nep-hpe New Economics Papers
on History and Philosophy of Economics
Issue of 2012‒11‒11
eleven papers chosen by
Erik Thomson
University of Manitoba

  1. Modigliani's 1944 Wage Rigidity Assumption and the Construction of the Neoclassical Synthesis By Rancan, Antonella
  2. The Economics and Politics of Women's Rights By Matthias Doepke
  3. « L'économie des discriminations » peut-elle se passer d'une « philosophie économique des discriminations ? ». By Cléo Chassonnery-Zaïgouche
  4. Large Distributional Games with Traits By M. Ali Khan; Kali P. Rath; Haomiao Yu; Yongchao Zhang
  5. Coalgebraic Analysis of Subgame-perfect Equilibria in Infinite Games without Discounting By Abramsky, Samson; Winschel, Viktor
  6. Bringing Work Back In Islamic Ethic By Possumah, Bayu Taufiq; Ismail, Abdul Ghafar; Shahida , Shahimi
  7. The Stationary Equilibrium of Three-Person Cooperative Games: A Classification By Okada, Akira
  8. Fame and the Fortune of Academic Economists: How the Market Rewards Influential Research in Economics By Hilmer, Christiana E.; Hilmer, Michael J.; Ransom, Michael R.
  9. Trust and Cheating By Jeffrey V. Butler; Paola Giuliano; Luigi Guiso
  10. Rethinking the Method of Principled Negotiation--1981-2011 By Yoshiaki Nomura
  11. Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information By Dirk Bergemann; Stephen Morris

  1. By: Rancan, Antonella
    Abstract: Modigliani's 1944 "Econometrica" article is considered one of the most important efforts to reconcile Keynes with classical economic thinking. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the genesis of Modigliani's article and to reexamine its place in the construction of Neoclassical Synthesis. Modigliani introduced the wage rigidity hypothesis to show how monetary factors influence real variables such as the employment level and the interest rate. Modigliani?s attention to the monetary origin of and solution to unemployment is in stark contrast to the neglect in Neoclassical Synthesis of the monetary side of the system and its inclination towards fiscal policy
    Keywords: Modigliani, wage rigidity, neoclassical synthesis, Patinkin
    JEL: B22 B31
    Date: 2012–10–25
  2. By: Matthias Doepke (Northwestern University)
    Abstract: Women's rights and economic development are highly correlated. Today, the discrepancy between the legal rights of women and men is much larger in developing compared to developed countries. Historically, even in countries that are now rich women had few rights before economic development took off. Is development the cause of expanding women's rights, or conversely, do women's rights facilitate development? We argue that there is truth to both hypotheses. The literature on the economic consequences of women's rights documents that more rights for women lead to more spending on health and children, which should benefit development. The political-economy literature on the evolution of women's rights finds that technological change increased the costs of patriarchy for men, and thus contributed to expanding women's rights. Combining these perspectives, we discuss the theory of Doepke and Tertilt (2009), where an increase in the return to human capital induces men to vote for women's rights, which in turn promotes growth in human capital and income per capita.
    Date: 2012
  3. By: Cléo Chassonnery-Zaïgouche (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne)
    Abstract: Since the 1950's, Nobel Prize economists such as Akerlof, Arrow, Becker, Heckman, Phelps and Stiglitz have analyzed discrimination in an economic framework, essentially in "positive" perspective. The two seminal models – Becker's model based on a "taste for discrimination" and Arrow and Phelps' theories of "statistical discrimination" – give two different answers to the implicit question of efficiency. Discrimination is inefficient – by assumption – in Becker's work because it's a « non-monetary cost », whereas discrimination could be efficient – in some cases – in statistical discrimination models. When discrimination is efficient, the normative basis disappears and no political recommendations could be made. The eficiency criterion is not sufficient to analyze discrimination both in a « positive » and in a « normative » perspective. The paper discusses two principles to renew this analysis : 1) individuals make choice using normative criteria ; 2) the non-discrimination principle is lexically prior to an efficiency criterion.
    Keywords: Discrimination, statistical discrimination, normative economics, positive economics.
    JEL: A13 J7 B40 B41
    Date: 2012–10
  4. By: M. Ali Khan (Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University); Kali P. Rath (Department of Economics, University of Notre Dame); Haomiao Yu (Department of Economics, Ryerson University); Yongchao Zhang (School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)
    Abstract: A comprehensive theory of large strategic games with (socioeconomic and biological) traits (LSGT) has recently been presented in Khan et al. (2012 a and b), and in this paper, we present a reformulation pertaining to large distributional games with traits (LDGT). In addition to a generalization of work initiated and advocated by Mas-Colell (1984), we delineate the role of saturated spaces, as studied in Keisler-Sun (2009) in the reformulated theory, and consider questions pertaining to \lq\lq realizations" of equilibrium distributions that were not previously asked.
    Keywords: Large game, strategic game, distributional game, traits, saturated probability space, realization, Nash equilibrium distribution
    JEL: C62 D50 D82 G13
    Date: 2012–12
  5. By: Abramsky, Samson; Winschel, Viktor
    Abstract: We present a novel coalgebraic formulation of infinite extensive games. We define both the game trees and the strategy profiles by possibly infinite systems of corecursive equations. Certain strategy profiles are proved to be subgame perfect equilibria using a novel proof principle of predicate coinduction which is shown to be sound by reducing it to Kozen’s metric coinduction. We characterize all subgame perfect equilibria for the dollar auction game. The economically interesting feature is that in order to prove these results we do not need to rely on continuity assumptions on the payoffs which amount to discounting the future. In particular, we prove a form of one-deviation principle without any such assumptions. This suggests that coalgebra supports a more adequate treatment of infinite-horizon models in game theory and economics.
    Date: 2012
  6. By: Possumah, Bayu Taufiq; Ismail, Abdul Ghafar; Shahida , Shahimi
    Abstract: Religion and work are seldom discussed. The two have caused scholars to question the religion’s role with work. This paper reviews research on the integrate between religion and work by examining issues of concept, definition, measurement, and reviewing research that examines the relationship of work and religion with respect to: different times, types of people, organize human interactions and sources of knowledge. We then discuss the methodological requirement for reintegrating work studies into social institutional theory and indicate what the conceptual payoffs of such integration might be. These payoffs include breaking new conceptual ground, resolving theoretical puzzles and envisioning the nature of new social institutions.
    Keywords: Work Islam Ethic
    JEL: J81 J40 J24 A10 J53 J30
    Date: 2012–01–12
  7. By: Okada, Akira
    Abstract: We present a classification of all stationary subgame perfect equilibria of the random proposer model for a three-person cooperative game according to the level of efficiency. The efficiency level is characterized by the number of "central" players who join all equilibrium coalitions. The existence of a central player guarantees asymptotic efficiency. The marginal contributions of players to the grand coalition play a critical role in their expected equilibrium payoffs.
    Keywords: cooperative game, noncooperative bargaining, three-person game, random proposer, core, marginal contribution
    JEL: C71 C72 C78
    Date: 2012–10
  8. By: Hilmer, Christiana E. (San Diego State University, California); Hilmer, Michael J. (San Diego State University, California); Ransom, Michael R. (Brigham Young University)
    Abstract: We analyze the pay and position of 1,009 faculty members who teach in doctoral-granting economics departments at fifty-three large public universities in the United States. Using the Web of Science, we have identified the journal articles published by these scholars and the number of times each of these articles has been subsequently cited in published research articles. We find that research influence, as measured by various measures of total citations, is a surprisingly strong predictor of the salary and the prestige of the department in which professors are employed. We also examine how coauthorship is rewarded by the market.
    Keywords: academic labor markets, professor's salaries
    JEL: J31 J44
    Date: 2012–10
  9. By: Jeffrey V. Butler; Paola Giuliano; Luigi Guiso
    Abstract: When we take a cab we may feel cheated if the driver takes an unnecessarily long route despite the lack of a contract or promise to take the shortest possible path. Is our decision to take the cab affected by our belief that we may end up feeling cheated? Is the behavior of the driver affected by his beliefs about what we consider cheating? We address these questions in the context of a trust game by asking participants directly about their notions of cheating. We find that: i) both parties to a trust exchange have implicit notions of what constitutes cheating even in a context without promises or messages; ii) these notions are not unique – the vast majority of senders would feel cheated by a negative return on their trust/investment, whereas a sizable minority defines cheating according to an equal split rule; iii) these implicit notions affect the behavior of both sides to the exchange in terms of whether to trust or cheat and to what extent. Finally, we show that individual's notions of what constitutes cheating can be traced back to two classes of values instilled by parents: cooperative and competitive. The first class of values tends to soften the notion while the other tightens it.
    JEL: A1 A12 D01 Z1
    Date: 2012–11
  10. By: Yoshiaki Nomura (Professor, Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP))
    Abstract: Fisher, Ury & Patton's Getting to Yes has established the Seven Elements of Negotiation and shows what a "theory for practitioners" should be. However, the following three points, among others, should be given reconsideration. First, though various authors support the framework of the seven elements, their interrelationship has not been clarified by those authors. Second, the meaning of 5 core concerns and its relationship with the element of interests are not so clear. Rethinking of non-economic damages and remedies such as an apology or an acknowledgement of facts may be a good start. Third, writings derived from Getting To Yes use commitment in two different meanings: in the sense used in game theories and in the sense of a legally binding promise.
    Keywords: Principled Negotiation, Interest-based Negotiation, Getting to Yes, Elements of Negotiation
    Date: 2012–10
  11. By: Dirk Bergemann; Stephen Morris
    Date: 2012

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