nep-hpe New Economics Papers
on History and Philosophy of Economics
Issue of 2012‒04‒03
twelve papers chosen by
Erik Thomson
University of Manitoba

  1. The Sanguine Science: Historical Contexts of Pigou's Welfare Economics By Norikazu Takami
  2. Ecological Economics and Philosophy of Science: Ontology, Epistemology, Methodology and Ideology By Clive L. Spash
  3. Corporate social responsibility: A perspective from Weberian economic sociology By Boeddeling, Jann
  4. What can the Big Five Personality Factors contribute to explain Small-Scale Economic Behavior? By Julia Muller; Christiane Schwieren
  5. Culture Languages and Economics By Victor Ginsburgh; Shlomo Weber
  6. Mark Blaug and the Economics of the Arts By Victor Ginsburgh
  7. Cooperation under Fear, Greed and Prison: the Role of Redistributive Inequality in the Evolution of Cooperation By César Andrés Mantilla
  8. The Strange Birth of Neoliberalism By William Coleman
  9. The Coevolution of Behavior and Normative Expectations. Customary Law in the Lab By Christoph Engel; Michael Kurschilgen
  10. A Dynamic Ellsberg Urn Experiment. By Lefort, Jean-Philippe; Dominiak, Adam; Dürsch, Peter
  11. Envy and Hope By Xavier Fontaine
  12. Ethique et parties prenantes. Les enjeux philosophiques By José Allouche; Olivier Charpateau

  1. By: Norikazu Takami (Institute for International Education, Doshisha University)
    Date: 2012–01
  2. By: Clive L. Spash
    Date: 2012
  3. By: Boeddeling, Jann
    Abstract: Answering the call for a new theoretical approach to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), this paper makes a suggestion from a Weberian perspective. It briefly appraises the existing research on CSR and develops key points of a new approach based on their criticism. Suggesting that CSR is a discourse about the role of the economy in society, it discusses whether a suitable new approach for the analysis of CSR can be found outside of economics and business ethics. It is argued that Max Weber's economic sociology and particularly his concept of ideal interests offer an appropriate framework. This framework is developed from Weber's theoretical writings and demonstrated to be used by him to analyze processes of change in the role of the economy in society. The paper then outlines how an analysis of CSR could be carried out building on an ideal interests-framework. It is suggested that such research would significantly advance the understanding of central, yet under-researched elements of CSR. Finally, I argue that the proposed research has the potential of contributing insights to action theoretical questions of modern economic sociology. --
    Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility,economic sociology,role of the economy in society,Max Weber,protestant ethic,ideal interests,theory of action
    Date: 2012
  4. By: Julia Muller (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Christiane Schwieren (University of Heidelberg)
    Abstract: Growing interest in using personality variables in economic research leads to the question whether personality as measured by psychology is useful to predict economic behavior. Is it reasonable to expect values on personality scales to be predictive of behavior in economic games? It is undoubted that personality can influence large-scale economic outcomes. Whether personality variables can also be used to understand micro-behavior in economic games is however less clear. We discuss reasons in favor and against this assumption and test in our own experiment, whether and which personality factors are useful in predicting behavior in the trust or investment game. We can also use the trust game to understand how personality measures fare relatively in predicting behavior when situational constraints vary in strength. This approach can help economists to better understand what to expect from the inclusion of personality variables in their models and experiments, and where further research might be useful and needed.
    Keywords: Personality; Big Five; Five Factor Model; Incentives; Experiment; Trust Game
    JEL: C72 C91 D03
    Date: 2012–03–26
  5. By: Victor Ginsburgh; Shlomo Weber
    Date: 2012–03
  6. By: Victor Ginsburgh
    Date: 2012–03
  7. By: César Andrés Mantilla
    Abstract: This work offers an analysis of cooperation dilemmas making emphasis in the role of the unequal outcomes. Increases in the benefit from leaving mutual cooperation are associated to the greed dimension, while increases in the cost from leaving mutual defection are associated to fear dimension. The manipulation of these dimensions allows defining two cooperation dilemmas derived from the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma. Using two different frameworks, classical game theory and evolutionary game theory, is shown that the magnitude and the direction of these inequalities have an effect over the decision of cooperation.
    Date: 2012–02–29
  8. By: William Coleman
    Abstract: The paper interprets the neoliberalism' of Friedman, Hayek (and others), as a partly successful doctrinal reformulation of 'historical liberalism' that certain material realities had by the mid-20th century proved solvent of. It argues that in the post-War period it was the doctrinal reformulations of political and individual freedom associated with neoliberalism that re-established the potency of ideas of 'free market and 'limited government'.
    Date: 2012–03
  9. By: Christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Michael Kurschilgen (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)
    Abstract: Customary law has been criticized from very different angles. Rational choice theorists claim that what looks like custom is nothing but self-interest. Positivists doubt that anything beyond consent assumes the force of law. In this paper, we adopt an experimental approach to test these claims. We show that the willingness to overcome a dilemma transcends self-interest. Cooperation is significantly higher in the presence of a meta-rule for the formation of customary law. Yet only if it is backed up by sanctions, law is significantly more effective than mere comity. Customary law guides behaviour into the normatively desired direction as normative expectations and behavioural patterns coevolve.
    Keywords: experiment, Public Good, Customary Law, Normativity, Crowding Outs
    JEL: H41 D63 C91 D62 K10 D03 C14
    Date: 2011–12
  10. By: Lefort, Jean-Philippe; Dominiak, Adam; Dürsch, Peter
    Abstract: Two rationality arguments are used to justify the link between conditional and unconditional preferences in decision theory : dynamic consistency and consequentialism. Dynamic consistency requires that ex ante contingent choices are respected by up dated preferences. Consequentialism states that only those outcomes which are still possible can matter for up dated preferences. We test the descriptive validity of these rationality arguments with a dynamic version of Ellsberg's three color experiment and that subjects act more often in line with consequentialism than with dynamic consistency.
    Keywords: experiment; consequentialism; dynamic consistency; updating; ambiguity; Non expected utility preferences;
    JEL: D81 C91
    Date: 2012–01
  11. By: Xavier Fontaine (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris)
    Abstract: Work in Progress
    Date: 2011–08–25
  12. By: José Allouche (GREGOR - Groupe de Recherche en Gestion des Organisations - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Paris - Université Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne); Olivier Charpateau (DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - CNRS : UMR7088 - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine)
    Abstract: Le terme d'éthique est devenu au fil des vingt dernières années un mot commun, dont le sens dépend de son utilisateur et régulièrement mobilisé dans le champ du management. Il est particulièrement prisé pour parler du comportement des entreprises vis-à-vis de ses partenaires et de ses salariés. La séparation entre propriété et décision a servi de point de départ à une analyse qui oscille entre juridisme et économisme pour définir les logiques de responsabilité de et dans l'entreprise. La théorie des parties prenantes s'est construite alors sur le constat que l'entreprise ne peut se limiter à rendre des comptes aux seuls actionnaires en maximisant le profit redistribué. La mise en perspective des textes fondamentaux sur les parties prenantes avec les courants philosophiques portant sur l'éthique permet l'émergence de plusieurs constats et questionnements.
    Keywords: éthique - parties prenantes - propriété - responsabilité sociale - utilitarisme - valeurs
    Date: 2012

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