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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Kis, János |
| Abstract: | There is a widespread agreement in modern democracies that a state should not force its citizens to lead lives they do not endorse themselves. It is also generally agreed that state acts should not be justified by appealing to the authority of religious books. Such claims are often reformulated as holding that state action should be neutral with respect to the ideals of the good life, or that the justification of state acts should be neutral with respect to basic beliefs. But does the use of the term neutral add anything important to the original wording? Does it point to a common principle - a principle of state neutrality (PSN) - that unites such judgments? If it does, what normative work PSN is supposed to do? What is its basis? What are the things towards which it requires the acts of the relevant type to be neutral? Such questions call for a theory of neutrality. The theory of neutrality has its natural home in the liberal tradition. Liberalism had a neutralist bent since its beginnings. But a systematic account of PSN was not laid out before the 1970s and '80s when John Rawls and others restated the foundations of liberal theory. While particular neutrality judgments are widely accepted, the general conception of liberal neutrality elicited strong critical reactions. Some of the critiques took liberalism's commitment to neutrality as evidence that the liberal view of the individual, society, and politics is deeply flawed. Others attacked liberal neutrality as reflecting a mistaken interpretation of what liberalism really is about. The debate subsided in the last decade or so, without settling, however, on a standard view. State neutrality remains a controversial idea. This article tries to spell out its main tenets and to explain how they hang together. It examines the central objections, and explores revisions that may enhance the theory's defensibility. -- |
| Keywords: | state action,principle of state neutrality,liberal neutrality,liberalism,theory of neutrality |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbrlc:spiv2012801&r=hpe |
| By: | Ehud Kalai; Eran Shmaya |
| Abstract: | Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent and (3) assume that the number of players is known. The current paper develops a general theory of Bayesian repeated large games that avoids some of these difficulties. To make the analysis more robust, it develops a concept of compressed equilibrium which is applicable to a general class of Bayesian repeated large anonymous games. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C72 |
| Keywords: | Nash Anonymous games, Nash equilibrium, Repeated games, Large games, Bayesian equilibrium, Price taking, Rational expectations |
| Date: | 2013–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1562&r=hpe |
| By: | Michał Krawczyk (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw) |
| Abstract: | I report the results of a large survey of experimental subjects and researchers concerning the use of deception. I conclude that members of these two groups largely agree on the extent to which various specific techniques are deceptive. I identify the main dimensions that determine this judgment. I also find that the attitude towards deception among subjects tends to be more favorable than among researchers, although even the latter do not readily conform with the common view that deception is taboo in experimental economics. |
| Keywords: | experimental methodology, deception |
| JEL: | C90 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:war:wpaper:2013-11&r=hpe |
| By: | Forges, Françoise; Vida, Péter |
| Abstract: | We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly fin nitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely fi nite), direct, cheap talk. |
| Keywords: | Bayesian game; pre-play communication; cheap talk; communication equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; Two Player; |
| JEL: | C72 D70 C73 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:dauphi:urn:hdl:123456789/8159&r=hpe |
| By: | Martin Binder |
| Abstract: | As a result of the disenchantment with traditional income-based measures of welfare, alternative welfare measures have gained increasing attention in recent years. Two of the most prominent measures of well-being come from subjective well-being research and the (objective) capability approach. Despite their promising features, both approaches have a number of weaknesses when considered on their own. This paper sets out to examine to what extent a fusion between both approaches can overcome the weaknesses of both individual approaches. It uses features of the capability framework to enrich what is basically a subjective well-being perspective. Key drawbacks of normative subjective well-being views can be overcome by focussing welfare assessments on "Subjective Well-being Capabilities" (SWC), i.e. focussing on the substantive opportunities of individuals to pursue and achieve happiness. |
| Keywords: | subjective well-being, capability approach, policy-making, normative economics |
| Date: | 2013–04–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:evopap:2013-02&r=hpe |
| By: | Andrew Caplin; Daniel Martin |
| Date: | 2013–04–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000649&r=hpe |
| By: | David K Levine; Salvatore Modica |
| Date: | 2013–04–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000692&r=hpe |
| By: | Dirk Bergemann; Stephen Morris |
| Date: | 2013–04–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000666&r=hpe |
| By: | Guillaume PASTUREAU |
| Abstract: | Le Mont-de-Piété est à l’origine du microcrédit social. Il s’oppose au dogme économique de l’Eglise, qui refuse et combat le commerce de l’argent. En prêtant à intérêt des petites sommes aux populations pauvres, le Mont-de-Piété participe à un double phénomène. Il met au centre des préoccupations le rôle social de l’argent ; il introduit une forme d’aide financière considérée comme plus efficace que la charité. La modernisation économique et sociale des sociétés européennes entre en contradiction avec les structures traditionnelles et pré-capitalistes. Notre objectif est de montrer dans quelle mesure le Mont-de-Piété est véritablement une innovation sociale majeure. |
| Keywords: | microcrédit social, argent secours, économie et religion, innovation sociale. |
| JEL: | A13 B15 N00 N93 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2013-14&r=hpe |
| By: | Daron Acemoglu; Georgy Egorov; Konstantin Sonin |
| Date: | 2013–04–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000654&r=hpe |
| By: | Emmanuel Malsch (UP1 UFR02 - Université Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne - UFR d'Économie - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne - PRES HESAM) |
| Abstract: | The present study would like to show - among other things - in the spirit of Hyndman, Terracol and Vaksmann (2009), that learning and teaching are still observed in an environment where there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium (but still, as in any finite game, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium), which is the case in the majority of real-life situations. The main objective in this paper is to test experimentally the following hypotheses: - First, we want to know if players believe that their opponents can be learners and that their actions might influence their opponent's beliefs. - Second, we would like to investigate the idea that players do use this awareness of their opponent's ability to learn to manipulate their opponents' beliefs. - Third, we want to know if there are other explanations we can provide for the way players behave in our game: "cyclic behaviour", "learning of correlated strategies"? - Last, we think that Inequity and Risk aversion might play a role but that doesn't undermine our teaching strategy hypothesis mentioned above. The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces our game and experimental procedure. Section III gives some preliminary results and descriptive statistics. Section IV-V and VI shows that subjects might be more sophisticated than the standard theories predict. Section VII-VIII-IX explore the possibility of "cyclic playing behaviours", the existence of a learning of "correlated strategy" and examines the effect of "inequity and risk aversion". Section X concludes the paper. |
| Keywords: | théorie des jeux, apprentissage |
| Date: | 2012–06–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:dumas-00813551&r=hpe |