nep-hpe New Economics Papers
on History and Philosophy of Economics
Issue of 2012‒02‒08
four papers chosen by
Erik Thomson
University of Manitoba

  1. Un aperçu historique de l’économie expérimentale : des origines aux évolutions récentes By Daniel Serra
  2. The prenucleolus for games with communication structures By Khmelnitskaya, Anna B.; Sudhölter, Peter
  3. Learning, Teaching, and Turn Taking in the Repeated Assignment Game By Timothy N. Cason; Sau-Him Paul Lau; Vai-Lam Mui
  4. Peer Effects and Social Preferences in Voluntary Cooperation By Thöni, Christian; Gächter, Simon

  1. By: Daniel Serra
    Abstract: L’économie a longtemps été considérée comme une science non expérimentale. En quelques décennies seulement, le paysage de la recherche économique s’est radicalement transformé : la méthode expérimentale occupe désormais une place reconnue dans la boîte à outils de l’économiste. Une histoire complète et cohérente de l’économie expérimentale reste à écrire. L’article vise simplement à en donner un aperçu qui respecte la chronologie, mentionne les moments forts de son évolution et identifie les pionniers de la discipline en même temps que les représentants des principaux programmes de recherche qui l’innervent. Il propose de fragmenter artificiellement l’histoire de l’économie expérimentale en quatre grandes étapes aux frontières peu précises qualifiées ainsi : (i) l’émergence : de la fin de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale au tout début des années 1960 (ii) un lent démarrage : les décennies 1960 et 1970 (iii) le décollage : les années 1980 (iv) la maturité : depuis le milieu de la décennie 1990.
    Date: 2012–01
  2. By: Khmelnitskaya, Anna B. (Faculty of Applied Mathematics); Sudhölter, Peter (Department of Business and Economics)
    Abstract: t is well-known that the prenucleolus on the class of TU games is characterized by singlevaluedness, covariance under strategic equivalence, anonymity, and the reduced game property. We show that the prenucleolus on the class of TU games restricted to the connected coalitions with respect to communication structures may be characterized by the same axioms and a stronger version of independence of non-connected coalitions requiring that the solution does not depend on the worth of any non-connected coalition. Similarly as in the classical case, it turns out that each of the five axioms is logically independent of the remaining axioms and that an infinite universe of potential players is necessary. Moreover, a suitable definition and characterization of a prekernel for games with communication structures is presented.
    Keywords: TU game; solution concept; communication and conference structure; nucleolus
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2011–12–10
  3. By: Timothy N. Cason; Sau-Him Paul Lau; Vai-Lam Mui
    Abstract: History-dependent strategies are often used to support cooperation in repeated game models. Using the indefinitely repeated common-pool resource assignment game and a perfect stranger experimental design, this paper reports novel evidence that players who have successfully used an efficiency-enhancing turn-taking strategy will teach other players in subsequent supergames to adopt this strategy. We find that subjects engage in turn taking frequently in both the Low Conflict and the High Conflict treatments. Prior experience with turn taking significantly increases turn taking in both treatments. Moreover, successful turn taking often involves fast learning, and individuals with turn taking experience are more likely to be teachers than inexperienced individuals. The comparative statics results show that teaching in such an environment also responds to incentives, since teaching is empirically more frequent in the Low Conflict treatment with higher benefits and lower costs.
    Keywords: Learning, Teaching, Assignment Game, Laboratory Experiment, Repeated Games, Turn Taking, Common-Pool Resources
    JEL: C73 C91
    Date: 2011–12
  4. By: Thöni, Christian (University of St. Gallen); Gächter, Simon (University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: Substantial evidence suggests the behavioral relevance of social preferences and also the importance of social influence effects ("peer effects"). Yet, little is known about how peer effects and social preferences are related. In a three-person gift-exchange experiment we find causal evidence for peer effects in voluntary cooperation: agents' efforts are positively related despite the absence of material payoff interdependencies. We confront this result with major theories of social preferences which predict that efforts are unrelated, or negatively related. Some theories allow for positively-related efforts but cannot explain most observations. Conformism, norm following and considerations of social esteem are candidate explanations.
    Keywords: social preferences, voluntary cooperation, peer effects, reflection problem, gift exchange, conformism, social norms, social esteem
    JEL: C92 D03
    Date: 2012–01

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