nep-hpe New Economics Papers
on History and Philosophy of Economics
Issue of 2011‒07‒27
six papers chosen by
Erik Thomson
University of Manitoba

  1. The Harmonic Theory; A mathematical framework to build intelligent contextual and adaptive computing, cognition and sensory system By Nick Mehrdad Loghmani
  2. Epistemic peerage, disagreement, and belief revision By Amir Konigsberg
  3. On the existence of Berge's strong equilibrium. By Messaoud Deghdak; Monique Florenzano
  4. A Continuous Time Approach for the Asymptotic Value in Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games By Pierre Cardaliaguet; Rida Laraki; Sylvain Sorin
  5. Does the Kind of Bond Matter? The Case of Food Bank Volunteer By Agostinho, Denise; Arminda, Maria; Finisterra, do Paço
  6. Keynesian Economics After All By A. Johansen; I. Simonsen

  1. By: Nick Mehrdad Loghmani
    Abstract: Harmonic theory provides a mathematical framework to describe the structure, behavior, evolution and emergence of harmonic systems. A harmonic system is context aware, contains elements that manifest characteristics either collaboratively or independently according to system's expression and can interact with its environment. This theory provides a fresh way to analyze emergence and collaboration of "ad-hoc" and complex systems.
    Date: 2011–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1107.4057&r=hpe
  2. By: Amir Konigsberg
    Abstract: Recent debates have centred on the normative influence epistemic peerage should have on the regulation of beliefs in cases of disagreement. A dominant position in this debate is that acknowledging an epistemic peer's possession of a belief contrary to one's own ought, in itself, to lead to the revision of one's doxastic commitments. In what follows I aim to challenge and rethink the notion of peerage underlying the disagreement debate and thus reveal that the traditional view of peerage rests upon an idealized conception of similarly between disagreeing parities, and thus to show that the normative constraints derived from it are equally idealized. Constructively, I will suggest a commonsensical solution to the disagreement problem based on what I propose as a soft, more moderate conception of peerage.
    Date: 2011–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp583&r=hpe
  3. By: Messaoud Deghdak (Laboratoire de Mathématiques Appliquées et Modélisation - Université de Mentouri); Monique Florenzano (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics)
    Abstract: In this paper, we establish the existence of Berge's strong equilibrium for games with n persons in infinite dimensional strategy spaces in the case where the payoff function of each player is quasi-concave. Moreover, we study the continuity of Berge's strong equilibrium correspondence and prove that most of Berge's strong games are essential.
    Keywords: Nash equilibrium, strong Berge equilibrium, fixed point, essential games.
    Date: 2011–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11039&r=hpe
  4. By: Pierre Cardaliaguet (CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - CNRS : UMR7534 - Université Paris Dauphine - Paris IX); Rida Laraki (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X); Sylvain Sorin (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X, Université Pierre et Marie curie - Combinatoire et Optimisation IMJ, CNRS 7586)
    Abstract: We consider the asymptotic value of two person zero sum repeated games with general evaluations of the stream of stage payoffs. We show existence for incomplete information games, splitting games and absorbing games. The technique of proof consists in embedding the discrete repeated game into a continuous time one and to use viscosity solution tools.
    Date: 2011–07–19
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00609476&r=hpe
  5. By: Agostinho, Denise; Arminda, Maria; Finisterra, do Paço
    Abstract: The value of volunteers to society is unquestionable. Understanding volunteer's motivations has been regularly recognised by researchers and administrators as a valuable component of volunteer's management. However, why people volunteer remains a studied but unresolved question. Indeed, individuals seem to volunteer their self for many different reasons, some of which may be based on their social situation, age or personal needs. In this study, and taking as unit of analysis the food bank volunteer, it was observed that the main differences between ‘Permanent' and ‘Occasional' volunteers are variables as age, ‘Benefits for own well-being and ‘Being volunteer in other institution'.
    Keywords: Volunteer; Volunteering; Motivations; Food Bank
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nsu:apasro:309&r=hpe
  6. By: A. Johansen; I. Simonsen
    Abstract: It is demonstrated that the US economy has on the long-term in reality been governed by the Keynesian approach to economics independent of the current official economical policy. This is done by calculating the two-point correlation function between the fluctuations of the DJIA and the US public debt. We find that the origin of this condition is mainly related to the wars that the USA has fought during the time period investigated. Wars mean a large influx of public money into the economy, thus as a consequence creating a significant economical upturn in the DJIA. A reason for this straight-cut result of our analysis, is that very few wars have been fought on US-territory and those that have, were in the 18th century, when the partial destruction of cities, factories, railways and so on, was more limited and with less effect on the over-all economy.
    Date: 2011–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1107.3095&r=hpe

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