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on History and Philosophy of Economics |
| By: | Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde (IJN - Institut Jean-Nicod - CNRS : UMR8129 - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), LEM - Laboratoire d'Économie Moderne - Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas : EA4442); Anne Corcos François Pannequin (LEM - Laboratoire d'Économie Moderne - Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas : EA4442) |
| Abstract: | In this article, we focus on two types of "aversion" which we deem essential aspects of the notion of trust: betrayal aversion (social) and ambiguity aversion (a special case of aversion to uncertainty). Based on trust-games studies in experimental economics and neuroeconomics, our main goal is to assess the conceptual, behavioral and neurobiological connections between betrayal and ambiguity aversions. From a social and individual psychological point of view the bottom line of our trusting behavior could be our general aversion to ambiguous signals. We approach social trust in the terms of a phenomenon based on uncertainty aversion.Specifically, a reduction of the perceived uncertainty of a social interaction tends to build up a trusting climate conducive to trade by decreasing betrayal aversion.We hypothesize that betrayal aversion and ambiguity aversion bear such a negative correlation. Focusing on this potential negative correlation our approach clearly differs from more positive accounts of trust centred on altruism. |
| Keywords: | trust game - betrayal aversion - ambiguity aversion - neuroeconomics |
| Date: | 2012–11–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:ijn_00734564&r=hpe |
| By: | Philippe Poinsot (PHARE - Pôle d'Histoire de l'Analyse et des Représentations Economiques - CNRS : FRE2541 - Université Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne - Université Paris X - Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense) |
| Abstract: | In the nineteenth century, the emergence of railroads in France resulted in new analytical issues, as they are natural monopolies. Jules Dupuit examined the issue of the operations of the railroad sector on several occasions (1853, 1861 and 1862). He would seem to have defended two contrasting positions, opening the way for debate among commentators. In this communication, I attempt to restore the consistency of Dupuit's positions on the railroads. In the first section, I distinguish between competition as an ideal and the feasibility of competition in the railroad sector; this distinction is implicit in Dupuit's work, but it helps us to grasp that, in his opinion, unlimited competition is not possible in the railroads and that it is not necessarily beneficial to the welfare of society. The State should therefore regulate the railroad sector either by State management or through concessions. In the second section, I specify the conditions under which he believed the State should manage the railroads sector instead of offering concessions to private companies. |
| Keywords: | railroads; Jules Dupuit; natural monopoly; regulation; competition |
| Date: | 2012–04–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00736078&r=hpe |
| By: | Carlsson, Bo (Case Western Reserve University, Weatherhead School of Management, Department of Economics); Braunerhjelm, Pontus (CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies, Royal Institute of Technology); McKelvey, Maureen (RIDE and Institute of Innovation and Entrepreneurship); Olofsson , Christer; Persson , Lars; Ylinenpää, Håkan |
| Abstract: | Research on entrepreneurship has flourished in recent years and is evolving rapidly. This paper explores the history of entrepreneurship research, how the research domain has evolved, and its current status as an academic field. The need to concretize these issues stems partly from a general interest to define the current research domain, partly from the more specific tasks confronting the prize committee of the Global Award for Entrepreneurship Research. Entrepreneurship has developed in many sub-fields within several disciplines - primarily economics, management/business administration, sociology, psychology, economic and cultural anthropology, business history, strategy, marketing, finance, and geography - representing a variety of research traditions, perspectives, and methods. We present an analytical framework that organizes our thinking about the domain of entrepreneurship research, by specifying elements, levels of analysis and the process/context. An overview is provided of where the field stands today and how it is positioned relative to the existing disciplines and new research fields upon which it draws. Areas needed for future progress are highlighted, particularly the need for a rigorous dynamic theory of entrepreneurship that relates entrepreneurial activity to economic growth and human welfare. Moreover, applied work based on more careful design as well as on theoretical models yielding more credible and robust estimates seems also highly warranted. |
| Keywords: | Entrepreneurship; innovation; evolution; inter-disciplinary |
| JEL: | B53 L10 L26 O30 |
| Date: | 2012–09–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0284&r=hpe |
| By: | Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde (IJN - Institut Jean-Nicod - CNRS : UMR8129 - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), LEM - Laboratoire d'Économie Moderne - Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas : EA4442) |
| Abstract: | The aim of this paper is to assess the relevance of methodological transfers from behavioral ecology to experimental economics with respect to the elicitation of intertemporal preferences. More precisely our discussion will stem from the analysis of Stephens and Anderson's (2001) seminal article. In their study with blue jays they document that foraging behavior typically implements short-sighted choice rules which are beneficial in the long run. Such long-term profitability of short-sighted behavior cannot be evidenced when using a self-control paradigm (one which contrasts in a binary way sooner smaller and later larger payoffs) but becomes apparent when ecological patch-paradigms (replicating economic situations in which the main trade-off consists in staying on a food patch or leaving for another patch) are implemented. We transfer this methodology in view of contrasting foraging strategies and self-control in human intertemporal choices. |
| Keywords: | behavioral ecology, intertemporal choice, myopia, patch-paradigms, self-control |
| Date: | 2012–09–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:ijn_00734565&r=hpe |
| By: | Peter Boone; Simon Johnson |
| Abstract: | Peter Boone and Simon Johnson believe that there are more and worse financial crises to come. |
| Keywords: | financial crisis, Japan, USA, Europe, euro |
| Date: | 2012–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepcnp:375&r=hpe |
| By: | Joaquin Gomez-Minambres (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); Eric Schniter (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | We study a dynamic model of self-control where the history of one's decisions (understood as emotions) has influence on subsequent decision making. We propose that effort and regret are emotions produced by previous decisions to either resist or yield to temptation, respectively. When recalled, these emotions affect an individual's preferences, in turn affecting self-control decision at a particular point in time. Our model provides a unified explanation for several empirical regularities puzzling economists and cognitive scientists. We explain non-stationary consumption paths characterized by compensatory indulgence and restraint cycles, why the amplitude of consumption cycles increases with foresight and decreases with emotional memory, and, finally, we show how unavoidable options that might show up on one's menu influence choices, consequent emotions, consumption paths, and preferences for commitment. |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:12-20&r=hpe |
| By: | Josef Falkinger |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses the discussion between economic power and the power of politics with particular focus on financial markets. After general reflections about the economic basis of power, the paper discusses in a general equilibrium framework how financial innovations can lead to risk creation and an inflation of financial products. This creates a fundamental disorder in the financial system which from an aggregate point of view can be described in a standard portfolio framework, in which higher rates of return go hand in hand with higher private risks but also with increasing externalized (social) risk and insurance illusion. Rate of return regulation is proposed as an appropriate regulatory measure. Alternatively the deficiency could be cured by admission regulations for financial products which put the burden of proof for no external (systemic) damages of a financial instrument to the issuer. |
| Keywords: | Power, financial crisis, risk-creation, inflation of financial innovations, rate of return regulation |
| JEL: | D53 G01 G18 A11 |
| Date: | 2012–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:093&r=hpe |
| By: | Francesco Fallucchi (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Elke Renner (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Martin Sefton (School of Economics, University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the role of information feedback in rent-seeking games with two different contest structures. In the stochastic contest a contestant wins the entire rent with probability equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditures; in the deterministic contest she receives a share of the rent equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditures. Information feedback has very different effects depending on the contest structure. We observe the highest rent dissipation in stochastic contests when players only get feedback on own choices and earnings. In these contests aggregate expenditures usually exceed the value of the rent. We find that giving additional feedback about rivals? choices and earnings moderates average expenditures. In contrast, in deterministic contests average expenditures converge to equilibrium levels when subjects only get feedback about own choices and earnings. In these contests additional feedback about rivals? choices and earnings has the opposite effect of raising average expenditures. |
| Keywords: | contests, rent-seeking, information, learning, imitation, experiments |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2012-12&r=hpe |
| By: | Jess Benhabib; Pengfei Wang; Yi Wen |
| Abstract: | We formalize the Keynesian insight that aggregate demand driven by sentiments can generate output fluctuations under rational expectations. When production decisions must be made un- der imperfect information about aggregate demand, optimal decisions based on sentiments can generate stochastic self-fulfilling rational expectations equilibria in standard economies without aggregate shocks, externalities, persistent informational frictions, or even any strategic comple- mentarity. Our general equilibrium model is deliberately simple, but could serve as a benchmark for more complicated equilibrium models with additional features. |
| Keywords: | Keynesian economics ; Equilibrium (Economics) |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2012-039&r=hpe |
| By: | David Dillenberger; Juan Sebastian Lleras; Philipp Sadowski; Norio Takeoka |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000583&r=hpe |