Kriterien Erkenntnisobjekt und methodologischer Standpunkt, Leitprinzipien sowie zugrunde gelegter Typus des Unternehmers werden daraufhin die unterschiedlichen Basisprogramme von Riegers Privatwirtschaftslehre im Sinne einer Rentabilitätsorientierung und einer Betriebswirtschaftslehre im Sinne einer Wirtschaftlichkeitsoptimierungslehre gegenübergestellt. Dabei zeigt sich, dass es mithilfe der Privatwirtschaftslehre gelingt, die konzeptionelle Orientierungslosigkeit in der deutschsprachigen Controllingforschung zu überwinden und folglich Riegers Arbeiten für die heutige betriebswirtschaftliche Diskussion keineswegs an Aktualität und Relevanz eingebüßt haben. --
    Date: 2013

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